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The candidate has two major linked interests. One is to reconcile competing explanations 
of ethnicity, and the other is to explore the factors underlying ethnicity in the light of a 
case study of the rise and decline of ethnic mobilisation among white Afrikaners in South 
Africa. For many observers the recent apparent "decomposition" of Afrikaner nationalist 
mobilisation has been surprising, and !he factors associated with this trend were expected 
to contain insights relevant to the theoretical debate. 
The first part of the thesis is a review of key aspects of literature which offers alternative 
explanations of ethnic attachments and mobilisation. It commences with a theme-setting 
example of a reconciliation of alternative viewpoints. At the end of the literature review a 
series of propositions is offered, suggesting the utility of an integration of alternative 
perspectives. 
The case study of Afrikaner ethnic mobilisation commences with a historical overview of 
the emergence of Afrikaner ethnic nationalism, from the early colonial settlement up to the 
lV 
present. Thereafter a wide range of empirical, survey-based evidence 1s presented, 
including exploratory factor analyses, covering patterns in the cultural, racial, socio-
economic and political attitudes of Afrikaners, comparing their responses with those of 
other South Africans. An account of recent political change and the responses of 
Afrikaners to the events is given. 
In the final chapter conclusions drawn from the evidence are presented as further 
propositions in a broader theoretical context. The fragmentation of Afrikaner ethnic 
nationalism is found to be associated with the bureaucratization of ethnicity during the 
period of apartheid rule, ambivalence on group boundaries, the usurpation of cultural 
identity by race, and a breakdown of internal co-ordination processes which ethnic 
mobilisation appears to require. 
At the same time a core of ethnic commitment, substantially independent of its material 
and political utility, is found to persist, surrounded by a wider compound of racial, cultural 
and political consciousness. Alternative scenarios of probable future developments are 
tentatively offered. 
The analysis appears to support the initial argument that etlmic mobilisation involves full 
combinations of the.processes which competing theories usually pit against one another. 
The process of ethnic mobilisation involves a variable incorporation of elements of class, · 
group status and honour and political activation, in which identity commitment, co-
ordinating agencies and ethnic boundary-construction interact as defining and integrating 
elements. 
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"I was told that the privileged and the people for med two nations. " 
Benjamin Disraeli, Sybil. 1845 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: 
THE ORIENTATION, SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THIS ANALYSIS 
1.1 THE ORIENTATION, WITH GELLNER AS ILLUSTRATION 
This dissertation has been approached as a case study on ethnicity within a particular 
society, and with a special emphasis on a particular group. the \vhite Afrikaners, but with 
the purpose of drawing conclusions that may be of wider and more general theoretical 
relevance to the topic. Very simply and briefly, the case study will be broadly focused on 
the following general question: 
"what are the features and factors, both within the ethnic phenomenon itse(f," or 
operating on it fi-om forces or factors external to it. ·which sustain or weaken 
ethnic group coherence_. mobilisation and group-based action?" 
Of the two foci of interest, the second is arguably the most interesting, because there are 
fewer studies of group decomposition than there are studies of ethnic persistence and group 
mobilisation. 
There are any number of societies in which such a case study could quite profitably have 
been undertaken, but since this author knows the South African situation best, the choice of 
society was obvious. Furthermore, the Afrikaners in South Africa may constitute a very 
interesting example of a formerly cohesive and powerfully mobilised ethnic group which, 
contrary to most expectations, has undergone political fragmentation and a loss of group 
coherence under the impact of sweeping political changes in the wider society. It therefore 
offers itself for study as a signal case of ethnic group "demobilisation". 
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But South Africa was not necessarily the easiest choice. This is a society in which the topic 
of ethnicity has become very politicised, and very understandably so, because the policy of 
apartheid was driven by interests which were structured and regulated in ethnic and racial 
terms. 
In the era of apartheid, the way in which ethnicity was approached by writers and 
commentators was often seen as somehow associated with a particular political position in 
relation to apartheid and in relation to the struggle against apartheid. Crudely stated, 
authors who took ethnicity or ethnic commitments very seriously were often seen as 
signalling a tolerance of the apartheid order. Alternatively they were sometimes seen as 
being intent upon, or at least at risk of giving apartheid a seniblance of legitimacy by 
associating it with universal phenomena. The apartheid government quite substantially 
stimulated this discomfort with ethnic studies by secretly sponsoring an entire international 
journal devoted to the study of ethnicity, entitled Plural Societies, as well as sundry other, 
carefully disguised ideological products, all of which emerged in disclosures which are 
referred to as the "Information Scandal of 1978". 1 
Donald Horowitz's comment about the climate in the study of ethnicity in general has been 
magnified in the South African situation: 
"The study of ethnic conflict has often been a grudging concession to something 
distasteful, largely because, especially in the West, ethnic affiliations have been in 
Zlisrepule, for deep ideological reasons ... and the firs! re.sponse to the rising tide of 
ethnic conflict was to treat it as an epip'henomenon. "(Horowitz, 1985: 13) 
Even today, strands of tension exist among many academics and intellectuals around the 
topic of ethnicity, although positions have softened very considerably. 
1 This scandal involved the unauthorised use of state fund by the Department of Information. on a variety of 
forms of propaganda. A newspaper, a five-volume series on human rights and freedoms and other products, as 
well as the journal referred to. Many academics contributed unwitti11gly. The cabinet minister involved 
eventually resigned. (See South African Institute of Race Relations, Survey oj'Race Relations, 1978.) 
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In view of the discomfort which existed and which still exists to some degree, many people 
reading this dissertation within the context of political and academic discourse in South 
Africa, are bound to ask the early question of where the analysis "stands" in relation to the 
distinctions set out very briefly above. At one level any such question can be answered very 
briefly. This author fully accepts that ethnic cleavages and concepts relating to ethnicity 
and culture were used deliberately as part of the rationalisations disguising and supporting 
material and power interests within the previous political structure of engineered racial 
inequality in South Africa. But a fuller response can also be given. 
The dissertation has no single specific mission -- it is not written to convince the reader that 
some schools o°f thought are right or wrong, or that some compelling basic truth remains to 
be uncovered. One of its major conclusions can be anticipated. which is that aside from a 
few highly ideologically inspired or politically instrumental viewpoints. most serious . 
students of ethnicity have all been at least partiallv rie.ht. even when thev were vehemently 
disa2:reeing with one another. If it has a mission it is to reconcile viewpoints which have 
created academic and intellectual antagonisms. In this spirit it will attempt to endorse the 
view of a rather quiet and often overlooked British sociologist of great wisdom and . 
intellectual judgement W.G. Runciman, expressed in a chapter on the emergence of 
modern sociology called "A catalogue of errors" (Runciman. 1998: chapter 3). 
Runciman observes much evidence in sociology of 
"The selfdefeating consequence of trying to banish rnther ·than incorporate 
alternative approaches ... "-(page 54) 
He sees in this at least part of the answer to his question: 
"if sociology is. as old as Herodotus and Aristotle -- to say nothing of Herodotus's 
contemporary ... Confucius -- you may well ,vonder why it has token so long to get 
asfar as it has." (page 46) 
ln this spirit of reconciliation this author accepts as points of departure, that ethnic 
commitment or mobilisation is not an inevitable consequence of differences in culture or 
origin. that frequently the cultural or other differences to which ethnic commitments relate 
are trivial in relation to the scope which ethnic mobilisation can assume. and that, more 
4 
often than not, it is substantially the outcome of processes which serve to advance the 
interests of some group or another and particularly their elites. 
At the same time, however, it seems to this author to be equally true that ethnicity has 
considerably more substance than being simply a form which the rationalisation or 
manipulation of interests takes. Aside from arguments which will be adduced in the 
dissertation, this substance is suggested by the ubiquity of its manifestation, and the 
similarities of ethnic expression at different times and in different places. This added 
significance is not necessarily derived from any "natural" force with all the imperatives 
\ 
which are assumed to flow from it. What this added feature might be has to be carefully 
and critical'ly but dispassionately uncovered, because it is vitally important in 
understanding the mobilising power and propensity for social and political commitment 
with wh~ch ethnicity is very often, but not inevitably, associated. As the guiding question in 
the beginning of this introduction would suggest, the exploration of the nature of the 
substance will benefit particularly from understanding instances where ethnicity dissipates 
under the impact of surrounding social forces -- in a sense a form of" null hypothesis". 
In order to illustrate·the orientation of this analysis. it is useful at this early stage to refer to 
an author whose approach does not close-out alternative possibilities. Reconciliatory 
positions are not absent in the literature and other authors could have been drawn in to play 
this anchor role; Donald Horowitz in particular ( 1985). The analysis by Horowitz, however, 
is very detailed and full for :he purpose. The particular author in question offers a much 
briefer review, but one which is a good illustration of the integration of factors which can 
deepen an analysis, and as such is useful as an entry point in this dissertation. The author 
referred to is Ernest Gellner, and particularly his latest review of nationalism (Gellner, 
1997, 1998). 
~~--
Gellner is not discussing ethnicity in its broadest sense.but that most muscular and formal 
sub-type of ethnicity called nationalism. His view accords with that of this author when he 
says that, when ethnicity of the type normally associated with ''high cultures" develops 
political ambitions or pretensions, nationalism is the result (page 35-36). His consideration 
5 
of nationalism covers virtually all the core issues in the study of the broader phenomenon 
of ethnicity. 
Gellner, because he has respect for the complexity of social dynamics. manages in a single 
slim book to describe and reconcile some very contrasting attributes of nationalism. In 
considering Gellner's approach it must be said at the outset that he is forthri oht in his 
b 
disapproval of nationalism. He acknowledges the work of Elie Kedourie in awakening him 
from "dogmatic slumbers" in which he assumed the "naturolness" and inevitability of 
ethnicity and nationalism (page 10). Thus awakened, Gellner is eloquent in outlining the 
I 
alternative position of the "Humanitarian internationalists. who deplore the particularism, 
exclusiveness, intolerance and brutality of nationalism ... " (page 9). and does not hesitate to 
describe nationalists as "ideological bandits" (page 42). as being "under the sway of dark 
gods·" (page 103) or to describe nationalism as being akin to a social pathology requiring 
".specific diagnosis and more .specific remedies or palliatives" (page 103 ). He entitles one 
whole chapter "The murderous virulence of nationalism" (ch. 8), and goes on to say that 
one must be "perturbed by the havoc, suffering, cruelty and injustice ofien brought by 
nationalism" (page 102). 
Morally aroused in this way, many lesser social scientists have proceeded to craft their 
observations and interpretations to support their moral outrage. but not so Gellner. His 
honesty and depth of observation moves him to admit that the roots of nationalism 
" ... are neither shallow nor despicable ... They may not be universally operative in 
all men and in all social climes ... but they are located ve,y deep indeed in the 
human condition as it is in our age. They go to the very heart of our being and our 
situation ... these roots· are both inescapable and not dishonourable." (page 12) 
In passing he hints at an even more fundamental basis to nationalism and ethnicity when he 
refers to their capacity to provide "instinctual satisfaction" and to address a "longingfor a 
grat(fj;ing, meaningful order" (page 103). 
In an analysis, which is elegant in its simplicity, he does justice to most of the competing 
claims in the literature as to the basis of ethnicity and nationalism. The core -of his 
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reconciliation of competing claims.made on behalf of nationalism is summed up in a useful 
analogy with "navel gazing": 
"some nations possess genuinely ancient navels. some have navels invented for them 
by their own nationalist propaganda, and some ore altogether navel-less." (page 
96) 
He expands this analogy after discussing Czech and Estonian nationalism by observing that 
"Some nations have navels, some achieve navels. some have navels thrust upon 
them." 
This generosity of conceptuali~ation and analysis makes room for almost the entire 
spectrum of theories of ethnicity, and as such it is refreshing and unusual. How much 
further "Yould sociology have advanced, had Karl Marx made an early acknowledgement 
that the mode of production does not define the structure and superstructure of modem 
industrial society in all respects, or if Talcott Parsons had conceded that the functional 
prerequisites of society do not alwavs or dominantly define the structure of social action, 
and that society at any given time is a reconciliation of the imperatives of self-sustaining 
order and the competition or conflict of interests? 
So Gellner argues that some ethnic and nationalist movements are rooted in a history 
stretching back to the bonds of early kinship, and are experienced in those terms (page 5), 
but he does not see this near-primordiality as inevitable. He say of ethnic culture that it is 
"both tenacious and volatile" (page 94) and says the same for nationalism, because it can be 
manufactured under the influence of calculations of interests -- the instrumental view. After 
recounting that a certain Himalayan trading community switched from a Tibeto-Buddhist 
culture to a Hindu-Nepalese language and religion, after deciding that their trading interests 
would be more favourably served under the latter. he asserts that "Cultural traits, though 
often experienced as given, can be under deliberate control" (page 2). 
At the same time he rejects the view of Kedourie (1960/1993). that nationalism is a 
shallow, utterly contingent and accidental phenomenon. and instead sees it as a necessary 
consequence or correlate of social conditions as they impact upon the needs of groups, and-
as such it is very widespread, deep and pervasive. But the deep roots are not necessarily the 
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destiny of all men (page 11 ). He therefore conceives of a difference between "nationalism- · 
prone and nationalism-resistant humanity", but acknowledges that most of mankind have 
fallen into the former camp in the period since the end of the eighteenth century (page 1 l ). 
He describes some states in which ethnicity has not been a dividin'g or activating factor as 
experiencing "blessed oblivion" or "amnesia" with regard to ethnic origins, singling out 
France as an example (page 45-6) (although signs of the resurgence of Breton and other 
identities might qualify its choice). 
Notwithstanding the prevalence of nationalism-prone humanity, he is convinced that 
constructed or instrumentally derived nationalisms, driven by extraneous social conditions, 
are more frequent than those with ancient, authentic or "primordial" roots (page 101). 
Among the social conditions he has in mind, class is the primary contender driving ethnic 
mobilisation. In the light of the many viewpoints that class is in fact the real factor and that 
cultural identity can be a disguise or surrogate for it, however. Gellner is once again 
scrupulously balanced: "Classes without ethnicity are hlind. ethnicjty without class is 
empty" (page 61). Hence he avoids pitting these two concepts against each other as so many 
others have done, and instead sees precisely their interaction as the major force behind 
modern nationalism. 
· But if nationalism is mainly a construction or instrumental outcome, it must by definition 
be an option, and Gellner is firm that it is not an inevitable option. Why then, despite this 
non-inevitability, would the forces of ethnicity be so prevalent and powerful? Gellner 
touches on a vital factor when he says that 
" ... a good way o.l recovering social cohesion is through ethnic movements. They 
can be activated and mobilised more quickly than movements based on more 
complex considerations: the marks and symbols of' ethnic membership are more 
compicuous in the modern world than any other. This may he sad. but it is a fact." 
(page 48) 
Geitner, therefore, is like a wise psychiatrist considering a patient with. from his viewpoint, 
some very unpleasant habits. He curbs his moral reservations. allowing his professionalism 
to induce a balanced understanding of the "problem". This understanding is so inclusive 
that in his final chapter he rejects various tendentious assertions of how ethnicity and 
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nationalism should be treated. He prefers a deference to the "real" rather than the "rational" 
in approaches to the issue (page 106). In an earlier work (Gellner. 1994: 45). after outlining 
his theory that ethnicity is stimulated by the forms of production and associated interests in 
modern society, he has this to say: 
"Whal can this theury offer those grappling with nationalist turhulence in the real 
world? A sense ul the need for sober realism. The appeal of cultural (ethnic) 
identity is not a delusion, excogitated by muddled romantics. disseminated by 
irre:-,ponsible extremists and used by egotistical privileged classes to befuddle the 
masses and to hide their, true interests from them. Its appeal is rooted in the real 
conditions of modern life." 
He argues that in pre-industrial societies kinship operated to allocate roles, statuses and 
rewards, but that in modem bureaucratic society, kinship has lost this function and has been 
replaced by ethnicity, which has become the principal method of identity conferment within 
the structures created by the industrial mode of production (Gellner. 1994:46). 
Against this background he argues that the emerging world of nation-states may see, or 
need to see, a shift towards supranational unity co-existing with recognised regional 
ethnicities. He takes this logic to the point of suggesting that. under ce1iain·conditions, non-
, 
territorial ethnicity can be accommodated by formal provisions for the exercise of cultural 
and group rights within over-arching political units (page 107-8). 
In Gellner we see, then, a realpolitik of ethnicity and nationalism. We also see a set of 
concepts which over-arch the often tedious arguments that ethnicity is or should be 
exclusively this or that. It may not be an exhaustively researched treatise in all respects, and 
it is at times too brief to be utterly convincing (some of his earlier works are more 
convincing), but this is refreshingly mature sociology. 
Gellner's brief review of nationalism in its modern forms so easily reconciles many, if not 
most, of the vexed issues in the study of ethnicity that it provides an excellent anchor for 
this analysis. But at the same time it leaves some gaps which this dissertation will attempt 
to address. 
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First, he does not attempt to set out in any detail why some groups "navel-gaze", to use his 
metaphor, ·and others are les_s inclined to turn to ethnicity. He argues convincingly that the 
reasons lie in the interaction between social situations and identity. but does not set out 
what combinations of factors stimulate the identity-based response. 
Second, when groups within populations in modern society are in stressed or threatened 
situations, they usually have recourse to options other than communal identity as a basis for 
their responses. Why then are ethnic or commun'al responses so frequent. His response that 
"classes without ethnicity are blind ... " is suggestive but not sufficiently informative. His 
point that ethnicity is effective in restoring social cohesion is more informative but begs for 
a more thorough exposition. His further argument. that ethnicity is most "compicuous" as a 
basis of identification and mobilisation, is problematic in the light of the intensity and 
visibility of issues of class, privilege and power in modern political economies. Gellner 
hints at even more when he claims that ethnicity is most readily and quickly mobilised, but 
this begs the question of why it is most easily mobilised among the alternative avenues for 
activism. Hence Gellner, as an analytical. reference, is hugely valuable but no doubt ·he 
himself would admit that some of his pointers can be usefully explored in greater detail. 
Third, from the opposite side of the debate as it were. he does not attempt to set out in 
detail why in some cases the identity "amnesia", that he ascribes to France. can occur. What 
types of factors can suppress or displace the communal dynamic? He suggests factors 
specific to France -- "a thousand years of history of a (on and off) strong state ... " (page 
46), but is a strong state a general disincentive for ethnic mobilisation? One might expect 
the opposite hypothesis as well, that strong centralist states can goad ethnicity into greater 
intensity and resistance to the central state. His other argument that nationalism was 
stimulated by the rise of Romanticism in central European political culture in reaction to 
the bloodless rationalism of the Enlightenment, raises the question of why in France there 
was not a similar reaction to the bloodless bureaucracy of post revolutionary France? 
Perhaps more than a strong state but an over-arching state, with high moral legitimacy or 
even ideological and symbolic hegemony, may be required. These questions are vital for an 
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understanding of the conditions under which ethnic groups may decompose or assimilate 
into other groups, and they are of singular importance to the South African case study. 
These research challenges, prefaced by Gellner, are the issues which will focus this 
dissertation. The questions stated at the beginning of this chapter and the framework 
offered by Gellner are very relevant to the responses of white Afrikaners and other cultural 
minorities in post-apartheid South Africa. Seeking answers to these questions in the South 
African situation may at the same time, therefore. offer some general answers to maJor 
questions in the debate about ethnicity and group mobilisation on a broader canvas. 
1.2 THE RELATIVE ABSENCE OF GENERAL THEORIES OF ETHNIC 
MO BILI SA TION AND DEMOBILISATION 
The questions ansmg from Gellner's review will be explored in the context of ethnic 
mobilisation or its absence, or ethnic demobilisation. in societies in which cultural 
differentiation exists. There is perhaps less literature to guide this task than that which 
exists at other levels in the study of ethnicity. 
The literature on ethnicity is very rich in description and interpretation. There are three very 
well-elaborated alternative theories on the driving force behind ethnic phenomena, which 
are normally referred to as the "primordialist". the "instrumentalist" and the 
"constructivist" paradigms, and many more flexible nuances around and between them. 
These are fully set out in chapter 2. Empirical or interpretive studies throughout the world 
by political scientists, historians, anthropologists and sociologists have produced a massive 
record of forms of expression and contextual circumstances of ethnicity in a variety of 
cultures and political systems. It is difficult, therefore, to add meaningfully to this 
storehouse of information and insights. 
What strikes one, however, is how relatively little general systematic work has been done 
in attempting to understand the conditions under which ethnic mobilisation, open ethnic 
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protest, dissent or conflict are likely to occur, and equally why they frequently do not occur 
or cease to occur. Many people have taken great trouble to understand and explain ethnic 
protests or rebellions with specific accounts of the events in the build-up of forces after the 
event, but there are fewer texts which can provide guidance. for example, on whether or not 
ethnic dissent will emerge in particular situations in a society and what factors might have 
to be present both external and internal to the ethnic process itself: to precipitate a 
challenge to an over-arching authority in the particular political system. 
Donald Horowitz, one of the authors who is an exception to the typification of research 
given above, in the sense that he has undertaken extensive comparative work and made 
general propositions relating to ethnic conflict, comments on this apparent lacuna: 
"As the rediscovery of' ethnicity has proceeded apoce. so hos the availability ol 
information about it. What has emerged is a plethora of more or less parochial 
material on ethnic conflict in scores ol countries. Whot hos not yet emerged is a 
comprehensive set of' generalisations that fits the material und into which new 
material can be .fitted ... There is, in the main, tao much know/edp:e and not enough 
understanding, loo much evidence chasing afier loo few categories." (Horowitz, 
1985: xi). 
Horowitz wrote this observation some thirteen years ago. and the paucity of applicable 
material still exists as far as this author has been able to determine. Robin Williams has 
pointed to the difficulties posed in this regard by a relative lack of adequate and comparable 
data-sets, by problems in developing comparative indicators and to the complex interplay 
between ethnic and socio-economic phenomena (Robi!1 Williams. 1994: 73). 
Chapter 3 will deal with various studies and propositions relating to ethnic action, reaction· 
and mobilisation. 
While of considerable utility to this analysis, particularly to the extent to which they 
explain particular ethnic conflicts, these very focused analyses. however. frequently relate 
to conflicts which have assumed particular forms in certain types of economies. They are 
also analyses of a type which assume that particular interests underlie or stimulate ethnic 
action or inter-group antagonisms. Such interests, and even conflicts of interests, may exist 
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with or without open protest, mobilisation and dissent. and where they coincide with 
cultural differences, they certainly do not necessarily or automatically result in ethnic 
mobilisation. The focus of this analysis, therefore, will be on why such factors will 
sometimes produce ethnic mobilisation or conflict, and why in other cases they will fail to 
do so, on the basis of insights drawn from the South African case. 
1.3 AN INITIAL DEFINITION OF ETHNICITY, AND FURTHER TERMINO-
LOGICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE 
PHENOMENON 
The Collins Dictionary of' Sociology provides a starting point in the approach to the topic. 
The Collins dictionary defines an ethnic group as: 
"A group of people sharing an identity which arises ji-0111 u collective sense of a 
distinctive history. Ethnic groups possess their own culture. customs, norms. beliefs 
and traditions. There is usually a common language: houndary maintenance is 
observed between members .... Typically they ore trnns-generational and 
biologically selfperpetuating . .. (but) not all ethnic groups are endogamous, 
however, and membership may be acquired through nwrrioge or other socially 
approved routes." (Jary and Jary, 1991: 202.203) 
Robin Williams (1994: 53) provides another clear and simple enough statement: 
"Collectivities defined by birth and cultural or physical distinctiveness are ethnies --
which may or may not be ranked, and may or may not he internally stratified." 
Williams' addition is useful because he reminds us that ethnic groups need not be instances 
of total commonality and homogeneity, and he also reminds us that ethnic groups are not 
always located on the same level next to each other in over-arching societies and that there 
can be quite sharp differences in the collective status of ethnic groups. These differentiating 
factors within ethnicity are of cardinal importance, as later discussion following Donald 
Horowitz (1985) will show. 
The discussion offered by the Collins dictionary elaborates on the first definition under the 
heading of ethnicity. by adding that the shared characteristics of the ethnic group may be 
I 
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actual or perceived, that ethnicity can incorporate racial distinctions. but that strictly racial 
characteristics are not necessarily or even usually a feature of ethnic criteria. 
One notes that Williams, by referring to physical differences. includes race under the rubric 
of ethnicity. Many definitions do not encompass racial categories. but as will be argued 
later as well, it is appropriate to include some types of racial identities as elements of 
ethnicity. Here one must make an obvious distinction between racial identity and racism --
the latter is a different topic and the "groups" created in the process can be stereotypes 
imposed on people. Racial identity, on the other hand. can be a component of ethnicity and 
it can be a variant of ethnicity. If race were merely a matter of pigmentation, hair texture 
and sundry other differences in typical appearance. it would be singularly trivial as a social 
marker. Race categories, however, sometimes in response to racism. can also be self-
conscious identities, and can become a matter of pride. of disparagement, a basis for 
mobilisation and vexed policy debate, precisely because race can acquire the symbolic and 
emotional content which characterises other ethnic identities. Many examples exist of just 
race. as such, are an absurd basis for any distinctiveness of a relevant social· kind, their 
associations, or correlates. as with lifestyles, values. sense of common ancestry, accents and 
how trivial or minute some ethnic markers can be, and although the physical differences of I 
the like, are precisely the components of typical ethnic identity. As Horowitz puts it 
"It is not the attribute that makes the group. but the group and group differences 
that make the attribute important." (Horowitz, 1985:50) 
If race has acquired importance in ethnic differentiation, it has to be taken seriously as an 
ethnic marker. In an analysis focused on South African society it is particularly important 
not to exclude racial identity from the analysis, as it is almost certainly a factor which 
interacts with ethnic identity in complex and intimate ways. 
The discussion in the Collins dictionary referred to above also makes the point that not only 
culture and lifestyle, but religion can be a component of ethnicity. Religion can add a 
particular quality to ethnic commitments which will be discussed in due course. Where 
ethnicity is associated with political goals and claims, and where territory is at stake, then 
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the form it takes is that of nationalism, which for present purposes will be regarded as a 
sub-type of the more general phenomenon of ethnicity. 
As the definition would suggest, the term "ethnic" is usually seen as being synonymous 
with that of a "people", or "volk" as it would be termed in Germanic languages. The 
concept of a "people" is both powerful in its connotations and very broad. What makes the 
concept of a volk or a "people" useful, is that it is clearly more intimate in its social content 
than the modern Western concept of a "nation" -- a constitutional and legal category, 
synonymous with the concept of a state (Ra'anan, 1991: 3-32) 1.). Since ethnicity is usually 
associated with differences in culture and identity within states. the notion of a "people" is 
what ethnicity is all about. This notion of "peoplehood" is usually formulated within the 
group interaction in a historical context -- a context which might emphasise either common 
biological origin or ties of blood, or a historical phase within which the group acquired 
defining characteristics. The origins or the defining characteristics may be objective 
realities or they may be constructions which have emerged over time -- the "defining myth" 
of the group. The essential feature would be a sense of affinity and association with that 
defining myth. 
The term "communal" identity or identification can also be used in addition to the term 
etlmic identity. Communal identity can be taken to refer to forms of social identification 
which are somewhat wider than ethnic identity. The definition of ethnicity offered above 
does cover religious chara-:teristics, but it is conceivable for there to be even wider 
inclusion, and the term communal identity may serve this purpose. Schermerhorn (1970: 
159) explains: 
"The term "communal" has come into general use in Asiun regions to denote 
collectivities ol religious, linguistic, national or caste nature, defined as a 
homogeneous whole and exerting their puwer as a unit in political affairs." 
One might add to the inclusion under the word communal. the category of region or locality 




Ethnic identities are notoriously subtle. The notion of ethnic or communal "markers" --
empirical indices -- which has proved to be very useful in many kinds of analyses of the 
phenomenon, cannot necessarily encompass all the criteria which enter into the group 
content and boundaries involved. Michael Moerman. for example. who conducted 
fieldwork among the Lue of Thailand, found that a powerful sense of "Lueness" was not 
necessarily consonant with objective cultural traits. He concluded that 
"Someone is Lue by virtue of believing and colling himself Lue and acting in ways 
which validate his Lueness." (Moerman, 1965: 1219) 
Erikson concludes that 
" ... cultural difference between two groups is not the decisivejeature a/ethnicity ... 
they must entertain ideas of each other os heing culturul~y different from 
themselves." (Thomas Erikson, 1993: 1 l) 
Erikson is also pointing out, therefore, that the definition is more frequently than not 
mutual, and that an ethnic definition is in part a self-definition but also involves being so 
defined by others. Erikson is also making the consequential and vital point that for an 
ethnic identity to exist or to have a social salience, groups must have a minimum of contact 
with each other. Without inter-ethnic interaction, any real or imagined cultural differences 
or distinctiveness is completely irrelevant, both in the community itself and for social and 
political analysis. 
Roosens (1989: 12) underlines this when he observes that the Flemish in Brussels, who are 
exposed to French every day, are much more likely to become self-consciously Flemish 
than their ethnic brothers and sisters in isolated rural areas in Flanders which are 
exclusively Flemish-speaking. 
The authors quoted immediately above and many others may dislodge the concept of 
identity from objective markers, but they all tend to retain the notion of particular in-group 
assumptions about their more-or-less unique ethnic· identity. Erikson. in similar vein to 
many other authors. argues that: 
" ... ethnic groups tend to have myths of common origin ond they nearly always have 
ideologies encouraging endogamy, which may be of highly varying practical 
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importance ... In this way [ethnicity] has a poli1ical and organisational aspect as 
well as a .~ymbolic one." (Erikson, 1993: 12) 
Manning Nash ( 1988) has proposed that the metaphors of bed. blood and cult are essential 
to ethnicity. A group of soccer fans, stamp collectors or opera-lovers may have an intense 
self-identification but they cannot be an ethnic group. ln terms of this view ethnicity 
implies some traits, or imagined traits, in common which cannot be changed. are perceived 
to be unchangeable. or can only be changed with great difficulty. requiring at least some 
kind of "rites of passage" or ritual conversion. These views would suggest that a class 
cannot be an ethnic group, no matter how mobilised, cohesive or conscious of its identity it 
might be -- it cannot have the connotations of blood. bed and cult. 
In other words, even those definitions of ethnicity which reject the necessity of there being 
objectively-based factors in the concept -- one part of the core primordial position -- and 
fully acknowledge all the manifest fluidity in the concept. retain the view that when one is 
talking about ethnicity, one is dealing with beliefs of descent. common ancestry and some 
kind of constructed concept of biological or cultural uniqueness. 
To revert for a moment to the other variants of "communal" identity, what would 
theoretically distinguish religious identity from that of an ethnic group is the nature of the 
enduring defining myth or feature of group identity. Hence a confessional or religious 
group, instead of developing or holding a definition based on common ancestry or 
biological inter-relatedness, would have a transcendent myth of a special kind of 
relatedness to God, a special calling or some other supernatural identity or concept. In the 
case of peoples who practice ancestor worship, the ethnic and the confessional group 
converge, since the ancestors define both types of inter-relatedness. 
In practice, however. transcendent and ancestral myths often run together and it is often 
difficult to disentangle the religious from the ethnic identity. This may be the case in 
Northern Ireland. for example, where many Protestants trace their ancestry to Scottish 
settler communities and the Catholics trace theirs back to an indigenous Irish heritage. 
I 
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Notwithstanding the difficulty of disentangling religion from ethnic identity where the two 
converge, George de Vos provides an interesting conceptual schema in which he makes a 
distinction between religious and ethnic identity as alternative basic forms of social 
identity. In terms of his schema the former are ''.future orientated" in the sense that they are 
intended as vehicles for an escape from a more constrained or frustrating present, towards a 
new identity, while the latter, ethnic identity, is "past" oriented. seeking to affirm an 
identity with a real or imagined historical condition. This distinction is important because 
the future orientation may lower the salience of ethnic ties. but de Vos does point out that 
the two may be mutually supportive as escapes from a constrained present (de Vos. George, 
1995:ch 1.) 
It follows from the foregoing, and in anticipation of observations in the next chapter, th~ 
once an ethnic identity has crystallised, it can and often does become a receptacle or vessel 
to which instrumental interests can be added or within which other non-ethnic interests can 
cohere. Indeed such extraneous interests can conceivably strengthen or even encourage th~ 
crystallisation and coherence of the particular identity. Hence an ethnic group can develop 
competitive material and power interests, and in the case of ethno-nationalist movements, 
such interests would amount to a fully blown geo-political and constitutional agenda. 
The acceptance of ethnicity as the product of a process of interaction in which an identity 
may even be created, raises the question of its generic status. Does it have a consistent 
underpinning? Is there some aspect or level of ethnic attachment which is always available 
to be evoked, which might contribute to its significance for social action? While descriptive 
definitions of ethnicity are reasonably straightforward, definitions which seek to identify 
the layers of the dynamic underlying ethnicity have to be more complex. These questions 
are vital to the understanding of the persistence or otherwise of the phenomenon, and will 
have to be addressed at some length in the next chapter. 
l.4 THE SOUTH AFRICAN CASE STUDY 
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In chapter 3, the author Ted Robert Gurr is quoted as saying that many general comparative 
analyses suffer from explanatory weakness because they lack the "fine-grained" evidence 
which can enhance the precision of generalisations (Gurr. 1993: 189). A case study of a 
society, in which all the major factors which one might assume to be involved in ethnic 
action are present, can offer the opportunity of bringing to bear the more detailed evidence 
to which Gurr refers. 
South Africa today seems a good place to begin to look more carefi..dly at the more detailed 
and finely textured conditions under which ethnic dissent may arise. And within South 
Africa, the Afrikaners are an excellent example on which to focus major attention in such 
an exploration. As already indicated, this is particularly so because recent signs of group 
L "clecomposition" among Afrikaners pose very challenging questions about the ways in which ethnicity responds to over-arching political and social forces. 
Afrikaners, here referring particularly to white Afrikaans-speakers. certainly were a 
reasonably well-established and consciously self-defined category of people, with a history 
of ethnic articulation and mobilisation. At the time of South Africa's transition from 
minority rule to an open democracy from 1989 onwards. tbe fear was often expressed, or 
the prediction made, that Afrikaners, until then in a position of supreme power as a 
language and racial group, would resist the process and attempt to reassert their power 
position. There were indeed prominent signs that this would occur. seen in far right wing 
attempts to destabilise the early "Codesa" negotiations. But the nascent instability subsided 
after prompt state action, and it seemed to be based more on naivety and hysteria than on 
determined organisation and realistic strategy (see final chapters). Following the transition 
to open democracy Afrikaner ethnic power has been virtually eclipsed. In contrast, other 
~ ethnic minorities in South Africa, the traditional Zulus in particular. bave largely 
maintained their ethnic coherence. An assessment of the factors associated with these 
divergent trends can contribute significantly to our understanding of the ethnic dynamic. 
It should be noted that in the rest of this dissertation. when the term Afrikaners is used. it 
will refer to white or caucasian Afrikaans-speakers. Where Afrikaans-speakers of mixed 
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blood are included, this will be specified or else the term used will be "Afi·ikaans-.<,peakers". 
There is no disguised racial motive in this distinction; it is made simply because the 
historical ethnic solidarity among Afrikaners has largely been limited to the white segment 
of the language group. 
Afrikaans-speakers, both white. and those of mixed blood. in 1996 comprised about 4, 13 
million adults of 15 years and older out of a total adult population of some 26,8 million; 
roughly 15 per cent. Afrikaans-speakers are the second largest language group after Zulu-
speakers, who comprise over 20 per cent of the adult population (Statistics SA, 1998). 
According to the 1996 census, the white "Afi·ikaner" ethnic group, however, amounts to 
some 7,4 per cent of the total adult population of 15 years and older. or 1.97 million people. 
Among adults they are outnumbered by Zulu-speakers. Xhosa-speakers and by English 
speakers of all races, but they outnumber white English-speakers by about 1.6 to l .2 
Afrikaners display considerable internal differentiatio11 i11 Jifestyles and socio-economic 
circumstances, and, as will be demonstrated in later chapters. also as regards degree of 
ethnic commitment. In the years of the rise of Afrikaans nationalism. and particularly from 
the nineteen thirties onward, a very large and eventually dominant "core" group emerged 
within white Afrikaans-speakers, self-defined in terms of allegiance to the Nationalist, later 
National, Party and of membership of one of the three Afrikaans-language Reformed 
churches (Giliomee, 1979: 104-127). 
This ethnic core has since become somewhat diffuse with the growth of Afrikaans 
membership of Evangelical churches and the Presbyterian church and by virtue of splits 
which occurred in the National Party in 1969 and 1982, and considerable subsequent 
fragmentation. The diffusion of the political core of Afrikaner nationalism was also 
accompanied by an increase in support for the National Party among white English-
speakers. 
2 Consultations by a population committee of the National Economic Development and Labour Council 
(NED LAC) during 1998 reflected a widespread view among South African demographers that the 1996 
census undercounted whites by between 300 000 and 700 000 people. The white Afrikaner group may well be 
larger than the figures given above. · 
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Unlike many minorities elsewhere in the world, Afrikaners have no region of 
concentration. and hence no "home" territory, being widely dispersed all over South Africa. 
In all other respects, however, they are more than merely a language group. Despite 
political and economic divisions, Afrikaners have the following distinctiveness based on 
four superimposed criteria for ethnic categorisation. namely language. racial composition 
(see earlier comments on race as a possible ethnic feature). a sense of common origin and a 
broad concentration of membership of Calvinist {Reformed) churches. Taken singly, these 
criteria are certainly not distinctive; indeed they could be argued to create the possibility of 
bonds of association with other groups in South Africa. In combination they are more 
distinctive, but even so, as objective features they are not necessarily a conclusive basis for 
a distinctive ethnic identity. As the earlier reference to Horowitz ( 1985:50) has suggested, 
however, what is more important than the criteria themselves is the meaning which the 
group itself invests in the differentiating criteria. Afrikaners have certainly taken the four 
linked attributes as the their definition of themselves (Giliomee J 979: 116). 
In the case of Afrikaners, the sense of origin is not "primordial" with connotations of 
common descent from a single ancestral stock. The commonality derives from the origin in 
the Dutch settlement at the Cape in 1652 and subsequent additions to the original settler 
group. As it happened, the composition of the original white settlers was not dominantly 
Dutch. The Dutch East India Company established the settlement but that early 
"multinational corporation" had attracted, in addition to Dutch employees, German, 
Flemish and Scandinavian seamen as personnel, and the Dutch contributed less than half of 
the original settlers. The Dutch settlers themselves were multi-ethnic, undoubtedly 
comprising Frieslanders as well as Hollanders and other Netherlanders. Subsequent 
settlement by French Huguenot refugees from religious persecution expanded the settler 
group, as did later contributions by Germans, Irish, Scots. Portuguese. Malays and Eastern 
European Jewish adventurers and traders (in the case of the Scots the initial increment 
comprised Presbyterian Calvinist missionaries imported by the British in an attempt to 
Anglicise the Dutch-speaking settlers). Although there was a high degree of endogamy 
within the white settler community, assisted at one stage by the deliberate importation of 
I 
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orphaned Dutch teenagers, there \Vas a small amount of race admixture between white men 
and indigenous Khoi women as well -- altogether accounting for around 6 per cent of the 
gene pool. (Various authoritative accounts of the early wfote settlement in South Africa 
may be referred to, inter alia T.R.H Davenport ( 1987). South Afi'ica: a Modern History.) 
The process of settlement was, therefore, somewhat of a "1nelti11g pot". but nevertheless, the 
official Dutch identity of the original settlement and the emergence of Afrikaans from 
variants of spoken Dutch at the time was sufficient to provide the Afrikaner group with at 
least a unifying focus as regards its origins. 
Afrikaners are also very interesting as a case study because they are one of the ethnic 
groups whose leaders have relinquished a position of power and dominance voluntarily, 
albeit under extreme moral, economic and political pressure. in 1994. The shift from 
apartheid occurred first as a response by leaders in the Afrikaans community seeking to 
establish a basis for durable co-existence in a mixed society. Many of them, President de 
Klerk possibly included, did so in the somewhat innocent or naive assumption fostered by 
some prominent Afrikaner opinion-leaders., that they would enjoy significant participation 
as a group on a permanent basis in the ongoing governance of the country. and would enjoy 
full scope for "coexistence" as a defined cultural group within a multi-cultural society. 
As it has happened, however, for Afrikaners who supported the political liberalisation of 
the society because they thought that they would retain significant political influence as a 
group, it was a massive "ruse". It was a ruse in the sense the Afrikaner cabinet leadership 
involved in the negotiations, whether deliberately or as a result of a loss of political will, 
lost sight of the commitments to minority rights, safeguards and participation that it had 
explicitly made over the whole period of early transition from 1989 onwards (see Isak de 
Villiers. Foreword, and chapter l. of du Toit, Z.B .. 1999). After a mere two years of power-
sharing in a government of national unity, the National Party. which had gained support as 
the champion of the new "accommodation", found that its understanding of the government 
by consensus was not shared by its partner in government. the electorally dominant ANC, 
and withdrew into opposition. 
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The position of the Afrikaans language, as well as many prominent Afrikaans place names 
and the official status of Afrikaans cultural heritage. has been reduced to virtually that of all 
the other non-English-speaking minority cultural groups in South African society. While 
the equity of the new arrangements in the context of eleven language communities in South 
Africa is difficult to challenge, the fact is that Afrikaans language and culture has suffered 
quite dramatic and rapid loss of status in the society. While the status of other minority 
languages is no more favourable, relative to Afrikaans. they have a rather poorly developed 
literature, virtually non-existent scientific and technical terminology and are not understood 
at all outside of Southern Africa. Afrikaans, on the other hand, has had a vigorous 
literature, has developed a scientific and technical terminology virtually on a par with 
English and as a "cousin-language" to Dutch and Flemish and "second-cousin" language to 
German, it can either be understood or easily learned by most Northern Europeans. Many 
Afrikaners find the downgrading of the language particularly painful in the light of its 
achievements. 
Although the major focus of this investigation will be the Afrikaners. their responses will 
be compared with those of other cultural minorities in order to fully contextualise the 
analysis. These other minorities include: 
• White English-speakers; a group of varied ongms but mainly descended from an 
original core of British settlers. Today the English-speaking white group is not regarded 
as an ethnic group in the conventional sense, firstly because its primary "marker" -- the 
English language -- has become so universally used in South Africa that it does not 
offer any particular distinctiveness, and secondly because one level of identification of 
this group is international Anglo-Saxon culture. Within the group. however, there may 
be cultural residues of older origins -- Scots, Irish. Welsh and English in particular, and 
there are also current ethnic minorities such as the Jewish group in particular. 
• The so-called "coloured" (Mulatto) group is clearly identified as a category of 
pigmentation, but more difficult to describe as an ethnic group. While some three-





group speak both Afrikaans and English with a very distinctive style and intonation; 
more distinctive in fact than say American English or Scots English as these may 
contrast with standard English. There is also a tendency among some coloured people 
to refer to themselves as "Afrikaanses" as opposed to "Afi-ikaners", and to their 
language as "Kaaps" instead of Afrikaans. Others regard themselves as "brown" 
Afrikaners. Clearly a complex process of identity crystallisation is taking place. 
• A "sub-category" of coloureds are people of Muslim faith descended from the Malay 
slaves who came to South Africa in the 16th and 17th centuries. Here again one may 
have to do with a latent or nascent ethnic group. reinforced by the Islamic faith. 
• Nine language groups within the African m~jority in the country, some very large like 
Zulu and Xhosa-speakers, and some smaller like Changana-Tsonga and Venda, but 
none of them insignificant. These language communities are all on a continuum of 
variation between deep rural traditionalism linked to particular "trihal" cultural centres, 
and modern urban status in the polyglot enviromnents of the urban areas. 
• South Africans of Indian ongm. This group, however. is divided between Hindus, 
Muslims, Christians and smaller faiths, and within the confessional groups there are 
variations in cultures of origin, mainly Hindi, Tamil, Telegu. Urdu and Gujerati. 
The situation of the other ethnic minorities in South Africa may be somewhat less complex 
than that of Afrikaners. Ethnic expression among minorities other than white has been 
subdued by apartheid, which tended to create a non-white cross-ethnic solidarity which, 
although weakening, is still pervasive among many elites and the intelligentsia within black 
and brown minorities. The English-speaking white minority. on the other hand, while 
experiencing many of the same policy impacts as Afrikaners, at least does not have to be 
concerned about the survival of its language. 
This dissertation will attempt to assess the salience and scope of claims by Afrikaners to the 
reinstatement of the language and cultural heritage of Afrikaners to a position of co-
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primary status and social "honour" in South Africa, and the likelihood of ethnic resistance 
among Afrikaners in the future, should these claims be frustrated.. More specifically it will 
assess the scope and significance of a recent decline in the political solidarity of white 
Afrikaners, and attempt to understand the implications of a possible divergence between 
political, cultural and social organisation among Afrikaners. ln other words, it will examine 
the way in which Afrikaner ethnicity has fragmented under the impact of changes in power 
relations and the structure of material opportunity in the society. and will attempt to assess 
the implications for future responses by Afrikaners. Hence. as suggested in the first section 
of this chapter, it will examine the processes and prospects relevant to either the defensive 
resurgence of Afrikaner ethnicity or to its possible dissipation. decline and assimilation into 
wider social groupings in the society. On the assumption that comparisons may deepen the 
insights derived, it will pursue these topics. taking account of the reactions of other 
minorities as well. The research questions will be made more explicit at the end on the 
theoretical chapters. 
The analysis will rely heavily on empirical survey-based evidence on attitudes among white 
Afrikaners in particular and other minorities in general. as well as drawing on special 
studies and documentary evidence of the various responses of Afrikaners and other 
minorities to their contemporary condition. The nature of the topic is such that the greatest 
need is to deepen insight rather than to propose fixed relationships between variables. The 
authors referred to earlier in this chapter have argued strongly. that what the topic needs 
most is a deepening of detail and a multi-facetted research approach taking account of 
many interacting variables simultaneously; an approach which does not lend itself to 
clearly conceptualised hypotheses of the textbook variety. At the end of the next two 
chapters, however, certain propositions will be made, some of which may suffice as 
hypotheses in the subsequent examination of evidence. 
CHAPTER2 
THEORY AND THE NATURE OF 
ETHNIC OR COMMUNAL IDENTITY 
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Any discussion of theory in relation to ethnicity can meander endlessly because of the 
wealth of contributions to the literature. Because of this and considerations of length, 
the coverage of the literature has had to be selective. 
The research question posed at the outset directs a theoretical review to certain themes, 
namely those of ethnic maintenance and persistence and of ethnic mobilisation and 
,demobilisation. To the extent, however, that the substance of ethnic commitments 
imparts a tenacity and intensity to the expressions of ethnicity. or the extent to which it 
might make ethnicity vulnerable to the impact of other forces in society, the issue of 
what ethnicity is all about is absolutely crucial. Horowitz makes this point in a slightly 
more specific but nevertheless relevant context when he says that: 
"Even il we grant arguendo that competition fi>r scarce resources is what 
div.ides groups, this hardly explains why they ore led to perceive and organize 
themselves along ethnic lines rather than along some other lines such as social 
class. Theories ol ethnic conflict need to specifj1 what the groups are fighting 
over, which is not as obvious as it seems ... " (Horowitz. 1985: 15) 
The last theme mentioned above has to be d7alt with first simply because it raises the 
most fundamental questions about the nature of etlmicity. Hence this chapter has to be a 
fairly basic review of the nature of ethnicity. The literature on ethnic persistence, 
tenacity and mobilisation deserves a chapter on its own and will follow in chapter 3. 
Therefore the chapter which follows is on how "fimdamental" or not ethnicity is within 
the social dynamics of complex societies, or stated differently. to what extent it is an 
"ineluctable" or "contingent" phenomenon. The resonance of the phenomenon in society 
is the issue at stake and the question is therefore of obvious relevance to the propensity 
for conflict surrounding ethnic claims. The review is intended to provide the rest of this 
analysis with as secure a conceptual footing as possible. 
2.1 ESTABLISHED VIEWS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF ETHNICITY 
The heading immediately above may sound fairly innocuous but it points to a field of 
great tension and vehement disagreement among authors. This theoretical divide has 
assumed the dimensions of an intellectual faction fight, with typical patterns of 
argument and counter-argument, postulations and rejoinders which have wasted a great 
deal of academic time. Theodor Hanf, the German political sociologist explains: 
"For the social scientist this (the .field of ethnic studies) is a mine.field, -- a 
precarious place to do battle, both academically and ... politically. Two large 
armies of passionate researchers face each other. occasionally armed with 
elegantfoils, though more often with heavy artillery. On the one side stand the 
ethnic "primordialists", for whom tribes, people, culture. kinship ties and 
emotional bonds are the stuff from which history is made. On the other side 
stands the brotherhood for whom everything the primordiu.lists hold dear is but 
passing epiphenomena of economic interests and contradictions, i.e. "false 
consciousness"." (Hanf, 1989: 31 ~I) 
The differences in viewpoints are not merely conceptual, but also reflect deeply held 
moral stances. Ethnicity has long been suggested to be a form of deviance or social 
pathology. An early, and influential, American review of social research commenced a 
chapter on ethnic relations with an outline of the "problems of ethnic relations", 
devoting a few paragraphs to the general phenomenon of ethnicity. but proceeding to 
devote most of the chapter to prejudice and discrimination (Berelson and Steiner 1964: 
ch. 12). Dench (1986: 6) discussing the British liberal reaction to Maltese ethnicity in 
the UK, speaks of the concept of an "individualist utopia" of assimilation: 11 ... sublimely 
ignoring the strength of ethnocentric currents . .. and treating .. . intolerance as 
something that would simply go away if right-thinking folk repudiated it ... ". Any 
review of theory on ethnicity is made more complex by such well-meaning moral 
impositions on the phenomenon itself. 
Williams (1994: 50), quoting Russel and Starr (1989), suggests that one half of the 
world's states experienced significant ethnic conflict after World War II up to the late 
eighties, and that about 80 per cent of the deaths in warfare in that period occurred in 





One might assume that if ethnic identities were little more than social labels or lifestyle 
categories, divorced of fundamental meanings or strong emotional investments, this 
formidable record would be surprising. Also, if ethnicity was little more than an 
optional surrogate for class solidarities or status competition. it would be fair to ask why 
it should be so frequently evoked. Classes, status groups and political constituencies 
have demonstrated that they are perfectly capable of finding other rationalisations to 
support the pursuit of their strategic and material interests. It is preciselv the apparent 
"resonance" and reasons for the ubiquity of the phenomenon which have to be 
understood if we are to assess what seems to be the tenaci tv of ethnicity and its potential 
for conflict. 
For these reasons it is appropriate to focus the review of theory on the underlying nature 
_of ethnicity -- on its intrinsic aspects -- in order to form judgements about why ethnic 
and communal identity as such appears to have the tenacity and resonance to so 
frequently form the basis of conflict, protest or rebellion and whether these qualities are 
really as general, invariant and resistant to other forces as appearances would suggest. 
It has struck this author that in many, if not most studies of ethnic phenomena, there is a 
tendency to leap over these very basic questions in order to address more immediate 
topics like the details of inter-ethnic conflict and reconciliation. precipitating factors in 
inter-group interaction and conflict, or patterns in ethnic movements and suchlike. 
Horowitz makes the point that 
"In intellectual terms, ethnic relations has been a field rife with dogma 
(descriptive detail could be added) and yet lacking in agreement on first 
principles." (Horowitz, 1985: 14) 
A particular author will all too often proceed with an analysis equipped with one or 
another, sometimes unstated assumption about what ethnic identity is. Perhaps it is this 
common short-cut which has made it so difficult for social science to achieve a 
reasonable consensus about the nature of and appropriate response to ethnic 
phenomena. Many social scientists still find themselves in deep disagreement with each 
other, not about the facts or patterns of ethnic behaviour. but over their interpretations 
of those facts or behaviour. 
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The obvious first task, then, is to outline the various major "schools", or perhaps more 
appropriately, "camps", in the study of ethnicity: the so-called objective ("objectivist") 
or "primordial" position, the so-called "constructivist" perspective, and thirdly, what 
may or may not be a variation of the constructivist position. often called the 
"instrumental" position. Gellner (see chapter 1) distinguished between a primordial and 
a modernist position; the latter being consonant with the constructivist viewpoint 
(Gellner, 1998: 13). 
2.1.1 THE "PRIMORDIAL" PERSPECTIVE 
The terms objective or primordial are both applied to this particular perspective. 
It assumes that there is a basic, fixed and universal attribute in human interaction 
underlying ethnic ties, a factor almost akin to a species-affinity or herd instinct. 
Obviously, however, not all the views encompassed in this approach would 
endorse a biological imperative or instinct. But at least the assumption is that 
there is an imperative of a social or psychological kind which is independent of 
the surrounding social field; hence the term "objective". 
The position owes much to Edward Shils (1957) and Clifford Geertz (1963). 
Shils sees the content of ethnicity as ties of blood and descent which possess 
such fundamental and socially significant relational qualities as to be 
"primordial", and which therefore acquire what he calls an "ineffable 
significance" (Shils, 1957: 142). Various other authors, including Geertz, have 
come to accept the linkages of descent as the defining essence of ethnicity, and 
as one of the "givens" or assumed givens of social existence: an " ... absolute 
import attributed to the very tie itself' (Geertz, 1963: 109). Clifford Geertz for 
example describes the developing, former colonial societies he studied as 
characterised by a tension between two kinds of fundamental expectations and 
commitments. On the one hand, there is a desire for progress, rising standard of 
living, effective governance and social justice. but on the other hand " ... the 
desire to be recognised as responsible agents ... a search for identity and a 
demand that identity be publicly acknowledged as having import." (Geertz, 
1963: 108) These commitments he saw to be deeply intertwined with primordial 
anachments, following Shils: 
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"By a primordial attachment is meant one that stemsfi·om the ':rtivens" --
or more precisely, as culture. is inei1itably involved in such matters, the 
assumed "givens" -- of social existence:, immediate contiguity and kin 
connection mainly, but beyond them the "givenness" that stems from 
being born into a particular religious community, .,peaking a parti~ular 
language, or even a dialect of a language, one/ /<Jllowing particular 
social practices." (Geertz, 1963: 109) 
This feature was described later by Harold Isaacs as essential tribalism (Isaacs: 
1975/1989). 
This assumption of some form of essentiality linked to ongm is problematic 
because of the manifest genetic heterogeneity of even those ethnic groups which 
claim strict endogamy and the equally manifest permeability of ethnic 
boundaries. Because of the importance of the propositions in the primordialist 
camp to the focus of this study, however, some additional attention has to be 
given to the literature within this framework. 
Pierre van den Berghe has gone somewhat further than Shils. referred to earlier, 
in seeking an absolute root of identity. He finds it difficult to accept that the 
basis of ethnicity can be constructed, imagined or subjectively-based: 
''ff ... (these views) were correct, an ethnic group exists whenever two or 
more people say so. ff ... I found it expedient to organize left-handed 
people as an oppressed minority and declared left-honders to constitute 
an ethnic group, and ifl could find afew people to ogree with me ... then 
according to the extreme subjectivist view. lefi-handers would indeed be 
an ethnic group." (Van den Berghe, 1.979: 27) 
Following E.O. Wilson (1975), van den Berghe applies a social Darwinist 
concept of "inclusive fitness" to ethnic solidarity ( 1981, 1986). His viewpoint on 
ethnicity is rooted in the concept of the ethnic group as a "superfamily", an 
extension of kinship and an expression of a genetic drive to kin-selection in 
reproduction. Because the extended kinship group share genes. and because 
endogamy is assumed to be conducive to "inclusivefitness". 
"ethnocentrism. nepotism, tribalism. nationalism. sectarianism, 
parochialism. racism -- all these nasty isms that lead us to prefer 
insiders to outsiders -- are biologically derived hecause they contribute 
to the actors inclusive fitness. 
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The general paradigm is that individual organisms behave, consciously 
or unconsciously, in such a way as to maximise their inclusive fitness. 11 
(1981:37) 
Hence, for van den Berghe, cultural and genetic development take place in 
relation to one another in a process of co-evolution, and ethnic solidarities are 
intimately bound up in the process. 
As one might expect, van den Berghe's arguments are highly controversial. They 
also appear to be hypothetical, awaiting proof and it is ditficult to imagine how 
proof of a biological drive could be adduced. 
Van den Berghe, however, does not drive this point to absurdity, he allows for 
some social variability: 
"To say that kin relation is the underlying hasis of ethnic solidarity 
allows only the grossest of predictions. hecause social relationships take 
place not i;1 abstract but in an environment .. . of scarce resources. A 
multiplicity of circumstances dictate the actual content l?l relationships 
... "(1981 :37) 
Van den Berghe acknowledges that race, for example. is a social construct 
( 1978: 406-409). Kinship is to a lesser or greater degree a meaning imposed on a 
group -- it is more or less ''fictitious" (1981 :22 passim). His notion of the root of 
ethnicity turns out, then. to be a symbolic one. an idealised notion and therefore 
it is variable. Van den Berghe, therefore. is a demonstration that some 
primordialists may not in fact "reify" ties of blood to the extent that they have 
often been accused of doing. 
Much blander and less challenging versions of the endogamy position can be 
found in the literature. Although ethnic in-group endogamy is by no means an 
iron law of ethnic interaction in the world. there tends to be a sufficiently 
pervasive, if inefficient and inconsistent. tendency towards it in world 
communities to suggest that it is one of the regularities of human social 
behaviour. Percy Cohen, the British sociologist has this to say: 
"Clearly what makes such group solidarity and inter-group rivalry 
ethnic. rather than anything else, is the.fact that each group possesses a 
distinct culture (this author would add. or thinks that it possesses a 
• 
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distinct culture). In addition, what makes ethnic persistence possible is 
the confinement of marriage and procreation largely within the ethnic 
group. The key to ethnic preservation is the mointenance of an internal 
culture including the social controls which prohibit others from having 
marital access to one's women: hence inter-ethnic sexual exclusion 
comes to possess strong symbolic significance. Thus each group will 
define its identity in terms of certain key cultural .symbols and will define 
its limits in terms of the permissibility of sexual access: so that in time, 
sexual exclusion andjea/ow,y become part of o larger set of sentiments 
and ideas which inform ethnicity." (Cohen: 1976: 24) 
There are patterns of widespread inter-ethnic marriage in industrialised societies 
today which would challenge this assumption of a general and persistent 
interaction between ethnic in-group cultural or imagined cultural traits and a 
tendency towards endogamy. The very high rate of intermarriage between Jews 
and Gentiles in Europe today ( estimated at 50 per cent The Economist, 
November 16-22, 1996), or between Japanese. Chinese and Caucasian 
Americans, for example, would be a particular challenge to his position. On the 
other hand. however, one may ask whether in the idealised culture of middle-
class white Europeans and Americans, the image and reality of Jewish, Chinese 
and Japanese social values (self discipline. hard work and commitment to family 
values) have not made them "honorary WASPS", as it were. When such patterns 
of widespread ethnic intermarriage do occur. do they not perhaps indicate a 
process of ethnic group "twinning" as a precursor to ethnic assimilation and 
consequent redefinition under a broader label? Cohen's argument, therefore, 
might have to be broadened to make room for the possibility of ethnic 
assimilation and the "ethnic" rules which govern it. 
It is interesting that Geertz, one of the ma.1or defenders of the primordial 
position, accepts that the ethnic category can originate from or consist of 
subjective or imagined conceptualisations or imagined communities (Geertz, 
1993: 394f). Hence his conception of primordiality does not rest on the objective 
fact of common descent. Yelvington (1991) has also used the term "fictitious 
kinship". This implies that the objects of the identification are variable and not 
necessarily linked to specific historical kin relations, and that they can shift and 
mutate. 
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Quite aside from all kinds of methodological and conceptual criticisms which 
one may make of the theories which rest on socio-biological explanations, the 
fact that there can be and very frequently are "surrogate" ethnic solidarities, like 
confessional and religious communalism without any suggestion of a genetic 
factor (Catholics in Ireland, for example, could hardly be described as a 
substantially pure gene pool) means, that these theories cannot address the 
question posed about the inevitability and ''.fixity" of ethnic identifications. 
· This objective variability, accepted by some "primordialists" themselves, may 
be argued to introduce ambivalence in the broad position. and raise the question 
of whether or not the variability does not negate the notion of the "givenness" 
referred to earlier as one of the cornerstones of the primordial position. One al so 
has to accept the simple probability that there are numerous and largely 
unnoticed categories of people which could have become "ethnic groups" but 
which have chosen to assimilate into broader social categories. 
Most of the discussion above shows that the crude primordialist position, or one 
which assumes objective realities of exclusiveness based on descent simply 
cannot be sustained. At the same time, however, to throw the concept out 
entirely would represent a huge loss in the understanding of the phenomenon. 
Mindful of this, Horowitz is very firm: 
"I have insisted on describing ethnic affiliations as involving descent. 
The principle of ethnic membership is typical(y the birth principle, 
however much it may be diluted in practice by fictive extensions." 
(Horowitz, 1985:83) 
Earlier he makes the crucial points: "Ethnicity is based on a myth al collective 
ancestry. which usually carries with it traits believed to he innate 11 (p52) and, 
"The putatively ascriptive character of ethnic identifications imparts to ethnic 
conflict its intense and permeative qualities" (p54). J?thnicity rµay not be 
~-. ··<....-, .. ...-'"\.._ .. 
· primordial; but to the extent that its symbolism, sentiments and the self-
perceptions associated with it have intensity and persistence akin to that of 
kinship, the primordial perspective is essential to any analysis of ethnicity in 
action, as it were. 
II 
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2.1.2 THE "CONSTRUCTIVIST" PERSPECTIVE 
The constructivist position can be variously described but at basis it does not 
assume an invariate, socially independent and objective reality of association or 
descent as the basis of ethnicity. Instead it understands ethnicity as either the 
outcome of a collective belief in or myth of fundamental commonalities. Such 
commonalities can obviously include actual ties of blood or descent, but they 
can be imagined or "constructed" in the collective process of group self-
definition (Max Weber, ( 1922/1968/l 980), or in the processes of forming and 
maintaining ethnic boundaries. In the latter case the boundaries and the rules and 
rituals associated with those boundaries assume greater importance than the 
content___.2.fJ:he cultur:e-w.hie,-h.,i~ enclosed within the boundary (Frederik Barth, 
1969/70). 
The view of Barth is compatible with a more general process explored by Frank 
Parkin ( 1979) and others, who following Max Weber. have called it "social 
closure". Those who have written on social closure do not relate it exclusively to 
ethnic boundary formation but to all forms of social demarcation in which 
groups seek to defend their interests or increase their advantages by restricting 
recruitment and access to membership of the group. 
Max Weber can be included in this category of thought but there are aspects to 
Weber's thinking which deserve a separate treatment. A brief discussion of 
Weber, therefore, will follow in the next section, in 2.1.3. 
The processes of boundary formation or a social construction based on collective 
beliefs therefore obviously can have some purpose or benefit. extrinsic to the 
"content" of the collectivity, and this "extraneous" element bas been argued to 
overshadow the fact of the group self-concept and its boundaries. Frederik B~rth 
is the author most closely associated with the constructivist position. He has 
-------explored the institutional action involved in group boundary maintenance, 
involving the establishment of shared goals and common rules of behaviour 
relevant to the boundaries. These practices are in turn capable of producing 
group solidarity, which is a strategic resource for a group in a competitive wider 
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system (Frederik Barth, .1969/1970). Perhaps equally important, Barth saw 
cultural characteristics and values as the consequences of ethnic group 
organisation. 
As already stated, perhaps the major postulate in this approach is that ethnic 
groups are not most usefully understood in terms of their actual or putative 
origins or defining features but rather in terms of a dynamic process of boundary 
maintenance, and in terms of features attributed to them in the interaction with 
other groups: 
"The criticalfocus ... becomes the ethnic houndarv that defines the group 
and not the cultural stuff that it encloses . . . fl a group maintains its 
identity ·when members interact ·with others. this entails criteria for 
determining membership and ·ways of signalling membership and 
exclusion." (Barth: 1969: 15) 
Particular features or markers of a group in Barth's view should not be seen as 
the causes of ethnic differentiation but rather as the signals and symbols 
established by the group in its communication. both with its own members and 
to outsiders in the process of boundary maintenance. Therefore, the i1mer 
content of ethnicity is less important than the very complex and self-reinforcing 
processes of group boundary maintenance: 
" ... the ethnic boundary canalizes social life -- it entails a frequently 
quite complex organisation of hehaviour and social relations. The 
identification of another person as a fellow memher of an ethnic group 
implies a sharing of criteria for evaluation andjudgement. ft thus entails 
the assumption that the two are fundamentally 'JJ!aying the same game" 
... a dichotomization of others as ... members of another ethnic group 
implies a recognition of limitations on shared understandings. 
differences in criteria for judgement of value and performance ... " 
(Barth, 1969: 15) 
This process-based approach to the understanding of ethnicity -- a process of 
boundary maintenance and consequential internal structuring of ethnic 
characteristics, leads Barth to say that ethnic categories 
" ... may be of great relevance to behaviour. hut rhey need not be; they 
may pervade all social life, or they may he relevant only in limited 
sectors of activity. 11 (14) 
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He would certainly not accept a thesis of inevitability. Barth, however, assumed 
even wider benefits and consequences on ethnicity when he pointed out that 
"ethnic categories provide an organisational vessel that may he given varying 
amounts and forms of content" (Barth, 1969: 14 ). The content of the vessel, 
however, is not the central point of Barth -- it is the vessel itself and the 
processes that create its structure. 
There is no doubt that this perspective adds to the analytical utility of the 
concept of ethnicity, but here again. one must guard against throwing the 
proverbial baby out with the bath water. Donald Horowitz, for example, accepts 
that ethnic boundaries are mutable, that fusion and fission can occur, that 
boundary definitions change in terms of utilities and transactions within the 
wider society, that "Political choices are also made by group leaders as 
assimilation and dzjferentiation proceed" (p6), but he reminds us that 
"Group boundaries are made of neither stone nor putty ... They are 
malleable within limits. The mutability of boundaries does not mean that 
ethnic affiliations are merely ''strategic" (p66) ... leaders cannot call into 
play an identity that is not founded on jwi,gements of relative likeness 
and difference." (p70) 
Here again there are clearly merits in an integration of insights. 
2.1.3 THE "INSTRUMENTAL" PERSPECTIVE 
In terms of the classification being adopted here, in the instrumental perspective 
the content, purpose and the competitive salience of the vessel of ethnic group 
formation is the critical element. In the light of the last quotation from Barth, 
this third perspective -- the instrumental view -- might appear as an obvious 
conceptual extension of the construtivist-, position. This. however. need not be 
the case, because the constructivists emphasise the process and the 
instrumentalists emphasise the content of the interests which might influence or 
inform the process. 
Within this category of view, however. one has to include more than one 
approach. For present purposes a distinction will be made between three broad 
0 
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positions: "ethnicity as .contingent", ethnicity as a "deflection of class 
opposition" and "ethnicity as a substantive structure in social competition or 
conflict": 
ETHNICITY AS CONTINGENT FACTOR IN STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS: 
This viewpoint is most closely associated with Marxist views and it tends to 
assign a reduced importance to ethnicity relative to class as a force in society. 
I 
First Marx and Engels see the realm of sentiment and ideas. of which ethnicity 
and culture would be a part, as the outflow or consequence of material 
conditions: 
"The production ol ideas, ol conceptions. ol consciousness is at first 
directly interwoven with the materiol uctivity und the material 
intercourse of men, the language ol real life . the direct efflux of their 
material behaviour . ... The phantoms fim11ed in the human brain are 
also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life process ... Morality, 
religion. metaphysics, all the rest o( ideology line/ their corresponding 
forms of consciousness ... have no history. no development, but men, 
developing their material production and their material intercourse ... 
alter, along with this their real existence. their thinking ond the products 
ol their thinking ... Life is not determined hy consciousness but 
consciousness by l(fe." (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, in David 
Horowitz (1971 :25) 
In line with these views Marx tended to regard authentic ethnic attachments as 
historical left-overs with very little role in the modern capitalist state; indeed 
more inclined to be counter-revolutionary than anything else (Rosa Luxemburg 
(Ed.) Davis, 1976:124-5). As Lockwood (1970) argues. the basic marxist 
position was to see class as the fundamentally necessary interest in the modem 
social system in contrast to status and other interests. like ethnicity, which were 
contingent phenomena clouding the analysis. 
As one would expect from a secondary or contingent phenomenon. ethnic 
commitments are not seen by the Marxists as having the potency of class 
interests. Westergaard and Resler (1975), Lockwood (1970), Luxemburg (1976) 
and others have argued, its capacity to generate intense conflicts 
notwithstanding, ethnic conflict is reactive, while only class mobilisation has the 
sweeping power to transform society and alter its most fundamental structures. 
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Ethnicity, as a derived phenomenon, has potential for rebellion, but not for 
revolution. 
ETHNICITY AS A DEFLECTION OF CLASS OPPOSITION 
John Stone points out that ethnicity has consistently been regarded by cquntless 
convinced critics of capitalism as an "irrelevant epiphenomenon. a smoke-screen 
disguising the "objective" class relations which are the true cause ol all social 
conflict" (Stone. 1985: 64). Whatever the motivations of such authors, these 
views are an appropriate warning that underlying interests and the social power 
of such interests can achieve consequences which at face value appear to be 
more comprehensive, and which, whether so intended or not serve to deflect 
attention from the core interests involved. 
This perspective on ethnicity flows originally from the analysis of Marx which 
defines the realm of ideology, ideas and culture as the "superstructure" which 
reflects and is the outflow of the base economic structure. Marx was clear that 
one cannot understand a phenomenon on the basis of the consciousness of the . 
actors involved. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about 
himself, one cannot judge historical processes by their consciousness. The 
• 
consciousness reflected in the superstructure does not have an authentic or 
independent significance (Marx 1989/1970:2 l ). Lefebre ( 1968: 76) draws out 
the added implication of Marx that: 
"It is the role of ideologies to secure the assen/ of' the oppressed and 
exploited. Ideologies represent the latter to themselves in such a way as 
to wrest fi·om them, in addition to material wealth. their spiritual 
acceptance of this situation, even their support. 11 
fn this purpose it is possible to see the role of ethnicity as one of providing the 
masses with commitments which will support economically conservative forces 
or disguise the underlying interests of the ruling class. Kautsky (quoted in 
Nimmni: 114) saw nationalism in the modern nation state. for example. as the 
handmaiden and cover for the profit motives of commercial capital. 
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One must not oversimplify the picture of the Marxist analysis. Many authors in 
this tradition have allowed for a dialectical relationship between cultural 
superstructure and the economic base. Althusser (1969) sees three levels of 
determinism in society, the economic, the political and the ideological, and they 
are relatively autonomous but interact. At different historical epochs different 
levels will be more powerful. Althusser, however. is aligned with Marx in seeing 
the economic forces as the ultimate determinant. or the determinant in the final 
instance, although the final instance never manifests clearly in a concrete 
relationship. But it is clear that not all of Marxism is characterised by the notion 
that culture is merely an epiphenomenon and a process like ethnicity can have 
"relative autonomy". Suffice to say, however. the attribution to the economic 
level of final force of determination means that culture at any given time, will be 
responsive to the requirements of the economic structure. 
ETHNICITY AS A SUBSTANTIVE STRUCTURE IN SOCIAL 
COMPETITION 
This materialist perspective allows ethnicity a basic significance as a vehicle for 
competition and conflict in its own right. No longer are we dealing with an 
epiphenomenon but a materialist perspective which sees ethnicity as an 
alternative to class organisation. 
This viewpoint is simply set out by Abner Cohen: 
"Ethnicity in modern society ... is the result of imensive struggle between 
groups over new strategic positions of'po-wer ... places of employment, 
taxation, jimdsfor development, education. political position and so on" 
(Cohen, 1974: 96) 
This theme has been elaborated by many dozens of authors. particularly in the 
analysis of ethnic conflicts; for a review see. inter alia. Robin Williams jr. 
(1994). 
Abner Cohen argues that ethnic groups in modern society are in the first instance 
" ... informally organised interest groups ... " (Abner Cohen. 1974: 96). Even 
more importantly, Cohen argues that this ethnic aniculation is likely to occur 
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when structural conditions or official policy or prohibitions make it difficult for 
the articulation of interests to occur within formal associations or processes. 
Cohen observes that ethnic groups will develop their rationale on the basis of 
cultural and historical claims but if new cleavages of interest arise which cut 
across the ethnic division, the ethnic coherence will tend to weaken. Ethnicity in 
these terms becomes a vessel, adorned with all the trappings of cultural 
meaning, but which is essentially there to promote instrumental objectives, and 
which will persist only as long as the particular interests are served. 
Another approach within the same broad paradigm. which could be extended 
beyond its initial focus on the USA, is that of Blauner (Robert Blauner, 1976: 
69-90). Blauner considers the circumstances and the degree of internal unity of 
"non-white" minorities in the USA and defines their situation as one of "internal 
colonisation". The power dominance of white America over the immigrant, 
enslaved or conquered peoples and the broader influence of a divisive racism on 
relations between the dominant group and the minorities and between minorities 
themselves, produces in the end a particular pattern of material disadvantage and 
insular cultural existence. which solidifies and becomes perpetuated as forms of 
minority ethnicity. 
The more general interest in this type of analysis of minority ethnic group 
formation as a consequence of internal colonialism, dictated often by the needs 
for control of minority labour, is that many plural societies owe their internaL_ ,------- ~-----=----,--------,-- . r_-c"'_-,,.,=c-_ 
differentiation to conquest and incorporation of people ,vhich initially ha~qD)§_ 
--•-~-----•---.._,_--c--.c• -,~-• •.-(,<.---.-,-=-. ~ ·• , •-•-•·, --· ••• - .....___ -••- ••"'-•----•------~-~•··.-.·•~=• A•~-., -•-~----- --~~--0:-~ 
base or sovereignty independent of the plural stat~..."..c This would. fo_r,_~~allJ.ple.,-• 
-._,._.._.....-------,~,,--c- ~- •• --•, • ~ -•• -,~ •-- •• •-••• ••~ .• ••• • ~•••· "'' •---• •- ,.-.,· ,,., • ~._n----~-•-• 
apply to the Scots, Welsh, Irish, Afrikaners. Z].~~~s,.__ar_e:_tons,J:li:!§...~'."~n fact _ 
· .. ________ ' --~··- ---·- ..,,_..,.. ... -- -.. ______________ ,.~-,~-~,.-------~· -~------•' 
wherever one looks. A case could be made. therefore. for the analysis of 
B~-••••·•,-...p,c•--·~~"-~------,....,__.c-,._,..,-=---c,, 
ethnicity, in many if not most of its locations. as the consequence of peoples, 
drawn from a different political and economic context to their present one, being 
"captured" in a political economy which they do not control, and where the 
dominant system does not fully incorporate or assimilate them for reasons which 
relate to interests in the dominant political economy itself Ethnicity, then, could 
be seen in these terms, as Stone (1985: 72) has observed. as a variant of the 
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dependency theorv applied to relations between imperial powers and Third 
World states. 
Hechter ( 1975) sees the pattern of polarisation as revolving around "core" and 
"periphery" cultures, involving a cultural division of labour. in the process of 
which the core proletariat uses it status advantage to exploit the peripheral 
proletariat. 
Somewhat close to the classical Marxist position 1s Tom Nairn (I 977:60, 
passim) who sees the entry of nationalist and separatist movements as 
structurally aligned with class movements but which take a detour, as it were, 
and in the process weaken or attempt to weaken the bourgeoisie or national 
establishment which is aligned with or protects the interests of capitalism. 
Although Nairn writes in the context of British movements, it is striking how 
many of the separatist movements in the world are in fact left-leaning in their 
ideological sympathies; the Basques being a prominent recent example. Nairn 
argues that the historical dev~lopment of Marxism made it unavoidable that 
nationalism would be underestimated and poorly integrated into Marxist theory, 
but he remains true to the core position when he argues that the patterns in the 
world's capitalist political economy lie at the basis of the uneven development in 
nations that produces the nationalism phenomenon. which is 
" ... a by-product of the most brutally hopelessly materialistic side of the 
history olthe last two centuries." (Nairn. 1977:335-6) 
Nairn is one of many Marxists who have felt that the core positions have 
underestimated the salience and the intrinsic significance of national and ethnic 
attachments in the interacting mix of structures in the nation state. The "Austro-
Marxists" were another category of Marxists who. while committed to the view 
that the more fundamental divisive principle remained class relations, were quite 
comfortable with the reality of "organic" national units within the Austro-
Hungarian empire, and believed that the needs of these ethnic units should be 
accommodated. This perspective was most prominently expounded by Otto 
Bauer. who saw national character as a an important distinction in the interplay 
of national and cross-national relations -- national character being the result of 
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both common material but also geographic and cultural historical expenence: 
"communities offate", based on reciprocal 1:elationships between people -- see 
various contributions on Austro-Marxism and ethnicity in Ra'anan et al (Eds.) 
(1991). 
The Austro-Marxists and the more recent Marxist critics of the core or classical 
Marxist position illustrate the diversity of viewpoints on nationalism and 
ethnicity within the broad Marxist paradigm: a diversity which is understandable 
in the light of the fact that both Lenin and Stalin had varied, but clear views to 
the effect that nationalities, albeit only at certain stages in the historical 
development of the international economy, had a right to self-determination. 
Therefore it is surprising that a "core" position in Marxism emerged with and 
after the Second and Third International which has been described as the 
"epiphenomenonalist" and "class reductionist" position. which relates 
nationalism, cultur.::: and ethnicity to a derivative status, fundamentally formed 
and structured by the relations of production in the economic base. (For a 
discussion see Ephraim Nimni (1985).) 
Most of the authors in the Marxist camp referred to immediately above would 
not like to be associated with writers outside the Marxist camp. but the content 
of their conclusions draws us very close to the position of Max Weber, who has 
already been covered in other context of ethnic boundary maintenance, but 
whose thinking on the topic was broader. Weber's views are certainly not easily 
categorised and can only be reconciled with instrumental views in a certain 
sense. Weber in Wirtschaft und Gesellschafi (1922/1980: 241, 239, passim) --
approached ethnicity as on~qf_t_!:ie elements in status. social worth or honour. At -------------· - . ·--·--- -· ---·--------------
one point. however, he declares ethnicity to be a concept of singularly little 
utility for analysis in the social sciences. The reality and the effects of ethnic 
consciousness were seen by Weber to be indeterminate. As indicated he saw the 
ethnic group as a status group in society, along with other categories of status, 
and he saw the particular ethnic content as able to be evoked in the subjective 
sphere, as a rationale accompanying but not necessarily determining social 
action. Hence ethnicity, while certainly not an epiphenomenon but a fully-
fledged status phenomenon in Weber's assessment. despite its very specific 
42 
symbolisms, nonetheless does not feature as having an independent significance 
in social action. Perhaps one might say that Weber saw ethnicity as one among a 
menu of status interests in society -- a subjective option for the populace in 
culturally differentiated society. Now this approach is "instrumental" only to the 
extent that ethnicity might accompany more determinate interests. 
Nevertheless. for Weber ethnic groups were categories of interest in themselves, 
with the interest being social ranking or honour and the material rewards which 
would accompany it. Weber makes an important point when he argued that 
ethnicity was the specific honour of the masses. to whom other forms of social 
honour were denied. Ethnic status was available more generally than other forms 
of status which depended on ranked categories (Weber. 1968: 391). He also saw 
class and ethnic commitments as being able to alternate as vehicles for 
competitive struggles; class would tend to be dominant in times of material 
stress, whereas ethnicity would surface in times of prosperity (Weber. 1968: 
389, passim). But perhaps most importantly of all. Weber was not convinced 
about the resilience of ethnic commitments. believing that they would be swept 
aside by the rise in the rationality of the modern bureaucratic state. 
The acceptance of ethnic groups as categories of interests in themselves, sm 
generis, also appears frequently in more recent interpretations. one of the more 
famous being the analysis of Glazer and Moynihan. who saw ethnicity as a more 
typical or even more fundamental source of stratification in modern society than 
class -- indeed class to them is the secondary or often derivative structure 
(Glazer and Monihan, 1975, 16-17, passim). Daniel Bell (1975) accepts an 
equality of significance for both class and ethnicity and like Weber postulates 
that they can be alternative choices for mobilisation in society. but that they also 
may become fused. Bell notes that ethnic commitments move into the vacuum 
created by the decline in the solidarities which occupational mobility fosters in 
working class movements (Bell, 1975: 165-166, passim). 
This "instrumental" interpretation of ethnicity as a form of interest "articulation" 
in its own right view opens the door to all manner of serious academic and 
semi-academic analyses which have concluded that particular elites with 
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commitments to power or material rewards have set about "constructing" inter-
group hostilities as a means of promoting a particular solidarity in support of 
their agendas. 
Summing up, ethnicity as a phenomenon. which is relegated to the status of a 
contingent or consequential phenomenon. is not the onJy perspectiv_e in a 
materialist or "instrumental' position. Even where this secondary status is 
accorded to ethnicity, however, there is significant variation in definitions of its 
importance in the understanding of sociaJ action. 
Anticipating for a moment the South African situation. the most controversial 
position among the range of "instrumental" viewpoints reviewed is that of 
relegating ethnicity to the status of either a consequence ot: or a cover or 
mechanism for the pursuit of class interests. These approaches. which have been 
referred to earlier as the epiphenomenolist and/or dass reductionist approaches 
have at times been controversial even in Marxist circles. Eugene Genovese, for 
example. roundly condemned his Marxist colieagues for underestimating the 
effects of ethnic beliefs 
".. once an ideology arises it alters profoundly the material reality and 
in .fact becomes a partially autonomous feature of that reality." 
( Genovese, l 971 : 340) 
The equally important point, however, is expressed in the words "once it arises" 
-- it remains a contingent phenomenon. Weberian approaches aside. perhaps the 
most common position in this category of writers is, that while ethnic 
phenomena may have lesser or greater degrees of relative autonomy vis a vis the 
economic base, in the final instance the ethnic process is shaped and determined 
by economic factors. 
One can contrast this assertion with a simpler and more persuasive point 111ade 
by Horowitz to the effect that ethnic group formation is in fact more powerful 
than class in its potential for interest articulation and conflict. After pointing out 
that empirical evidence shows that social identification and polarisation along 
clas~ lines is relatively weak, Horowitz makes the point that ethnic groups meet 
the assumptions that Marxists make about the exclusion and inescapability of 
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class position much better than class does itself, because of the fluidity of class 
membership under conditions of social mobility (Horowitz, 1985: 90-92). 
2.2 ADDITITIONAL PROPOSITIONS 
Each one of these perspectives is persuasive in its own way. although the primordial 
position has been most frequently criticised, most basically because the assumption of 
some invariate or "ineluctable" identity based on descent cannot be reconciled with the 
manifest variability of the phenomenon. Many ethnic groups are of mixed origins, and 
clearly people have passed from one ethnic identity to another. they have manipulated 
their identities, they have sought all manner of advantages from ethnic belonging and 
been driven in this regard by many types of needs and motivations. some intrinsic to 
ethnic identity and others extrinsic to it, and at times they have neglected, suppressed or 
ignored their ethnic identity and allowed it to become latent. (See. for example, Jack D. 
Eller and Reed M. Coughlan (1993).) 
Certainly, the centre of gravity in most approaches to ethnicity would tend to rule out 
the "primordial" perspective as a major basis for analysis. On the other hand approaches 
of the constructivist and instrumental type are reconcilable with each other, as possible 
parallel processes. An ethnic phenomenon might be heavily structured by the 
circumstances of its social construction and boundary formation and at the same time 
function as a vehicle for the promotion of extraneous group interests which in turn 
increase the salience of the boundaries. 
~t, without accepting the validity of arguments about biological or socially invariate 
fundamentals of the type proposed by the "primordialists". one cannot escape the need 
to consider the possibility of the content of the commitment having more intrinsic 
significance; a phenomenon sui generis, accompanying and reinforcing both its 
structure and boundaries and the material interests which determine its role in a political 
economy. As suggested already, the fact that ethnic identification and conflict are so 
ubiquitous, suggests the presence of resonators within the content itself; resonators 
which might intensify the qualities which give it persistence and a propensitv to cause 
conflict. As Daniel Bell has put it, the ethnic mix "comhining interest with an affective 
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·tie" is what gives ethnicity its potency (Daniel Bell, 1975: 152-159). This would mean 
that one has to be cautious before assuming, _as some liberal theorists do, that ethnic 
commitments can be "educated out" of human relationships in situations of inter-
cultural, sectarian or inter-racial stress. The exploration may have to go beyond the 
limits of the established theories reviewed. 
Some of the reasons for this additional exploration actually lie in the valuable 
proposition of the "instrumentalists" that ethnicity in itself is a vehicle of "interest 
articulation". Why does the jockey of interests so frequently find that riding the horse of 
ethnicity enables more forceful progress to be made'? Furthermore. one has to ask the 
additional question of what kind of interests? One accepts without reservation that 
ethnicity has been ridden in the pursuit of class and power interests, but are these the 
only interests? The points from Max Weber summarised earlier would incline one to 
add at least status interests, and if ethnicity is a status and can provide the rewards of 
social honour, then the jockey and the horse become interchangeable. Interests need not 
be material -- "not by bread alone ... 11 as it were. 
But these suggestions beg all sorts of questions about the specific content and meaning 
of interests in status and honour. A more substantial consideration of this possibility 
leads one into what, for want of a better term, one has to call "psycho-sociology" and the 
factor of social needs. 
It is this type of motivation in humankind that many authors and thinkers have assumed 
without attempting to explicate its nature in more detail. Charles Taylor, following 
Hegel, gives a masterful account of the dilemma of community in the modern state: 
"Thus Hegel's dilemma ... is this: The modern ideolo,1.,ry1 of equality and of total 
participation leans to a homogenisation of socie(v. This shakes men loose from 
their traditional communities but cannot replace them as a /hcusfiJr identity ... 
the attempt to .fill the gap by moving tavvards a society of universal and total 
participation ... is vain. It can only aggravate the problem hy intensifying 
homogenisation ... Some of the differences which remain are depreciated. and 
are breeding grounds for alienation and resentment. Others in fact ,IU! the gap 
and become foci of identity. These are principal()! ethnic or national differences 
... But nationalism tends to lead to single homogenous stotes ... but then it is in 
danger of suppressing dissent and diversity and .fczlling over into narrow and 
irrational chauvinism." (Charles Taylor. 1984: 195-196) 
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Humankind's need for community ~nd the modem dilemma of alienation has been a 
central theme in both popular and academic social analysis. Ethnicity is not an issue in 
simple agrarian societies, because its functions in providing community are performed 
by locality groups, villages and kin networks. They will become ethnic only when they 
are brought into interaction with other localities and cultural groups. Ethnicity becomes 
most salient in addressing the dilemma of community in bureaucratic and impersonal 
modern society in which some extent of multi-culturalism gives it the point of entry to 
fulfil a need for community, and as we have seen. to perform a variety of other 
functions for the in-group, some of them benign and others less so. 
Benedict Anderson, by implication, states the same problem in a different way (1983). 
As understood Anderson argues that the collapse of old aristocratic political and 
religious systems and the "high centres" of human identification. as well as the rise of 
capitalism and the print media encompassing larger economic and political systems, and 
which reduced the importance of linguistic diversity. led to a situation in which people 
formed or had to form "imagined communities" -- abstrac:t conceptions of the zone of 
belonging. This set the stage for the development of the modern nation state and its 
form of affiliation. This affiliation is, however, far removed from community; it is a 
codified construction, an ideological creation. 
Anderson's depiction of the political constitution of the modern industrial or commercial 
state is useful and accurate, but, as said, by implication it is an admission that the 
modern rational and secular state cannot fulfil the role of community. It cannot address 
the needs which the universal presence of "community" signify. It is. however, rather 
too easy and glib to simply accept that there is some powerful and pervasive category of 
needs. The assessment which follows attempts to specify and understand what these 
needs are and how they arise. 
Here one is not referring to diverse or sporadic expressions of individuals in society but 
to persistent, consistent and patterned social needs as a factor in ethnicity. One place to 
start in understanding the needs is Talcott Parsons. Without accepting for one moment 
the full paradigms of Talcott Parsons in respect of the structure of social action or 
functionalism. his reference to "need dispositions" as a basic regularity in social action 
illustrates the point (Parsons and Shils, 1951 ). Parsons saw need dispositions as rooted 
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in universal personality patterns -and as such to have an independent significance -- they 
are not merely an epiphenomenon derived from and fundamentally shaped by social 
structure and culture (Parsons, 1970:82). 
The utility of Parsons ends here as far as this analysis is concerned, but the possibility of 
ethnic interests being defined by social needs requires more attention, given in the next 
section. The arguments which follow are set out in full awareness of the dangers of 
what is called reductionism in sociological analysis and therefore will be followed by a 
discussion of precisely the issue of tolerable reductionism. 
2.2.1 ETHNICITY AS SOCIAL "NEED" 
The question, then, is whether or not there is some quite fundamental and 
substantially irreducible factor associated with ethnicity which, while not 
"primordial", is capable of imparting the "resonance" referred to several times 
m preceding sections. If ethnicity, whatever its class or structural 
accompaniments, were to be underpinned by a category of social needs, then 
many questions about its ubiquity and persistence may be closer to being 
answered. 
"Man is a social animal who needs his own territmy. and he needs to belong to r. 
a social group in which his identity is not lost. " This quotation by Patricia Elton 
Mayo (1974: 1.) repeats the concept of needs. twice in one sentence and as such is 
useful as_ an introduction. If people "need" to be "ethnic", and that need is 
general and not contingent, then it can be regarded as basic in nature with or 
without claims of ties of blood. Such propositions can be found in abundance; 
they assert an intimate connection between individual and the group which 
implies deep need gratification, but often without teasing out the precise 
dimensions or content of the group intimacy. 
Clifford Geertz himself has referred to the "desire for recognition" of identity, 
hence also suggesting a general social need (1963:108). Geertz refers to "an 
unreflective sense of collective selfhood" and a "consciousness of kind". He 
describes the bonds as 
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"ipso facto; the result not merely of affection. practical necessity, 
common interest, or incurred obligation. hut at least in great part by 
virtue of some unaccountable absolute import altributed to the very tie 
itself 11 ( l 09) 
Geertz postulates that notwithstanding the fact that the political modernisation 
process will weaken the local and parochial ties within which group identities 
reside, the need for people, to avoid loss of definition results in a re-
crystallisation of identity groups in the changed social structure in the form of 
ethnic blocs, which enable the individual to preserve the "consciousness of kind" 
(154). This tendency, or for him inevitability. which he describes as "ineffable 
and at times having an overpowering coerciveness". is for Geertz rooted in the 
non-rational foundations of personalitv and because of this. is to a relatively 
significant degree independent of social and political processes. The postulate, 
therefore. is that certain fundamental regularities will exist in a society, in terms 
of which people wi II need to identify themselves with ethnic ( or other 
communal) groups and meanings which will have achieved an enduring 
character after centuries of crystallisation. 
Harold R. Isaacs m his very well-known "Idols of the Trihe" (Isaacs: 1989), 
while accepting the primordial position and indeed expressing it very 
categorically. accepts that political change and varymg power relations can 
change the content of group identity. Therefore. he would accept the notion that 
there is a variable subjective process of ethnic meaning-creation. Nevertheless, 
in Isaacs' view, the world over, the "essential tribalism" lies not in the content 
but in the inevitable process of identification, in the course of which the 
individual achieves a sense of belonging and self-esteem: 
".. in all cases the function of basic group identity hos to do most 
crucially with two key ingredients in every individual's personality and 
l{fe experience: his sense of belongingness oncl the quality of his self--
esteem ... here he is not alone, which is what all but a very few human 
beings most fear to be ... Wrapped into his affiliation is the matter <!l 
esteem and self-esteem: how individuals are seen hy others and how they 
see themselves." (Isaacs, 1989: 42,43) 
This exposition by Isaacs identifies the "givenness" not as any particular kinship 
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notion of primordiality stems from a typical need which social organisation may 
modify or allow to mutate, but which it will never eradicate. His position on this 
is not absolutely categorical; he allows for the fact that "some individuals get d 
sufficient sell-esteem out of the stuff ol their individual personalities alone", but V 
the essential tribalism arises because "More people have to depend on their 
group associations to supply what their individual personulities may deny them" 
( 43). Isaacs predicts that 
" ... essential tribalism is so deepzv rooted in the condition al existence 
that it will keep cropping out of whatever is loid over it like trees/arcing 
their way through rocks on mountoinsides a mile high. " (Isaacs: 1989: 
26) 
Hence. in his view, notwithstanding modernisation and globalisation of culture, 
one might expect a permanent fragmentation and re-tribalisation of identities in 
any society, based on real or imagined descent or locality or any other factor 
which is assumed to define the character of its members. 
The author Geoff Dench puts the same feature of "helongingness" in different 
words: 
"Fraternal groupings provide their mernhers 1vith intrinsic satisjc1ctions. 
such as conviviality and the assurance of mutual respect ... if we look at 
the norms by which most people in modern societies actually regulate 
their everyday lives ... .frequent recourse is. in foct, 1nade to values which 
put satisfactions available through group membership and service; 
before individual.freedom and aspiration." (Dench. 1986: 183) 
The closest one can get to what Geertz calls the "ineffi:.1ble and coercive" factor 
in ethnicity, without assuming some objective force of origin. lies then, in what 
he refers to as the "non-rational elements ofpersonolity". another expression of 
the needs asserted by Mayo above. The question then is. do human beings, in all 
sorts of social and cultural conditions. have a reasonably constant personality-
based drive to seek self-esteem and emotional security in communal group 
identification? 
This leads us to the question of the place of human nature in sociology and to a 
somewhat deeper consideration of the issue of identitv in human development. 
In particular one has to consider how variable such tendencies may be in order 
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to avoid falling into the primordialist trap of assuming some objective and 
invariate bond between individuals and groups of origin. 
It is relatively easy to document the fact that human beings, as a self-conscious 
species, will always need to find reassurances to protect and bolster self-esteem. 
Morris Rosenberg (1979:24) makes the telling point that self-concept "is an 
important object to everyone, usually the most important ohject in the world". 
The boundaries of the self-concept include "ego-extensions". objects outside the 
actor that lead him or her to feel pride and shame. The ego-extensions lead one 
quite naturally to the ethnic group as an ego extension. arguably one of the more 
consistent forms of ego-extension in the world. This notion of ego-extension 
would be compatible with the concept of the "generalised other" of George 
Herbert Mead (1934/1962). Mead, and many others following him, argued that 
these external collectivities or "generalised others" are more than props for the 
ego but shape identity in the sense that the self becomes the internalisation of the 
organised attitudes of the others, as perceived and defined by the ego. In this 
context ethnic groups would be very specific and bounded interactive 
perceptions. Hence, ethnic groups as "generalised others" may not be the 
exclusive source of identity formation but where they are, their consequences 
and functions for the individual would be powerful indeed. 
George de Vos and Marcelo Suarez-Orozco ( 1990) (hereafter referred to as de 
Vos and Orozco) have devoted at least as much attention to the question of 
ethnicity in relation to personality development as anyone else. Following Erik 
Erikson (1963), they use the concept of "social self:identity": the attempts which 
are inevitably made by the individual to 
" ... assume, in as integrated a manner as possible. an inner consistency 
in inhabiting a series of roles in various social relationships ... (which 
have) particular pertinence to problems of' selFacceptance and self-
hatred related to minority status. 11 (de Vos and Orozco. 1990: 32) 
They argue that 
"Human beings learn to define themselves by selectively identifying 
themselves with certain groups and distancing themselves.from others ... 
the individual adult needs the reinforcement of communication with 
sign?ficant others to maintain a sense of'a virtuous orjustified se?f ... Any 
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dynamic view taken qf societies through history must include how and 
under what circumstances a self~conscious sense of' social belonging 
arises and is maintained ... "(180). 
It is VITAL to note, however, that social identity is not necessarily ethnic 
identity; it can be based on a wide variety of different types of social 
categorisations. As de Vos and Orozco themselves have argued, religious 
identity can as easily be fitted under the broad description of social belonging as 
ethnic identity. Hence one might argue that it can be assumed that processes of 
social identification are universal, but not necessarily confined to the ethnic, or 
even to other forms of communal identity. ~
The emphasis, therefore, is on the aspect of identity needs. In the preface to the 
1995 volume by Romanucci-Ross and de Vos (1995) (hereafter referred to as 
Ross and de Vos), Ross and de Vos argue that 
"relative priority must be given to the emotional. even irrational 
psychologicalfeatures underlying one's social identity. " ( 12) 
Ross and De Vos observe, for example. that 
"The haste sense of ethnicity is expressively one onswer to the human 
social need to belong through a sense of continuitv . " (1990: 224: 
emphasis added) 
"Defining oneself in social terms is a hosic an.ni:er to the human need to 
belong and lo survive ... In ifs deepest sense. ethnicity is a sense of 
q/Jiliative survival. " ( 199 5: 24) 
This need for continuity is perhaps best served by identification with symbolic 
objects with the resonance of an actual or imagined or constructed deep history 
-- ancient cultural or ancestral traditions; hence one arrives at ethnicity. To be 
certain, a case could be made that an expressive and deeply committed 
identification with the human race or with peoplehood in general could offer an 
alternative to ethnicity -- see Geoff Dench below. Progressive cosmopolitan 
humanist-idealist intellectuals argue this case very frequently. This argument 







Humanity at large, however, is very abstract and it does not have the essential 
functions which the expressive identification with a particular "people" would 
( fulfil, namely an opportunity to associate oneself closely with the p~he 
/ basis 0~11eci_"1c act11al, asslll!1ed_ or _in,agi!1<:_c!_~ttri btJte,_~terpreting de Vos 
· and Orozco ( 1990: 243), one could assert that one ''pull" which ethnicity has 
over other objects of identification is what they· call "contrastiveness". 
Obviously for an identification to have any potency. it must allow the identity-
seeker to feel distinctive or distinguishable. This contrastiveness is particularly 
necessary when dignity is threatened or pride is at stake: 
". .. humans generally exhibit a hasi<.: vulnerahilily to social as well as 
personal depreciation, belittlement. dehasemenl. degradation, 
denigration or defamation. " ( de Vos and Orozco. 1990: 46) 
When such threats to identity are present. and one must admit that they are 
ubiquitous in all societies, then, as de Vos and Orozco put it 
"An alternative ... is to resort to a protective and reactive form of ethnic 
definition as a means of establishing and maintaining a sense of 
collective dignity. "(220) 
Occupational or social status groups could also be argued to have the 
contrastiveness necessary to satisfy the need for special identity, and in a 
country like India. for example, they form the basis of ethnicity-like caste 
systems. But ethnicity has the advantage that it offers additional symbolic 
content. It offers both the ancestral resonance or historical depth and the 
contrastiveness. Ethnicity, as a more or less inevitable object of identification in 
non-homogenous social situations, therefore. appears to win the contest of 
resonance on points against other possible objects of social identification. It does 
not knock them out, however. 
In line with the discussion above, one can agree with de Vos and Orozco in their 
adamance when they say that sociologists should accept 
" ... ethnic or cultural identity as a primary social determinant on a par 
with nationalism and class affilialion in holh past and present conflicts 
within societies." (1990: 206) 
However. as already suggested, the ethnic group does not occupy this space 
exclusively -- there are ego-extensions of a similar type. such as status 
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possessions, sporting teams, pride · in honour bestowed and sexual prowess, 
personal popularity, national patriotism and a whole range of other possibilities. 
One could say that the need for identification is the constant (the equivalent of 
the "primordial" factor) but the human individual and community have choices 
when it comes to the objects of identification. 
As already briefly pointed out in chapter 1, de Vos and Orozco argue that 
"in this primary sense of belonging. an individuol can lean towards one 
of three orientations: a) a present-oriented general concept of citizenship 
and allegiance to the state or lo some more specific occupational 
definition: b) a more fi.1ture oriented. /ronscendent or universalist 
religious or political definition of the sell or c) some form of past-
oriented ethnic identity based on oncest1y and origin. 11 ( de Vos and 
Orozco, 1990: 218) 
To pu_t some of these options m more everyday terms, the identity-seeking 
individual can immerse himself or herself in a search for power, wealth and 
privilege, in civic consciousness and general patriotism. in religious devotion or 
humanist causes, or in an ethnic or parochial identity. One knows from common 
observation in society that these are in fact very real alternatives for people. 
One can deal with general patriotism as an alternative to ethnicity very quickly. I 
In a multi-cultural society, ethnicity will have the advantage, already discussed, 
of greater contrastiveness -- it will have more resonance than a cross-cutting 
patriotism, despite the occasional "highs" offered by warfare or major 
international sporting events which may give the latter a temporary emotive 
advantage. The Spanish may cheer for Spain in international soccer or tennis 
matches. but many return to Catalan or Basque loyalty the next week. The other 
choices, however, are far more complex. 
Why and how are specific choices made between the options outlined above? De 
Vos and Orozco try to give answers, although, as with much of their treatise it is · 
intertwined with other themes. At various points they refer to the concepts of the 
relative autonomy of individuals in different cultures, and to possible differences 
in the degree of ''.field independence" which one finds in different population 
categories (l 990: 240, 249, 236, passim). Obviously. cultures, classes or 
categories among which there is a high level of individual autonomy and field 
independence, will be less inclined to seek ethnic attachments than the case in 
populations in which individuation is not prominent. De Vos at one point calls 
this 
"contrastive independence. A particular culture can emphasise a 
particular style of ego development that expects a member lo seek 
individual mastery and to perceive selfcontrol as an internal process ... 
the individual is to become selfrelicml rather than passively dependent 
on others or on any outside force to address personal needs. Collective 
security is ubjured ... the individual lakes the initiative in an instrumental 
manipulation ol the social as ·well as the material environment. 11 (1990: 
69) 
This orientation has been more conventionally described in psychology as an 
"internal locus of control", or as the opposite of the "other-clirecled", less-secure 
tendencies which have also been long discussed in social psychology. De Vos 
also refers to the 
11
••• socially expediential (sic) individuals (who) are fhund not too 
infi·equently in contemporary society. They practice forms of 
individualistic social mobility at the expense of group ties. 11 ( 1990: 236) 
Also certain cultures, pre-industrial cultures in particular. but also eastern 
cultures. are of a type in which tendencies to individuation hardly exist, as 
opposed to western cultures in which highly individual expression is very 
frequent. There is an abundance of evidence of this variability in human society. 
Hence one might expect the "ethnic-orientation" to be rather weaker in western 
middle class society, and particularly among highly individuated professionals, 
managers and intellectuals. Geoff Dench is more explicit and more judgmental. 
He contrasts the 
"... self serving transformation of humanism hy libero/ elites into a 
philosophy for winners" with communalism and ethnicity as a 
'JJhilosophy for the weak", the "humhle .fhlk -- the losers in the open 
society. 11 (Dench, 1986: 180-182) 
This is perhaps why many social scientists, as members of liberal elites in the 
West, have found it so difficult, or threatening. to take ethnicity. seriously in 
their own societies. Both de Vos and Milton Gordon refer to what they call the 
"liberal expectancy" among social scientists and the intelligentsia. which has 
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had the consequence that the failure of America's "melting pot" ideal of ethnic 
assimilation took them by surprise ( de Vos and Orozco, 1990: 2 I 3; Gordon, 
1978: 68-70). One must accept that these other levels of identification will 
compete with ethnicity in industrial societies as sources of ego-defence and 
psychic investment. 
It may be suggested, therefore, that in order to make a case for ethnicity as the ( 
dominant ego-extension, one might have to confine the generalisations to the 
peasant, proletarian and lower-middle classes. in which one is likely to find 
majorities of people with low personal resources and less self-confidence. This 
author has found, in an empirical investigation. that self-confidence is very 
highly correlated with socio-economic status (Schlemmer. l 973). 
It would be overstressing this factor, however. to suggest that all confident, 
autonomous middle class individuals will eschew ethnic commitments. In any 
pool of self-actualising, "individuated" people one will find a proportion who 
will orientate to their ethnic groups on the basis of a sense of responsibility, . 
particularly if the ethnic group is under stress or disadvantage. It is from these 
middle-class "returnees" that ethnic groups frequently draw their leadership. I' 
Furthermore. middle class champions of etlmic causes may very well be I 
motivated by a very universal and democratically endorsed ethical consideration 
-- the right of cultural minorities to protection. self-expression and recognition 
of their status. One also has to allow, however. for the possibility that some of 
the middle class ethnic leadership might in this role perceive opportunities to 
manipulate ethnic feeling for particular political, economic or social causes, 
bringing in the instrumental views once again. 
Some authors state the case for the need-fulfilling functions of ethnicity so 
simply and logically that one wonders why so many sociologists have been able 
to avoid accepting this basis for ethnicity for so long. Horowitz describes the 
range of needs involved: 
11
••• the need for familiarity and community. for fcanily-like ties, for 
emotional support and reciprocal help, and for mediation and dispute 
resolution -- .for all the need, served hy kinship hut notF on a larger 
canvass ... Common ethnicity enhances the predictability of their 
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behaviour and imposes a set of normative obligations on transactions ... 
create bonds between bureaucrats and citizens ... " (Horowitz, 1985: 81 ). 
It is hardly surprising, then, that there are always enough people in any culture, 
or even any class within it, with the particular needs for ethnic identification 
discussed above, to make it a sufficiently consistent and pervasive phenomenon 
in world society to warrant acceptance as a universal and fairly (but not 
absolutely) inevitable phenomenon. 
Milton Gordon sums up the case for ethnicity as a powerful contender for the 
position of major "receptacle" for affiliative needs. As a form of "peoplehood" 
ethnicity, as Gordon puts it: 
"has proved to be hardy. As though with o wily cunning of ifs own, as 
though there were some essential element in mcm's nature that demanded 
it -- something that compelled him to merge his lonely individual identity 
in some ancestral group ojfellows smaller hy.fi.1r than the whole human 
race, smaller than the nation -- the sense of ethnic belonging has 
survived . . . twentieth century urban man is closer to his stone age 
ancestors than he knows." (Gordon, 1978: 108) 
The evidence and argument which has been adduced, in this author's judgement, 
has certainly established the case for a fundamental factor of considerable 
resonance in ethnicity. Some people may wish to call it a "primordial factor", 
but this would take it beyond the evidence adduced. A clear case, however, has. 
been made for an alternative ''fundamental" factor which does not rely on the 
reality or symbolism of blood and origin. It is therefore possible to avoid the 
"baggage" of crude primordialism and acknowledge the millions of words of 
convinced criticism of the theory of blood and lineage. The position which 
seems to emerge, more precisely, is that there is a personality-based need or 
disposition among manv people in most societies and subcultures that offers the 
option, to find external interactional or symbolic support reassurance and 
feedback to bolster self-esteem and self-concepts, and that the prevalence of this 
need is such as to ensure that ethnic or other communal attachments will be a 
persisting and ubiquitous phenomenon. 
At the same time, however, there is nothing that has been argued above that 
would discount the possibility that such externalisation of identity needs could 
I 
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not be provided by powerful shared ideological commitments. some kinds of 
class solidarities in the workplace, deep immersion in lifestyle pursuits, 
reassuring interpersonal relations within a family. sexual or marital context, and 
the like. We may accept the salience and fundamental nature of the needs, but 
we cannot necessarily accept, on the basis of the nature of such needs, that the 
inevitabilitv of ethnicity as the particular object or focus of such needs has been 
demonstrated. 
Summing up to this point, what one can argue is that among the deep-seated 
identity need gratifiers "on offer", as it \Vere. ethnic identity may enjoy a 
persisting advantage, for the following reasons. First because the svmbolism of 
ethnicity goes to the heart of the universal dilemma of self-esteem -- who am I. 
where do I come from. and who do I belonu to? There are many categories of 
people in any society who may have the material achievements. the alternative 
personal resources or the alternative social solidarities to sail above this type of 
identity reassurance. For the mass of people, particularly those who do not have 
strong alternative commitments, ethnicity and its cousins. racial and religious 1 
identification, are likely to remain powerful attractions as choices for ego-
externalisation. Furthermore, leadership and role models for the etlmic "cause" 
are always likely to be available. / 
' 
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matter of culture, values, symbols, languages, accents, lifestyles, or because it 
may be replete with historical justifications and myths of origin, ethnicity offers \: 
:::o::::::d:::d:nt:::t;o:l~:::~::~:::::1::::::;1::a::~:: ::~:~han class ) 
But, before closing the case in respect of the rootsprings of ethnic identification, 
one has to consider what the opponents of propositions such as those made 
above would say. Up to this point the "constructivist" and "instrumental" 
viewpoints have only been briefly outlined, and it is necessary to review the 
basis of these propositions in more detail and to assess their implications for the 
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propositions made about ethnic identification as a source of social need 
gratification. 
2.2.2 A CAUTIONARY COMMENT: SOCIETY AS SOCIAL FACTS. THE 
DANGER OF REDUCTIONISM AND OF OVERLOOKING HIDDEN 
RELATION SHIPS 
Any approach based on needs, need dispositions or other aspects of social 
psychology is not always compatible with typical approaches in sociological 
analysis. Many, if not most sociologists tend to approach social phenomena as 
processes or structures with regularities which impose themselves on individuals 
rather than as the outcomes of regularities which exist within the typical 
individual personality. Many sociologists would regard the foregoing section on 
social needs as somewhat of a sociological heresy. 
The danger of "reductionism" is usually seen to lie in attempting to explain 
propositions in one science in terms of the propositions applicable to another 
science. Another danger which would be identified would be that of accepting 
the phenomenon of ethnicity at face value and being lured by the gratifications 
and sentiments associated with ethnic commitment into overlooking less-
obvious but more salient relationships between ethnicity and other aspects of 
social structure. In this framework the approach of seeking explanations at the 
level of needs and motivations could be depicted as a celebration of some type 
of 'false consciousness", as Hanf, quoted earlier. has pointed out. Worse, the 
this criticism might even extend further to suggest that an approach, based on 
the assumption of social needs, could be giving undue legitimacy or cogency to 
conservative or anti-progressive views on the salience of ethnicity. 
In discussing the needs-based perspective. this author has tried to avoid drawing 
on social scientists whose views on ethnicity are part of their espousal of 
"traditional" values or socially conservative ideologies. By the same token, this 
author has also not drawn on another equally ideological category of social 
scientists, whose major preoccupation is to strip away all processes which 
complicate a revolutionary class-based analysis of society. 
I 
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There are. however, analyses without a focused ideological "agenda" which pose 
fundamental questions for any "primordial" hypothesis or for propositions about 
ethnicity based on patterned social needs. It is necessary to review some of these 
kinds of analyses by way of illustration. 
The most basic criticism of a primordial position. or one based on psychological 
variables or personality needs. would be the argument that sociology and 
political sociology should be based on ".,·oc:iuf fcu.:ts". and that bringing in the 
psychological factors like emotional needs or need dispositions. robs social 
analysis of its most meaningful content. There have been periods within schools 
of sociology when the accusation of such "reductionism" would have been 
enough to discredit an analysis without any further effort. 
Georg Simmel (1917/1950) argued for a pure sociology which would study 
patterns of social interaction as the most basic facts. Emile Durkheim, in his 
Rules of Sociolo2:ical Method (1895/1938). was even more prominent in arguing 
that the proper subject matter of sociology is social facts -- values, customs, 
laws, currents of thought, social institutions and other regularities of behaviour 
derived from a level of social as opposed to psychological action. These social 
elements exist at a level different to that of individual motivation and need, and 
exercise a shaping influence or coercive restraint on the individual irrespective 
of personality characteristics. Social reality is here seen as a reality sui generis 
and is irreducible to individual agency and hence to psychology. 
One possible argument within this broad tradition in the social sciences would 
be that ethnicity cannot be explained other than in terms of its own dynamic; 
that it has to be explained as a phenomenon which is intrinsically specific (in 
other words. it reproduces itself through its own mechanisms and not through 
extraneous motivations of participating members). This view of ethnicity would 
be that like anv other form of social structure. it is interactional or derived from 
" . 
patterns of interest or from the logic of the processes \.Vhich shape its existence. 
Therefore it would not be inevitable in society: alternative structural 
arrangements or processes could displace it or make it redundant. In other 
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words, ethnicity would have to achieve the regularity of occurrence and 
interactional logic of say, the family, or kinship. or interest-based organisation to 
impress this type of sociologist that it is a ubiquitous structure or pattern of 
society. 
More frequently, however, the argument would be made that a reductionist 
approach sacrifices the great strength and contribution of structural analysis, 
namely that by focusing on relations between elements of structure, or between 
interacting structures, the analyst is able to "detect". identify or uncover a deeper 
dynamic or pattern of causality which is not directly observable. The major 
example is Marxist analysis. While this approach can produce and has produced 
absurd propositions akin to a typical conspiracy theory. there can be no doubt 
that powerful interests in a society can. through very opaque processes of 
selecting and promoting certain responses, secure outcomes advantageous to 
themselves. For sociologists of this viewpoint. to argue that ethnicity is derived 
from regularities in the social needs and personality systems of individuals 
would be to ignore that such needs are shaped. inadvertently or through the 
manipulation of culture and social forces. by concentrations of economic and 
political interests. 
The arguments for structural analysis and against reductionism, however, should 
not be carried too far, and a number of streams of sociology and political science 
have found that the elements of individual agency. or patterned needs, have to be 
incorporated. The propositions of Parsons and Shils about need-dispositions 
have already been noted (Parsons and Shils. 1962). but there are many more 
persuasive arguments in subsequent literature. There have been many schools of 
theorists; theorists of the "middle range", the Symbolic Interactionists, the 
Exchange Theorists, the Social Phenomenologists. the Hermeneutic viewpoints 
and others, a vast weight of thought which has sought to "hring men back in", to 
quote George Homans (1964). The Collins Dictionwy of' Sociology takes a 
wisely cautious position, saying that: 
"The debate over (individual) agency and structure in sociology can be 
seen as fundamental to the discipline and unlikely ever to he resolved. ... 
It is clear that conceptions of structuralism ... must he acknowledged as 
a raising of central questions in sociological analysis that have been 
I 
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useful in combating a one-sided individualism. . . . Equally however, 
structuralism is <dten seen as itself unjustifiably one-sided even by some 
of its own previous leading proponents," (.lary and Jary. 1991: 634-5) 
The structural approach, however, is a useful source of caution in respect of the 
danger of over-emphasising the independent force of typical social needs. The 
sociological tradition of respect for "social fc1cts" must incline one t9 seek a 
balance or reconciliation between the psychologically and sociologically-based 
perspectives. A excellent guide to such a reconciliation is to be found in the 
contribution by Berger and Luckmann in their \VOrk "The Social Construction of 
Reality" ( 1967). Another _key work in this tradition is that of Anthony Giddens 
( 1984 ). but for present purposes the perspective by Berger and Luckmann will 
suffice. 
Berger and Luckmann put relevant parts of their argument together as follows: 
" ... society is a human v11orld. made hy men. inhabited hy men, and. in 
turn. making men in an ongoing historical process. (p2 l l) .. , man 
produces reality and thereby produces himself" (p204) 
Berger and Luckmann therefore do not see the psychological level as an 
immutable level of reality, akin to their examples of biological constraints on 
social patterns outlined elsewhere in their text. They are explicit in warning that 
psychological theories must be "adequate" in terms of the social context and 
reality in which the phenomenon becomes manifest. Hence they would argue 
that the ego-extension needs and needs for identity- reassurance discussed in the 
previous section are shaped by the type of society in which they appear: 
"The .specific contents that are internulisecl in primary socialisation vary, 
ol course, from society to socie(y. 11 (p/j5) Hence: "Identity is/armed by 
social processes ... determined by the social structure. 11 
(It might be possible for a collectivity of berry-eating recluses to develop 
completely different types of needs for identity and reassurance than those 
outlined in the previous section.) 
They continue: 
"Conversely. the identities pm@l.£-:.fi.!l. hy the inte,play o( organism, 
individual consciousness and social structure react upon the given social 
( 
structure, maintaining it modifying it and even reshaping it. 11 (pl 55) 
. Hence: "Identity is a phenomenon that emerges fi'om the dialectic 
between the individual and society. identity types. on the other hand, are 
· ... relatively stable elements ofobjective social reality." (pl 56) 
In drawing out the implications of this "dialectical" proposition for ethnicity one 
might say the following. In most of human society, people are socialised within 
families and the families are located in local communities with characteristics of 
language, habits, bonds of integration and interdependency and the like. Most 
children in society develop identities not like those that may be developed by 
berry-eating recluses, but identities in interaction with significant others up to 
the level of communities. This locality-relatedness and the awareness of 
linguistic and cultural similarities and differences between communities is a 
typical part of socialisation. This social space attunes identity formation to the 
possibility of identification with some and not others in the same society. Hence 
a basis of identity internalisation is formed which can elabo0k--in19_ etlmicity. 
Once this occurs, the structures of the ethnic interactions vvi ll reinforce, and be 
reinforced and maintained, by the identity formation. If there are factors in wider 
~- --·--·-~-~ 
social interaction in the society which induce stress or difficulties of adjustment 
or injuries to identity of any kind, the possibility will be great that the 
externalisation of identity will seek the comfort and the reassurance of the 
closest grouping of significant others -- the kin network, the village or m 
modern multicultural society the ethnic in-group. 
Where a society is so organised that there are no significant social differences 
between localities and communities to be internalised in the identity-forming 
process, then ethnicity will be less likely. The identity forming process and the 
needs for identification with significant others, even if intensified by difficulties 
in adjusting to the wider interaction, will find and take different forms. Hence 
there is a logic in the views of cosmopolitan humanists that schools should be 
desegregated and multi-cultural, that neighbourhoods should be integrated and 
that as much contact and familiarity across society as possible should be 
engineered. There was also a logic in the views of some of the early Communist 
revolutionaries that family systems and religious practices should be dismantled 
I 
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and replaced by bureaucratically run collectives of various types, m order to 
reduce the weight of conservatism in community life. 
But it is highly implausible in any modern multi-cultural society that all forms of 
closer identification with in-groups can be effectively discouraged or eliminated. 
The sheer and simple forces of lifestyle, language and proximity are sufficient to 
"-----~ 
create, not the final e~i}ic:: _ _pro_duct, but the conditions within which it can 
develop. Social needs for affinity and self-reflection. particularly if aggravated 
\..__ __ . 
by social stresses, will do the rest. 
From another perspective, Milton Gordon gives an overview of the debate on the 
place of individual psychological needs in his work on Human Nature. Class 
and Ethnicity (Gordon, 1978: chapter l ). Following Alex lnkeles. he makes the 
very vital point that the introduction of personality or psychological variables, 
but within a sociological context, is essential in order to reduce the amount of 
unexplained variance in typical structural analyses of social processes. He 
argues that: 
" ... very little sociological analysis is done without using at least an 
implicit p.\ychological theory. It seems evident that in making this theory 
explicit and bringing psychological data lo bear .\ystematically on 
sociological problems we cannot fail hut improve the scope and 
adequacy ofsociological analyses. 11 (Gordon. I 978: 32) 
How does this type of analysis relate to the "constn1cth1ist" and "instrumental" 
theories of ethnicity. There is no problem in reconciling this kind of view with 
that of the constructivists; the conditions for the emergence of ethnicity having 
been established, the boundary-forming and rationalising processes posited by 
the constructivists take the phenomenon further. formalising and entrenching its 
structures and rules of association. In fact, it is exactly what Berger and 
Luckmann would postulate when they argue that the dialectic of interaction 
between the individual and society is socially constructed. 
The problem arises in trying to reconcile this kind of approach with that of those 
"instrumentalists'' who would argue that the ethnic phenomenon is engineered or 
secured in ways difficult to observe by ma.1or interests. in support of their 
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relative advantage in society (see earlier outline of this position). Berger and 
Luckmann allow for this when they say that psychological theories may be 
"concocted 'before the fact' so to speak. Their subsequent social 
establishment and concomitant reality-generating potency may be 
brought about by any number of affinities he tween theorising personnel 
and various social interests. Deliberate ideological manipulation by 
politically interested groups is one historical possihility." (p200) 
The theorising personnel would be the ideologists and agents of the interests 
lurking in the cultural superstructure. 
Berger and Luckmann, however, see this as a possibilitv, and not as the 
inevitable or typical process. While this author also accepts the instrumental 
process as a possibility, for it to be the typical process would mean that the 
interests would have to gain access, in ;:m efiective and ongoing basis, to 
community life and family life and to meticulously orchestrate the responses of 
communities to their social environment. It would mean that power elites or 
capitalist agents, without attracting the attention of the media. ,vould be making 
sure that, say, Quebecois schools, churches. local community structures and all 
sorts of popular cultural activity are following an agenda to create and recreate 
an ethnic consciousness. This author is convinced that some of these interests 
attempt this kind of manipulation, but how could such attempts conceivably be 
as efficient as to secure widespread ethnic consciousness and solidarity. If ethnic 
manipulation is so efficient why have at least equally vigorous attempts by the 
US Federal Government in certain periods to counter race prejudice been less-
effective? 
The more plausible and probable explanation in cases where ethnicity coincides 
with interests is that the "base" process of ethnic group formation occurs largely 
independently of any manipulation by interests groups, but once established, it 
may be encouraged or reinforced by agents of the interests. frequently 
inadvertently. If the ethnic phenomena secure material and power advantages for 





Most mature analysts who would endorse the "instrumental" school do not need 
to assume that ethnicity is created by mysterious and covert processes of 
manipulation. In any event, "Ockham's razor" -- the recognised principle of 
"parsimony" in theory seems appropriate here: why seek elaborate and obscure 
explanations if more plausible and simpler explanations will do the job? 
The discussion of the approaches above which !econcile the structural and 
individualistic levels of explanation confirm the salience of individual agency, ---
motivation and needs arising from the situation of individuals. They warn 
against equating the needs with the assumptions of primordiality, however, 
because the case is compelling that the needs adduced are not absolutes or 
invariate objective realities with the status of biological characteristics. They are 
socially variable. both in flavour and in strength. They shape structure but are 
shaped by structure and the social conditions of the communities in which the -- - , . - --- - -- - -- - - ,__ .. . - - ... ~ ----
needs develop. 
If such needs for community and identity are fairly similar across modern world 
society, it is because the institutions of the family. of residential arrangements, 
of networks and localities are basically fairly similar. They are also not 
inevitable, because the way in which a local or group or status-group culture 
develops can produce alternative avenues for the gratification of such needs, The 
modern middle classes in pos_t-industrial society have indeed produced a 
powerful alternative, rooted in the cultural convergence accompanying 
globalisation. The rich life-styles and the recreational and occupational 
- ------
gratifications of the "cosmopolitan" classes make the need for particularistic 
identification redundant. 
Yet where they are salient, these needs, while in no way "primordial", have 
qualities akin to those generated by primordiality. They have the quality of 
"ineluctability". which is the quality which Shi ls reserved for the primordial 
motivations behind ethnicity. Primordiality -- no: but ineluctability under certain 
common social conditions -- yes. 
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The preceding sections have attempted to review most of the m8:JOr viewpoints on 
ethnicity contained in the literature. Not all signal contributors can be covered within 
the space limits of this dissertation, but the author would be disappointed to find out that 
a major perspective has been omitted. 
Before attempting to reconcile the various strands of theory as a basis for propositions 
to guide this analysis, _it is necessary to look specifically at the literature on ethnic 
mobilisation and conflict, as a further basis for understanding why ethnic processes 
might intensify, persist or decline as a consequence of their intrinsic dynamics or under 
the impact of extraneous social forces. This follows in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER3 
PROPOSITIONS ABOUT ETHNIC MOBILISATION AND 
ACTION AND THEIR OPPOSITES 
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lt is impossible in this review to avoid some overlap with the material covered in 
chapter 2. Some additional references to the nature of the ethnic phenomenon will 
appear, but as far as possible in a somewhat different context of assessment. 
As already suggested in chapters 1 and 2, the field of writing on ethnic or communal 
mobilisation, action and conflict has contributed a great deal to the body of wisdom 
about ethnic strife. But at the same time, some of the very authors whose contributions 
have been greatest have admitted that the level of precision of the knowledge seldom 
al lows confident predictions of conflict or action. This section will review the 
contributions as a further background to focussing the conceptual approach on the 
questions of ethnic action, persistence and decline in the South African case study. 
3.1 THE BALANCE OF FORCES: ETHNIC ACTION AS A STRATEGIC 
OUTCOME 
Perhaps the most plausible or convincing propositions are based on the assumption that 
ethnic action, like any form of dissent in society, is based on the strength of motivations 
in relation to the constraints and opportunities. Systematic propositions around the issue 
of ethnic mobilisation or its absence along these lines are a well-established approach. 
Some thirty years ago, Blalock (1967: ch. 5) for example, outlined a systematic 
approach of potential utility based essentially on a calculus of power, within what was 
basically a conflict paradigm. Although his propositions sound like truisms, they are the 
type of basic and in a sense common-sense dynamic often overlooked in current 
explanations of ethnic conflict. For example, he proposed that minority mobilisation 
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would be low if there is either a low perceived probability of reducing the 
discrimination against the minority or a high probability of extreme and punitive 
sanctions. Further, minority mobilisation is likely to be greatest where the group is 
intermediate in relative size, being neither too small to exert any meaningful influence 
nor so large as to constitute a major power threat, and as a consequence invoking 
powerful and early counter-reactions from the dominant majority. Given a minority of 
intermediate size, the probability of mobilisation is increased by the presence of a 
potential coalition partner not sufficiently powerful to mobilise successfully on its own. 
If dominant group mobilisation is increased as a result of the minority mobilisation, it 
will lead either to a reduction in minority reaction or. if the minority perceives the 
prospect of success, to an increase in the intensity of minority mobilisation leading to 
overt conflict. Blalock states the qualification, however. that the effectiveness of 
dominant group sanctions depends on the level of discrimination. If the latter is felt very 
intensely, the sanctions will lose their strength as a deterrent. 
These propositions are logical strategic considerations; as suggested they boil down to a 
type of power-instrumentality. Self-evident though they may be. one would be foolish 
indeed not to incorporate such propositions as very basic considerations in a 
hypothetical framework relating to ethnic mobilisation and action. The dynamics 
implied by Blalock's propositions may be too blunt to have great explanatory precision, 
however, and obviously one should allow for the effects of many coincidental or 
intervening factors which would reduce or augment the strength of any set of strategic 
calculations by an ethnic collectivity. 
An analysis in a similar kind of framework -- one which is essentially strategic or 
"instrumental" -- is presented by Donald Horowitz (1985: ch. 6), specifically around the 
question of ethnic separatism and secession. Suffice it to say that Horowitz looks at 
ethnic secession as the outcome of a type of strategic weighing of grievances, demands 
and constraints; prominent among the latter being the economic costs of secession. 
Elsewhere in the work, however, Horowitz demonstrates that he is abundantly aware 
that very complex intervening and conditioning variables are present in all ethnic 
interaction arid that strategic or instrumental perceptions can be augmented or weakened 
by more complex factors in the consciousness of the actors. 
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A very n·oteworthy recent attempt to increase the precision of analyses of ethnic dissent 
is that of Gurr. Ted Gurr has followed up his famous work. Why Men Rebel ( 1970), 
with an analysis focused on minorities (Gurr 1993); a very comprehensive review of 
statistical evidence relating to 227 ethnic minorities and their responses to their 
situations during the eighties. 
Gurr's findings show that the 
"consistently strongest determination of magnitudes of communal protest and 
rebellion in the 1980s is the group's prior mohilisalion for political action ... 
mobilisation for non-violent protest at the end of the 1970s predicts 33,4 per 
cent a/the magnitude ojjJrotest ... (and pri01) mohilisutionjhr rebellion predicts 
45, 5 per cent of the 1980's magnitude of rebellion ... "(p I 88). 
As Gurr points out, these results point to the power of a self-sustaining conflict 
dynamic. Gurr is obviously aware, however, that the more interesting question is why 
groups mobilise in the first place. and the interrelationships in his data provide some not 
unexpected answers. 
Gurr concludes: 
"Economic disadvantages, especially those associated with discrimination and 
poverty, are consistently correlated with economic and social grievances and 
with demands.for greater political rights. They also were weakly but consistently 
correlated with magnitudes of communal protest. Resentments about restricted 
access to political positions and a collective history of lost autonomy drive 
separatist demands and rebellion generally ... grievances (and the objective 
conditions to which they are a response) arc critical in the early stages ofgroup 
mobilisation, but become less significant than group orgunisation. leadership 
and state response once campaigns or organised politicul action are underway. 11 
(188-189) 
This is Gurr's resolution of the deprivation and mobilisation theories of civil conflict. 
Among the important early factors in the development of an activist ethnic 
consciousness is the loss of benefits or status, and here Gurr reinforces the propositions 
of other authors like Rothschild ( 1981) and Esman ( 1990). It is often noted that shifts or 
changes in relative status or rewards are accompanied by greater awareness of the 
benefits they can bestow. 
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Of particular interest is Gurr's assessment of the effects of the surrounding political 
system. In institutionalised democracies, he observes. the trend is for dissent to take the 
form of organised communal protest, whereas communal rebellion prevails in non-
democratic states. In some democratising states, the presence of communal challenges 
shifts the system towards autocracy. Gurr concludes that 
"the process ·ol democratisation provides opportunities that ::ipur the 
mobilisation of communal groups for both protest und re hellion ... In p<~werful 
states the balance of opportunities and risks fc1vour communal protest over 
rebellion ... In states that most rapidly expanded their JHJtvers ... rebellion was 
intensified and protest diminished . .. the process of 'slale-huilding' has had 
inimical effects on many communal groups. e.\pecially those on the social and 
geographic margins." (Gurr, 1993: 189-190) 
Renee de Nevers also considers the wider political context and in the process has made 
a useful attempt to systematise the effects of patterns of power and the nature of its 
expression on the likelihood of ethnic conflict, by looking specifically at what can occur 
in democratising states to reduce or exacerbate ethnic conflict ( de Nevers. Renee (l 993: 
31-48). 
De Nevers also assumes that ethnic groups with an established identity in a multi-ethnic 
society are more or less automatically predisposed to defend their ethnic interests under 
certain conditions, and this is discussed in the next section. After exploring the varieties 
of forms of response to ethnicity the author concludes that there are conditions in an 
emerging democracy which can reduce or eliminate the potential for conflict, 
particularly smce the democratising process itself encourages a temporary 
"submergence" of ethnic commitments. But it is a submergence. not an elimination of 
the potential for ethnic action. The ethnic factor is assumed to be always at least 
potentially present as a basis of reaction if ethnic relations are mismanaged in the new 
democracy. 
Drawing from various parts of de Nevers' analysis allows the following summary to be 
made of the major factors which, in her view, will encourage ethnic conflict or hostile 
reactions from ethnic collectivities under conditions of democratisation ( de Nevers' 
propositions are not in the original order and are summarised and paraphrased): 
• a history of ethnic grievances; 
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the impossibility or perceived impossibility of an ethnic group addressing those 
grievances through legal or political channels; 
• intolerance or absence of moderation among ethnic leaders; 
• the previous government having been a non-democratic minority regime; 
• previous authoritarian manipulation of the ethnic distributions in the society; 
• solidary or mono-ethnic opposition to the old regime, as opposed to inter-ethnic 
co-operation in opposing the old regime; 
• perceptions among political leaders of advantage m perpetuating ethnic 
hostilities; 
• uneven sizes of ethnic groups in the new society: 
• the presence of ethnic allies in influential positions in neighbouring states; 
• the military (or, it can be added, the state bureaucracy) becoming dominantly 
composed of one ethnic group or certain ethnic groups to the disadvantage of 
others,· as opposed to a composition which is heterogeneous and unable to be 
stereotyped; 
the ignoring or underestimation of the ethnic factor 111 negotiations for the 
establishment of the new democracy; and, 
• a political and constitutional system which does not through devolution or other 
constitutional devices, create a reasonable balance between the power enjoyed 
by different ethnic groups in the society. 
It is difficult to question any of these propositions, because they have a face validity in 
the light of the numerous historical and contemporary examples to which de Nevers 
refers. The only part of this analysis which could be open to challenge is the\ 
assumption, mentioned earlier, that ethnic groups will inevitably behave as collectivities 
in response to their political situation. For the rest. de Nevers' exposition seems to boil ..J 
down to sound, practical principles of ethnic conflict management in divided societies, 
the absence of which is likely to produce the kind of reactions which are so typical in 
situations of rapid change, as in the former Yugoslavia, Soviet Union and perhaps South 
Afrfoa. 
De Vos ( 1995: ch l) sets out a variety of circumstances under which the ethnic identity 
will not become activated for action in a situation of cultural pluralism. They include 
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the internalisation by groups suffering discrimination of the negative images which 
others have of them, leading to demoralisation and even to social pathologies, a reaction 
in which an ethnic group may retreat from any social. challenge and become less visible, 
concentrating on achieving material self-reliance. Alternatively stated. this is a strategic 
compliance with wider societal norms while the group develops capacities to compete, 
and a denial of ethnic identity in order to more readily assimilate into the wider 
community or achieve individual status advancement. This ties in with Horowitz point 
that the cement is stronger in ranked systems. 
The paradigms of Gurr and de Nevers can be accepted as broadly applicable to 
mobilised ethnicity for itself (to borrow from the well-known distinction made for class 
consciousness between class "in itse(f' and class ''./hr itself"). a prior analysis may be 
required to assess to what extent a nominal ethnic category has become a self-defined 
category of interest and status, competing as such, in the wider community. This prior 
analysis will presumably be the ''.fine grain" to which Gurr refers as necessary in the 
analysis of etlmic mobilisation (Gurr, 1993: 189). 
Gurr emphasises balance of opportunity and constraint up to overt suppression. Given, 
however, that ethnic commitments can be covert, and if the ethnic commitment has 
become established as the basis of the gratification of identity needs, no amount of 
coercion will eradicate it completely, as already suggested above, unless alternative 
opportunities for identity and status gratification exist. The alternatives, if rewarded, are 
likely to gain ascendancy over negatively sanctioned ethnic commitments. 
Many of the propositions and findings discussed thus far tend to correspond broadly 
with the earlier propositions of Blalock. As such they present ethnic action as a response 
to deprivation and relative deprivation at basis, but thereafter the direction, mode and 
intensity of the action is determined by the framework of strategic opportunities, 
constraints and ameliorating forces within the power arena. 
These examples of predictive paradigms all reflect the very broadest of dynamics. What 
they are saying in effect is that ethic groups will develop conceptions of their interests, 
and on that basis are likely to compete within economic and political systems. 'If 
invidiously ranked or discriminated against within labour markets or in social ranking 
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systems as a whole, and if the discrimination is perceived as deprivation relative to what 
they feel they are entitled to receive, which occurs particularly when groups have lost 
autonomy, status or resources, they will be predisposed to act in defence of communal 
interests. If furthermore, they perceive opportunities for success in altering their 
situation, they may actively dissent or rebel. Such action is most likely where the group 
has already been mobilised for protest or active dissent, and has a history of such action. 
It is also more likely at intermediate levels of political opportunity -- those between 
extreme repression and the full access and incorporation of minorities in successful 
pluralist democracies. 
Williams (1994: 73) lists the critical elements: 
1. Strong ethnic identities and boundaries 
2. Grievances 
3. Opportunity structures relative to ethnic group resources 
4. Resource mobilisation. 
He emphasises that these factors have to be attended to simultaneously in attempting to 
explain or predict minority dissent. 
This kind of summing up has a persuasive common-sense logic to it, and considerable 
empirical support, but nevertheless the predictive power of such propositions is 
generally not strong. The regression coefficients quoted by Gurr illustrate this 
weakness. The lack of predictive precision is usually due to the presence of variations 
within the causal factors and the presence of intervening factors which can nullify, alter, 
weaken or strengthen the cause and effect relationships. Gurr himself refers to the need 
to follow up his general propositions and interrelationships with more detailed (".fine-
grained") analyses in order to increase the depth and the precision of the propositions 
(Gurr, 1993: 189). 
R.A. Schermerhorn (1970: chl) describes how his repeated and unsuccessful attempts to 
apply the categories of "power-conflict" analysis to ethnic action throughout world · 
history eventually drove him to accept that a less mechanical and more dialectical view 
was necessary to explain both the presence and absence of ethnic dissent. He refers to 
Max Gluckman in pointing out that conflict between groups of unequal power in 
societies can "engender integrative bonds" that have ".system" characteristics, and which 
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can include surprising degrees of mutuality and reciprocity amidst the stress of inter-
group competition, conflict and even oppression. Hence the "conflict" can always 
gradually acquire the characteristics of a self-sustaining equilibrium, albeit invidious in 
objective terms for one or more of the groups involved. 
One obviously has to qualify the notion of ethnic conflict as some kind of 
discrimination-driven war-game with reference to more complex perspectives from 
systems theory in general and from social psychological theory. Respect for this 
complexity immediately leaves room for an examination of the particular features of 
ethnic identity, because in the process of identity formation or its change over time, one 
may discover a greater or lesser propensity for ethnic dissent or aggressive mobilisation. 
Gurr, for example, might have been able to isolate the general factors in the situation 
which are most significant but they do not consistently have the effects which his 
regression equations point to. One group with a sense of deprivation may rebel, but 
another group with an equal sense of deprivation may attempt to deny or play down the 
ethnic identity in order to try to escape the discrimination. One will have to attempt to 
assess the extent to which lhe escape routes for a group are denied, but also differentiate 
between nuances in the characteristics of ethnic consciousness within Gurr's broader 
categories in order to achieve greater precision. The importance of the actors' own 
definitions and self-definitions, which Gurr's analysis could not incorporate, are 
critically related to the type of action one has in mind. Individuals and indeed even 
collectivities have to make complex connections between their circumstances or status 
and their ethnic identity, and the nature of the perceived connection will influence their 
collective strategies. 
Mason points out the dilemma: 
"Ethnic divisions . . . are rather common features among the members of the 
contemporary nation state system, and ethnic groups typically co-exist in some 
structural arrangement characterised by differential distribution of societal . 
benefits on the basis of ethnicity. if such discrimination were sufficient to induce 
ethnic conflict. then such conflict would be far more pervasive and persistent 
than it is the fact. Indeed. what is striking is !he relative rarity of ethnic 
collective action in a global system in which ethnic stratification is anything but 
rare." (Mason, 1992: 579) 
I 
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Part of the indeterminate nature of the ethnic dynamic is the critical role of ethnic 
intellectuals who are " ... articulate and ambitious und at the same time occupied with a 
search.for identity" (Williams, 1994: 66), and the effectiveness of intellectuals does not 
necessarily co-vary with the factors predisposing groups to dissent. Another part of the 
indeterminacy lies in complex interactions between ethnic mobilisation, modes of 
dissent and the level of socio-economic development in a country or a region. Horowitz 
(1985:258), observes from his inventory of cases of conflict that secessionist 
movements tend to be early and frequent for less-developed groups in less-developed 
regions, and both rare and late among socio-economically advanced groups in advanced 
regions. with permutations of these factors in between. Possibly the "status" and 
credibility of the surrounding political economy is an important factor. 
3.2 CONFLICT AS INTRINSIC TO ETHNIC PHENOMENA 
3.2.l ETHNICITY AS A VEHICLE FOR EXTRANEOUS INTEREST-
COMPETITION 
Some propositions of general utility in understanding propensities for ethnic 
dissent can be derived from theories of ethnic conflict which reduce the field of 
complexity by focusing on key interests which are hypothesised to lie at the core 
of ethnic interaction, and would by extension see ethnic dissent · as a 
phenomenon akin to class action, and as such inherently competitive. For 
example there is the analysis so-called ".split lahour morkets" and the inter-group 
hostilities which are generated (Bonacich, 1972: 547-559). Another useful 
perspective, and one referred to in the previous chapter is offered by Hechter 
( 1975) and others, namely that of "internal cofoniolism". Similar to this 
perspective is the long-standing analysis made by South African Communist 
Party anti-apartheid activists of what they termed "colonialism of a special 
type", in their attempts to integrate the class, racial and ethnic dimensions of 
minority domination in the old South Africa (No Sizwe, 1979). These 
contributions, however, assume that because the ethnic phenomenon has an 
interest base of a class type or of a type associated with the striving for liberation 
from colonial domination, the likelihood of mobilised action can be expected. 
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This begs the question of why some victims of class or colonial domination will 
act and others will remain quiescent for long periods. 
3.2.2 ETHNIC STATUS AS INTRINSICALLY COMPETITIVE 
There are various contributions which depart from the view that ethnicity. as an 
interest in itself, has a type of in-built propensity to result in mobilisation. 
Hannan (1979) and Olzak (1992), for example. propose or imply a basic 
propensity for inter-ethnic competition in society. Renee de Nevers (1993) 
argues " ... Thus. the potential for elhnic con/lie! is almost universal ... " (p32). 
This assumption is so strongly held that the author poses the question of whether 
ethnic conflict is not an "inevitable" consequence of the disintegration of 
authoritarian controls in a democratising society. Ethnic groups are assumed to 
respond like interest groups and classes. but with the rewards being based on 
status and prestige rather than material benefits -- Weber's ( 1922/1968/1980) 
basic view, as suggested in the previous chapter. The implication would be that 
there is constant and universal competitiveness between ethnic categories 
seeking to maximise opportunities for status enhancement, or alternatively 
seeking to protect status positions. The studies in question have explored how 
processes of modernisation, urbanisation. nation-building and the expansion of 
the bureaucratic state can alter or intensify the conditions of inter-ethnic 
competition, and as such precipitate conflict and dissent. Of particular interest 
has been the evidence that processes can occur which break down existing 
barriers to contact between groups and in so doing create conflict when prior 
"boundary" mechanisms lose their effectiveness -- ethnic responses surge at the 
very time when the political and social systems are expected to achieve 
integration and assimilation. As the assessment of Weber's views in the previous 
chapter would suggest, however, ethnic status interests may also become less 
and less relevant in the modem bureaucratic state, and many ethnic groups have 
become assimilated into larger national identities. or into supra-national class 
loyalties. 




"All modern nation-states seem to go through a process ol attempting to 
forge a set of belief.r.; that serve as their cornerstone . . The search for 
underlying identities, for shared commilmenls to rhe same set of!Jymbols, 
no doubt will continue to be the most challenging feature ol nation-
building and one to arouse ancient rivalries within new and old nations." 
(Orum 1983:288-289) 
The once confident assumptions that traditional "particularisms" would be 
eroded by "universal" values and loyalties in the processes of political 
modernisation have proven to be extremely problematic. not only as processes 
but within the content of the over-arching values of nation-building themselves 
(see chapter 2, and the arguments of Geoff Dench in particular). Here again, 
however, overarching nation-building works in some situations and arouses 
resistance from ethnic groups in others, and the question is why this variability 
should exist. 
Horowitz ( 1985: part II), in his exploration of what has been termed the theory 
of "relative group worth". adds the depth of the We berian perspective on status 
as a general reward system to this kind of perspective on inter-ethnic 
competition within the nation state. Against the background of such 
assumptions, the potential for protest, dissent and rebellion can in a sense be 
roughly predicted on the basis of social, political and economic changes which 
alter or threaten established concepts which group members have of their 
relative position in society. 
Horowitz also makes observations about the variability in the salience of 
ethnicity between Western and less-developed societies which shed light on 
Weber's assumption that the modem, rational nation state would erode ethnicity. 
He makes the point, supported by empirical references. that the intensity of 
ethnic conflict is lower in the West than it is .in Third World states. This he 
ascribes to the fact that the over-arching national identities in the West have 
relatively great salience, to the presence of compelling alternative commitments 
and generally to cross-cutting affiliations which prevent ethnicity from 
displacing other forms of identification in civil society. As a consequence 
perhaps, even ethnic parties tend to reach out beyond ethnic issues (Horowitz, 
1985: 18-21). 
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These observations lend some credence to the Weberian expectation that 
ethnicity would be eroded in modernised political systems. but the evidence is 
that it has not occurred to the extent that Weber expected. The core principles of 
ethnic affiliation have survived the modern era almost everywhere. What is 
useful from the perspective of this dissertation. however, is that the modes of 
governance and civic organisation in the society are important variables bearing 
upon the strength of ethnic attachments. 
There is compelling evidence of the validity or partial validity of all the 
perspectives discussed above, but they do not necessarily offer predictive 
precision as far as the strength of ethnic mobilisation is concerned. The fact that 
boundary maintenance has weakened or that ethnic status is threatened does not 
necessarily lead to conflict. Within the predisposing factors one has to look for 
patterns of interaction which increase the likelihood of mobilised dissent. 
ETHNIC CONFLICT IN RANKED AND UNRANKED SYSTEMS 
In chapter 1, one of the definitions of ethnicity noted distinguished between 
ranked and unranked ethnicity. The analysis of Horowitz identifies its 
importance in respect of modalities in the potential for ethnic conflict in society. 
Horowitz argues that in ranked systems. there is often a more or less explicit 
"premise of inequality" with an associated degree of consensus or acceptance by 
the subordinate status groups of their inferior social position, strengthened by 
reciprocity and clientelism. All this leads to greater predictability in inter-ethnic 
relations in stable ranked systems. By contrast. unranked systems are less 
predictable: "As there is less generalised domination. so there is also less 
generalized collaboration." (Horowitz, 1985: 28) 
In situations in which the stability of the system is threatened. ethnic conflict 
tends to take different forms in ranked and unranked ethnic interaction. 
Horowitz points out that because class and ethnic status tend to coincide in 
ranked systems, ethnic dissent tends to be in the direction of social revolution or 
transformation. In unranked systems, the ethnic groups behave like incipient 
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nations, and will act stratetegically in pursuit of objectives, which are usually to 
secure rights to separation or autonomy rather than to overthrow the existing 
system (p30-3 l ). Horowitz also makes the useful point that in unranked systems, 
because class and ethnic status cut across each other. there is a tendency for 
class issues to be avoided. Hence the politics of ethnic conflict in ranked 
systems tends to be radical, whereas that in unranked systems tends to be 
conservative (Horowitz, 1985:32). 
3.3 THE FACTOR OF EMOTIVE INTENSITY OR "MAGNIFYERS" AS 
FACTORS IN CONFLICT 
Among the alternative sources of social identity, ethnic identity may have a particularly 
compelling quality. Some definitions of ethnicity and nationalism assume that a 
propensity for conflict is built into the very nature of the identity. George Brock has 
been quoted by Pfabigan ( 1991: 54) as defining the phenomenon as: 
". .. a people united by a common dislike of its neigh hours and a common 
mistake about its origin." ---·-
Many others, however, would insist that ethnic identity and even ethnic mobilisation do 
not necessarily imply ethnic conflict. 
The study of Arend Lijphart, which demonstrated, in the very cradle of class theory and 
ideological mobilisation, Europe, that ethnic and religious interests have weighed more 
heavily in the outcome of elections than class interests, is very telling (Lijphart, 1979, 
1980). Lijphart found in a "crucial" experiment in four societies in which class 
divisions, ethnic identities and religious cleavages existed. that a multivariate statistical 
"tree" analysis showed religion to have the strongest influence on voting, followed by 
language, with class in a distant third place. He also ·suggested that religion may have 
enjoyed priority over ethnicity because it had historical links with party mobilisation, 
and that there were alternative avenues in the society for expressing ethnic interests. 
There was no doubt, however, that class lagged far behind in the extent of its political 
effect. 
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What might be seen as a contrasting opinion on this issue is that of Mason ( 1992), who 
makes the point that despite the ubiquity of ethnic stratification. serious open ethnic 
conflict as such is relatively rare. To this valid observation one must add the point that 
class-based organisation and action is commonplace in most complex societies. But the 
test of the power of ethnicity does not lie only in its potential for open conflict. Dench 
points out that class loyalties, being based on competitive levels of relative material 
advantage and disadvantage, are not as resilient as ethnic loyalties because they are 
subject to segmentation and internal differentiation: 
"Real material interests tend to unite small segments much more powerfully than 
large ... class-in-itself is still light years and many pmyers awcryji-om becoming 
a class-:for-itse(f." (Dench. 1986: 192) 
These points are not the issue. however. The issue is that ethnicity tends to have a more 
powerful effect than class in its interaction with political variables, and when ethnic 
conflict emerges, it is more difficult to resolve than material disputes. 
The critical question to be answered is whether or not ethnicity as a form of social 
identification and mobilisation has a tendency to encourage or promote conflict more 
than other forms of interest articulation in society. and for that reason needs special 
treatment. In popular discourse the point is often made that religious and ethnic 
conflicts are more difficult to resolve than class-based conflict because the issues in 
dispute in the case of the former are never quantitative. A strike over wages, a 
movement of protest over taxation or a land dispute between communities can often be 
resolved with a trade-off, a quantitative compromise. It needs no particular insight to 
realise that trade-offs are less possible when categorical distinctions or symbolic values 
are involved. A settlement offering a religious minority half of its claim to truth or an 
ethnic or racial group half of its claim to dignity is likely to be more aggravating than 
reconciling. The symbolism mobilised simply does not lend itself to mediation. 
Donald Horowitz, in a section entitled "The long reach of ethnicity" describes how 
pervasive the ethnic dimension can be in a multi-cultural society: 
"The permeative propensities of ethnic affiliations in divided societies are easily 
demonstrated ... ethnicity finds its way into Cl myriad of issues: development 
plans. educational controversies, trade union of/airs. land policy, business 
policy, tax policy. Characteristically, issues that elsewhere would be relegated 
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to the category of routine administration assume a central place on the political 
agenda of ethnically divided societies. 11 (Horowitz. 1985: 8) 
Other particular aspects of this problematic have been identified by some of the other 
authors reviewed thus far. De Vos, for example, makes the point that ethnic groups can 
maintain their solidarity and commitments even to their own material and status 
disadvantage ( de Vos, l 990: 206, 212), and that ethnic mobilisation can involve 
irrational elements which makes ethnicity " ... fimction as u continual source of 
instability in complex stratified social :,,ystems" (206). 
Another feature of ethnicity, which de Vos, among many others has mentioned. is the 
longevity of ethnic memory. ln a few paragraphs he suggests that the germs of early 
20th century German racial ideology could conceivably be traced back to the particular 
patterns of conquest of agricultural Slav people south of the Baltic by Teutonic knights 
in the eleventh centurv. He talks of a "psychocultural European "disease" .. that is a 
cultural inheritance ol the middle ages" (182, 183). "Ethnic mainlenonce depends on 
the force a/feelings developed in the past as well as events in the present" (de Vos, 
1990: 216). As a phenomenon which has an intrinsic tendency to justify itself on the 
basis of ancestral tradition or experience, ethnicity can call into play and reactivate past 
trauma or injury to the group at any time. Since past injury cannot be corrected by 
present policy, ethnic mobilisation can produce totally insoluble problems for the 
present. One can seriously ask the question of whether any form of afiirmative acti_on 
will ever be able to ameliorate the collective pain of simply the knowledge of their 
slavery for Afro-Americans. 
Then de Vos also makes reference to phenomena associated with threatened group 
identity which he calls "projection" and "pejorative di.wlacemen/''. which are better 
known by the commonplace word "scapegoating". De Vos makes the point that 
"Group identity is very often based, partially al least. on an ability to perceive 
outsiders in a contrasting pejorative sense . . . outsiders can be evaluated 
negatively in reference to traits that may be equally present hut are not 
recognizable within one's own group." ( 1990: 68) 
This is also otherwise known as stereotyping and a similar concept in the literature on 
race relations is "stigma". Once again, it hardly needs to be stated that inter-group 
reconciliation is made infinitely more difficult by such processes where they exist, and 
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they exist very often in ethnic and racial interaction and mobilisation. for reasons which 
will be explored presently. 
Where in-group maintenance is associated with rituals of "puritv", and where such 
rituals have involved pain or self-sacrifice, then a boundary is established between the 
in-group and others which has deep significance for the individuals conceme~:i. At a 
collective level this can lead to pariah status for the outsiders in the minds of the in-
group members, and to the notion that the danger of "contamination" is ever present in 
dealing with the outsiders. These processes can make ethnic reconciliation infinitely 
more problematic than. say. a class conflict. Very frequently the blending of religious 
and ethnic identity sets a basis for the development of notions of purity (see de Vos and 
Suarez-Orosco. 1990: 167-179 for a discussion of notions of purity in ethnicity). 
Drawing out the implications of these features would suggest. then. that the ethnic (or 
religious and other communal factors) in situations of conflict add to any instrumental 
concerns the intensifving factor of affective ties -- much more intense than interest 
involvement. Horowitz (1985: 14) makes the point that if the rewards in the case of 
ethnic conflict 
"... lie in the area of' psychic gratification, or if the colculations of the 
participants are so relative that no benefit i.,· considered a gain unless it comes 
at the expense of an opponent", 
which he would agree is often the case with ethnic conflicts. the potential for an 
intensification of conflict is obvious. 
This is why class-based conflict, except among leaders and intellectuals who might feel 
that their worth and dignity is ignored by a bourgeois establishment appears not to 
generate the heat of ethnic or religious conflict. Interest competition without an ethnic 
dimension may be more frequent, but it seldom has the capacity to arouse irrational 
passions the way ethnicity can. 
At the same time. however, as a qualification of the suggestion that ethnicity intensifies 
social conflict one has to acknowledge a very common. indeed well-nigh universal 
pattern of dual identity or biculturalism. As ubiquitous as mobilised ethnicity is the 
phenomenon of ethnic groups associating themselves with over-arching national 
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identities. The frequent reference to Italian-Americans or Irish-Americans, to Scots-
British, to German Swiss, to Tamil or Gujerati Indiai1s and the like bring to mind the 
very many instances in world culture where a dual identity is not necessarily 
problematic. De Vos quotes a number of authors to suggest that biculturalism is not 
always characterised by the marginality of the ethnic minorities involved. as many 
earlier authors feared ( de Vos, 1990: 234 ). 
3.4 THE INDETERMINACY OF ETHNIC CONFLICT POTENTIAL 
Quite clearly none of the propositions above can plausibly claim that mobilisation and 
dissen·t are inevitable. While many of them will account for the pervasiveness of the 
phenomenon of ethnic dissent, there is a large margm of indeterminacy in the 
phenomenon. 
Part of the reason for the indeterminacy and variability of the ethnic dynamic as it 
relates to dissent is that ethnic phenomena and consciousness are infinitely fluid and 
capable of what one could call "self-augmentation" or "sel(negation", to the point that 
it is well-nigh impossible to define "hard" indicators of ethnic identity itself. let alone 
predicting a propensity for mobilised action. Denis-Constant Martin ( 1995: 5-21 ), 
among others, has described ethnic action as a "narrative" -- a script which is infinitely . 
capable of being rewritten by the actors under the impact of changing opportunities as 
perceived by themselves. Hence an ethnic "idea" can be created within a situation in 
which it may not hitherto have been a very prominent possibility. and it can evaporate 
equally unexpectedly if some alternative set of opportunities presents itself. Examples 
are given of Hindu nationalism mobilised in response to perceived external threats from 
Muslims in India, with the Hindu group feeling arching over different racial and cultural 
groups. Who would have expected light-skinned Brahmin elites and black Dravidian 
peasants to perceive a common identity and commit themselves to a common struggle? 
Power and class interests might have less mutability than ethnic phenomena. Ethnicity 
is perhaps closer in form and characteristics to linguistic phenomena in its capacity for 
subtle variability. 
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This is not to say that ethnicity is an ephemeral phenomenon or epiphenomenon. There 
is a sufficient commonality to ethnic phenomena where they present themselves, to 
justify the assumption of a powerful and "generic" underlying dynamic. which can be 
mute or explosive, depending on a complexity of factors. 
One also has to allow for the possibility of "tiers" or layers of identification. Hence 
there may be a most basic specific ethnic loyalty, but at a more general level a racial 
solidarity in which different ethnic groups combine in contradistinction to a third group 
of racial outsiders. This has been typical of many colonial situations and is particularly 
relevant in the South African case. It can apply to inclusive Chinese. Indian and Anglo 
Saxon groups outside of their countries of origin as well. Since. as we have agreed, race 
can be a form of ethnicity, one then has the situation of both more specific and more 
inclusive ethnic categorisations in a society, which may dilute the potential intensity of 
a particular primary identification. At the time of writing. a news item has reported a 
multi-ethnic solidarity protest against racism in Sidney. Australia. involving Aboriginals 
and various Asian groups (Citizen, 25/11/1996). 
Indeed one of the hallmarks of complex modern industrial society is that of dual or 
multiple roles, statuses and identifications. As the previous chapter signalled, one of the 
objectives of this study is to elaborate the formula for stable and mutually acceptable 
accommodations involving both specific and overarching ethnic loyalties in stable 
balance. For present purposes l:et us record that despite its "intensifying" potential, 
ethnicity need not always be the source of stress and stand-offs in a society. Ethnicity is 
a highly combustible element, but it is not inevitably ignited. 
One must accept therefore, that in terms of its conflict potential. ethnicity is not a zero-
sum factor but manifests itself in degrees. The dimension of the degree of 
intensification which ethnicity imparts interacts with the dimension of types.of interests 
involved. Ethnic conflict can be about as many issues as any other form of conflict. 
Extracting from personal recall, and from Horowitz (1985). Stone ( 1985) and a number 
of other authors one may broadly summarise the patterns in the following categories of 
active, mobilised or institutionalised ethnicity: 
ethnic groups as surrogate classes; 
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intra-class ethnic divisions, most frequently seen in the phenomenon of divided 
labour markets with all the potential which that has for intensifying competition 
for scarce job opportunities or occupational status advancement (see chapter 2); 
ethnic groups in status competition or in conflict over relative group worth, 
which often results in competition for symbolic rewards rather than material 
advantages; 
the phenomenon already referred to of "internal colonialism", in which all the 
claims of a particular group may be frustrated by a dominant group -- material 
advantages and access to material resources. group status and honour and access 
to power; 
the phenomenon of the fully developed plural societv, as described by J.S. 
Furnivall (1948), M.G. Smith (1965), Leo Kuper and M.G. Smith (1969), within 
which cultural segments or subgroups become incorporated into the central 
market economy but are segregated and/or choose to retain a separate sphere of 
societal existence more or less complete in itself. The principle is that 
'formations" much more comprehensive than clnsses, strata or minorities are 
differentially incorporated into the political economy of the society which 
emerges as a combination of both ethnic strata and ethnic "pillars", coherently 
manipulated to serve the social, political and economic needs of the dominant 
group or groups. It will be argued that, notwithstanding the fact that the concept 
of the plural society has fallen into disuse, South African society was a classic 
case of a "plural society" until the collapse of apartheid in 1994. But as will also 
be pointed out, the application of theories of the plural society to South Africa 
was always hotly opposed ·by progressive critics on the grounds that it 
complicated and weakened the diagnosis of the former society as a system of 
racism and human rights violation or as a system of capitalist exploitation of 
ethnic divisions in the search for control over the labour power and its 
reproduction. 
Each one of these types of social action or organisation in which ethnicity is embroiled· 
has a particular profile as regards potential for conflict. If one interrelates these 
differences with the differences in degree of conflict potential in the permutations of 
identity discussed above, it is abundantly clear that ethnicity is hugely complex and 
subtle in its associations with social conflict, but because of the "combustibility" of the 
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CONCLUSIONS FROM THE LITERATURE: 
EMERGING PROPOSITIONS 
This dissertation has a dual focus; one general and the other the South African case 
study. In respect of the general focus, a contribution might be made by drawing together 
aspects of the literature reviewed in a series of propositions, even though only some of 
them might turn out to be relevant to the South African case study. 
A large number of interrelated propositions can be drawn from the review of the 
literature. The variety of these propositions poses a challenge of integration for theory. 
Furthermore, the points made in the review of the literature have often suggested wider 
generalisations. As a consequence the propositions made below are either directly 
drawn from the literature reviewed, or are elaborations consonant with the literature. 
In the interests of brevity. they will be organised in a schema. This kind of treatment is 
not ideal because ethnicity is redolent of subtlety and at times blurred meanings and 
ambiguity, not to mention the indeterminacy discussed in the last chapter. The attempt 
which follows is therefore subject to serious qualifications, but it may shorten the 
process of drawing conclusions nevertheless. 
The procedure which will be followed will be to proceed through different levels of the 
phenomenon, identifying first the necessary conditions for or features of ethnic 
consciousness. followed by what appear to be the patterns relevant to ethnic filQill2. 
construction (boundarv formation. and coherence (conditions of membership, access 
and affiliation, norms and rules of association, etc), then the definition of interests, 
thereafter the conditions which seem to be relevant to mobilisation and goal-directed 
interaction or ethnically-based activism and contestation. In this exercise references to 
the authors or postulates in the literature will be omitted for the sake of brevity and 
clarity. 
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A. LEVEL ONE: CONSCIOUSNESS 
A 1. A necessary, but not sufficient condition for ethnic consciousness is a category 
of people which is distinguishable in terms of a marker or markers of social 
identity, or which considers itself to be distinguishable in this way, evt;n if no 
specific or exclusive markers exist. 
A2. Ethnic conscwusness m this category will have emerged if the group has 
developed a self-definition of identity which relates to an objective. imagined or 
rationalised feature of common ancestrv and historical origin, or values it 
considers to be derived from such origins, whether such identity relates to all the 
markers or not (a group which has a sense of common origin may be most 
prominently marked by religious adherence) 
A3. Such a self-definition need not be made by all or even a majority of the 
individuals to whom the markers apply, but needs only !o include a significant 
proportion of the potential members defining themselves in this way; every 
category in social analysis has core and marginal membership. Hence the self-
consc10us core of an ethnic group can be a sub-category of a language or 
cultural group. 
A4. Such self-definitions are highly probable because of the very basic levels of 
need gratification which a consciousness associated with kinship and the roots of 
individual identity can contribute. Ethnic consciousness, however, is vulnerable 
to alternative avenues for need gratification (see below). 
AS. A group which defines itself solely in terms other than origin or putative origin 
and ancestry (e.g. a religious group which has an exclusively confessional 
definition of itself) may respond like an ethnic group under certain 
circumstances but it will rather be a sect or a denomination, not an ethnic group. 
A religious group which has a historical association between religion and 
ancestral origin is an ethnic group, however. 
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A6. This self-definition may be public, overt or disguised, usually depending on the 
sanctions imposed by the wider community. 
A 7. Consciousness is a very fluid and subtle phenomenon, and it is an issue subject 
to indeterminacy and unpredictability, hence is by no means an automatic 
consequence of cultural distinctiveness or even of discrimination against the 
category of people in question. 
A8. Ethnic consciousness, as a consequence of the features outlined immediately 
above, can be very "impressionable" as it were, and is vulnerable to competing 
or overarching values and loyalties. A strong and effective overarching state, 
values in the overarching polity which reduce the moral legitimacy of ethnic 
. commitments, for example, can weaken ethnic consciousness and create 
ambivalence. 
A9. Hence the emergence of a marked ethnic consciousness is likely to reqmre a 
credible category of ethnic leadership, of sufficient strength as role models to 
counteract the universalistic or assimilatory values in overarching national 
polities, and this will be particularly true if "nation-building" projects by the 
central state are a prominent feature of the political system. 
AlO. In modern states ethnic consciousness is part of a morality play, and has to vie 
with the heroic actor of the central state; which frequently has the resources to 
outbid minority ethnic groups for audience attention. 
Al 1. Ethnic consciousness is likely to be most marked among categories of people 
who cannot rely on individual effort and achievement to bring psychic and 
material rewards. The modern Western liberal state and achievement-based 
economies are likely to erode ethnic consciousness among those categories of a 
cultural group which can compete on the terms laid down by the economy. 
Al 2. The group in question may relate itself to an entire national territory, and under 
such circumstances will be a sub-type of ethnicity usually referred to as 
nationalism. 
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A 13. The nomenclature involved in the self-identification may or may not relate to the 
objective or putative origin (e.g. Afrikaners have a sense of Germanic origin but 
their label is African; one of the symbolic references of the militant Northern 
Irish Protestant activists is that of the historical Dutch Royal House of Orange). 
A 14. Where an ethnic consciousness has coincided with other aspirations or interests 
over a period of time, they can usurp the ethnic consciousness to the extent that 
the resulting self-identification becomes an inseparable blend of material and 
symbolic factors. The original elements of the consciousness wilL however, be 
at least latently present to impart an intensity and coherence which might not 
otherwise exist. 
Al 5. Given the roots of ethnic consciousness in real or putative ancestral and kinship 
loyalties it tends to be among the more intense forms of consciousness. 
A 16. This consciousness can be strengthened if there is an association between class 
and ethnicity, as in ranked ethnic groups. Similarly, an e!lmic component can 
strengthen class-consciousness. Class-consciousness in the modern industrial 
state tends to be weaker than ethnic consciousness because of economic mobility 
opportunities and the complexities in the modern division of labour. 
Al 7. Hence ethnic consciousness, because of the greater stability of the factors 
underlying it, tends to be more intense in its expression than class-
consc1ousness. 
B. LEVEL TWO: BOUNDARY CONSTRUCTION AND GROUP 
COHERENCE 
Bl. A category of people which has a collective consciousness which may be 
defined as ethnic will have acquired the structure of an ethnic group if the group 
has established criteria of membership, criteria to distinguish themselves from 
proximal groups, and formal or informal yet established and institutionalised 
rules governing behaviour relevant to group affiliation. 
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B2. The group has located itself and been located in the social space in relation to 
other groups. This can include anything from establishing rules of social 
distance to coalitions or alliances with other groups. 
B3. The patterns suggested above will determine whether groups are ranked or 
unranked iri relation to one another, and of roughly equal status in society or not. 
In ranked systems the boundaries and the rules of association are often imposed 
on the group by the higher ranked groups, but to some degree or another, groups 
of inferior ranking can accept the conditions imposed on them and use them as a 
basis for consciousness and solidarity. 
B4. In unranked systems the boundary processes and the rules of affiliation will tend 
to originate within group dynamics, but they are under the influence of the 
interaction with other groups. It follows that the difference in dynamics between 
ranked and unranked systems is not absolute, and some unranked groups are 
more equal than others, enjoying closer association with power elites in the 
society at large. It is possible for an unranked system to become changed into a 
ranked system over time, and vice-versa. 
B5. The boundary formation can be inadvertent, can be forced upon the group by 
external structures, or can be as a consequence of strategic considerations among 
ethnic leaders who will mobilise to secure adherence to boundary rules. 
B6. The boundary construction is only partly related to the intrinsic qualities of the 
ethnic category and can also be determined by the strategic requirements of the 
interaction with other grnups, other nations or with the overarching nation state. 
B7. The criteria and the rules and boundaries may remain fixed or may change over 
time, in response to social changes within the group or in response to changed 
relations with other groups. 
B8. Just as not all individuals who are eligible to develop ethnic consciousness have 
the need to do so, so rules associated with the boundaries of groups' needs are 
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not necessarily adhered to by all eligible individuals. There is always a lesser or 
greater proportion of people who in terms of ethnic rules are marginal to the 
group. 
B9. Such individuals may disavow their group membership. or they may attempt to 
establish competing rules, or they may operate outside the group but in the name 
of the group, which is often seen as the most serious form of disloyalty. 
B 10. The extent to which the group secures adherence to the rules of association and 
commitment to group goals is a measure of the coherence of ethnic groups. No 
ethnic group is utterly coherent, but if the zone of coherence is limited to a tiny 
minority of the group, it will be at risk of ceasing to be an ethnic group and will 
tend to be regarded as a faction. Obviously. ethnic groups can become reduced 
to factions, and vice-versa. 
B 11. The whole issue of boundary formations and maintenance must take account of 
the phenomenon foat ethnicity can be a layered phenomenon. Two or more 
ethnic groups may be distinct at a primary level but at a secondary level develop 
affinities with similar ethnic formations. This will be typically the case where 
groups share a particularly salient marker, such as racial status. Inter-ethnic 
coalitions of whites differentiating themselves from blacks have been familiar in 
colonial dynamics. 
C. LEVEL THREE: THE DEFINITION AND ARTICULATION OF 
INTERESTS 
Cl. Where the scope of an ethnic group is national and the phenomenon can be 
regarded as nationalism, the issue of interests need not be treated in any different 
way to the approach adopted for society in general. In an intensely nationalistic 
society, the major focus of relevant ethnic interests will relate to neighbouring 
states and to the international community. 
C2. This does not mean to say that all manifestations of nationalism coincide with 
ethnicity. since some forms of nationalism will in fact be ethnic coalitions within 
I 
93 
the over-arching state, as for example in the case of Indian, Swiss or British 
nationalism. to the extent that they exist. Many authors will insist that this form 
of nationalism be treated differently to ethnicity, and notwithstanding the 
descriptive validity of their points, so much of the dynamic of nationalism is in 
fact a variant of ethnic consciousness that it may be treated as a more inclusive 
ethnic "layer" in terms of the proposition offered earlier. An over-arching 
nationalism can become a type of secondary "ethnicity". The civic identification 
with a formal state, which is usually referred to as "'patriotism", is indeed a 
different type of consciousness. 
C3. It is entirely possible for inter-ethnic "coalitions" to have their interests converge 
so closely over time that the more particular ethnic cultures will become 
assimilated into a more general association. In other words. one must assume 
that ethnic groups at any given time may have originated in a coalescing of two 
or more ethnic groups in the past - Afrikaners would be a case in point. 
C4. Where the ethnic unit coincides with a nationality or citizenship, it will become 
internally differentiated along lines other than ethnic, such as class lines. If the 
nationalism is intense enough, then one would expect the internal interests-
competition to be less intense than in a state in which nationalism is more 
subdued. From this comes the popular notion that national sport (or war) can 
"bring a nation together". 
CS. To return to the type of ethnicity which is based on internal differentiation 
within a state, the ways in which interests are formed and the permutations of 
interests are many and varied. Reference was made earlier in this report to 
ethnicity as a vessel in which all manner of content can be poured (Barth). 
C6. First one must postulate the existence of ethnic status interests. A generally poor 
ethnic group can be so captivated by concerns with status and social honour that 
its members will be proud of those few members who become rich. It would not 
be unfamiliar if the more privileged minority even exploits its poorer brothers 
confident that class consciousness will not surmount the status barrier to disturb 
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the process. Here is a case where the Marxian notion of false consciousness , 
cautiously applied in its context, has utility. 
C7. Status and social honour is convertible into other advantages. and vice-versa. 
The typical pattern of the conversion of great wealth into status and honour 
(through the Queen's lists in the UK or through great public benevolynce) is 
familiar in many societies. But if status relied only on its conversion into wealth 
and power it would not be commonplace among the less wealthy or powerful. 
The primary currency of status and social honour is pride and well being --
psychic gratification. and hence status in its own right is its own reward. This is 
why ethnic attachments can be regarded as one of the most generally available 
gratifications in otherwise stratified societies. Even without general public 
acknowledgement, the sense of pride that members of a generally under-
privileged ethnic group will feel, are self-sustaining. · 
C8. It has been suggested above that material privilege and status and esteem can 
"leverage" each other, and they can also coincide. Once ethnicity has established 
a self-categorisation in a cultural group, the coherence. the self-confidence and 
the boundary maintaining networks can, and often are. turned to the pursuit of 
other interests in the realms of power or economic opportunity. The boundary-
maintaining processes will also be of immense strategic advantage in keeping 
competition at bay. 
C9. The rewards and advantages of group definition and boundary formation which 
take an ethnic form, contrary to the Marxist position, are not the primary 
catalysts for the group definition. The Marxist position assumes processes that 
cannot be demonstrated and are mystifying. To assume that a class interest will 
somehow set about creating the intimate personal attachments of ethnicity from 
nothing at all in order to justify privilege is far-fetched. The self-categorisation 
of the symbolic kind found in ethnicity has to be present at least in the form of 
nascent identity before material or power interests march in to add the heavy 
artillery. The real or imagined kinship association is the primary factor, 
although, as with apartheid, it may end in being trivial compared with its 
consequences. 
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C10. The postulate above also implies. that the so called processes of group 
"construction", in the form of boundary maintenance, social closure against 
competition by other groups and the like, although muscular and ultimately 
decisive in forming the structure of ethnic interaction with society and other 
groups, are also secondary as compared with the real or imagined kinship 
attachments, because it would again require an extremely fanciful conception of 
social process to suggest that greed and competition for scarce resources will 
search around for ways in which to create some line in the sand of society in 
which to construct an identity. The extraneous self-interests have to cohere 
around something which has an independent significance. 
C 11. This may appear to be bringing "primordialily" in by the back door. By 
accepting the feature of primacy of the identity-based core of ethnic structure, 
one is in a sense accepting "primordiality". but not of the kind which assumes an 
"ineffable" objective reality. The primary attachments may never occur because 
they are options in human history, and other sources of primary identification 
such as religion (without ethnic undertones) or individualistic self-expression are 
available. 
C 12. But this brings one back to the point that the ethnic or kinship oriented 
attachment is the most generally available option, hence its ubiquity. It does not 
require ability, effort or the seclusion from worldly tastes that religion in its 
authentic form usually entails -- it is the Weberian "peoples option". 
C13. As the "people's option" in a manner of speaking, one might expect the major 
opposition to ethnic expression in modern and many ancient societies to come 
not from the other popular interests (even if ethnic groups hate and compete with 
each other they usually accept each other as realities). but from the elites whose 
interests are by definition pursued within the widest possible frame of reference. 
A national power elite will resist and attempt to discredit not only separatist 
movements but also value systems which reduce the importance of over-arching 
social networks, reward systems and scope of power. A President wants after all 
to be President of all the people, and a top socialite. artist. writer. gang boss or 
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trade unionist would also want to increase the surface area of his or her "pond". 
In most nation states the national system of status and reward is the ''.first team", 
and no first team player wants to be rendered equal by a regional hero. 
C 14. This is why the mam opposition to ethnic claims tends to come from the 
universalistically oriented high urban cultural centres. But here again one must 
guard against the assumption of deliberate intent. Those value systems which 
oppose ethnic attachments do not construct their case for the purpose. The more 
universalistic or international-humanitarian value positions are genuine 
commitments and possibly even superior in moral status for mankind. But just as 
interests discover the useful vehicles of an authentic ethnic attachment. so the 
universalistically oriented elites find their own value systems useful as a basis 
for opposing and denigrating the ethnic attachments. 
Cl 5. But in doing so these elites, sometimes i.nadvertently. and sometimes 
deliberately attempt to prevent access by ordinary people to the more easily 
available gratifications of ethnic attachment. No union boss, politician, official 
or personality wants his or her constituency or audience divided by "lesser" 
forms of social differentiation. If all the good and universal values fail to fill up 
the small ethnic ponds, then the heavier earth-moving equipment of patriotism 
and nation building may be tried, and as history has shown, sometimes with 
great effect and sometimes with contradictory consequences. 
C16. The point above raises the issue of how resilient ethnic interests are. Extraneous 
interests which coincide with ethnicity would be expected to increase the 
resilience. What if extraneous interests do not coincide but contradict ethnic 
interests? A typical example will be class interests which could be contradicted 
by ethnic interests. It is logical to assume that ethnic interests will be weakened 
in such cases but the outcome may not be certain or clear-cut. Since the 
postulate has been made that ethnic commitments are typically intense, it may be 
proposed that class interests will not readily negate ethnic commitments, but 
every commitment has its price. It must be assumed to depend on the relative 
weight of rewards. 
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C 17. But this clear-cut situation does not always arise, because ethnicity can "co-opt" 
class interests as it were by dividing the labour or other "markets" and closing 
off opportunities for other groups to compete. This is a general possibility not 
limited to working class dynamics, and ethnic elites can produce the same 
processes of segregating off competition for advantages. 
C 18. This raises the question of whether ethnicity co-opts class or class co-opts 
ethnicity. The Marxist analysis would incline one to expect the latter. But in 
terms of the assumptions made by these same analysts class-consciousness tends 
to be universalistic abstract and rational, while ethnic commitments, whether at 
working class or elite level are more emotive and motivating. When the early 
South Africa Communist Party coined the slogan "workers of'the world unite to 
protect white workers", it was probably a case of ethnicity (racism) strengthened 
by class interests, co-opting class solidarity for a different purpose. 
Cl 9. If the class interests coinciding with the ethnic identity of an ethnic category are 
blocked or frustrated by opposition to the ethnic aspect. and the rewards are very 
salient (the principle of every interest having a price), then an ethnic group may 
begin to suppress or retreat from its open ethnic commitments in order to secure 
it advantages. This situation would be an incentive for assimilation. Given the 
intensity of ethnic commitments, the price would have to be high. The ethnic 
group could also withdraw its ethnic commitments into a private sphere and in 
all public or civic dealings present itself as part of the "open order", as it were. 
There is sufficient evidence of an enthusiasm for "passing" in societies for this 
to be accepted as fairly commonplace, albeit associated with great personal 
tension and conflict. The stress of these situations is quite capable of producing 
self-hatred. 
C20. If. however, the interest groups to which entry is sought prevent entry through 
mechanisms of discrimination and "social closure". then the ethnic 
commitments are likely to intensify in order to protect the morale of the ethnic 
group rebuffed in this way. 
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C21. To return to situations of successful interest driven assimilation, the proposition 
has been made that the rewards or potential rewards would have to be 
substantial, and given the primacy of ethnic commitments, even while 
suppressed for long periods, residues of identity commitments would remain and 
can become activated long after successful assimilation appears to have occurred 
-- in some cases centuries (a recent account in The Economist (July 3, 1999:88) 
of a resurgence of Basque ethnicity among the descendants of successfully 
integrated 19th US pioneer settler stock is an interesting recent example). 
C22. This leads to the conclusion that working class people who move into the middle 
classes are hardly ever likely to celebrate their working class or peasant origins, 
but a celebration of ethnic origins among successfully assimilated ethnic groups 
is very frequent. 
C23. In attempting to disentangle class and ethnic commitments and interests, 
however, it is probably wisest to assume opaque and muddy blends of sentiment 
and values. The principle of mutual contagion of commitments is very likely to 
apply. Nevertheless, on balance, it would seem as if the ethnic mobilisation in 
material competition has more reinforcing elements and magnifying features 
than purely class-based mobilisation. Although not exclusively so, class and 
power-based mobilisation has a greater tendency for schism and splitting than 
ethnic mobilisation. 
D. ETHNIC MOBILISATION, ACTIVISM AND CONFLICT 
D 1. Where ethnic groups have long established boundaries both of a social and 
geographical nature, and have internal economies (the situations which are 
referred to as plural societies ad defined by Furnival and Smith) and hence do 
not have to compete with each other, ethnic differences are more compatible 
with coexistence in an overarching state (India would be an example, with 
exceptions). 
D2. Where, however, centralised political systems and economies, or boundary 




operation or avoidance on which stability is based, ethnic groups will be at risk 
of developing ethnically defined antagonisms and conflicts. The Protestant 
people of Northern Ireland could hypothetically have the same cordial or neutral 
relations with the Catholic Irish as the Scots or the Welsh, but they share a 
contested space. The same principles seem to be operative underneath all the 
other layers of conflict in respect of Turks and Kurds. Serbians and Kosovars, 
Sri Lankans and Tamils, and hundreds of other examples. These are situations in 
which a shared but segregated dispensation has been bequeathed by history. 
D3 In modern integrated and centrally organised states. four alternatives and very 
different sets of rules can secure the stability of the "good fences make good 
neighbours" principle. One is a principle of multiculturalism, a normative order 
which is effective in liberal democratic systems which provide widespread 
security. Another is the principle of decentralisation or devolution, in which the 
state provides a modern surrogate of the older tribal or community autonomy 
and separation, but overlaid with rational norms of co-operation and integration 
based in the distinction between tiers of government. This can be formal and 
constitutional or it can be an evolutionary reconciliation of relationships as with 
the earlier Dutch system of internal social "pillars" (zuilen) of Protestant, 
Catholic and secular socialist traditions. A third "reconciliation" occurs in some 
ranked ethnic systems in which the minor ethnic groups for periods or to some 
extent accept the seniority of the majority group or higher status group. The 
other principle is that of assimilation and nation-building. The latter two are 
arguably the least stable and effective systems of securing coexistence. 
D4. If the assimilation principle is authentically equitable. i.e. mutual assimilation, 
and all assimilees are of equal status and if it cushions its effects by tolerating 
residues of multiculturalism, the assimilation principle is effective. The problem, 
however, often arises because the question of who assimilates whom is at stake. 
If a majority or historically powerful group assimilates on its own terms an 
ethnic minority, then the reward trade-offs for the assimilated minority have to 
be substantial (an ethnic market-clearing price as it were). This is possible in 
prosperous and rapidly growing economies. 
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D5. Also, if the dominant group backs the process with powerfi.tl, rational norms and 
moral precepts which permeate the society, to the extent of displacing the more 
particularistic ethnic commitments by convincing the ethnic minorities that they 
should not be atavistic and "bac/nvard", it may also work. This is a process of 
introducing a moral block which denies the ethnic minority the legitimacy of the 
gratifications of ethnic attachments. 
D6. If, however, the majority attempts the assimilasionist programme with a less 
than persuasive material and moral rationale, then these situations are likely to 
lead to conflict. 
D7. In ranked systems of ethnic domination by majority groups, premised on the 
assumption that there are core and marginal. senior and junior. or first class and 
second class citizens, are the least stable systems of ethnic integration. In a 
world which is extending democracy and human rights. this is almost inevitably 
associated with ethnic conflict because of the uncertainty it generates. The 
conflict is more intense than class conflict, for a variety of reasons, one of which 
is that in class conflict the elites, deliberately or otherwise. benefit from national 
rituals which allow the poor classes to feel part of the nation -- sport, religion or 
powerful national symbols being among the mechanisms. In ranked ethnic 
systems on the other hand, the minority groups are kept in their place often 
without the ruse of being made to feel part of the nation. 
D8. There could be situations, however, where a combination of moral 
rationalisations for the advantaged status of the majority and material 
gratifications might persuade a negatively ranked ethnic minority to accept its 
relative status -- there can be no mechanical predictions of dissent. 
09. Where an ethnic group has developed grievances, one still cannot predict that 
organised active dissent will emerge. If the group is question has engaged in 
such action before the probability of dissent will be increased, simply because 
patterns of leadership, networks or organisations and other forms of 
preparedness may exist, and their may be a group tradition of militancy. 
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D 10. Other factors will have to be in place as well. Such factors have been established 
in comparative empirical work and include perceptions of a reasonable chance 
of success, and motivations which outweigh the negative sanctions or coercion 
which are likely to follow -- in other words a positive strategic balance of 
probabilities as perceived by the aggrieved group. 
011. In this context it is particularly relevant to consider what the group may have to 
lose. A group which is already in a position of material disadvantage will have 
less to lose than a group which is protecting a relatively advantaged, albeit 
deteriorating situation. 
D 12. One must assume, however, that if the grievances are sufficiently serious and or 
the ethnic status consciousness is sufficiently strong. the constraining factors 
will lose relative weight. The grievance factor may be particularly salient if the 
ethnic group in question has suffered loss of status or material advantage, or if 
its situation is one of being "squeezed" in the sense that no options for escape 
from a deteriorating situation are offered by the political majority in a country. 
D 13. An open question is to what extent dissent over strategy within an ethnic group 
is likely to reduce or increase the chances of active dissent. It could cut both 
ways. On the one hand it would seem to be logical to assume that different . 
strategic agendas in a group will weaken the coherence and the mobilising 
capacity within the group. On the other hand, however, a polarisation within the 
group may isolate extremists from moderating influences and increase the 
probability of an ethnic sub-formation taking very militant action. The situations 
in Northern lreland, among the Basques in Spain, the Tamils in Sri Lanka and 
many other theatres of ethnic conflict would appear to bear out the second 
proposition. 
The propositions above are almost embarrassingly numerous. but the complexity of 
interacting factors in ethnic action, which are often taken as indeterminacy, warrant the 
detail presented -- in fact more could have been added. Even with all the detail, nuances 
have inevitably been missed. As Ghai et al point out: 
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"As a source of con_fiict, ethnicity takes its coloration from the specific 
circumstances of time and society. It is difficult to pin it down as an independent 
variable in the ordering of social, political and economic life .. . Ethnicity is 
(also) highly manipulable: indeed its very existence can he con_jured out of 
vague bonds and symbols of association. There is a dynamic quality to ethnicity 
which suggests that more attention should be puid to history than is 
customary. .. 11 (Ghai et al, 1992:81, quoted by Bekker. 1993: 8). 
The author almost regrets that he has not been able to justify the application of any 
single paradigm to the phenomenon in question, in order to avoid the detail, and yet the 
detail may not be enough. ., 
The propositions, m their present detail, however. would appear to cover the 
possibilities which might he expected in the review of ethnic reactions in the South 
African case study. Most basically, however, with the degree of oversimplification 
necessary for a brief summary, what the propositions. taken together, suggest is that 
ethnicity: 
• is not primordial as a consequence of any objective factor, but has a primordial-
like quality being associated with sentiments of origin and kinship and being 
based on identity needs, which intensify the phenomenon: 
is a category of status interests sui generis. and that these interests can be 
intensely held because of their emotive underpinnings; 
hut that these emotive dimensions are variable in their manifestation because of 
the presence in most societies of alternative need gratifyers, the variable strength 
of individualism in modem society and the susceptibility of populations to the 
values associated with nation state loyalties and/or universal values which can 
be exploited to discredit ethnicity; 
• that in its construction over time, and in the establishment and maintenance of 
its boundaries, ethnicity becomes blended with other. non-ethnic interests, and 
can become structured by them and even usurped: and 
• that its propensity for survival, political mobilisation or activist dissent. depends 
on grievances which cannot be assuaged by alternative rewards, persuasive 
moral rationalisation for action articulated by leaders and opinion-formers. and 
equally persuasive prospects for success which outweigh perceived constraints 
on ethnic action and perceived risks of such action; 
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that, as a consequence of these variable factors, the scope of core ethnic 
mobilisation can vary greatly and that it is logical to assume that a threshold 
exists below which there will be insufficient momentum or critical mass to 
sustain the ethnic "enterprise". 
Most importantly, what these conclusions suggest is that the three competing schools of 




THE SOUTH AFRICAN CASE STUDY: 
BACKGROUND PERSPECTIVES ON AFRIKANER ETHNICITY 
The amount of background literature on or around the issue of ethnicity in South Africa is 
vast, but it has been dominated by the huge issue of apartheid. Therefore much of this 
scholarship has not been directed at the phenomenon itself but at its apparent consequences 
or at policy issues relating to it. As already suggested earlier. analyses have tended to leap 
over the intrinsic aspects of ethnicity, making assumptions about its nature and status, in 
order to proceed to assess its role in racial conflict. Since this case study has a different 
focus, being concerned with the phenomenon itself and its persistence or otherwise, many 
very familiar and significant writings on South Africa will be omitted. with regret. Relevant 
literature on the issue of race domination and conflict will, however, be referred to as the 
case study proceeds. 
5.1 THE EMERGENCE OF AFRIKANERS AS AN ETHNIC GROUP 
Ethnicity is a phenomenon par excellence which has to be understood in the light of its 
history and the factors which are powerful in its emergence. This is because the myths or 
binding realities of origin are so powerful as components of ethnic consciousness. Although · 
this very definitely cannot pretend to be a historical analysis, a brief review of the 
emergence of Afrikaner nationalism is necessary. In this section an account will be given 
which is as factual as possible, and a conceptual assessment will follow in the next section. 
It is perhaps important to note that Afrikaner ethnicity does not have its origins in a clan or 
tribe or in a geographically concentrated face-to-face community of great antiquity. It is not 
being suggested that all ethnicity has to begin this way, but the origins may conceivably 
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help to explain later responses of the group, and therefore it is necessary to briefly trace the 
process in the case of Afrikaners. 
The category m question had its earliest origins m the Dutch East India Company's 
provisioning settlement at the Cape in 1652. Only some 37 per cent of the earliest settlers 
were in fact of core Dutch origin, as has already been explained ( Heese. 1971 ). Degenaar 
(1987: 244-245) gives a similar set of estimates for the early composition of Afrikaners as 
German 35 per cent, Dutch 34 per cent, French 13 per cent, "non-while" 7 per cent, British 
5 per cent, other European 3 per cent and unknown 4 per cent. What they had in common 
was management by a large paternalistic and bureaucratic corporation which attempted to 
regulate virtually all aspects of their lives, a common exposure as largely Christian 
Europeans to non-Christian indigenous races of different pigmentation and customs, the 
institution of slavery, which the settler elites benefited from. and exposure to the 
individualistic and commercial values which were spreading across Europe. As the 
employees were released from Company service to become "Free Burghers" (settlers on 
own account, as it were), they pursued agricultural or commercial market-oriented 
enterprise and risk-ventures in a hostile new environment, in contrast to the indigenous 
Khoi people whose economies were largely of a subsistence kind. Within 20 years of the 
first settlement two wars with the Khoi people had occurred. no doubt substantially of the 
settlers own making. As Guelke observes, they emerged quite soon as remark~bly 
homogeneous given their origins, but it was a homogeneity based on European racial 
identity, Christianity and common risks on an expanding and hostile frontier (Guelke, 
1979:43). 
As Giliomee recounts, by the turn of the century, local concentrations of free settlers had 
mounted two rebellions against the Colonial authority, then British. but that there was: 
"no apparent interest in the cultural aspects of nationalism. They were not even 
consistently anti-imperialist or anti-British." (Giliomee, 1979: 353) 
Hence the Afrikaner identity may not yet have become established with much content 
distinct from that of a cultural fragment of Europe. 
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Giliomee ( 1979) points out that the Company, informally but consistently fostered a racial 
categorisation by its administrative procedures, creating the assumption of a superior status 
for the European settlers. If early ethnicity defines itself in terms of the contrasts between it 
and its social surroundings, a racial dimension was incorporated even before a specific 
sense of a cultural heritage had become established, not as racism in any intrinsic sense, but 
as a defining ethnic marker. The Company also encouraged a Dutch identity and in so 
doing established the language root of what was later to become Afrikaans. 
In one the most useful analytical outlines of the emergence of ethnic identity among 
Afrikaners, Giliomee (1979: ch. 4) identifies the following elements which contributed to 
the crystallisation of ethnic coherence up to the modern period. He points out that the 
colonial governments and the social conditions on the frontier, and by implication later in 
the Voortrekker Republics, fostered a sense of equality and individualism. He also points 
out that the "openfi·ontier" on which the white "Trekboere" (migrant farmers) and Xhosa 
tribesmen often intermingled, and at times had to reach mutual accommodations with one 
another, produced an amount of uncertainty of status and cross-racial co-operation which 
was lacking in the more formal situations nearer the urban centres of the colony. He claims 
that there is little evidence of widespread racist thinking aside from that which arose from 
the Christian-"heathen" division. Later, when the colonial authorities intervened, when 
slavery was abolished and missionaries began promoting social reform, the racial reactions 
became more marked. Giliomee quotes evidence suggesting that the idea of an equalisation 
(gelykstelling) of Christians and non-Christians was a component in the reactions of the 
frontiersmen which led to the Great Trek (p95). 
The Great Trek itself was not a nationalist movement as such, since it was motivated not so 
much by aspirations to freedom but by the desire to escape constraining legislation, 
deteriorating socio-economic conditions, lack of land and a breakdown of law and order. 
The Voortrekkers did not trek as a nation (Giliomee. 1979: 100). F.A. van Jaarsveld, 
however, makes the point that as the patriot rebels and the Voortrekkers encountered 
resistance from the British, first in Natal, it engendered in them the realisation that they 
were in fact creating their own history. Furthermore, their quest for freedom raised the 
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question of freedom for who and from what, all-nascent national sentiments (Van 
Jaarsveld, 1959: 16-44, passim). 
When demands addressed to the Netherlands gained no response, the Free Burghers tended 
to shift their allegiance to a local identity. By the turn of the 18th Century the term 
"Afi·ikaner" had become established and the colonists were beginning to refer to themselves 
as "true natives of'our truefatherland" (quoted by Giliomee, l 979: 97). 
~e emergence of a new national identity was therefore a gradual but in a sense an 
accumulative process, which took an inevitable course of identity-crystallisationj As 
Degenaar (1987) puts it, the Afrikaners "discovered" themselves as a "volk" with a common 
destiny. As in the United States, the new national identity emerged out of deteriorating 
loyalties to a former national identity, which was in any event weak by virtue of the mixed 
ethnic composition of the settlers. 
This new identity was strengthened by the approach of the British colonial authorities to 
attempt to "Anglicise" the Dutch-speaking population through education policies and of 
course a general language policy. Their resistance was not born of loyalty to the 
Netherlands, however, and Giliomee notes that the first "A/i'ikaans" journal, De Zuid 
Afrikaan, expressed the following opinion: " ... A colonist o{ Dutch descent cannot become 
an Englishman, nor should he strive to be a Hollander" (1979: 99). On a visit to the Cape 
by Trekker leaders from the North in the late eighteen eighties the leaders addressed the 
local Afrik~ners with the words "We are, after all. of one nation, one blood, one bone and 
one.flesh" (Degenaar, 1987: 237). 
Equally important, however. was that the reaction of the colonists to British control in the 
urban areas was mixed, with some colonists seeking co-operation with and indeed 
assimilation into the new elites (the "Anglomanne") and others at least maintaining a 
distance (Jacobijnen); a division which continued thereafter (Le Cordeur: 1986: 77). It was 
really only in private and in the context of the very decentralised Dutch Reformed Church 
that the language and aspects of the culture of the Dutch-speakers could be protected. 
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The divisions between different commitments became more sharply crystallised when the 
first major political party, the Afrikaner Bond, was founded in 1880 and became the site of 
a struggle of identity. One faction wanted to keep it exclusively Dutch-Afrikaans, but 
another, which eventually prevailed, wished to see it as more inclusive. At that stage one of 
the protagonists, S.J. du Toit, distinguished between three kinds of Afrikaners: those with 
English hearts, those with Dutch hearts and those with Afrikaner hearts; the latter being 
people who also sympathised with the Boer Republics in their struggles against British 
Imperialism. The same kind of debate about how the boundary of the Afrikaner group 
should be defined, and how a foreigner should be defined. raged in the Transvaal Republic, 
with "exclusivists", "inclusivists" and middle-of-the-road views. As time progressed and 
hostility to British imperialism intensified, the exclusivist view strengthened (Giliomee, 
1979: 101-103). 
After the Anglo-Boer War and the establishment of the Union of South Africa, the 
distinction between two major views on the relative exclusiveness of Afrikaners became 
more firmly established. Generals Botha and Smuts of the South African Party-United 
Party tradition saw a need for the English and Afrikaans streams among whites to merge 
and form a common South African patriotism within the British Empire under the Crown. 
In opposition to this, General Hertzog and Dr. D.F. Malan. while differing on the 
legitimacy of the new South African state, were committed to a preservation of perhaps not 
an exclusive group for Hertzog, but at least a distinctive Afrikaner identity with language as 
its major marker -- a two stream policy. To this end they both supported the development of 
the Afrikaans language and culture to the status of a "high culture" to replace the cultural, 
linguistic and intellectual dependence on Dutch and English. After tbe official replacement 
of Dutch by Afrikaans as one of the two official languages, this programme was very 
successful and even before 1948 the Afrikaans language had become modernised, 
elaborated and well institutionalised. The emphasis on Afrikaans ethnicity was also focused 
on the psychological needs of a people who had been exposed to humiliation and brutality 
at the hands of the English troops in the war, and the various attempts by the British to 
weaken the influence of the Afrikaans ethnic movement. Hence the ethnic cause became 
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centred on not only the constitutional dispensation, but also on the status and psychic needs 
of a population which had experienced the traumas of war, defeat and impoverishment 
(Giliomee, 1979: I 07). The reminder of the historian, Hugh Trevor-Roper is apposite: 
"For nationalism has its normal causes. It is the expression of wounded nationality: 
the cry of men who have suffered great national defeat. or whose nationality is 
denied, or who live insecurely on exposed nationalji-ontiers and in danger of being 
swamped by.foreigners." (Trevor-Roper: 1962: 12) 
In addition to these dimensions, the economic needs of the large numbers of poor 
Afrikaners who migrated to the cities in search of unskilled work. underscored the large 
wealth gap between the Afrikaners and the English-speakers. who had all but taken over the 
public service in addition to their advantaged positions in mining, and soon after in 
commerce and industry. The income gap was estimated to be 1 :3 in 1910 (Giliomee. 
1979: I 07). 
One recourse among the poorer unskilled Afrikaner proletariat was to join the Labour 
Party-linked English-language trade unions, but after the thirties and the forties, when black 
workers entered the economy in large numbers and were able to undercut the white 
workers, Afrikaners withdrew from unions that had neglected and even spurned their ethnic 
and language needs, and joined the Christian-National Afrikaner \Vorkers' movement. Later 
when Hertzog, who had moved closer to the Smuts position with a notion of a cross-ethnic 
alliance of English-speaking and Afrikaners, took the National Party into "fusion" with the 
South African party to form the United Party. D.F. Malan (already mentioned), a 
theologian, who had always held more. principled and rigid notions of the ethnic needs of 
Afrikaners, experienced additional pressure from the Afrikaner working- class movements 
to mobilise separately, and he broke away to form the "purified" National Party. His 
position as the articulator of both cultural/ethnic and worker interests also brought him into 
opposition to the influence of big mining capital with which the United Party had various 
kinds of links (Giliomee, 1979: 110). The National Party was therefore based on a class-
alliance of petit bourgeois cultural and labour interests, unified by a common threat -- the 
Anglophile-international lifestyle, values and language which were effectively twinned 
l lO 
with economic imperialist and local big capital interests co-ordinated by a bureaucracy 
which was seen to have been excluding Afrikaner nationalists from positions of influence. 
Marxist analysts have given prominence to the class-based elements in these developments 
but Giliomee, while recognising the factors of class. saw the developments as being based 
on compound effects of class, status, ideology and psychic needs ( G i I iomee. 1979: 110). 
The National Party which had emerged stood for republican independence. the restoration 
of the status of the Afrikaans people to that of a core position in the nation, and the 
acceptance of English-speakers who were prepared to assimilate into that core. Further 
commitments were to the economic advancement of Afrikaners in all fields, the protection 
of the Afrikaner working class from competition from blacks. a two-stream cultural policy 
in which Afrikaans mother tongue education would be guaranteed and Afrikaans cultural 
and professional bodies would be promoted, the further development of the Afrikaans 
language and all other measures required to restore the group status and self-confidence vis 
a vis English, as well as the maintenance of the racial identity of the white group. 
To these ends the National Party successfully mobilised most Afrikaner intellectuals who 
had not become co-opted into the networks of the United Pai1y, and it practised affirmative 
action in promotions in the public service based on informal criteria which included support 
for the party itself, membership of key Afrikaans cultural and youth organisations and often 
membership of one of the three Dutch Reformed "sister" churches. Nothing was laid down 
formally but the use of a variable set of indicators for appointments to para-statal and 
government bodies worked well to ensure the rapid upward mobility of ethnically 
committed Afrikaners and those who supported their cause. It should be noted that there 
was no formal exclusion of English-speakers, and quite frequently English-speaking 
Protestant and Jewish National Party sympathizers were able to enjoy occupational and 
other benefits of political patronage. This author's (mixed Afrikaans-English, and mixed 
DRC and Catholic) family's own experience in the fifties was that religious affiliation was 
very important, with Anglican and especially Atheist and Catholic affiliation ruling even an 
Afrikaans-speaking recruit out of contention for meaningful positions in the public sector 
(the religious factor was, for example, instrumental in dividing the fairly large Dutch and 
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German-speaking communities m Pretoria between insider Protestants and Catholic 
outsiders). As Giliomee points out, the new intelligentsia among core Nationalist 
Afrikaners became ethnic entrepreneurs, promoting partly through the Broederbond (see 
ahead) the values, orientations and practices required to further the cause of a subtly, but 
firmly bounded ethnic category which was narrower than the Afrikaans-speaking white 
group as a whole. The latter included a large number of traditional Smuts-supporting 
families, many of whom, notwithstanding the definitions imposed by the ethnic 
entrepreneurs, regarded themselves as just as "wore" (true) Afrikaners as anyone else. 
When Smuts took South Africa into the Second World War on the side of Britain and her 
allies, the cleavage between the United Party and Nationalist Party Afrikaners deepened 
considerably, leading to open antagonisms even within families. 
Dunbar Moodie ( 1975) took the ideologized positions of the intellectual core and ethnic 
entrepreneurs of the Nationalist Party as the basis for his conception of an Afrikaner "civil 
religion" (see ahead) but as Giliomee notes, the ordinary rank and file Afrikaners were not 
necessarily captive to this subtle and variable. but powerful form of boundary formation 
(Giliomee, 1979: 113). 
It is important to understand the commitments of the formally secret, but in fact semi-secret 
Afi-ikaner Broederbond, because it represented a very specific form of ethnic mobilisation; 
a planned and systematic attempt to define the nature and boundaries of an ethnic group 
and to promote its status and interests. The basis for this analysis is the book by J.H.P. 
Serfontein, a journalist hostile to the Broederbond who spent many years accumulating 
secret documentation and, at some personal risk, published his expose of the organisation in 
1979 (Serfontein, 1979). Serfontein describes the motivation to establish the Broederbond 
at the founding meeting in June 1 918 as the 
" ... bringing together ("verbroedering") of the Afi·ikaners who are at present spread 
over the whole ol South Africa and are largely opposed to euch other, without the 
least cohesive power." (p32) 
He goes on to describe the self-confessed aims of the movement as 
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"The welding together of Afrikaners ... towards unifrmnity ofpurpose, the interests 
of Afrikaners must always be served, ... To carry the Aji-ikaner volk ... toward,; its 
sense (f identity ... to cultivate love for his language. history, land. volk and law, ... 
pure original South African culture and art must be promoted ... The society must be 
refined/ purified ("veredelmoedig") with the maintenance of'its old pure morals and 
characteristics such as hospitality, democratic conviviality. and readiness to stand 
by each other in bitterness or in need ... We build ourfi1ture on the Rock of' Christ." 
(p32) 
An important part of the strategy was the establishment of cells that could act to promote 
the interests of members in all spheres in each local situation. including job and business 
advancement, to establish Afrikaans schools and to assist members who sought political 
office. It developed into an all-pervasive network of interlocking cells and cross cutting 
organisations through the representation of cells on a wider regional basis. 
lt also proceeded to organise front organisations to interact in the public sphere, helping to 
organise a large "volkskongres" in 1934 on the poor white problem. the Economic Volks-
kongres in 1939, the Economic Institute and the Afrikaans Commercial Institute 
(Handelsinstituut), the establishment of an Institute for Christian National Education, the 
Institute for Social Welfare, and the establishment of Afrikaans workers' organisations to 
combat Communist and other "denationalized" interests among the workers, the Federation 
of Afrikaans Cultural Organisations (F AK), the Reddingsdaadbond to help poor Afrikaners 
launch small businesses (which had 300 000 members by 1943 ). the Volkskas Bank, the 
forerunner of South Africa's largest bank today, the Voortrekkers. an Afrikaans equivalent 
of the Boy Scouts/Girl Guides, and many others. The Bond through the A TKB helped to 
organise the powerfully effective symbolic "Trek" of 1938, which. because of the wave of 
sentiment which it created, Serfontein describes as the "single most important event in the 
rise to power of the Afi·ikaners" (p42), and which also had the effect of side-lining the 
established political leaders of the time, including General Hertzog himself. 
Serfontein also recounts that the Bond was deeply politically divided in the earlier years 
with much tension between the Hertzog and Malan factions. When Malan created his 
purified, later the "Herenigde" (reunited) National Party, the way was clear for the Bond to 
begin to associate closely with the new Nationalist Party. Hertzog criticised this bitterly, 
I 
ll3 
saying that the " ... unity of Afrikanerdom was being bartered away j()r a Republican-cum-
Calvinist Bond", and "The purged National Party, ·with its purged leaders. now stands.forth 
openly in all its racial nakedness, adorned with only one.fig leaf" SECRECY 11 (Serfontein, 
1979: 41-42) 
The Afrikaner Broederbond also had a complex and somewhat uncomfortable relationship 
with another ideological mass organisation well to the right of the National Party, the 
400 000 strong "Ossewabrandwag" (OB), which had a fascist one-party philosophy and 
which supported Hitler's Germany during the war. The National Party and the Federation 
of Afrikaans Cultural Organisations came into conflict with the OB, and while there were 
many prominent Broederbonders who were members of the OB. there were many others for 
whom the fascism of the OB and of other hyper right-wing organisations such as the 
"Greyshirts" was anathema. In the final instance, tbe Afrikaner Broederbond although 
striving for cohesiveness, relative ethnic exclusivity and the total segregation of the races, 
was not fascist or particularly authoritarian. In fact one of its characteristics was an endless 
debate -- at times confusion -- about specific policies and positions within its broader 
framework and also about the position of the minority of non-Nationalist or "SAP" 
sympathizers within its ranks. Right up to 1948 its political stance was diffuse, although it 
was united in supporting apartheid. 
Two things were, however, remarkable about the Broederbond: the methodical, systematic 
and at times very patient way in which it developed and implemented strategies 
(Serfontein, p47), despite lack of clarity on goals at times, and even allowing for the 
strategic approach, the relatively rapid success of its campaign to attract leading Afrikaners 
into its ranks in the face of the sophisticated and more inclusive philosophy offered by the 
Smuts and Hertzog traditions of leadership -- a leadership vvhich was certainly not lacking 
in legitimacy in the early struggle against British imperialism. The Broederbond, through 
what was an ambitious and partly-successful programme of co-ordination and mobilisation, 
was partly instrumental in laying the basis for the Nationalist victory in 1948, and therefore 
was the midwife of the emergence of a more fully-rounded and formalised Afrikaner 
ethnicity. 
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It is worth noting briefly what Afrikaner nationalism had to prevail against. After the 
Anglo-Boer war, Generals Botha and Smuts were primarily committed to the healing of the 
deep rift of antagonism between Afrikaans and English-speaking whites and reconciling the 
new country to the broader international capitalist liberal-conservatism of the British 
Commonwealth at that time. For this task they enjoyed immense credibility as former Boer 
generals; Smuts having been among the last to surrender to the British. This position of 
reconciliation was made more credible by the fact that Smuts was mistrusted and opposed 
from the English-speaking side by the intensely pro-British Unionists. Smuts. particularly, 
had the additional advantage of an exalted status within the Commonwealth and Britain, 
having been a British barrister, a member of the British War Cabinet in the First World War 
as well as having held other prestige positions in British academic life. He was, 
theoretically, an almost incomparable ego ideal as an Afrikaner boy (Boerseun) who made 
good. For the Afrikaners who adopted the reconciliatory attitude. he was a towering symbol 
of the new South African unity, in tune -- indeed a leading figure in -- the emerging modem 
international (and after the Anglo-Boer War, somewhat chastened) spirit of development 
and democracy. It was against the immense stature of Smuts that the Nationalists had to 
mobilise. 
The consolidation of Afrikaner nationalism hereafter can be broadly sketched on the basis 
of electoral advances. In reviewing these, the major sources consulted are those of Heard 
(1974) and Davenport (1987). In the elections of 19 l 0. among whites. the Botha-Smuts 
South African party was substantially opposed only by the harder line British "chauvinists" 
in the Unionist Party, and the SAP attracted a massive share of the votes of the then 
demoralised and fragmented Afrikaners. The majority of the SAP was 56 per cent in the 
absence of any party for the Afrikaner nationalists. By the 1915 elections General Hertzog 
had split from Botha and Smuts largely because of the perception that the entry of South 
Africa into the First World War indicated an over-riding loyalty to the British imperialist 
cause and formed the National Party. This new party did fairly well under the 
circumstances and gained 21 per cent of the ( overwhelmingly white) votes. but some 40 per 
cent of Afrikaners were still committed to the reconciliatory "South A/i·ican" position. 
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In the 1920 elections -- a time when the sharply deteriorating economy had drawn many 
less-skilled Afrikaner workers into the Labour Party, the National Party increased its share 
of the vote to 33 per cent, and significantly more Afrikaners voted "nationalist" than South 
African Party. In the 1924 elections, Hertzog and the Nationalists entered into a pact with 
the Labour Party which had been driven to side with Afrikaner Nationalists by the actions 
of Smuts in siding with mining capital in brutally suppressing the 1922 Mine-workers' 
rebellion, in which 230 white miners were killed. In this election the National Party took 47 
per cent of the vote, indicating that some two-thirds of Afrikaners had moved to the 
Nationalist position, and the Pact government brought Afrikaner nationalists into executive 
power for the first time in the Union. This position was maintained in the 1929 elections, 
when the National Party won 5 3 per cent of the seats. 
Hence, from 1915 to 1929 there was a steady consolidation of an Afrikaner Nationalist 
power-base to the point that well over 80 per cent of Afrikaners were voting for an ethnic 
cause. This ethnic cause was, however, a moderate one because the position of its leader, 
Hertzog, was what was termed the two-stream approach. Hertzog was committed to South 
African unity, like Smuts, but was less pro-English capital and was committed to raising 
the status and conditions of Afrikaners to a position of parity with those of the English-
speakers. He was not exclusive in his nationalism. In respect of the blacks, however, he was 
a firmer segregationist than Smuts, and he was implicitly supported in these measures by 
the Labour Party, which was dominantly English-speaking. 
The continuity in the trend in the consolidation of Afrikaner nationalism was broken by 
economic crises in the early thirties, and in response to popular demand, Hertzog and 
Smuts sank their differences and formed a coalition with the South African Party, which 
after the 1933 elections, in which the Nationalists won 50 per cent of the vote, was 
formalised as the new United Party. Although Hertzog within the United Party was 
instrumental in passing a number of fundamental segregationist measures, his association 
with Smuts and British-English-speaking South African business interests was too much for 
the more principled Nationalists, who by now were being ideologically strengthened by the 
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Broederbond. Hence in 1934, Dr. Malan, a Cape Nationalist broke away from Hertzog to 
form the "Pur(fied" National Party, later to become the "Herenigde" (Re-united) National 
Party, and the English-speaking equivalents of the purists broke away to form the 
Dominion Party. 
Many "moderate" Afrikaner Nationalists remained in the Smuts-Hertzog alliance, however, 
and initially the new National Party was weaker than it had been before the ''./i1sion", as it 
was called. In the 1938 election, Malan's nationalists won only some 18 per cent of the 
seats. Afrikaners, despite the mobilising zeal of the Broederbond, were once again 
disunited politically. In the meantime, Hertzog had broken away from the United Party 
because of Smuts' decision to enter the Second World War on tl1e side of Britain, but he 
failed to be accepted back by the new Nationalists and retired from politics, while his 
lieutenant Havenga formed the moderate but weak Afrikaner Party. 
It is important to note, however, that the divisions in Afrikaner politics at the time were 
wider than the differences between the South African unity position and the Nationalist 
position. There were also important differences in terms of militancy among Afrikaners, 
with the Ossewabrandwag, the Greyshirts and Oswald Pirow's New Order taking lines in 
broad sympathy with National Socialism. Malan, despite his intense commitments to 
Afrikaner unity, distanced the National Party from the more militant and extreme right 
wing elements, setting the stage for a coalition much later with the moderate nationalists in 
the Afrikaner Party. 
In the 1943 election, the Nationalists strengthened their position again to take 29 per cent of 
the seats, up from the 18 per cent of 1938. In fact they won 33 per cent of the votes cast, 
which implied that they had recovered to achieve a slight majority among Afrikaners, but 
clearly there was still a major component of the Afrikaner ethnic constituency in the 
reconciliatory anti-Nationalist coalition formed by the United Party after the elections. As 
popular interpretations had it at the time, the "Bloedsappe" (Afrikaners inveterately loyal to 
the Smuts tradition) had not yet budged. From now on the action was to be the struggle of 
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the Nationalists and to an extent the Broederbond, not always in formal alliance, to build 
the unity of the Afrikaner volk and to achieve political supremacy. 
In 1948, that moment arrived, but the victory remained narrow. The National Party was 
able to exploit some important non-ethnic issues; mainly what it portrayed as United Party 
weakness on a United Nations and India-led campaign against policies in respect of 
Indians, militant protests by the African Mineworkers Union and a setback for Smuts in the 
United Nations rejection of his proposal to incorporate the then South West Africa into 
Union. The National Party had also begun to exploit the anti-Christian influence of 
international Communism. 
The National Party. in alliance with the tiny Afrikaner Party. won 53 per cent of the seats, 
giving it an electoral victory, but securing only 39 per cent of tl1e votes; the discrepancy 
being due to the loading of rural votes in smaller rural constituencies. Clearly this was a 
further advance on the 33 per cent of seats won in 1943, but Afrikaners were still divided, 
with 20 to 30 per cent sticking to the conciliatory "South A/i"ican" position. In the 1953 
elections the National Party won 59 per cent of the seats but only 49 per cent of the votes, 
which meant that more than some 15 to 20 per cent of Afrikaners were still outside the 
''.lold". In the l 958 elections, however, the National Party won 55 per cent of the votes and 
this meant that well over eight out of ten Afrikaners had been politically incorporated into 
the Nationalist power base. 
Then came the final political test of the unity and ethnic commitment of Afrikaners -- the 
Referendum on the issue of the Republic. Symbolically the achievement of a Republic 
would for Nationalist Afrikaners reverse the defeat in the Anglo-Boer war and finally curb 
the threat of English-cultural and political imperialism and political interference by the 
Commonwealth. The campaign for the Republic was given impetus by a prophetic "Winds 
olChange" speech made by Mr. Harold MacMillan, the British Prime Minister, in which he 
warned of the inevitability of political transformation for South Africa to accommodate the 
rising demand for black political rights, the Sharpeville and other black protests and the 
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imposition of a State of Emergency and the attempted assassination of Dr. Verwoerd, who 
had become Prime Minister in 1958. 
In the referendum the yes vote for a Republic gained 52 per cent of the vote. implying that 
despite the controversies, the determined opposition of the United Party which .exploited 
the reconciliatory mission of Smuts to the hilt, warnings of world opposition and even some 
talk of a secession by Natal, some 80 per cent or more of Afrikaners backed the Republic. 
The processes were set in motion to inaugurate the Republic and Dr. Verwoerd went to 
London to the Commonwealth Conference with an application for South Africa to remain 
within the Commonwealth as a Republic. An ensuing confrontation led to him withdrawing 
the application and returning to announce: 
"We have triumphed -- not over another country. nor over Britain. but we have 
freed ourselves .fi'om the pressure £f the Afi·o-Asicm nations ... we mxw go forward 
alone. We are standing on our own.feet. 11 (quoted by Heard: 1974: 118) 
The Afrikaner nationalist mission had been achieved. 
5.2 INTERPRETING THE EMERGED AFRIKANER NATIONALISM: 
SOME PERSPECTIVES 
The understanding of the history of Afrikaner ethnicity has been made more than unusually 
complex by the manifest association which has been demonstrated between ethnic 
commitments and the clearly associated factors of class. race, and Calvinist religion. These 
associations have allowed a plethora of "one-factor" theories to grab centre-stage in 
explanations of the phenomenon. Furthermore, attempts to understand the nature of the 
Afrikaans ethnic aspirations have also been so thoroughly obscured by a flood of either 
self-delusionary, contrived or tendentious self-definitions of themselves by various kinds of 
Afrikaner spokesmen over the period since the 1930s, that a clear conception of the 
phenomenon is difficult to arrive at. Degenaar (1987:231-3) notes the tendency towards 
mono-causality and also the tendency among Afrikaner nationalist historians to project the 
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modem nationalism backwards m time to earlier periods; a tendency which O'Meara 
describes as follows: 
"Most of ii seffconsciously seeks to construct politicallcullural mythology. One 
leading author has gone so far as lo claim divine appoinlment to this task. 
(referring to G.D. Scholtz, 1967) .. . The result is a "diseased" national outlook ... 
(O'Meara, 1983:4)". 
Degenaar identifies some 26 phases or elements in the emerging make-up of Afrikaner 
ethnic identity -- in other words a complexity of interactions which dare not be 
oversimplified (Degenaar, 1987: 232-3). 
Within this contested field of interpretation one has to discuss the major issues of debate, 
before attempting to reach some conclusions about Afrikaner history which will be useful 
for the present. 
5.2.1 CLASS AS THE MAJOR DYNAMIC? 
Dan O'Meara offers the most sophisticated interpretation of Afrikaner nationalism 
from a broadly Marxist perspective. Following Marx's . well-known warnmgs 
(referred to in earlier chapters of this dissertation) he insists that the nature of 
Afrikaner nationalism cannot be explained in terms of the conscious meanings of 
the ethnic actors themselves. He criticises authors who have tended to take the 
subjective views of Afrikaners into account, among others Adam and Giliomee 
( 1979), for assuming that subjective needs and the actors self-definitions are 
prominent in the shaping of nationalism -- what he tenns an extreme form of 
idealism (O'Meara, 1983 :8). 
Yet O'Meara himself places an almost extreme final emphasis on his alternative 
hypothesised factor, class. He argues: 
''All ideologies provide some form of "psychological security" and emotional 
anchorage to those who believe in them. This tells us nothing and begs 
precisely the most important question -- why. and under what conditions do 
differentiated collectivities of people come to he organised in terms ql one 
ideology rather than another?" 
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He takes an alternative basis of explanation, one which '' ... seeks to go beyond such 
teleological and idealist circularity ... 11 which he clarifies as: 
· "Thus the approach here seeks to explain the development o/ Afrikaner 
nationalism ... through locating Aji-ikaans-speakers in the context of the 
social relations. conditions, contradictions ond struggles consequent upon 
capitalist accumulation in South Afi'ica. 11 (p 12) 
This approach, admittedly, does not lead O'Meara to crude economic reductionism 
and the proposition that Afrikaner nationalism was a form of false consciousness 
and self-mystification, as it has in many other Marxist interpretations. His approach 
is more sophisticated in that he accepts that the experience which groups have of 
their conditions is real and authentic. He also accepts that Afrikaner nationalism 
was more than a passive response to class struggles. and that it was an active 
organisational and ideological form through which the class forces operated. But 
nevertheless, the ideology and its organised responses were based on experiences 
which he describes as "partial" because the reality experienced was 
"misrepresented" to the people who experienced it. In seeking the fuller reality he 
proposes that 
11 
••• petit bourgeois groups sought to transform themselves into an industrial 
and commercial bourgeoisie utilising a broad set of organisational, 
ideological, and political means to mobilise mass support _ji-om Afrikaans 
speakers of other classes for this attempt." (pl 6) 
In other words, the intellectual leaders, proponents and grass roots supporters of the 
Afrikaner nationalist ideal were exposed to interpretations of the reality which were 
partially true to their experience but for the rest obscured the fact that they were 
being led up the garden path by their greedy petit bourgeois colleagues. 
This explanation is plausible to the extent that it describes a widely acknowledged 
aspect of Afrikaner mobilisation from the thirties onwards. As has been 
demonstrated, the Afrikaner Broederbond -- in its menu of secret co-ordinating 
action, included objectives which were identical to O'Meara's description -- in fact 
they were among the most public of its strategies. One is tempted therefore tempted 
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to ask O'Meara, "so what?". The serious question which arises, however, is whether 
or not the rest of the ideology was simply a disguise for class mobilisation or 
whether the class objectives were part of or extensions of processes which O'Meara 
negates as "idealistic". Obviously class interests were important, but was it only, or 
dominantly, class? Did the individuals who became rich with the establishment of 
Volkskas Bank, Santam and Sanlam in some mysterious vvay manipulate the cream 
of Afrikaans intellectuals to erect a massive structure of interlocking organisations, 
networks and commitments, to drive divisions between powerful political leaders, 
and to plan mas:,ive festivals just so that they and their petit bourgeois colleagues 
could make a quick buck? This is what O'Meara ( 1983 ). with precise and detailed 
examples as evidence in his sections 6-12, is arguing: 
"Thus the analysis of"this ideology must needs concentrate on the content al 
these struggles and not be misled by the .\vmholic forms in which they were 
cast." (pl 66) 
O'Meara's facts are all convmcmg and one may accept that both he and a core 
Broederbonder of the time would have agreed that a major goal of the Afrikaner 
Christian-National economic movement was the economic empowerment of a 
marginalised petit bourgeoisie. Similarly one can accept bis conclusions (p248 
passim) that the economic movement by 1948 had moved from the co-operative 
mobilisation and rescue of the dispersed and alienated volk to the consolidation of 
Afrikaner capital. O'Meara provides more convincing evidence of these 
developments than most Afrikaner historiographers adduce for their positions. What 
then is the disagreement? It lies in what neither O'Meara or the "idealists" he 
criticises can categorically prove directly. The question raised is whether the 
interests and relations in the Afrikaner base production system somehow 
determined the framework and the critical priorities. or whether the overarching 
ideological and broader motivational system -- the ethnicity -- created the 
opportunities and the inter-class support to allow the consolidation of Afrikaner 
economic interests to occur, and as Moodie puts it, to allow Afrikaner capitalism to 
be "subverted' to the aims of the volk (Moodie, 1975:289). O'Meara's proposition is 
the more difficult to prove and it requires more than the "exemplifications" he 
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produces, because for each of those there are other quotes and events that would 
"prove" the contrary. One has to in fact fail to be able to demonstrate the opposite of 
what O'Meara infers (the null hypothesis) before one can accept his position as 
proven on the basis of exemplification. For the moment all one can say is, that the 
structural case is based on an inference from certain facts. while the idealist case is 
based on the acceptance that the people who articulated the interests of Afrikaner 
Nationalism were not alt mystified, self-beguiled or sophisticated liars. The 
possibility of the latter, quite frankly, is absurd. 
A less indirect and less conceptually structured proposition about what really 
happened is that the bankers and the shopkeepers and the mining magnates who 
emerged were in the right place, in the right group and with the right broader 
ideological commitments at the right time. As with black economic empowerment 
in South Africa today, the ideologues and trade unionists were actually proud of 
them because they managed to make the most of the politically and ideologically 
constructed opportunities. 
O'Meara also does not fully answer the question he directs at Adam and Giliomee --
why one choice of ideology and not another? The nationalist enterprise, because of 
the scope of its mobilisation and its compelling emotive base was indeed 
particularly suited to the purposes of the bourgeois entrepreneurs. but the implied 
further part of his question, which is why nationalism has these particular 
advantages is not considered. Adam and Giliornee do attempt to answer precisely 
that with reference to "psychological security needs". which. as has been 
hypothesised in the literature in previous chapters, is not a teleological or circular 
factor but an independent underlying factor which is particularly well addressed by 
ethnic commitments. It is simply not true that any or all ideological commitments 
offer much the same mass appeal as ethnicity, as O'Meara suggests. 
The problem with the class-based approaches to Afrikaner ethnicity and its political 
agenda is not that the factor of class is invalid -- on the contrary. it is very valid 
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indeed as a component of the phenomenon, as is clear from the brief history offered. 
The Marxist approaches postulate more for class than that of a component part of 
the explanatory action; they want, as Wolpe suggests. class as an autonomous over-
riding or final force: 
"The consequence of this acceptance of the "uctor's" definition of the 
situation ··.· is that the ideological and political are given a predominance 
such as either to obliterate differences in relations ofproduction or to give 
the appearance that the political and lhe ideological define new relations ol 
exploitation. In either event the economic level is deprived of any autonomy 
whatsoever ... whatever the nature of the conflicts or contradictions ofSouth 
Afi-ican capitalism. (that) there is no possihilitv of the white working class or 
any Ji-action of it ever entering into an alliance with African workers in a 
struggle to overthrow the capitalist state." (Wolpe. 1976:215) 
If non-Marxist analysis excludes the possibility of class interests being a vital and 
analytically independent component of ethnic formations, then it would be as 
tendentious as the Marxist propositions themselves. Adam and Giliomee were 
certainly not excluding the relevance of material interests. but as Giliomee points 
out: 
"An orthodox class analysis ... does not provide un adequate answer to the 
question ol why the ''purified" version of Afrikaner nationalism became a 
drivingforce in such a comparatively short time.'' Giliomee, 1979: 110) 
Class interests, even if there was a bourgeois conspiracy to use nationalism to create 
an industrial and financial powerhouse, were relatively powerless to drive and 
·structure the process. They accompanied it and drew advantages from it but it was 
bigger even than they were. Max Weber's explanation of an "elective affinity" 
between structure and ideology is more easily reconcilable with the relationships 
between nationalism and class interests we have observed in the preceding review: 
"Ideas, selected and reintegrated from the original doctrine, do gain in 
affinity with the interests of certain memhers of special strata; if they do not 
gain such an affinity they are abandoned" (Gerth and Mills. 1977:63). 
Weber, furthermore, was referring not only to class interests but also to status and 
power. 
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Class interests enter the mix in the Afrikaner ethnic phenomenon in various ways. 
The Free Burghers in the Cape settlement were largely poor. and the migrant 
farmers later were very poor, living in hostile and circumstances. They were socio-
economically interposed between the poorer blacks and the richer officials and 
bourgeoisie of the urban areas and large farms. It would have been most unusual 
had their socio-economic circumstances not engendered antagonism towards the 
pro-Dutch and thereafter pro-British establishments and had these circumstances not 
been a factor in the Great Trek. Still later the impoverished circumstances of the 
Afrikaners after the Anglo-Boer war were undoubtedly a factor inclining the poor 
Afrikaners. through ethnic unions, to seek protection against both the English-
speaking industrialists and the black labour force which. because of its greater 
poverty and different community-structure and lifestyle. was able to undercut the 
Afrikaner's wages. The broader inequality between the English and Afrikaans 
communities after the turn of the century has already been referred to, and the 
coincidence of nationalist aspirations and Afrikaner bourgeois economic 
empowerment is equally obvious. Material contrasts and stresses were an obvious 
factor in the mix which was Afrikaner ethnicity. but to revert to Gellner in the 
introductory chapter, "without ethnicity, class is blind" -- class was not the 
STRUCTURING or dominant dynamic. 
5.2.2 RACISM AS THE STRUCTURING DYNAMIC? 
Race, as a factor obscuring a balanced understanding of Afrikaner ethnicity, needs 
little research to identify. Afrikaner nationalist politicians and · political 
entrepreneurs have given the many thousands of people. who have labelled 
Afrikaner ethnicity a cover for or correlate of the racism of the apartheid era, all the 
ammunition they ever needed. For example, the future Prime Minister D.F. Malan's 
speech at the commemoration of the battle of Blood River in 1938 extols the 
achievements of the Afrikaner nationalist enterprise in a particular order: 
"They made their sacrifices. There is still a white race. There is a new 
People. There is a unique language. There is an imperishable drive to 
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freedom. There is an. irrefutable ethnic destiny. 11 (quoted by Neuhaus, 
1986:26, my emphasis) 
This author's former Professor of Sociology at the University of Pretoria, Geoff 
Cronje (who missed many classes because of his tireless work in the fifties in 
promoting the cause of Afrikaner nationalism and that of the Broederbond and the 
Ossewabrandwag), wrote several books on the topic which were required reading 
for the new nationalist political elite in Pretoria. in which he spoke almost 
exclusively of race. and very seldom about culture or ethnicity as an autonomous 
phenomenon. In his most famous book " 'n Tuisle Vir die Nugeslug" (A Haven for 
our Descendants) he gives his definition of the Afrikaner nation and its calling as 
follows 
"The Boer nation .. is rooted in this land ond hos arisen fi'om this very 
earth, it knows the problems of this country from own experience ... South 
Africa is the only.fatherland for the Boer notion ... it hus created ifs culture 
_fi-om it own power and resources ... Because the Boer notion is indigenous it 
is in the best position to place the interests of the country above all other 
considerations ... (and all this comes immecliu1e/y under and elaborates on 
the heading): "It is historically the tusk and calling of the Boer nation to 
determine a racial policy for the country and to see to its implemenlation". 
(Cronje, 1945: 23) 
But Afrikaner nationalism and the racial interface are not quite as simple as these 
quotes would suggest. At issue is whether the response to race was "racist" in the 
sense of making the somatic and genetic factor predominant -- AN INTRINSIC 
RACIAL AVERSION, or whether race entered the mix as an ethnic boundary 
factor. Giliomee, on the basis of the archival material and reports of officials 
discerns three attitude sets among the colonists at around 1 780 to 181 O; the one a 
perception of cultural distinctiveness, the second being a perception of intrinsic 
genetic inferiority. and the third based on a "prior" claim to privileges emanating 
from their association with the colonial authorities (Giliomee. 1979: 93-94 ). The 
major distinction is between the first and third and the second. It is possible for race 
to become incorporated into an ethnic boundary-maintenance process without it 
necessarily being "racism" in the sense of a perception of genetic inferiority. 
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One can explore this possibility with what may be a rather silly hypothetical 
scenario. Would the responses of the Cape Free Burghers and the Trekkers been 
different had they encountered a technologically less-advanced people who spoke a 
different language, and a non-written language at that. who were non-Christian and 
did not cover their bodies, BUT WHO WERE WI-HIE-SKINNED CAUCASIANS? 
Unlikely: the settlers would have had the same conflicts and misunderstandings 
with these whites and would have stereotyped their culture as backward. Instead of 
a racial distance they would have developed an ethnocentric distance. The structure 
of the contact situations made a racially defined ethnic boundary inevitable, and 
since ethnic boundaries are self-reinforcing. it would have been perpetuated into the 
20th century. Certainly there was a prior European tradition of somatic sensitivity to 
dark skins, but race can be ethnic distance in disguise. Perhaps one should not drive 
too fine a point, but the Afrikaner race-consciousness that emerged with his 
ethnicity has probably always been a mixture of the racism and race-based ethnicity 
as described above. Theories of ethnicity have not reached consensus on whether 
race and ethnicity are both phenomena of a type or whether they have to be 
approached as conceptually distinct phenomena. Sandra Wallman ( 1988:229) makes 
the persuasive point that 
"Once ii is clear that ethnic r.elations follow on the social construction of' 
difference. phenotype (race) falls into pluce as one element in the repertoire 
of'ethnic boundary markers." 
Degenaar (1987: section 8.3) points to the possibility that the kind of nationalism 
which was emerging -- a "volksnasionalisme" (translation difficult but broadly a 
'folk-nationalism") inclines the self-definitions involved to intensely felt 
exclusiveness, which is closely consonant with rigid social closure and the 
stereotyping of outsiders. Hence while one accepts on the basis of overwhelming 
evidence that Afrikaner nationalism is steeped in race-stereotypy, one does not 
necessarily have to accept that all of the patterns are equivalent to racism, because 
they arise primarily from the Afrikaners definition of himself more than from the 
definition of the excluded other. 
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That there is a dimension of extreme racism within the mix is also clearly evident. 
What is particularly interesting is the tendency among some nationalist ideologues 
to use the conception of white purity as a basis for excluding other whites who do 
not share the concept -- in other words race attitudes as a boundary marker. The 
prominent Afrikaner nationalist historian, DJ. Kotze. defines the nationalist 
conception of the state as, inter-alia: 
" .. each nation should rule itself . . (and) Until such a di.\pensation is 
established in South Africa, the Afi-ikaner together with other worthy whites 
must retain the power ofthe slate. 11 (Kotze. 1968:5-1) 
Hence, for some of those involved in boundary maintenance. the attitude to race 
was a principle of exclusion or inclusion. 
As the hegemony of the nationalist cause was to progress later, even the 
authoritarian and highly directive Verwoerd. who had built his career on his 
championship of an exclusive ethnic cause, after the victory of the Republic in the 
1960 referendum, was able to offer the English junior partnership in the enterprise: 
"Patriotism .. fellow citizenship. fi-iendship. o/1 hove hecume of more 
importance to us. The English-speaking and the Aji-ikaans-.~peaking sections 
have become like the new bride and bridegroom who enter upon the new l(fe 
in love to create together and to live together as life-mates. 11 (quoted by 
Moodie, 1975:285-6) 
This is hardly the stuff of ethnic exclusion, and the key is the wider ethnic boundary 
-- race. With the ghost of British Imperialism and with it the threat of liberalism 
finally laid to rest, an ambiguity of boundary processes becomes evident; the 
boundary widens to allow associate membership up to the cutting point of race. 
5.2.3 CALVINISM AS THE STRUCTURING DYNAMIC? 
The Chairman of the Broederbond in the thirties described the mission of the Bond 
as follows: 
"The Afrikaner Broederbond has been hurn in the deep conviction that the 
Afikaner people have been planted in this land through the hand al God 
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with the destiny to survive as a separate people with their own mission." 
(quoted by Degenaar, p243) 
D.F. Malan, in the same 1938 speech quoted earlier_ gave an interpretation of 
Afrikaners which came very close to the notion of "chosen people", which had 
become a fairly familiar sentiment among sections of the Afrikaner nationalist core 
elite of the period: 
"The history of the Afrikaner reveals a determination and definiteness of 
purpose which makes one feel that A/i"ikanerdom is 110/ the work of man but 
a creation ol God. We have a divine right lo he Afi-ikaners. Our histmy is 
the highest work of the centuries. 11 (quoted by Neuhaus, 1986:25) 
(Malan, however, later denied that he intended to suggest that the Afrikaners were 
an uniquely chosen people, but he would not have denied the resonance of 
Calvinism within the collective mind-set of Afrikaner leadership.) 
The interaction between religious ideas and the development of the Afrikaner 
"people's nationalism" is a very complex. Some aspects are simple and self-evident. 
Degenaar (p241) reminds us that many European nationalisms have been enmeshed 
in religious doctrines. Then there is the fact that for the settlers in the Cape, and the 
Trekkers, the church was the only institution with any resources in their civil 
society distinct from the colonial authorities, and their membership of the church 
was one of the most important aspects of the race-ethnic boundary. It can probably 
be accepted that their Protestant identity was for a long time firmer than their 
cultural identity, laying the basis for what may be termed a "volkskerk" dynamic at 
the heart of their ethnicity.3 
But as time progressed the religious influences became more specific and complex. 
Moodie (1975) has made the premier analysis. as a basis for his thesis, that the 
Afrikaner ethnic cause took the form of a "civil religion". Unlike some popular 
stereotypes, which saw an undifferentiated traditional religiosity as somehow bound 
lt needs to be noted that the volkskerk notion derives from the nature of the affiliation -- the DRC did not 
define itself as such. 
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up with anti-modern tendencies among Afrikaners. Moodie distinguishes between 
various doctrinal influences. Interpreting broadly from Moodie. other writers like 
Hanekom ( 1951) and my own family exposure to the Dutch Reformed Church, the 
broadest orientation is that the "Volhkerk" was an institution separate from the 
state, and later to an extent even at least semi-independent of Broederbond pressure. 
The position, which was clearest in the larger NG Kerk. nnd was also evident in the 
northern breakaway Hervormde Kerk, was fundamentally intertwined with a broad 
Afrikaner consciousness. The Hervormde Kerk adopted a more conservative and 
ideological social and political stance. The larger NG Kerk had also been influenced 
by the more evangelical and pietistic Scottish Calvinist ministers brought in by the 
British and an evangelical tradition that emerged in the Netherlands itself, as well as 
by the more liberal Cape tradition. This evangelical influence emphasised the 
experience of faith, and provided a basis for less emphasis on religious ethnicity and 
hence potentially for a more inclusive "liheral" theology. In the Hervormde Kerk 
the liberal theology was constrained by a highly conservative political ideology, and 
an explicitly ethnic theology.4 
In contrast to this were the influences emanating from the doctrines of Abraham 
Kuyper. the Dutch Calvinist theologian and later Prime Minister, which found a 
focus in the third division in Afrikaner Calvinism. the Gereformeerde Kerk 
(Doppers). Kuyperian Calvinism inculcated the duty. delegated directly from God, 
to exercise individual conscience and to take individual responsibility for actions 
within the separate sphere of community, work and government, but subject to the 
final sovereignty of God, Whose intentions have to be actively interpreted in 
everyday life. The Kuyperian vision is one which Moodie describes as "collective 
individualism" and it is consonant with democracy and fundamental equality of all 
in the community of the Almighty. It formed the philosophical underpinnings of a 
more religiously activist and committed stance by the church in politics and 
.i In the largest church, the Dutch Reformed Church, the issue of race was controversial for a long time. and 
the church only formally segregated its structures (mother church and racially separate mission churches) 
under pressure from influences from the frontier regions. Later this "separate but equal" philosophy helped to 
structure government policy and Christian-national education. 
130 
strengthened the volks-tradition by providing a powerful coinciding doctrinal 
principle, which also strengthened the principle of "self-determination" 
(Volksnasionalisme). This vision implied doctrinal boundaries to the ethnic group 
rather than race as such, but obviously the doctrine divided Calvinist Afrikaners 
from largely non-Calvinist and non-Christian blacks as much as it would divide 
them, and did divide them, from white non-Calvinists in South Africa and Catholics 
in the Netherlands. Much later, in the sixties. the commitment to Calvinist doctrinal 
principle was to impel many Gereformeerde intellectuals to question Apartheid 
while maintaining a conservative theological position. 
In the 20th century, in contrast to all three Reformed influences, both German 
Romanticist and more authoritarian. dogmatic and potentially atheist National-
Socialist influences entered the mix. Moodie refers to the "neo-Fichtean" influence, 
seen in leaders such as Nico Diederichs, the earlier Verwoerd (born in the then 
Rhodesia of Dutch. not Afrikaans parents) and others who studied in Germany. This 
thinking reduced the importance of religious conviction in relation to a purer 
emphasis on an organic "volk" and its intrinsic mission. lt strengthened the more 
militant nationalists in the National Party and Broederbond themselves. The 
National Socialist ideology influenced the Ossewabrandwag. political activists like 
Hans van Rensburg, Oswald Pirow and the "Greyshirts" movement. My 
interpretation of events in the fifties was that the NG and Gereformeerde Calvinist 
traditions. however, acted as a bulwark against the spread of fascist ideology of this 
type. They most certainly prevented any widespread anti-sernitism from developing 
and there were prominent "insider" Jewish businessmen interacting with the local 
Afrikaans Nationalist leadership in the forties, fifties and sixties in Pretoria and 
elsewhere. Catholics were more problematic for the Calvinist Nationalists during 
this period, however, and an anti-Catholic sentiment was one of the most marked 
features of Transvaal Nationalism. 
These different influences are· less prominent today, but in the late emergence of 
Afrikaner nationalism in the thirties, forties and fifties, they were still an informing 
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influence in the strands of ethnic and political ideology of the time. Furthermore, 
there had been mutual influence between the three sister churches. thus reducing the 
doctrinal differences quite substantially. There was. thus. some notion, not 
necessarily of being the elect of God, but at least of being accountable to 
transcendent authority. Most importantly, the influence of the various strands of 
Calvinism was to pr0vide a moral and intellectual confidence to the leadership. 
5.2.4 A COMPOU1\JD PROCESS 
As the earlier chapters have argued, the concepts of ethnicity and nationalism have 
to allow for the combined effects of various levels of interest. motivation, moral 
commitment. rationalisation, organisation and boundary formation within the 
phenomena. The emergence of Afrikaner ethnicity has to be understood as a 
compound process, but one in which a "dialectic". to quote Degenaar (p252), exists 
between powerful elements, each one of which offers itself as the basis for grasping 
the phenomenon, but not one of which is sufficient in itself 
Afrikaner Nationalism was aiso a process of crystallisation. and as Giliomee 
(1984:41) reminds us, it was only after the Anglo-Boer war and the full entry of 
Afrikaners into a situation of divided pluralistic politics and economic interaction, 
in which positions had to be taken and distinctions fonnalised, that a definite 
national consciousness developed, and which was then projected backwards onto 
the strands of influence which produced the ethnic consciousness: "... a nation 
necessarily creates its own history" (Degenaar. 1987:233). 
A process of interacting elements with rationalisations and myths often constructed 
after the events, suggests that Afrikaner nationalism was amorphous. but this would 
not be accurate. The crystallisation of these elements into a cohesive whole leads to 
what Giliomee, following Blumer (1964) has also described as a "sense of' group 
position". and with it a consciousness which I have argued feeds back into very 
basic needs for identity, status and reassurance. Calvinism, class. power, ethnic 
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entrepreneurship all gave content and structure. but the Afrikaners cannot be argued 
to be anything other than primarily an ethnic group. But the brief history outlined 
indicates the possibility of some characteristics relevant to its responses to current 
conditions and likely future persistence. These will be drawn together in the final 
chapter. 
5.3 THE HEYDAY OF AFRIKANER ST ATE NATIONALISM: 
DOMINANCE, DIVERSIFICATION AND DIVISION 
The 1958 election and the 1960 referendum campaigns were fought on an ethnic basis 
focused on race. An editorial in the Nationalist Party mouthpiece Die Trcmsvaler put it very 
succinctly: 
"The tribal drum beats for every 'rasegte' person ... the National Party causes a 
voice to be heard that its people trust -- the voice of the good shepherd ivho knows 
his own and whom his mvn know." (quoted by Schlemmer. 1987: 53) 
After the nationalist victory in the 1960 referendum the prospects of the alternative pole to 
Nationalism ever being able to threaten Afrikaner ethnic interests declined rapidly. During 
the preceding period education at all levels had been segregnted. the principle of mother 
tongue education deeply entrenched and the language of the public service, although 
nominally bilingual, had shifted to a primary position for Afrikaans. A number of symbolic 
place names had been changed to Afrikaans as well. Virtually all public service provision 
and public amenities had been formally segregated. The formidable Dr. Verwoerd had 
become Prime Minister in 1958 and even most opposition MPs acknowledged has 
intellectual strength (see Davenport, 1987: chapters 14 and 15). 
Furthermore, Verwoerd's policy of granting independence to the African "Homelands" had 
contributed substantially to splitting the opposition. because a group of eleven United Party 
MPs had split off from the official opposition in 1959 to form the Progressive Party, partly 
because the United Party had opposed the granting of more land for the Homelands. The 





Black politics had moved to centre stage as the critical threat to the new position of 
dominance of Afrikaners. The AN C's Congress of the People at which the Freedom Charter 
was signed in 1955 had been preceded by rural rebellion and then by the ANC's urban 
"Defiance Campaign". The Sharpeville massacre was to follow. and for South Africans and 
for the world at large. the ethnic struggle of the Afrikaners was almost totally eclipsed by 
the new dynamic. Most importantly for Afrikaner Nationalism. it meant that white unity 
became much more salient and more and more conservative English-speakers began to 
identify in political terms with the Nationalist Party. which accordingly went from strength 
to strength electorally. The proportion of seats won by the National Party increased as 








Obviously these percentages meant that from 1958 English-speakers began to support the 
National Party in large numbers -- this author's own calculations at the time of the 1966 
election were that over 30 per cent of English-speakers who participated voted Nationalist 
in that election; a proportion which was due to increase yet further. The basis of this 
solidarity was probably racial, and it was facilitated by the fact that the National Party in 
government had begun to allay the .cultural fears of English-speakers· from the 1961 
referendum victory onwards. 
As the historian Kapp puts it 
" ... status and cultural factors were the most power/id in attaching Afrikaner votes 
to the National Party and in arousing enthusiasm/or it. The post-1961 period saw a 
marked decline in the salience of these two issues. The National Party now became 
the champion al national unity and co-operation he tween the two white groups in 
the belief that a genuine Republican loyalty and patriotism could be generated once 
the status ql both the Afrikaner and English-speaking communities had been 
assured. Dr Verwoerd and his successor. B.J. Vorster went out of their way to 
cultivate English-:,,peaking support. 11 (Kapp, 1987: 17) 
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Although this pattern of rapprochement ("toenadering") had a setback in the 1970 
elections, the major division in South African politics and society was now more than ever 
before, the issue of race and the rights of "non-whites". 
Afrikaner culture had become institutionalised and the state assumed responsibility for its 
custodianship. Afrikaners retained ethnic consciousness and commitments, but could make 
the comfortable assumption that as long as a white government was in power, their superior 
numbers among white voters (roughly 60 per cent) and the fact that the English-speakers 
shared their most basic interests as fellow members of a dominantly middle-class racial 
oligarchy, the need for cultural and ethnic mobilisation had passed. Hence the ethnicity of 
the Afrikaner became an increasingly latent factor. 
The electoral complacency of the Nationalist Party was, however. due to be threatened by 
dissent from very conservative Afrikaners, not in terms of cultural commitments but in 
terms of racial policy. In 1969, after a messy dismissal of three Nationalist Party MPs, one 
of whom was Dr. Albert Hertzog, son the great General Hertzog. the Hersligte (restored) 
Nasionale Party (HNP) was formed. The split was only partly cultural, and in the main it 
was due to the fact that the Herstigtes objected to very limited cosmetic and pragmatic race 
reforms because they saw apartheid " ... as a se(fcontained ,\ystem that had to be defended 
in its totality. as Verwoerd had envisaged it" (Davenport 1987:424). Despite great political 
heat generated by the breakaway movement, the Afrikaner Broederbond supported the 
Prime Minister to the hilt. and the new HNP was never able to win a seat in Parliament, 
except for one seat as a result of a by-election victory handed to it in an electoral agreement· 
with the Conservative Party much later. 
The worst was yet to come from the right wing, however. ln the late seventies and early 
eighties the National Party shifted its basic policy positions on race quite substantially and 
in fact, without acknowledging it, moved towards the policy position which had been 
advocated by the United Party at the end of its existence -- a policy of so-called "Race 
Federation". These shifts were accompanied by the increasing prominence of technocratic 
I 
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approaches to government -- a major break with the older tradition of ideologically-based 
policy. A major concession to the reality of an integrated economy in the common areas of 
the country had been to recognise the permanence of non-homeland blacks in the cities and 
towns, leading to the establishment of black local authorities which enjoyed a measure of 
joint decision-making with white authorities on Regional Services Councils. Major reforms 
in regional planning and development policy also recognised the interdependence of black 
and white areas. At the social level segregation in theatres. restaurants and amenities was 
abolished by government. The prohibition on mixed marriages and sexual mixing was 
abolished and private schools and state universities were allowed to tntegrate their student 
bodies. The principle of political self-determination and a dominant power position for 
whites was firmly retained. but in the framework of the unacknowledged "race federation" 
principle of the need for joint and overarching mechanisms to ensure participation by all 
races in major development policy. These reforms were far-reaching at the time, and 
although change activists labelled them co-optive and the reforms "repressive", each one 
created precedents for further reform. 
ln 1982, former members of the National Party, who had been excluded from its ranks due 
to an earlier propaganda scandal involving the covert misuse of State funds to promote the 
National Party, and a group under Dr. Andries Treurnicht within the party, began 
mobilising against the reforms in the areas of race policy and particularly the policy to 
create two additional houses of Parliament, with lesser powers, for coloured people and 
Indians (there had been proposals for the incorporation of back representation into an over-
arching essentially consultative body but this was so firmly rejected by blacks that it was 
not pursued). After Treurnicht's dismissal from the party in a period of high drama, the 
Conservative Party was formed in March 1982, led by Dr. Andries Treurnicht. Soon after 
its establishment it established itself as a potential threat to the National Party, particularly 
in the Northern Transvaal, where it won a critical by-election in its leader's constituency. 
The Conservative Party advocated a very clear alternative to the race "federation" of the 
National Party: 
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"Partition is the only key to a stable and peace/id fitlure ji)r all the nations of 
Southern Afi'ica. Partition is the Conservative policy which will ensure that the 
Afrikaner people together with those English-speakers who wish to associate 
themselves with the Akikaners ... w;/l be ruled by their people alone." (quoted by 
Bekker and Grobbelaar, 1987: 73: my emphasis). 
The emergence of the Conservative Party was also accompanied by a widening d·ivision in 
the Dutch Reformed Churches. The larger NG Kerk. after a Commission of Enquiry into 
the theological foundations of apartheid in l 987, published an official church document 
called Church and Society (Kerk en Samelewing) which distanced it from the apartheid 
principle. The smaller Hervormde Kerk, however, remained publicly committed to racial 
exclusivity, along with a breakaway NG church called the Afrikaner Protestant Church and 
a few smaller movements. all providing a religious home for right-wing Afrikaners (see 
Bekker and Grobbelaar, 1987: 76). A Market and Opinion Surveys poll in October 1987 
showed the polarisation which was taking place in the Afrikaans churches: 
Table 1 
CHURCH MEMBERSHIP AND POLITICAL PARTY ADHERENCE: 
M&O POLL, OCTOBER 1987: Nl692 
AFRIKAANS CHURCH AFFILIATION 
NG Gereformeerde Hervormde Apostolic 
NP 51% 67% 37% 50% 
CP 29% 17% 42% 31% 
HNP 3% 3% 8% 2% 
Balance to 100% other parties or. no choice 
The association given above is more complex than a simple doctrinal division. In a M&O 
special survey in late 1982/early 1983, the respondents were classified in terms of high, 
medium or low religiositv in terms of frequency of church attendance and bible reading at 
home. The proportions classified as highly religious were as follows: 
GEREFORMEERDE CHURCH: 64% 
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NG CHURCH: 50% 
HERVORMDE CHURCH: 35% 
The pattern above would suggest that the Hervormde church affiliation was tending to 
become more political than religious in motivation. It is also important to note, however, 
that the median monthly incomes of NP and CP supporters were at that time hardly 
distinguishable: NP R1389, CP R1468. The division between the two parties was most 
certainly not along class lines in the period of the split. 
The critical issues in this division were not overtly cultural or ethnic in the sense of relating 
to Afrikaner identity; rather they centred on a conflict between the principle of the 
maintenance of rigid racial divisions on the one hand and reforms in race policy which 
although far from the minimum required by black interests, had the potential to lead to 
forms of joint multi-racial political participation and hence carried the danger of weakening 
"white" self-determination. As Afrikaner nationalism had become institutionalised within 
the policy of Apartheid, its full aims and objectives were in fact an automatic consequence 
of white domination and as such it was underwritten by white, not specifically Afrikaner 
domination. In this sense the Conservative Party's agenda was in· fact a latent Afrikaner 
nationalist agenda. Another way of putting this is to say that Afrikaners, because of their 
ethnic interests, had a greater "stake" in white domination than the English-speakers, and 
this was the basis for the Conservative Party's reactionary opposition to constitutional 
reform. This reaction was not a new extremism -- the CP was caught in a time warp. They 
were applying exactly the same criteria of evaluation in politics as the National Party had 
ten to fifteen years earlier. -- a good Afrikaner was supposed to have the correct race 
attitudes, as well as the right religious persuasion and sense of history (as well as language 
loyalty, obviously). The correct race attitudes were an ethnic boundary marker. This was 
the ethnic reality that the Conservative Party attempted to revive. 
It is of interest. therefore, to review the progress of the Conservative Party in opposition. In 
the 1987 election it won 22 seats in Parliament, reducing the National party's proportion of 
seats from the 80 per cent it had achieved in 1981 to 7 4 per cent. 
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In the 1981 elections the CP/HNP share of the vote was 15,5 per cent. which increased to 
29,9 per cent in 1987 and to 31,6 per cent in 1989 (quoted by Grobbelaar, 1991: 210). A 
series of opinion surveys by Market and Opinion Surveys. :i which yielded election 
predictions which were usually very close to results of election outcomes, allow the extent 
of Afrikaner support for the CP and the tiny right wing Hl\JP to be traced over time -- the 
CP and the HNP are grouped together because they both reflect a core Afrikaner "ethnic" 
vote in the sense described above.6 
Table 2 
VOTING PREFERENCES OF AFRIKAANS-SPEAKING WHITE 
VOTERS: M&O SURVEYS (N circa 1100-1200) 
Left of NP NP I Right of NP (CP, HNP) 
April 1982 6% 55% 29% 
July 1982 6% 56% 24% 
October 1984 7% 60% 20% 
June 1986 I 5% 61% 22% 
August 1987 9% 52% 35% 
November 1988 6% 55% 36% 
The percentages do not sum to 100% because non-choices and non-responses are 
not presented. 
Market and Opinion Surveys used a representative probability postal panel of 1800 to 2000 whites (and 
others not included here) which obtained very high response rates because panellists were entitled to free 





6 The parties to the "left" of the NP included the Progressive Party or its later equivalents and the successor 
parties to the United Party which were left of the NP only inasmuch as they were somewhat more pragmatic 
in respect of race policies but far from Jiberal. 
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The results on the table above show that the core ethnic position started at nearly one-third 
among Afrikaners soon after the establishment of the CP. then dropped to one-fifth by 1984 
to 1986. As the pace of reform in race policy and the prospects of negotiations with black 
political movements drew closer in 1987 and 1988, the support among Afrikaners for the 
right wing parties, mainly the CP, increased sharply to well over one third, and to 
majorities in the northern and north-eastern parts of the country. (In this period English-
speaking support for the NP varied between 25 per cent and 40 per cent and for the right-
wing parties between 3 and 8 per cent.) 
Hence, although Afrikaners were hotly divided on race issues which reflected an 
underlying ethnic agenda, the majority were clearly pragmatic and willing to countenance 
reform in race policy without sacrificing self-determination. and in that commitment they 
were in company with a substantial minority of English-speaking whites. Just how 
polarised the NP and the CP supporters were on a critical issues of race is evident from the 
results of another M&O poll, conducted in April I 985. in which party supporters were 
asked whether they would support a "unitary state" in which all races enjoyed participation 
within the same system, a compromise or "consociational'' alternative in which race-based 
self-determination within a joint dispensation would be achieved, or a "partition model" in 
which total political separation of the races was maintained. The results were as follows, 
the PFP below is the Progressive Federal Party, the NRP is the New Republic Party, 
successor to the United Party: 
Table 3 
POLITICAL MODELS FOR SOUTH AFRICA: 
RESULTS OF AN M&O POLL OF APRIL 1985, ALL VOTERS (N 1678): 
SUPPORT GROUPS 
PFP NP NRP CP I HNP 
Unitary Model 78% 29% 16% 3% 9% 
Compromise Model 18% 59% 73% 23% 6% 
Partition Model 3% 11% 7% 73% 83% 
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I Other/No Info 1% 1% 4% 1% 2% 
Other Market and Opinion Research Polls showed the same degree of polarisation on all 
specific issues of race policy and segregation. The National Party by tbe mid-eighties had 
moved to the left of what the older Hertzog position had been when Malan split away to 
form the purified National Party partly on issues of race and ethnic principle. and the Malan 
position, as specified in more formal detail by Verwoerd. had been broadly adopted by the 
CP and the HNP. 
The Broederbond had in the period of the seventies and eighties started to take its lead from 
the National Party rather than giving the lead to the party. Hanf et al ( 1981 :97), on the basis 
of interviews with Afrikaner political elites, came to the conclusion that by the mid 
seventies the Bond had become an "instrument of the NP" and as such had to relinquish its 
emphasis on the exclusive interests of Afrikaners. In fact. this author's understanding is that 
Dr. Verwoerd's political and intellectual stature and influence had in a sense broken the 
autonomy on the Broederbond. As a consequence of this there was also a split in the 
Broederbond in 1984. and a new organisation, the A/i'ikaner Volkswag was established with 
a view to pursuing exclusive Afrikaner ethnic and race commitments. An M&O poll in July 
1984 revealed that only 17 per cent of Afrikaners saw a need for the Volkswag; 5 per cent 
among NP supporters, and 63 per cent among CP supporters. Most Afrikaners with the 
exception of the CP supporters saw the Volkswag as a disguised political organisation, and 
hence its fortunes followed those of the CP. 
The Conservative Party and before it the HNP were never really able to appeal to Afrikaner 
etlmic concerns, separate from the political system into which these concerns and interests 
had become absorbed. This was mainly because they fought their campaigns around race 
policy and were unable to make their latent agenda clear. 
This view may seem to avoid the obvious impression that the dynamic was in fact one of 
race with an ethnic colouring rather than the interpretation given above. One might forgive 
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any black person who sees this kind of question as offensive hair-splitting. Yet if we are to 
understand the phenomenon of ethnic reaction among Afrikaners, attention to the nuances 
is essential. Janis Grobbelaar (1991 ), in an exhaustive treatise on the right wing Afrikaner 
movement, for the most part does not attempt to disentangle the issues of race and ethnic 
ideology, but in her final conclusions she draws on the earlier religious principle of a belief 
in a divinely-ordained "volkeverskeidenheid" ( ethnic variety) as a core aspect of the right 
wing ideology (p34 7). Earlier she quotes C.J. Jooste. one of the prominent right-wing 
ideological spokesmen, the Director of the then South African Bureau of Racial Affairs: 
"The Afi-ikaner has since his earliest existence tried lo shore his c01111/Jy with unassimilable 
strangers ... in large numbers ... " (Grobbelaar, 1991: 326). The conservative English-
speakers were accepted by the CP as assimilable, but the Africans and other groups of 
colour were not assimilable, by virtue of their large numbers as wel I as due to any assumed 
racial characteristics. Here again this, in a very broad sense. is racism at work, but in the 
context of this analysis we arrive once again at race as an element in ethnic boundary 
formation. 
5.4 AFRIKANER ETHNIC MOBlLISA Tl ON lN THE NlNETlES 
The largest challenges to the Afrikaner ethnic "project". and the most interesting test of its 
reactions in the political environment, have arisen in the long-delayed transition to majority 
rule in South Africa. The broader dynamics of this transition are a fascinating topic, but 
they belong to another analysis -- this dissertation, already uncomfortably long, is not about 
the entire South African political economy but about a subset of the dynamics: the role and 
reactions of Afrikaner nationalism and minority consciousness within the broader patterns 
of change. 
Under pressure from a variety of sources, including economic sanctions and a range of 
other international pressures, and most especially a chronic balance of payments problem, 
which was placing a ceiling on economic growth in the country. from at least 1986 onward, 
the power elite in the National Party and the Broederbond had been considering ways of 
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engaging non-communist elements of the ANC in negotiations. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and South Africa's participation in the settlement in Namibia, impediments to 
negotiation were eased and the rest is history. After the signal event of the release from 
prison of Nelson Mandela and the un-banning of the ANC and other liberation movements 
in 1990, there was in fact no alternative but to begin negotiations, which proceeded 
relatively rapidly from then onwards. 
In this process the National Party inevitably positioned itself as a wide-spectrum party. In a 
representative national survey conducted by this author in mid-1992. with fieldwork by 
Market and Opinion Surveys, the support bases of the various political parties appeared as 
follows: 
Table 4 
SUPPORT BASE OF POLITICAL PARTIES AMONG WHITES 
IN MID-1992: M&O SURVEYS WHITE SUB-SAMPLE: N 1665 
Nationalist Democratic Right-Wing 
Party Party (CP/A WB/HNP) 
Home Language 
Afrikaans 53% 15% 88% 
English 46% 83% 12% 
Other 1% 2% -
Household Income 
<R2000 p.m. 20% 8% 35% 
R2000 - R2999 15% 12% 15% 
R3000 - R3999 13% 13% 15% 
R4000 - R4999 11% 8% 11% 
RS000 - R7499 16% 20% 9% 
R7500 - R9999 8% 12% 3% 
RI0000 plus 8% 11% 3% 
Hence, as the transition to majority rule began, the National Party was indeed in its base 
composition a centre-party, between the more reform-oriented and traditionally anti-
apartheid Democratic Party and the Conservative and other right wing parties which were 
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clearly very dominantly Afrikaans in their support base. The National Party was almost 
evenly balanced between English and Afrikaans-speakers although the upper middle-class 
English-speakers tended towards the Democratic Party. 
The results according to income show much less polarisation than one might have 
expected. While it is clear that the poorer whites tended to be less inclined to support the 
centre and reform positions, there was no crystallised class tendency in the responses. 
Political culture, ethnic factors and class interests \:vere interacting in complex ways in 
white politics. 
What is most important in these results is that the National Party could not afford to pursue 
an Afrikaans nationalist agenda in the negotiations and nor could it take the side of either 
poorer or richer whites. It had to be comprehensive in its positioning. It had in fact become 
the old South African Party of Smuts that it had fought so bitterly decades before, and was 
in effect no longer an ethnic party. The ethnic factor was represented by the right-wing in 
white politics. 
When the government in 1989 started actively planning the transition from white political 
control, the reactions among right-wing and conservative Afrikaners seemed serious and 
substantial. The breakaway movement from the Broederbond, the Afrikaner Volkswag; 
committed itself to the establishment of a "Volkstaat" and claimed a membership of 50 000. 
The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) A WB. under the 
aggressive leadership of the. melodramatic Eugene Terreblanche. the HNP and a party 
called the Boerestaat Party started working for the establishment of a "fi·ont" to oppose the 
government initiatives, and called upon the Conservative Party to resign from seats in 
Parliament to force by-elections throughout the country. They tried to plan a national 
"General Election" organised by Afrikaner movements to demonstrate Afrikaner 
opposition to the negotiation moves by government. 
As has already been indicated, in the general Election of September l 989, the Conservative 
Party gained nearly 700 000 votes, well over one-third of the Afrikaans voter turnout. Later 
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in the same year it defeated the National Party in a by-election in a very safe National Party 
seat in Durban, far away from the core areas of Afrikaner political culture, and observers 
noted a 23 per cent swing away from the National Party. The Conservative Party held a 
"Volksvergadering" (People's meeting) at the V 0011rekker monument which attracted a 
crowd of up to I 00 000 supporters. 
In addition, more than a dozen instances of local white vigilantism. murders and attacks on 
Blacks and general dissidence occurred, spearheaded by an organisation calling itself the 
"Wit Wolwe" (White Wolves), but spreading to a few other militant splinter movements as 
well. This pattern continued through l 990 after the release in February of Nelson Mandela 
and the commencement of negotiations between the government and the ANC in earnest 
(South African Institute of Race Relations, 1990: 215-262 passim). 
In 1991, the Conservative Party. the HNP and a number of other organisations took out 
advertisements condemning the now established negotiations in the strongest terms. The 
A WB in 1990 warned that the "forces of the Afrikaner people would be difficult to control" 
(South African Institute of Race Relations, 1990: 21) and indicated that it had commenced 
paramilitary training for some thousands of its members. Two paramilitary units, the 
"Boerekommando" and the "Wenkommando" were formed. ln 1991 the AWB announced 
that the time had come for the Afrikaners to "prepare .fcJr war" (South African Institute of 
Race Relations, 1992: 1.) This author at the time, on the basis of opinion survey trends, 
estimated that the militant A WB had between 50 000 to 70 000 committed supporters, and 
some 300 000 passive supporters, the latter figure comprising some 15 to 20 per cent of the 
Afrikaans electorate. 
The same texture of events and statements continued during 1992 and 1993, broadening to 
include attacks on black school buildings. Various right w"ing organisations under the 
leadership of the Boerestaat Party announced their intention to mobilise to establish a 
"Volksraad" (People's Assembly) in Pretoria as an alternative to the government. In the run-
up to and during the first democratic elections in l 994, the dissidence intensified, with 32 
right-wingers arrested for sabotage and conspiracy. revealing that plans had been made to 
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blow up the Johannesburg International Airport in order to disrupt the elections. Twenty-
five members of the A WB were arrested on 96 counts of sabotage and bombings. Dr. Johan 
Steenkamp of the National Party drew attention to a l 6-page "War Plan" of the A WB, and 
the preparation of mass graves for blacks was suspected. 
All this may have seemed like the beginnings of general resistance. but reactions among 
extreme groups always tend to suggest more than they represent on the ground. In March 
l 992, a general referendum among whites was held in which the government sought to 
establish the extent of support which its negotiation initiatives enjoyed. The question asked 
in the referendum was: 
"Do you support the continuation of the re(orm process which the State President 
began on 2 Februwy 1990 and which is aimed ut u ne.v constitution through 
negotiation'!" 
The government obtained a 69 per cent endorsement of its initiatives from whites, which 
represented very narrow but nonetheless significant majority support among Afrikaners. 
Only in one region of the country, the far Northern Transvaal, was there a majority no vote 
(57 per cent) (South African Institute of Race Relations, 1993: 419). The opinion poll 
conducted by this author in mid-1992 enquired into the responses to the referendum by 
language and party, and the results are given in the table below: 
Table 5 
SUPPPORT PATTERNS IN THE MARCH 1992 REFERENDUM ON 
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ANC: NATIONAL SURVEY FOR AUTHOR 
BY M&O SURVEYS: WHITE SUB-SAMPLE: N1665 
Referendum Nationalist Democratic Ri 0 ht-"' 
Afrikaans English 
Party Party Wing 
• Voted Yes 79% 84% 4% 45% 73% 
Voted No 4% 3% 83% 41% 8% 




Other results of the 1992 opinion survey amplify the conclusions which can be drawn from 
the voting patterns in the referendum. Respondents were asked: "The government is 
negotiating with the ANC and other political groups. This could lead to a parliament 
representing all people, Afi-icans included, with a lesser or 1;reater de,:ree ofprotection for 
whites and other minorities. 11 Responses were sought in terms of the categories outlined in 
the table below: 
Table 6 
REACTIONS OF AFRIKANERS AND OTHER WHITES 
TO THE PROSPECTS OF AN OPEN DEMOCRACY WITH MORE 
OR LESS PROTECTION FOR MINORITIES: 1992 
Afrikaners English NP Right-Wing 
Welcome the new system 4,9% 14.4% 11.6% 0,0% 
Accept the new system 16,7% 29.4% 29.7% 0,7% 
Accept depending on 48,0% 49.0% 54.4% 37,4% 
minority powers 




Reject and oppose new 12,1% 2.0% 0.3% 27,4% 
system 
The table suggests that only approximately one fifth of Afrikaners went into South Africa's 
transition with more or less unqualified acceptance of the process, compared with over 40 
per cent of the English-speakers. Among the Afrikaners to the right of the National Party, 
sixty per cent rejected the moves; over one quarter implacably so. 
Afrikaners, therefore, went into the new dispensation deeply divided. but the weight of the 
most respected opinion among Afrikaans professionals, academics. business leaders and 
most church leaders was in favour of negotiated change. As the table immediately above 
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shows, somewhat more than half of the Afrikaners who endorsed the nef.,!;otiations· in the 
' 
referendum must have assumed or hoped that it would lead to a form of "power-sharing" 
between the white community and the emerging majority political forces under the 
leadership of the ANC -- a typical "consociational" arrangement. in which minority 
protection would have been built into the basic system of government. 
The full spectrum of results in this survey led to the following broad impression of the 
orientation of Afrikaners and whites at the time: 
11One reaches the somewhat sohering conclusion that the overwhelming 
endorsement ol negotiation and reform in the recent referendum was due very 
subslantia!ly to .fears ol what would happen il Mr. de Kl erk lost and negotiation 
ceased It was not due to any particular enlhllsiasmfor the reslllts olnegotiation ... 
Popular views on the composition of an interim government. once established, is 
that it should contain as many political parties as possible. even including the 
Conservative Party. Generally very few (white) people would like to see a big party 
cartel between the ANC and the National Pllr/y. ... (or) to see the interim 
government taking control of the security.forces." (Schlemmer. 1992: 19-20) 
The results in the survey made it quite clear that had Afrikaners suspected that the 
negotiation process would lead to the loss of executive powers in central government for 
the parties they supported, there would have been very little support for the shift away from 
white power dominance. 
Furthermore, the right-wing movements had diluted their appeals, some of which were on 
behalf of Afrikaner ethnic survival and others were against "Communism"; the latter being 
a threat which had subsided in the minds of most of the white electorate with the collapse 
of the old Soviet Union. In the 1992 opinion poll referred to above. the lar2:est single reason 
given by supporters of the right-wing parties for voting no in the referendum was the fear 
of "communism" - 20 per cent. (See also evidence by A WB members to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, Citizen, 24 May, 1998.) 
The right-wing formations became semi-consolidated for a period from May 1993 onwards, 
when 21 right-wing parties and organisations formed the Afrikaner Volksfi'ont. calling for a 
Volkstaat which would be part of a confederation of states within the Republic. The 
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Afrikaner Volksfront in October 1993 entered into a further alliance, called the Freedom 
Alliance, with the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Administrations of three black 
"Homelands"; an arrangement across colour lines which few would have predicted a few 
years earlier. Both these alliances held discussions with the government and the ANC in 
attempts to sell the goal of political self-determination within a confederation. They were 
given audiences as part of a pacification strategy but quite obviously to judge from later 
developments, neither the National Party government nor the ANC wanted territorial 
partition of any kind because both anticipated that they \VOtild enjoy substantial support 
across all regions. A National Party cabinet minister and negotiator. Roelf Meyer, made a 
vague promise that some form of self-determination would be possible in the north-western 
area of the country, but this idea never led to any serious planning. Later in 1993 the A VF 
and the ANC held discussions in an attempt to secure an agreement on a Volkstaat, but in 
the end neither the National Party nor the ANC were at all enthusiastic about taking any 
agreement to the Parliament and to the newly established joint government-ANC 
Transitional Executive Council (TEC), and the Afrikaner Vryheidsfront withdrew its 
participation and submissions. The talks around the possibility of an agreement on a 
Volkstaat had the effect, however, of delaying an earlier intention to establish an Afrikaner 
Transitional Government in defiance of the negotiation process and the soon to be 
established TEC. Early in 1994 Mr. Nelson Mandela put paid to any expectations of 
Afrikaner self-determination when he said that any agreement before the elections was out 
of the question. 
A Transitional Authority for Afrikaners was then established by the A VF in name, but soon 
afterwards one of the prominent leaders, General Constand Vi]joen warned that a Volkstaat 
at that stage would have to be established by violence, and instead he advocated a solidarity 
vote in the coming open elections to demonstrate support for self-determination. It is fair to 
say that had someone of ViJjoen's stature (he had been head of the S.A. Defence Force) 
advocated an act of force to establish a Volkstaat, it may have divided the army and South 




Thereafter General Viljoen established the Freedom Front. a party dedicated to self-
determination and agreed to participate in the open elections, which in tum split the 
Afrikaner Volksfront. General Viljoen, in return for heading off violent confrontation, was 
granted a statutory body, t!1e Volkstaat Council. to make recommendations to the new 
government on the establishment of a Volkstaat. The Volkstaat Council has by the time of 
writing run its term, made its recommendations, but with little sign of any interest in taking 
them seriously by either the governing ANC or the National Party. What in fact happened 
is that both the ANC and the National Party strung the Volkstaat movement along, using 
techniques of deflection which worked admirably in the fragmenting of the potential 
conservative Afrikaner solidarity around the issue of self-determination. Inexperienced in 
negotiation and in confrontational strategy, the conservative Afrikaner Movements were 
putty in the hands of the confident ANC and over-confident and duplicitous National Party. 
With the establishment of the Freedom Front, the Conservative Party lost a majority of its 
erstwhile support. 
Meanwhile, the more extremist Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (A WB) mounted various 
attempts at destabilisation, including a hopelessly botched attempt to secure the territory of 
the homeland of Bophuthatswana against insurgency by ANC supporters, in the course of 
which several A WB members were killed by the Bophuthatswana army which sided with 
the emergent ANC. In the process, and in the course of several more attempts to foment 
violent resistance followed by very quick arrests by the police (the A WB was quite 
obviously as leaky as a sieve), the A WB became thoroughly discredited in the eyes of even 
right-wing Afrikaners. The same fate awaited other groups like the Boerekommando, The 
Wit Wolwe (white wolves) and the Boere Republican Army. In the process Afrikaners in the 
police and the army arrested and uncovered fellow Afrikaners in these extremist 
movements. It was a situation much akin to the action by Smuts against the Boer rebels in 
1914. The effect on the confidence and psyche of right-wing Afrikaners was devastating. 
The energy, thrust and sense of purpose of right-wing mobilisation were dying (for more 
detailed accounts see S.A. Institute of Race Relations. 1994 and 1995: chapters on Political 
Developments). At this stage there still are a few militant right-wing activists in the 
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political field, but they are judiciously cautious and extremely covert. By its very nature, 
current conspiracy is simply not available for analysis. 
One has to conclude, however, that the mc1:1or reason for the apparent willingness of 
Afrikaners and indeed whites in general to be led into the new negotiated settlement, was 
their trust in the then President de Klerk to ensure that ultimate white veto rights would not 
be sacrificed. While orientations around the issue of strategy were deeply divided and 
varied, the majority of the whites would not have endorsed or accepted the situation which 
was to emerge. In a series of comparable opinion surveys between 1991 and mid-1993, de 
Kock demonstrated that "hope for a peacefi1! fi11ure" among whites declined from 56 per 
cent to 24 per cent over the period (de Kock, 1996:43). Although the de Kock surveys also 
showed that support for de Klerk fell between 199'.2 and 1993. de Klerk remained the 
dominant figure in minority politics. Frost sums up the situation very well: 
"In general the members olthis group (the whites) 111erefearfi1l olthe consequences 
ol democratisation and were primarily interested in .rn/eguording their jobs and 
property. It seemed to them that the best sofegzwrds would involve complicated 
constitutional devices ... for the most part they were lw11py 10 leave 1he process in 
the hands of "constitutional experts" ... the apathy they had learned under the old 
technocratic rulers persisted into the new period lvlost whites (and coloured<; and 
Indians) supported de Klerk silently and even apathetically. content to leave 
constitutional negotiations to the political leader." (Mervyn Frost. 1996:23) 
Opinion surveys conducted by R.W. Johnson and this author before the elections showed 
that whites were increasingly gravitating towards the National Party as the elections drew 
nearer. While in mid-1993, among whites support for the National Party and the right-wing 
parties was virtually level pegging, by February 1994, just before the elections, among 
wl1ites who indicated a political choice and an intention to vote. 62 per cent supported the 
NP, compared with 24 per cent supporting the right-wing parties who were resisting the 
tide. If one includes the conservative whites who supported Chief Buthelezi's strongly anti-
ANC positioned 1FP, the "resistant" proportion rose to 3 l per cent (Johnson and 
Schlemmer, 1996:80). Among Afrikaans speakers roughly just more than one half 
supported the NP and just less than one half the conservative parties. 
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The first open General Election of 1994, although preceded by complex and drawn out 
negotiations, was in the final instance an event presided over and organised by the National 
Party, operating on behalf of the majority of members of racial minorities and the ANC, 
operating on behalf of Africans with the exception of deeply traditional Zulus who 
supported the IFP under Chief Buthelezi. The major dissenting vote was the vote for the 
single party that stood in the election to represent the principle of white self-determination 
under the leadership of Afrikaners, the Freedom Front. In the final outcome the Freedom 
Front gained 424 000 votes. some 18 - 20 per cent of the white vote and slightly under one-
third of the Afrikaans vote. The right-wing vote would obviously been slightly higher had 
the Conservative Pai1y participated. Clearly what had happened was that most whites and 
Afrikaners decided to consolidate their position by voting for the National Party, which 
emerged with 20 per cent in the election and was the second largest party after the ANC 
which received 62 per cent of the total vote. 
5.5 THE SITUATION OF AFRIKANERS TODAY 
An assessment of the situation of Afrikaners today is not simple. ln every formal sense the 
country today is a non-racial democracy with the rights of individuals, including the 
individual's cultural and religious rights, protected by a sophisticated constitution. 
Conventional discrimination is prohibited and the principle of equality of status for all 
individuals and groups prevails. In terms of one dimension of principle in the constitution, 
Afrikaners, through the protection of the individual rights of members, have complete 
freedom to live the life of an ethnic community. South Africa is a far cry from. for example, 
multi-cultural Malawi in 1973, when this author was present in the country to hear the 
President, Dr. Hastings Banda instruct the population as follows: ''fi"om this day you are all 
Chichewa now" (Chichewa being the largest single language group in the country). 
At the same time, however. the South African constitution makes special provision for the 
qualification of clauses relating to equality and discrimination by sanctioning affirmative 
action and equity legislation, which is intended to discriminate in favour of "previously 
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disadvantaged" people, and there is no "sunset clause" or time horizon for the provisions --
they exist in perpetuity. They do not only relate to employment but to state tender 
procedures and numerous other regulations by government. The qualifications to the basic 
constitutional provisions do not only relate to the public sector but to all employing 
organisations and equity legislation has recently been promulgated. which requires all 
organisations above fifty employees to prepare formal policies for affirmative action in 
their appointments. 
These developments can obviously be justified on a number of grounds in the light of past 
discrimination and on the grounds that, unless the country achieves greater equality, it will 
not achieve the stability and necessary consensus on economic policy issues required for 
growth and development. From the point of view of the extent of opportunity for white 
minorities, however, the policies represent formal constraints relative to their qualifications. 
For example, the racial composition of public sector employment has changed rapidly and 
in mid-1997, whites made up 20 per cent of the service, but in terms of the minimum levels 
of qualifications necessary to obtain work in the public service (school standard 8 or 
equivalent), whites made up some 32 per cent of the population over 20 years of age (South 
African Government (1998) White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service, 
Government Printer). Policies of employment redress in the context of differential 
qualifications must inevitably create the fear or feeling among better-qualified minorities 
that they will be relatively disadvantaged. Whether this is defensible or not is not the 
immediate issue; in terms of the perceptions of inany if not most whites, the new 
dispensation imposes racially-based constraints on them. 
One obvious point which must be made is that this kind of exclusion affects all whites, not 
only Afrikaners (although the public service opportunities affect the Afrikaners more than 
the English-speaking whites because Afrikaners tended to look to the public sector for 
career opportunity more than the English-speakers). This is a vital point to remember 
because this commonality of circumstances, as well as the obvious racial and broader 
cultural similarities between fellow Europeans, may be a powerful factor interacting with 
the more particular ethnicity of Afrikaners. 
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There are, however, specific ways in which Afrikaners have had their scope of opportunity 
constrained. All the formerly Afrikaans-language universities. with the exception of the 
University of Stellenbosch, have adopted dual language policies with English on the 
ascendancy. The University of South Africa has formally shifted to English as its official 
policy. Afrikaans schools may not refuse entrance on grounds of language competence and 
if more than 40 students demand to be taught in a language other than Afrikaans, the school 
has to provide the alternative language of instruction. leading to a shift of the school's 
language identity. Most government departments have dropped the convention of using 
both English and Afrikaans in their official communications and Afrikaans is now almost 
never heard at official meetings or in public use. Afrikaners can no longer count on being 
attended to in Afrikaans in their dealings with officialdom. It has been proposed by 
majority party representatives that Afrikaans be dropped as an official language of 
parliament. The use of Afrikaans on the state television services has been scaled down 
dramatically. 
What has happened is that in the short space of five years. Afrikaans as a language of 
public communication has been reduced from its formerly dominant position to that of little 
more than one of the eleven official languages of the country. which is formerly justified in 
terms of cultural and language equality. Since the use of eleven languages is impractical, 
what this means in practice is that Afrikaans has been replaced by English as the public / 
language of the country. 
All these developments may be perfectly understandable -- indeed many commentators 
would argue that they were generous to Afrikaners -- in the light of the needs and rights of 
the majority in the country (a different topic), but from the point of view of both the 
cultural interests of Afrikaners and their sense of ethnic status and honour. the effects could 
be expected to be significant. In terms of the propositions by Gurr ( 1993 ), Rothschild 
( 1981) and Esman ( 1990) in the literature which has been reviewed. one might expect the 
Afrikaners, as a former ethnic elite which has rapidly lost its advantages. to re-mobilise in 
an attempt to restore or improve their ethnic status, or at least to resist any further erosion 
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of their cultural interests. This has not happened to any really significant extent although 
conservative Afrikaans-based parties have reacted very strongly to official treatment of the 
Afrikaans language. 
Recently in parliament, a senior leader of the Freedom Front, currently the largest party 
espousing self-determination for Afrikaners, made the following statement: 
"You (the ANC government) are determined lo disempower !he Afrikaner and 
whites in all respects. You have already taken ourji-eedom. Enough is enough ... if 
the ANC government wants confrontation. so be ii. We are reody to take up that 
challenge." (The Citizen, June 6, 1998) 
It is also not uncommon to hear rumours that a more general mobilisation of conservative 
Afrikaners is taking place clandestinely. The sources of such rumours are often unreliable, 
but there is very little doubt that lesser or greater conspiracies are hatched in far right-wing 
circles on an ongoing basis. Hard evidence of this is manifest in occasional thefts of 
weapons from military installations, for which white right-wingers are arrested, who are 
then congratulated by far right-wing groupings (Citizen, June 6. 1998). 
But other evidence shows that there is precious little political solidarity around the ethnic 
cause among Afrikaners. The MarkData database, assembled from regular nation-wide 
surveys over time, shows that the average level of support among Afrikaners for parties 
espousing self-determination for the ethnic group (The Freedom Front, The Conservative 
Party, the Herstigte Nasionale Party, the A WB and the Boerestaat Party) averaged only 
some 20 per cent over the period of 1995 to 1997 (MarkData (Pty) Ltd). This represents a 
drop in the level of support in the 1994 election, which was itself an erosion of the earlier 
position. 
The results of the 1999 general election and polls conducted in the run-up to the election 
underscore this point even more heavily. In the Mark.Data pre-election poll conducted in 
March 1999 ( a poll which is substantial1y validated by the fact that it predicted the winning 
majority of the ANC to within 0,8 per cent -- 65,5 per cent versus the election outcome of 
66,4 per cent), is was found that white Afrikaner support for the specifically Afrikaans 
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"ethnic" parties, the Freedom Front and the "Afhkaner Eenheidsbeweging" (Afrikaner 
Unity Movement, which incorporated the Conservative Party) had declined to some 14 per 
cent (the FF 11 per cent and the AEB 3 per cent). Even when second choices of parties are 
added (with adjustments to ensure that the addition does not include an overlap of first 
choices and second choices within the ethnic parties). the total endorsement of the two 
parties above is some 26 per cent. 
Obviously it is possible that many ethnically engaged Afrikaners endorsed the National 
Party, formerly the party of Afrikaans ethnic solidarity. the Federal Alliance led by Louis 
Luyt, a prominent Afrikaner businessman and rugby administrator and other parties. The 
choice of party is by no means a guide to the cultural orientations of voters. But the other 
parties do not claim to act on behalf of Afrikaners. In the new situation the National Party 
and the other parties all claim to be non-ethnic and non-racial. although they in fact 
mobilise more successfully among some class and racial minorities than others. What the 
pattern does indicate is that Afrikaners no longer have a political vehicle for their ethnic 
interests and show little inclination to support the parties that offer this vehicle. 
In the 1999 election results themselves, the two ethnic parties. the Freedom Front and the 
Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging polled no more than 1.09 per cent of the vote and some 7 per 
cent of the Afrikaner votes, calculated on the assumption that virtually all the support they 
received was from this group. 7 
The reason for the drop-off in conservative Afrikaans support for ethnic parties lies mainly 
in the fact that they have swung towards the Democratic Party in large numbers. The 
Democratic Party has established a profile as a party best able to and most committed to 
voicing protest against majoritarian and anti-minority tendencies within the ANC 
government. It is a non-racial, although largely white party founded on liberal democratic 
and free-market principles. much like the far left-wing of the old South African and United 
Parties which Nationalist Afrikaners regarded with the deepest suspicion and even 
venomous hatred in the twenties, thirties and forties. In a MarkData post-election poll in 
7 Calculations made on the basis ofan extrapolation of 1996 census figures for white Afrikaans-speakers. 
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June 1999, the breakdown of support for the vanous parties 111 the election among 
Afrikaners and other groups was as follows; it will be noted that Afrikaans "ethnic" suppmi 
has fallen to a meagre 11 per cent: 
Table 7 
PARTY SUPPORT AMONG POPULATION GROUPS AS REFLECTED IN A 
POST-1999 ELECTION POLL: NATIONWIDE MARKDATA OMNIBUS: 
SAMPLE N 2242, JUNE 1999 
Blacks Coloureds Asians White \Vhite 
I 
Afrikaans English 
j National Party 0.4% 23,9% l 1.0% 28.1% 12.4% 
Democratic Party 0,2% 17,8% 53.2% 
I 
43.8% 67,0% 
Freedom Front 0,2% - - I 10.4% 3,6% 
, 
I 
Afrik. Unity Mnt. - - - 0.8% -
Federal Alliance 0.1% - - I 7.7% -
• ANC 85,9% 53,9% 35.0% 2.6% 4,8% 
IFP 8,0% - - - -
1
UDM 3,0% 2,4% - 1.4% 3.6% 
PAC 0,4% - - -
I 
-
I Others 2,0% 
I 
2,0% 1,0% 4.5% 
i 
8,7% 
In drawing this review of Afrikaner ethnic mobilisation and demobilisation to a close, some 
comments on factors which seem significant at the present time in explaining the dramatic 
political decomposition of the group are appropriate. By way of introduction to this I give a 
little example of the fragmented consciousness among core opinion leaders. 
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In May 1998, this author addressed a group of prominent Afrikaners who had formed 
themselves into an ongoing and very serious, but informal discussion group in Pretoria. The 
address was on the implications for Afrikaans of new government policies in the field of 
affirmative action for black South Africans, one implication of which is that Afrikaans 
businesses of any substantial size which wish to operate as ethnic concerns. employing 
mainly Afrikaners, will be illegal because of new requirements of racial representativeness 
in workforces. The logic, from the side of government, is simply that it is necessary, in the 
light of past discrimination on racial grounds, for the composition of all significant 
organisations to be actively changed to allow more scope for black progress up the 
occupational ladder. Equal opportunities on merit it is argued. are insufficient to achieve 
this, and therefore more positive engineering of outcomes is required. Hence the arguments 
in favour of the legislation are persuasive in the light of the effects of apartheid and racial 
discrimination in the past. 
The composition of the group was diverse: retired and current semor officials in 
government and military officers, Afrikaans businessmen. journalists and people drawn 
from voluntary cultural associations. The reactions of the participants, all "core" 
Afrikaners. could not have been more varied. Many if not most of the senior officials and 
retired public sector personnel took the view that the legislation was understandable, 
sufficiently qualified to allow for adaptation to changing requirements in employment 
policies and as such was probably best accepted. The Afrikaans businessmen and 
professional took the line that they would make their individual adaptations and concentrate 
on making profits and accumulating wealth, even if it meant changing the ethnic profiles of 
their concerns. The journalists and intellectuals were divided between those who felt that 
the new dispensation was, once again understandable if not desirable, and had to be 
accepted, and those who felt that, intentionally or not. it constituted an attack in the rights 
of an ethnic group to exist and prosper within a multi-cultural society and as such had to be 
vehemently opposed. Clearly, there was no consensus or coherence among this rather 




At least five factors need to be noted in respect of the decomposition of the group. First, 
one must bear in mind that the excesses of apartheid have created a powerful sense of guilt 
and a matching moral rationale for the discouragement of any forms of racially 
particularistic expression in South Africa, unless they are specifically linked to policies of 
redress in the powerfully centralised non-racial nation-building project of the ANC. 
Second, Afrikaners have become a rather successful middle and upper-middle class. Brief 
extracts from the database maintained by MarkData ( Pty) Ltd. illustrates this. The 
following estimates are based on the merged results of strictly comparable nation-wide 
samples of the South African adult population for the period 1995 to 1997. and hence 
represent an average over those years. The total sample size or all races was N 30480: 
Table 8 
LEVELS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AMONG 
SOUTH AFRICAN WHITES BY HOME LANGUAGE: 1995-1997 
(Source, Mark.Data database) 
I All S.A. Adults White Afrikaans White English 
Post-school qualification 5,4% 21.5% 26,7% 
Graduates as % of adults 2,0% 92% 12,2% 
Median household income R 917 R 4 881 R 5 892 
Median personal income among R262 R2 956 R 3 225 
earners. 
Semi-professional or higher 14,8% 46.2% 47,4% 
among employed 
"Living standard measure": 20,6% 85.6% 87,0% 
two highest categories 
The top two categories of the "Living Standard Measure". an index commonly used in 
commercial research, represent a middle to upper-middle class lifestyle, with at least one 
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vehicle, modem household appliances and. electronic equipment and significant leisure 
expenditure. The other categories above are self-explanatory. 
From the brief results presented above, it 1s clear that the white Afrikaners are only 
marginally less-successful in material terms than their white English-speaking counterparts, 
who have a standard of living and lifestyles comparable to. say. white Australians, New 
Zealanders and Canadians. Afrikaners are correspondingly much more affluent than South 
Africans of all races taken together, despite a rather rapid recent narrowing of racial 
inequality. 
As such Afrikaners (and obviously their English-language compatriots) still have a 
perception of themselves as relatively comfortable compared with the mass of black South 
Africans. Their occupational achievements and experience also \VOtild give them 
considerable confidence in their abilities as individuals. Therefore it has to be considered 
that any ethnic resentments, no matter how genuinely felt. could be tempered by their 
relatively high levels of socio-economic security. 
Thirdly, the policies of the new South African government in reducing the official status of 
the Afrikaans language and heritage, have been pursued within a broad rationale of equity 
and fairness for all minority languages. The favoured position of English in public 
communication is justified on the basis of the status of English as a world language and a 
lingua-franca. Furthermore, government Ministers hasten to reassure Afrikaners very 
frequently that their language and culture are valued and respected as part of the cultural 
diversity of the country. Very recently President Mandela announced his intention to 
establish a mechanism to de:11 with the fears and frustrations of minorities (Citizen, June 6, 
1998), an intention which has been endorsed by the new President Mbeki. Constraints 
placed on the right of Afrikaners to mother-tongue schools are also justified on the basis of 
resource constraints and the consequent need for a sharing of facilities. or on the basis of 
the right of all children to gain admission to schools of their choice, even if it means that 
Afrikaans schools have to offer classes in English to accommodate the needs of the new 
enrolment. 
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The impact of these steps in language policy is more than somewhat ameliorated by the fact 
that most Afrikaners speak English reasonably well and the fact that a command of an 
international language has obvious benefits. In fact many Afrikaans parents are choosing to 
send their children to English schools for precisely this reason. 
Fourthly, Afrikaners have a serious deficit of leadership equipped to respond to the new 
challenges within an ethnic framework. Part of the reason for this is that the character of the 
apartheid government which presented itself as. and was generillly perceived to be, an 
Afrikaner government, was such as to alienate most of the competent professionals and the 
intelligentsia from the ethnic cause. The distance which opened up between the Afrikaans 
intelligentsia and the government was carried over into the post-apartheid situation. This 
distance between the intelligentsia and the professionals and the ethnic cause has been 
preserved by the latter day rewards of being seen to be committed to the new nation-
building project. This motivation applies particularly to businessmen and professionals 
whose careers are dependent on government contracts, consultancies and acceptance by the 
powerful (indirectly) state-controlled electronic media. At the very time of editing this 
section the author received a call from a senior executive in the largest Afrikaans press 
group, Nasionale Pers, formerly the powerful ally of the Afrikaner Nationalist cause, 
asking for advice on the appointment of persons to the Board of the Company to assist it in 
repositioning itself in a position likely to be seen to be sympathetic to racial transformation. 
The political scientist Deon Geldenhuys, in a perceptive article. has typified the types of 
positioning and signals that most prominent members of the Afrikaans intelligentsia adopt 
or try to send today: a "near obsession to depict A/i-ika11ers as heing in various political 
camps", a "deathly anxiety that some Afrikaner cultural or political organisation will speak 
on their behalf', a replication of their former orthodox desire to be associated with the new 
political establishment and t:, remain within the political framework. an "unholy fear of the 
taint of ethnicity", South Africa is unique and while ethnicity may be acceptable elsewhere, 
in South Africa it is deviant, and finally an identification with African culture (Deon 
Geldenhuys, 1999: 13). Geldenhuys' assessment is well illustrated by the views of a 
I 
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prominent, National Party Pretoria City Councillor whq in fulsomely approving a proposal 
to rename the Capital as Mandela City said: "It will show that we Afhkaners have embraced 
the values for which Nelson Mandela received international recognition" (Mail and 
Guardian, July 2-8). Ethnic leadership, if it is to ever become viable again for the 
Afrikaners, will clearly have to rebuild itself over time. 
In the fifth place, South Africa is part of a racially homogeneous sub-continent, and the 
sense of the dominance of the African cultural domain makes it difficult for minorities of 
European or Asian racial extraction not to perceive themselves as "settler communities", all 
justifiable claims to an indigenous status for Afrikaans notwithstanding. The fact that 
Afrikaners have feelings of identity based on group origin. and the foct that the early origin 
is "Europeanl!, can quite easily become blended with a perception of having a type of 
"guest status" on the African continent. The brute fact that all white and Asian minorities 
are overwhelmingly outnumbered is also demoralising to racial minorities. In this 
connection the categorisations of de Nevers, referred to earlier, are relevant. 
Finally in this review of developments, it is important to note that Afrikaners from the very 
earliest mobilisation had the church on their side, and particular expressions of Calvinism 
deeply enmeshed within the ethnic consciousness. In 1998. one of the three most influential 
dominees (Ministers of Religion) in the Pretoria N.G. Kerk. invited Archbishop Tutu, the 
foremost anti-apartheid church leader in the country, to give a sermon in his church, after 
which the Dominee apologised for Apartheid and broke into tears. The Afrikaner today is 
aware that no longer will religiously sanctioned principle offer any ethnic reassurance. 
Afrikaners no longer have God on their side. 
Hence, while a sense of ethnic "status-loss" is palpable, it occurs within a political context 
of arnbiguitv at best and influential discouragement of ethnicity at worst. This ambiguity in 
the present status of Afrikaners quite obviously weakens any urge to mobilise in defence of 
ethnic identity, self-determination and the values formerly associated with the Afrikaner 
civil religion. Afrikaners are now more deeply divided and fragmented than they were in 
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the years before the Broederbond began its mobilisation in 1918. It is worthwhile recalling 
a quote from a Broederbond leader, Henning Klapper. referring to that period: 
"The years 1914 to 1917 ... were years of struggle for rhe Afhkaner, years of 
dissension, years of scattering (verstrooing). yeors ofji-usrration. This was the 
decade after the English war in which we were desrroyed But we felt that we could 
not remain lying down; by the grace of God we had to stond up." (quoted by 
Serfontein, 1979:30-31) 
Thus, after nearly two centuries of attempting to establish. rationalise and defend an 
identity which at one point was the arguably the most controversial ethnic identity in the 
world, the Afrikaners today are scattering themselves to the political winds, desperate to 
escape the political identities of the past. While this may be widely seen as appropriate 
moral penance, it is a challenge to many theories of ethnic persistence. ls this the end of 
Afrikanerdom or will a new cycle of ethnic mobilisation commence sometime in the 
future? 
Is ethnicity as fragile as this, or does it simply become latent under effective moral 
pressure, to rise Phoenix-like at some later point of history? 
In order to deepen the insights adduced to this point. some attention needs to be given to 
empirical findings relevant to the questions. 
I 
METHODOLOGICAL NOTE ON THE EMPIRICAL CHAPTERS 
WHICH FOLLOW 
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In the chapters which follow, a range of research dato is used which is drawn .from 
previous studies undertaken by the candidate. The studies have been chosen because, in 
addition to their original purposes, they appear to shed significant light on the issue under 
investigation. In some cases, however, had the studies been designed specially for this 
dissertation, the wording of certain items in research questionnaires or the selection of 
items would have been different. These shortcomings notwithstanding. the material has 
added value from the perspective of the approach adopted by the; candidate. 
In some cases further computer analysis would have been desirable. but the original records 
no longer existed. 
If any one of the studies had been able to be conducted specially for this thesis, in the 
tradition of dissertations, much fuller technical specification of the data-set would have 
been provided. Since over eight different studies have been drawn on. however, such 
technical specification was simply not practical, since it would have resulted in the 
technical appendices exceeding the length of the main text and the dissertation running to 
an absurd length. 
One alternative would have been to eliminate some of the studies in order to provide more 
detail on the remaining material. In the light of the different perspectives and the shifts in 
evidence over time which the various studies have provided. however, this would have 
thinned the texture of the evidence. Hence the variety of research has been retained, and the 
specification of the technical detail has been reduced. by deliberate choice. 
CHAPTER6 
ASPE(:TS OF ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS AT THE POPULAR 
LEVEL AMONG AFRIKANERS IN SOUTH AFRICA FROM THE 
SEVENTIES TO THE NINETIES 
6.1 INTRODUCTORY COMMENT 
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The prev10us chapter has examined Afrikaner nationalism and ethnicity in its public 
manifestations over time. These trends have been driven by the actions of ethnic leaders 
and political parties: what may be called the "civic forces'· at work. Another level of ethnic 
activity and consciousness is that which exists at the level of the aggregates of individuals 
who comprise the groups. The civic phenomena do not necessarily coincide with the 
aggregates of individual attitudes. It is doubtful, for example. that all or even most middle 
class Germans in the thirties entertained ideas of themselves as a master race. Presumably, 
however, there has to be at least a minimum of attitudinal support for leader-led ethnic 
action at the civic level for a group to be mobilised. 
The recent history of the Afrikaner ethnic movemenr has been that of a group in disarray 
and decline, as the previous chapter has shown. It is of interest to see whether the lack of 
cohesion is reflected in popular commitments and attitudes, which is what this chapter is 
about. 
Any one empirical study of attitudes can be subject to biasing features and data-
inconsistency, perhaps due to the wording of times or events that have taken place just 
before interviews and the like. For this reason, where possible. it is always advisable to 
compare results between different attitude surveys or surveys over time. and build up a 
picture of the general trends. Because attitude survey material is so sensitive to the context 
I 
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of questioning and the wording of items, it is also not very useful to place a great deal of 
emphasis on the precision and minor variations in the results. Attitude surveys are most 
useful if they are used as broad indicators of a reality and should never be confused with 
that reality. For these reasons the review which follows is very broad, based on several 
surveys, and not much attention is given to the minute of deviations and differences. What 
is being sought is a broadly valid but approximate index or surrogate indicators of the 
texture of popular ethnic consciousness among Afrikaners in recent decades. The picture 
which emerges will be carried through to the final chapters. when the trends will be related 
to other findings and integrated conclusions drawn. 
6.2 SELF-IDENTIFICATION AMONG AFRIKANERS 
The recent subsidence of ethnic commitment among Afrikaners raises questions about the 
penetration of ethnic consciousness among Afrikaners at large. It is therefore of interest to 
review evidence relating to self-identification on a comparative basis, both over time and 
between groups in South Africa. By self-identification one means simply the tendency, or 
otherwise, for the members of a "group" identified in terms of a potentially ethnic "marker" 
like language, region or religion, to define and see themselves as being associated with that 
"group", hence incorporating it into their presentation of themselves to the surrounding 
social world. Ethnicity cannot be imposed on people (as Apartheid regimes in the past 
attempted to do); it has to be part of the self-categorization of the people in the group 
themselves. 
In March to May 1974, this author conducted a nation-wide attitude study among a 
representative sample of whites in South Africa, among whom Afrikaans-speaking whites 
constituted a sub-sample of 641 .8 
x Fieldwork conducted by Market Research Africa (Pty) Ltd .. personal interviews throughout. The sample 
was probability sample stratified by province, cities and towns and by rural-urban distinctions. The study was 
conducted at the request of and sponsored by the 1820 Settlers National Monument Association and the 
journal Optima. Hereafter this study will be referred to as the "1974 survey". 
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The respondents were presented with a list of well-used words describing different 
"groups" in South Africa and they were asked "which word describes you best?" The 
results were as follows for the Afrikaans-speakers: 
Table 9 
TERMS CHOSEN BY WHITE AFRIKAANS-SPEAKERS 
TO DESCRIBE THEMSELVES: 1974 
i 
Afrikaans-speaking South African 50.7% 
White South African/White 21.1% 
South African 15.2% 
Afrikaner 12,0% 
Other definitions 0.7% 
Tentatively, one is inclined to see the dominant choice of Afrikaans-speaking South 
African as legally correct but something of an identity compromise compared with the 
more explicit or exclusive term "Afrikaner", which is clearly a minority choice, and which 
is overshadowed by the racial identification of "white". One has to be tentative in this 
regard because there could have been people with as much fervent ethnic consciousness 
among the "Afrikaans-speakers" as among ''Afdkaners"; the two descriptions are not 
mutually exclusive. In later evidence more light will be shed on this issue. 
There was relatively little variation in the extent of choice of "Afi-ikaner" in the sample. 
People living in small rural towns were most inclined to choose it ( 19.5 per cent) and young 
adults (8,9 per cent) and people with degrees (6,9 per cent) least likely to choose it. 
Surprisingly, there was little tendency for people who were active in cultural or community 
organizations to choose this description more frequently than others (14,6 per cent). 
Members of business committees chose it somewhat less than others (6,7 per cent) and civil 
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servants slightly more frequently (15, 7 per cent). These variations, however, are relatively 
minor and cannot lead to any particular conclusion. 
One category of respondents, however, did select this description substantially more 
frequently than the rest of the sample. Some 25,9 per cent of people who were defined on 
the basis of other items in the study as "ideological separatists" chose to call themselves 
Afrikaners as opposed to other descriptions. This category was based on answers to other 
items which suggested that the people referred to were not necessarily racist or racially 
motivated but appeared to insist on a more consistent policy toward black South Africans to 
encourage them to develop towards ethnic autonomy and selfdetennination. Hence there 
appeared to be somewhat of a correlation between this fairly idealistic and programmatic 
"apartheid' orientation and a greater self-consciousness of a specifically ''Afrikaner" 
identity. 
This theme of self-identification was expanded in a later nation-wide survey among whites 
conducted in 1977 .9 In the 1977 attitude survey the Afrikaans-speaking white respondents 
were asked (in Afrikaans, obviously) "What is most important ro you -- the.fact that you are 
an Afrikaner or the fact that you are a South African?" Thus the "compromise" and rather 
bland and descriptive alternative of "Afrikaans-speaking South African" was eliminated by 
forcing a mutually exclusive choice. The results were as follows: 
9 The study was designed by the author and the fieldwork carried out by Market and Opinion Surveys (Pty.) 
Ltd. among a nation-wide stratified probability "panel" of whites, among whom Afrikaans-speaking whites 
constituted a sub-sample of I 352 respondents. The responses were obtained in self-completion postal 
questionnaires. The panel was recruited for a period covering several surveys. with one-third random 
replacement each year, with incentives being the payment of subscriptions to magazines of the respondents' 
own choices so as to eliminate media-related biases. This postal panel became an institution was used time 
and again to correctly predict the outcome of whites-only elections. 
Table 10 
WHITE AFRIKAANS-SPEAKERS: CHOICE OF SELF-
IDENTIFICATION BETWEEN AFRIKANER AND 
SOUTH AFRICAN: 1977 
Afrikaner 18.5% 
South African 77,7% 
Other write-in choices (diverse) 3.8% 
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This finding tends to confirm that of the 1974 study. to the effect that the fairly exclusive 
ethnic self-definition of "A/i'ikaner" was most definitely not the dominant choice. In fact it 
was a surprisingly small minority choice. 
A further confirmation of the earlier findings was that those respondents with a strict and 
rather programmatic ideology of ethnic separatism (as assessed by responses to other items) 
were more likely than others (37,3 per cent vs 18.5 per cent for the overall sub-sample) to 
choose the description of "Afrikaner" above that of South African. There is an abundance 
of evidence in both the studies referred to that support for apartheid was racially or 
racialistically motivated (not the topic of this analysis), but here one finds a confirmation of 
the fact that, in part, a strict apartheid ideology was also. or for some of its proponents, a 
matter of an extension of ethnic consciousness beyo_nd the in-group and onto others, no 
doubt at least in part motivated by the desire to protect the in-group. 
One contradiction of the earlier study was found in the fact that Afrikaans-speaking 
graduates were more likely than others to choose the self-definition of "Alrikaner" (30, 1 per 
cent). The fact that the choice was forced in the 1977 survey probably made the difference; 
perhaps the more self-confident graduates found it easier to disentangle themselves from 




In the 1977 study, as with the earlier investigation, persons associated with cultural or 
community organisations were not significantly more likely than others to see themselves 
as exclusively Afrikaans. One difference that did emerge was that those Afrikaans-speakers 
who were marginal to the extent of never or seldom attending church services were less 
likely than others to choose the self-definition of "Afrikaner'' (5,5 per cent). 
A rather striking finding in the 1977 survey is found in the fact that an "Afi·ikaner" self-
definition was associated with a greater awareness of racial distinctions in South Africa. 
For example, respondents were asked whether or not they considered Afrikaans-speaking 
coloured people to be "Afi-ikaners". In the sample of Afrikaans-speaking whites as a whole 
some 52 per cent agreed that coloureds who spoke Afrikaans at home were Afrikaners, 
while 27,6 per cent felt that they were not Afrikaners and some 14,3 per cent were 
uncertain. Among the white Afrikaans-speakers who felt that coloureds were not 
Afrikaners, as many as 41, 1 per cent considered themselves to be Afrikaners as opposed to 
South Africans -- well above the average. Hence there appears to be an association between 
the self-description of "Afi-ikaner" and racial exclusiveness. This obviously ties in with the 
suggestion made earlier in the dissertation that race became a marker in Afrikaner ethnic 
identity, but the opposite conclusion cannot be ruled out: this being that a racist 
consciousness stimulated a need for a term of self-identification which is clearly distinct 
from any terms which can be applied to brown Afrikaners. 
In an attempt fo identify the parameters of ethnic consc10usness more closely, self-
identification questions were included in a large nation-wide study conducted by this author 
in mid-1992. IO 
10 The fieldwork was conducted by Market and Opinion Surveys (Pty) Ltd. The white sample was a stratified 
probability~ of l 665 respondents in all areas of South Africa, rural and urban. The method of questioning 
was a self-completion questionnaire. Very high response rates were obtained. namely 83 per cent. because of 
the fact that respondents were contacted to reply to repeat surveys in return for subscriptions to magazines of 
their choice (thus avoiding ideological suggestion). The panel had been successfully used by the firm for over 
a decade and, inter alia, provided excellent predictions of election outcomes. To avoid respondents developing 
greater sophistication or being socialised by the exercise, one-third of the panel was randomly replaced each 
year. The sample size of Afrikaans-speakers was 1045. but due to the length of the questionnaire, random 
sample splits were introduced (two versions of the questionnaire) and some of the items in this study were 
fielded among a random sub-sample of 505 Afrikaans speaking whites and 330 English speakers. 
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It is appropriate to begin with the second self-identification question asked. The phrasing 
was: "All people have feelings of identity. They identify themselves with certain traditions, 
groups or life styles. Here is a range of statements of" identity. How would you idenfify 
yourself: in the _first place and in the second place." The statements and the results 
comparing Afrikaans and English-speaking whites are given in Table 11. 
Table 11 
CHOICE OF IDENTITY STATEMENTS TO INDICATE 
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY IDENTIFICATION AMONG WHITES 
ACCORDING TO HOME LANGUAGE: t 992 (N 835) 
. Statement . Afrikaans speakers English speakers 
l st zml ct 2nd 
Individual with characteristics 15,2% 13,3% 19,7% 26,2% 
• South African in a mixed society 13,1% 12.7% 12.4% 19,0% 
European/Western 1.2% 1.4% 6.6% 9,3% 
• Religious identity 9,7% 9,1% 3.4% 0.3% 
Class identity 3,4% 15.6% 11,4% 16,6% 
African 0,6% 2.4% 0,7% 1,4% 
English-speaking South African 1,4% 1,8% 27.2% 12,4% 
Afrikaans-speaking South African as 3,8% 6.7% 0.0% 0,0% 
with Afrikaans Coloureds 
White Afrikaner 39,6% 9,1% 1.4% 0,3% 
Other (open) 0,4% 0,6% 0,0% 0,7% 
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These results may reflect a shift in self-identification between the earlier studies reported 
on above and the 1992 study, but it impossible to be categorical about this since the form of 
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questioning was different. The results in Table 11 above suggest a stronger identification 
among Afrikaans-speaking whites with the appellation "Afi-ikaner". and in this case "white 
Afrikaner" specifically, compared with the previous results. 
The major reason for this would probably have been the fact that the more ambiguous 
option of "Afrikaans-0peaking South African" was not offered among the statements, quite 
deliberately. What was offered was the choice of describing themselves as "Afi-ikaans-
!:.peakers" but including coloured Afrikaans-speakers. Faced with this choice, as many as 
nearly 50 per cent of the Afrikaans-speaking whites in the sample opted for "white 
Afrikaner" as their primary or secondary identification. This demonstrates the earlier point 
that Afrikaner identity is an amalgam of racial and ethnic identity. 
In retrospect, the English-speaking whites in the sample should have also been "forced" to 
m~ke a racial choice by phrasing their comparable option as "white English-.,peaking South 
African"; possibly this was a mistake but it would probably not have worked very well as 
an option because of uneasiness about the political "correctness" of the description among 
English-speakers. Broadly, the English-speakers reveal a greater inclination than Afrikaners 
to describe themselves in class terms or · as individuals with certain (non-ethnic) 
characteristics. One of the possible reasons is that English speakers are in fact a composite 
of people of diverse ethnic origins (Scots, Jews, Irish, etc.) but in South Africa the 
composite is united by a combination of race and language, but a language which is widely 
shared. Hence although the English speakers display some characteristics of an ethnic 
group, the identity is very blurred. 
Both the Afrikaans and English-speakers tend to avoid the implicitly racial identification of 
European or Western person. even though the phrasing avoided the more politically 
incorrect use of the word "white". Had they been forced to use it they might have, but they 
had other identity options. As already indicated, the phrase English-speaking South African 
is usually associated with white racial identity, with the result that English-speaking whites 
had an easier option to choose. 
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The most important suggestion in these results, however. is that while many Afrikaners 
would probably have selected Afrikaans-speaking South African, as the previous results 
suggest, had they not had to accept coloureds as ethnic cohorts as part of the choice. Hence 
these results probably maximise the extent of identification with a specifically white and 
Afrikaner ethnic group. 
All the results discussed above can be criticised for forcing respondents into categories. 
This methodological coercion is perfectly appropriate if one wishes for theoretical reasons 
to compare one 'forced" or suggested choice with another. and the results certainly mean 
something. The criticism is valid, however, if the researcher attempts to draw conclusions 
as to the intensity or relevance of the categories presented. A choice between different 
ethnic descriptions can indicate their importance relative to one another but certainly not 
relative to a range of other possible identity choices. 
An attempt .was made to overcome this problem in the l 992 investigation by providing a 
completely open opportunity for respondents to choose self-descriptions. The item was 
phrased as follows: "How 1-vould you describe yourself' A person in. say. Zimbabwe could 
describe himself or herself as a father, a mother. a clerk. an engineer. a farmer, a poor 
person, a rich person. an Ndebele, A MShona, a white, an Englishman, a sportsman, a 
biack, a sludent, a Christian, an African, Zimbabwean and so on. Give three ways in which 
you wouf d describe yourself 11 
The choice of self-description was then left entirely to the respondent to provide. The 
choice of Zimbabwe as a basis for the examples was to make it clear that the examples 
given were purely hypothetical possibilities but without introducing a country or place 
which would be completely strange for South Africans with little feel for countries abroad. 
The spontaneous replies of respondents, with open answers classified into broader 
categories, and with the three answers combined, are presented in Table 12. Because the 
form of the question was identical for all respondents. it is possible to compare the 
responses of Afrikaners with those of all other categories of South Africans. 
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I . Table12 ~ 
• SPONTANEOUS SELF-IDENTIFICATION AMONG AFRIKANERS AND OTHER 1 







• -speaking speaking Blacks Coloured Asian 
I I Whites Whites i I 
I Black/African 
I 





I White 50,5% 50,0% 0.0% 
I 
0.0% 0,0% 












Asian 0,0% 0,0% 0.0% 0,0% 37,2% 
I 




0,0% • 0,0% 0.0% 33.6% 0,0% 
' 
I 1 "Tribal" identity 0,0% 0,0% 0.0% 0.0% 0,0% 
I 
Religious identify • 63,2% 25,9% 26.2% I 53.0% 
'I 
30,3% 
/ Occupational role 29,9% I 51,0% 
I 
28.6% I 30.2% 48,8% 
• Class identity 12,6% 18,0% 40.2% 13,0% 29,2% 
I Family role 45,0% 32,7% 46,7% 48.9% 58,0% 
• Gender 6,5% 4,5% 12.0% 11.5% 7,0% 
! Sports person 4,4% 13,1% 8,6% 7.6% 8,1 % 
Moral character 5,0% 5,8% 12.9% 15.7% 11,7% 
J Other/diverse Less than 5% 
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If we accept these spontaneous choices or self-descriptions as an indication of the salience 
of ethnic identity, then one must inevitably draw the conclusion that ethnicity, as defined in 
the introduction to this chapter, is not the most basic element of self-consciousness in the 
society. In 1992, at any rate, the racial "castes" which were established long before 
apartheid were still the most significant sources of self-identification. followed by class or 
socio-economic distinctions. 
Family roles and linkages are obviously significant to South Africans across the board 
(somewhat less so for the English-speaking whites). but these are not dividers in a society. 
Religion is also very significant, and while it has strong ''communal" features among 
Muslims, and perhaps to a weaker extent among Hindus. it is not a feature which can set 
Afrikaners or English-speakers apart, since they both share religious denominations with 
coloureds, Indian Christians and with each other (the Afrikaners did not tend to specify a 
Calvinist affiliation). 
Class appears to be dominantly an awareness of poverty and deprivation, and 
understandably it is strongest as a way in which people define themselves among Africans, 
followed by Indians. Surprisingly, perhaps, it is no stronger as a factor among coloureds 
than among whites, which possibly partly explains why coloureds were able to identify so 
readily with the predominantly middle class National Party in the 1994 elections. 
"Communal" identity, at the level of popular consc10usness, appears to be dominantly 
racially-based among Afrikaners, English-speakers and blacks. and it is roughly on a par 
with a broader South Africanism among coloureds and Indians. In a different context one 
would, of course, be able to define the Indians as an "ethnic" minority, say in the USA or 
the UK, for example, but its association with the racial classifications which has been long 
made in South Africa suggests that, as an identity factor, it is equivalent to the "white", 
African and coloured racial identities of the other groups. 
The more unambiguously ethnic identities are those of "Afi-ikaans", as already indicated, 
"Hindu" (a religious communal identity) and English-speakers. ln regard to the latter, and 
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referring back to earlier comments, the results show that the popular conception 1s that 
being "English-speaking" is a specific identity, not shared by English-speaking coloureds, 
blacks or Indians. since not one of the respondents in the latter three categories mentioned 
it as a factor or described themselves as being "English-speaking". 
If one accepts, then, that "Afrikaans", "English" and "Hindu" are ethnic markers in the 
popular sentiment, one can asses their relative salience. The results would suggest that they 
follow race and broader South Africanism in salience in the popular consciousness among 
English-spe-akers. but among Afrikaners and Hindus. they are roughly as strong as the 
broader South Africanism (separate calculations were made to assess these relativities 
among Hindus). Among Afrikaners, however, the racial marker is the most salient. 
Concluding broadly and provisionally from Table 12. the results seem to roughly confirm 
the earlier suggestions that a specifically "Afikaans" identity. at the level of popular 
consciousness, is weaker among Afrikaners than their racial identity. Because even the 
Afrikaans identity does not cross the racial line to coloureds. however. it is an amalgam of 
ethnic and racial identity. Afrikaners, to put it simply. seem to see themselves as a 
particular kind of white South African. 
One might also conclude from Table 12 that "English" identity among whites is as salient 
in the popular consciousness as Afrikaans identity is among Afrikaners. and that it is also 
an amalgam of racial and language-based ethnic consciousness. The fact that it is less 
prominent in the "cultural politics" of the country is probably due to the fact, that its 
features are not directly articulated by cultural leaders to the same extent as among 
Afrikaners, and to the fact that the continued existence of English as the "linguafranca" of 
South Africa is not in doubt; most of the "non-English" end up speaking English anyway 
and the English speakers can therefore be culturally more confident than others. 
Ethnicity is not a quality or a characteristic which can be made to order by the purists. 
Groups construct their own identities over time in interaction with their social 
environments. It seems clear that the identities which have emerged over time are racial-
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ethnic . amalgams or · ethnicities which have racial markers as prominent features. 
Furthermore, it would seem then, that in the decades up to the early nineties, a specifically 
Afrikaans-cum-racial identity was not the strongest identity factor among Afrikaners at 
large, whatever the cultural and political leaders might have claimed. This may be one of 
the reasons why the narrow Afrikaans-based political parties have not been particularly 
successful in mobilising support on Afrikaans, ethnic tickets other than in periods where 
the basis of mobilisation could simultaneously address other interests and concerns. The 
National Party's greater (white) inclusiveness after the sixties was well attuned to the 
identity sentiments · of the larger majority of Afrikaners. and the speed with which 
Afrikaners have shifted to support the traditionally English Democratic Party lends weight 
to this feature among Afrikaners. These conclusions are provisional and will be carried 
forward to be assessed in the light of other findings. 
6.3 THE SALIENCE OF CULTURAL AND ETHNIC CONCERN AND 
COMMITMENT AMONG WHITE AFRIKANERS 
Ethnic self-identification may not be the strongest identity anchor among rank-and-file 
Afrikaners but this. however, may not mean that the consciousness. even if secondary to 
race-consciousness, is unimportant in the political consciousness of Afrikaners. To explore 
this question it is necessary to return to other items in the surveys already reviewed. 
The first question which one can address is the extent to which Afrikaners are and have 
been concerned about the maintenance of cultural and language rights and status. As is 
quite common in opinion survey research, the responses to direct questions on an issue 
which has a ring of social desirability about it can be misleading, and this has to be borne in 
mind in the results which ai-e presented. 
In the 1974 investigation. for example, Afrikaans-speaking respondents were asked: "How 
important is it for a language group like Afrikaans-speaking South A/deans to maintain 
their identity, language and cultural traditions? 11 Some 86 per cent of the Afrikaans 
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respondents indicated that it was "very important". Only roughly one per cent felt that it 
was "not at all important". Hence cultural maintenance appears to be an issue of virtual 
consensus among the Afrikaans community at large. 
Interesting deviations occurred among some categories of interest. however. For example, 
among the following categories the endorsement of the goal of cultural maintenance being 
"very important" was significantly lower than average of 86 per cent. namely: 
members of business committees: 51 % 
race-integrationists, as measured by other items: 41 % 
low church attenders: 6 7% 
low religiosity: 42% 
those with English-speaking close relatives: 51 % 
those with English ancestry: 27% 
Thus the consensus on cultural maintenance broke down at the margins of what may be 
termed the Afrikaans cultural core of people bound into the communal network by strong 
family and religious ties and by lack of exposure to the more liberal thinking in business. In 
other words, the situation may be that a concern with ethnic culture is part of a "traditional 
mindset", and that it is brittle when exposed to wider fields of interests. It may also be an 
indication that the more and outwardly-Jinked members of the cultural group withdraw 
their commitment to the values of the group. 
Further evidence for this fragmentation at the edges of the group consensus is found in 
response to the question: ''In your occupation. is it d(fficult to act and interact !Jpecifically 
as an Afrikaner?" Overall, 19 per cent of the respondents said that the difficulty was 
comprehensive (heeltemal moeilik), and this rose to 31 per cent and l 00 per cent among 
respondents who had developed progressive ideas about race integration in business and 
occupational life respectively. These are indications of the fact. already referred to. that the 7 
Afrikaans cultural cohesion seemed to be bound up with the institutional racism of l 
apartheid. 
In fact, to a large extent the Afrikaans worldview seemed to rest on features other than the 
culture and language itself. Following an item on what characteristics or achievements 
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Afrikaners should be proud of, the question was asked "What two things should Afrikaners 
. not be proud of?" The following answers suggest that "cultural deviation" was not the 
dominant concern; verbatim answers are classified in categories: 
moral or religious deviation: 
lack of cultural cohesion and pride: 
too little commitment to apartheid: 
too great a commitment to apartheid: 
too chauvinistic: 
tolerance of immigration and its effects: 








Here again we see that the moral worldview almost eclipses the cultural commitment. This 
item has the weakness, however, that if very little breakdown in commitment to culture was 
occurring at the stage the study was undertaken. as an issue it would not have had the 
salience to elicit responses comparable to those on issues around which problems did exist, 
like moral deviation. Other items were included, however. which perhaps provide a more 
valid indication of the level of commitment and concern on ethnic issues. 
A range of statements was presented to respondents and they were asked to rate them on a 
scale of 10 in terms of the "importance" of each, thus enabling a comparative assessment of 
the concern over ethnic issues to be made. The average scores for each item in the range are 
presented in Table 13. 
"' ' What these simple comparisons show is that cultural commitment among Afrikaners was 
not rated more highly than a range of other value positions. ln fact. here again we see that a 
concern with morality and even with non-racial justice was rated more highly than ethnic 
i.. .... ~.:mcems. 
On all the ethnic concerns listed in the table there was an inverse correlation between level 
of education and degree of ethnic commitment -- graduates displayed the lowest degree of 
concern with ethnic issues. Members of social and cultural organizations did not display 
any greater degree of concern than the general public, although they were relatively more 
concerned with morality and with maintaining apartheid. 
Table 13 
RATING.OF ISSUES IN TERMS OF IMPORTANCE: 
AFRIKAANS RESPONDENTS, 1974: AVERAGE SCORES OUT OF 10 
(Items are in random order with ethnic-cuJtund items presented last) 
abilities and knowledge 8,8 
success in the 
religious outlook 
whites against black 8,1 
danger of communism 
[ To live a happy and contented life 8.5 
I To work hard for monetary profit 
i 
8,6 
I To live an upright and moral life 
I 
9,4 
To be a loyal follower of the country's leaders 8,4 
• Maintaining moral standards in films/magazines I 8,0 
I 
~aintaining strict segregation of the races 8,3 
I Unity and loyalty to SA among white and non-white people 8,7 
I Fairness and justice for all races i 9,0 
To serve the country and all its people 
I 
8,8 
To serve the Afrikaans community 
I 
8,5 
To 12romote the cultural affairs of Afrikaners 
I 
7,9 





The highest ratings of ethnic issues were given by an attitudinal category which may be 
called was called "Separationist-verfigtes": people who displayed a firm but very idealistic 
and developmentally oriented approach to the separation of the races. The relationship 
I 
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between commitment to the theoretical goals of (or rationalisations for) apartheid and a 
concern with the cultural and ethnic cohesion of Afrikaners was evident throughout other 
findings in the study. 
Returning to the issues included in the table above, respondents were also asked to indicate 
whether or not certain of the issues were becoming more or less important over time. The 
following were the proportions indicating that a particular issue was becoming more 
important: 
Communism and terrorism: 90% 
Justice for all races: 67% 
An upright and moral life: 63% 
Cross-racial loyalty to SA: 62% 
Personal success and profit: 62% 
A strict religious outlook: 61 % 
Protection of whites against competition 
from non-whites 60% 
Promoting the cultural affairs of Afrikaners: 56% 
Serving the Afrikaans community: 55% 
Promoting the use of Afrikaans: 50% 
Here we see agam that in the mid-seventies, in the mature period of apartheid when 
opposition to the system was just starting to build up to the serious proportions of the late 
seventies, rank-and-file Afrikaners appeared to be least concerned with ethnic issues and 
relatively more concerned with threats to the white system and also with greater justice for 
all races but in a context of the maintenance of white standards and traditional morality. 
An indication of the relatively low sense of threat to Afrikaans culture and language is seen 
in the results of a question on what the sample perceived to be the hypothetical 





AFRIKAANS-SPEAKERS: PERCEIVED EFFECTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
RULE BY THE BLACK MAJORITY IN SOUTH AFRICA: PROPORTIONS 
ENDORSING EACH OF A RANGE OF ITEMS PRESENTED: 1974 
(Two items could be endorsed) 
Threats to public order and safety 58,5% 
White job security threatened 47.8% 
Lowered incomes and living standards 28,1% 
Lifestyles and everyday culture would change 21.7% 
Inter-racial marriage would occur 18.5% 
Afrikaans language and culture would be threatened 18,4% 
No undesirable consequences 0.4% 
Uncertain/don't know 1,5% 
These results also suggest that specifically ethnic concerns were not very high on the 
agenda of ordinary Afrikan~rs. Even among the members of social and cultural 
organizations there was no significantly higher level of commitment or concern with ethnic 
issues. Oddly enough, the only social category which displayed statistically significantly 
higher levels of concern with the survival of Afrikaans culture. as measured by the item 
above, were members not of the three Dutch Reformed "susterkerke" but of the Evangelical 
sects, among whom 26 per cent perceived a hypothetical threat to Afrikaans culture as 
opposed to the average of 18 per cent. Perhaps their religious "di.,placement" from other 
Afrikaners increased their awareness of Afrikaans cultural interests. 
Hence in the mid-seventies, specific concerns with Afrikaans language and culture were not 
high on the barometer of popular sentiment and no evidence suggests that these issues were 
any more salient, relative to other issues, on the agendas of Afrikaans cultural leaders. 
There is. however, an abundance of evidence in the opinion survey referred to above that 
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the dominant concern of the public and of social leaders was with the status, power and 
protection of whites, rather than specifically of Afrikaners. 
This same pattern is evident in the results of the study in October 1977, as described earlier. 
Readers will recall that late 1977 was a period when the popular protests against apartheid, 
which had erupted in June 1976, had not yet been suppressed by state action, and indeed 
had spread from the youth in the townships to adults. The early forerunners of the popular 
resistance movement, the United Democratic Front. had emerged in the form of the Black 
Parents Association and other similar groups, and it was clear that the ANC in exile was 
active in an undercover role in the resistance in the townships. Questions similar to those 
asked in 197 4 were posed in late 1977. 
Once again, the relative threats to various interests hypothetically predicted of a majority 
black government were probed and the results appear in Table l 5: 
Table 15 
AFRIKAANS-SPEAKERS: PERCEIVED EFFECTS AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF RULE BY A BLACK MAJORITY IN SOUTH AFRICA: 1977 
(Two items could be endorsed) 
Threats to public order and safety 80,4% 
White job security threatened 37,2% 
Lowered incomes and living standards 33,5% 
Lifestyles, popular culture would change 18,1% 
Afrikaans language, culture threatened 13,8% 
Inter-racial marriage would occur 8,9% 
No undesirable consequences 2,5% 
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In this set of items. exact comparisons over time are possible since the wording of the items 
was identical to those in the 1974 survey. Comparing the results above with those in Table 
14 shows that concerns about public order and safety had intensified markedly between 
1974 and 1977, as one would have predicted. Concerns with white job security and with 
Afrikaans language and culture had actually declined in salience. as had the rather atavistic 
concern with miscegenation. 
Once again, graduates displayed marginally less concern with ethnic survival than the rank-
and-file (10 per cent vs 14 per cent), but no other category evinced greater or lesser concern 
with cultural survival than the average, not even Afrikaans cultural leaders. 
As before, respondents were also asked to rate the importance of a range of issues of policy. 
In Table 16 below, the rank-ordering in terms of the ratings out of 10 for the those items 
which were common to the two surveys are presented for 1977 compared with the findings 
for 1974 derived from Table 15 above: 
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Table 16 
AFRIKAANS-SPEAKERS: RANK-ORDERING OF THE RA TED 
IMPORTANCE OF A RANGE OF POLICY ISSUES: 1974 AND 1977 
1974 1977 
I To live an upright and moral life 1 
2 To maintain a strict religious outlook 2 
,, 
Unity and loyalty to SA among white and non-white 
,, 
.) .) 
4 To serve the Afrikaans communitv 6 
5 Strict segregation of the races 9 
6 Protection of whites against non-white competition 8 
7 To protect morality in films and the media 4 
8 To promote the cultural affairs of Afrikaners 7 
9 To achieve personal success and achievement 5 
The comparisons suggest that morality and religious views remained as important in the 
later period as before, and that the protection of the media against immorality had become 
more important (presumably because of more progressive influences in the media). The 
relative importance of ethnic and cultural concerns did not increase, and in fact in regard to 
"serving the Afrikaans community" the importance declined. The perceived importance of 
strict segregation of the races also declined, however. as did the protection of whites 
against non-white competition. Clearly, the political ground was shifting in the perceptions 
of Afrikaners, but the relatively greater emphasis on public morality than on ethnic 
protection or promotion remained the same. 
In the 1977 survey, a more detailed view of the perceived importance of policy concerns 
was obtained from a series of questions on the policies of political parties. First, an open 
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question was asked on the "most important principle or policy ol the party you support". 
The spontaneous answers were classified and the results are presented in Table 17. 
One notes in this table of replies the complete absence of any direct concern with Afrikaner 
ethnic interests in language or culture. Some 80 per cent of the respondents supported the 
National Party, but any emphasis of the ethnic commitments of the party is notably absent. 
Perhaps, however. the concern with Afrikaans cultural interests was simply taken for 
granted. This issue will be taken up again in due course. 
Table 17 
AFRIKAANS-SPEAKERS: THE MOST IMPORT ANT PRINCIPLE OR POLICY 
OF THE POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORTED: SPONTANEOUS ANSWERS 
CLASSIFIED: 1977 
Apartheid/separate development/homeland development 
I 
20,8% 
Peace/law and order 15.9% 
No discrimination against blacks/justice for blacks 15,7% 
Resisting foreign interference in SA affairs 
I 
7,4% 
· Protection of white rights 4,8% 
Honesty and 4A% 
• Protection of white power position 
I Representation for blacks 
4A% 
3,7% 
• Anti-communism 0,8% 
I Other- diverse 6,8% 
The open question dealt with above was followed by a structured item: "Asfc1r as the policy 
of any political party is concerned, which of the following are of first and second 
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importance in your view?" A range of options was presented, and the results of the primary 
choice are presented in Table 18 below: 
Table 18 
AFRIKAANS-SPEAKERS: MOST IMPORTANT POLICY OR PRINCIPLE OF 
A POLITICAL PARTY: FIRST CHOICE AMONG ALTERNATIVES 
PRESENTED: 1977 
White security 27.2% 
Fairness and justice for all races 15,1 % 
I Maintenance of moral standards 13.6% 






Language/cultural interests of Afrikaners i l,1% 
Other items I <1,0% 
In terms of the second choices, language and cultural interests fared no better with only 1,6 
per cent of respondents endorsing the issue. Contrary to earlier findings. however, in these 
results the better educated respondents were slightly more likely to endorse the cultural 
concerns: among professionals, the level of endorsement was roughly 9 per cent. 
In a further question respondents were asked why they supported a particular political 
party, and a range of options was presented. The results \Vere essentially very similar to 
those above, with the option: "Represents my language ond c:ultural group" obtaining a 
mere 4, l per cent endorsement as the primary reason and 2,3 per cent as the secondary 
reason. Once again, professionals were slightly more inclined to endorse the issue: 6 per 
cent vs 4 per cent but the difference is hardly significant. 
1111 
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When respondents were asked why they were less than completely happy with the policies 
of the party the supported, one response option was: "Too liule attention to the interests of 
my language and culture 11• A mere 4,6 per cent indicated this to be a reason among those 
who were less than happy with their parties. Of interest. however. is the fact that among 
Afrikaans supporters of the old United Party, the Progressive Reform Party and the 
. Democratic Party (opposition parties of the time), the proportions indicating that their 
dissatisfaction stemmed from too little attention to their ethnic interests rose to 18,5 per 
cent (UP), 29,5 per cent (PRP) and 38,5 per cent (DP). Also. among Afrikaners of low 
religiosity and low church attendance, as many as 46 per cent indicated dissatisfaction with 
the concern with Afrikaans cultural interests. 
These strands of deviation suggest that while in the bosom of the National Party and the 
church, an over-arching concern with the ethnic interests of Afrikaners could indeed be 
taken for granted. Those Afrikaners who were outside of the Afrikaans institutional 
complex were the ones who became aware of their ethnic isolation and appeared to develop 
a more conscious concern with Afrikaans cultural issues. Oddly enough, this concern only 
appeared in the context of dissatisfaction with the party they were supporting. This might 
1 
suggest that the National Party in the current phase may start to have the same effect, 
because its concern with seeking support from non-Afrikaners might also flush out a latent 
concern with ethnicity. 
Finally in the 1977 survey. an opportunity was taken to lightly explore an underlying 
dimension of ethnic consciousness, namely the inclination to approach the world in a group 
or individual context. Admittedly, the examination could not be rigorous, since space and 
costs did not allow the use of scales, but the question was put to respondents: "The interests 
ol a group are more important than the interests ol the individual. Do you agree fully, 
partly or disagree?" 
Among all Afrikaans respondents, 32 per cent agreed fully and 25 per cent disagreed. 
Among graduates 36 per cent agreed fully and among United Party supporters. no fewer 
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than 42 per cent agreed fully, once again suggesting that the isolation from the protective 
institutional embrace of the National Party "activated" a concern with collective solidarity. 
At this stage, then, one might tentatively conclude that one of the reasons for the relative 
lack of emphasis on ethnic concerns that the results have produced is in fact that apartheid, 
a powerful protective political party deeply associated with Afrikaner concerns and an 
association with churches, which were equally Afrikaans 111 an all-encompassing sense, 
allowed ethnic concerns to sink into a type of latency. 
Did the tendencies reflected in the results so far hold in the dispensation following the 
beginnings of transition in 1990? 
In the 1992 survey referred to in the previous chapter and again in the previous section, 
further questions were posed; for example: "In c1 new South Africa under a new 
constitution, which two of the following interest groups. if any. will prohably have to give 
up most?" The results, according to home language among whites. and party adherence are 
given in Table 19: 
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Table 19 
WHITES: PERCEPTIONS OF THE TWO INTEREST GROUPS MOST LIKELY 
TO HA VE TO MAKE SACRIFICES IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA: 1992 
(Two answers summed hence percentages exceed 100%) 
Afrikaners English NP Right-Wing 
Afrikaners in general 36,2% 14,9% 23.8% 43,8% 
Less-privileged Afrikaners 17,3% 12.0% 14.3% 21,7% 
Public servants 11,7% 16,9% 15.4% 8,6% 
White farmers 23,6% 15,0% 13,9% 36,3% 
White police/army 4,1% 2,7% 3.9% 2,4% 
Various categories of whites 38,4% 50.4% 47.5% 39,3% 
White business 18,6% 25,8% 22.6% 15,0% 
Black activists 7,7% 14.4% 13.6% 3,8% 
Homeland interests 3,9% 1 1% 6.4% 0,9% 
Coloureds/ Asians 2,6% 2.0% 2.9°/ci 1,3% 
These results suggest that over one half of Afrikaners and almost two thirds of right-
wingers perceived a specific threat to Afrikaners in the new dispensation. If one allows for 
the fact that white public servants, farmers and members of the security forces are 
obviously mainly Afrikaans, then the perceived threat rises to slightly over 80 per cent 
among Afrikaners. There was quite clearly an ethnic structuring in the perceptions of the 
future, also seen very clearly in the fact that English-speakers. who are dominantly in 
business, saw a greater threat to business than did Afrikaners. 
The question was asked of respondents: "Which groups in South Afi'ica do you think will 
refuse to be ruled by people who are not their own leaders?" Only some 5 per cent of 
Afrikaans respondents mentioned "Afrikaners" as such, and even among the right wing 
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only 9 per cent mentioned Afrikaners. Many political categories were identified but clearly 
Afrikaans respondents, not even those in the right wing. perceived any basis for a 
consolidated ethnic response. The only substantial mention of an ethnic reaction as such 
was the expectation, among 17 per cent of Afrikaans respondents, that Zulus would demand 
self-determination. Rank-and-file Afrikaners. therefore. saw Zulus as more "ethnically 
reactive" than they felt that they were. 
These findings from the 1992 study appear to be no more than confirming the pattern 
already established from the earlier studies, namely that even as the majority rule 
dispensation was fast approaching, the reactions of most Afrikaners and other whites was 
focused more on the loss of racial privileges rather than specifically on ethnic interests. 
Neve1theless, Afrikaners seemed to experience a greater sense of vulnerability as 
Afrikaners, and as such the results suggest that the perception of threats and changes, while 
racial in content, as it were, were ethnically structured in the sense that Afrikaners appeared 
to be much more threatened or cautious than the English speakers. Also, the findings show 
that the right-wing, notwithstanding its claim to be specifically concerned with ethnic self-
determination, appeared to represent a sharper fear of racial injury than of ethnic loss, but 
once again seemingly as part of an ethnic response to the environment of change. 
Certain items fielded in the 1992 survey had aspects comparable to those in the earlier 
studies and once again allow cautious comparisons over time to be made. In one question 
respondents were asked what the two most important reasons were for supporting any 
political party, but with a different range of options which emerged from depth interviews 
with all races rather than whites alone -- results are given in Table 20 below: 
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Table 20 
TWO MOST IMPORTANT REASONS WHY PEOPLE SUPPORT 
POLITICAL PARTIES: CHOICE BETWEEN OPTIONS PRESENTED: 
WHITE AFRIKANERS: 1992 
First reason Second reason 
Strongest party/most supporters 3.0% 2,2% 
Works for national prestige and achievements 3.1% 2,8% 
Great inspiring leader 2.4% 2.6% 
Addresses material needs of people like yourself 17.6% 23,1% 
Works for economic growth/investment 28.1% 33,0% 
Represents language/cultural group 28.3% 15,9% 
Readers will recall that in a previous enquiry in l 977. but with different options, language 
and cultural issues obtained a mere 1 per cent endorsement from Afrikaners. In the table 
above ethnic interests emerge as the second most important issue just behind economic· 
prosperity. This may reflect a rise in the salience of ethnicity as the prospect of majority 
rule drew near, but it may also reflect the fact that the dominant items from the previous 
enquiry, namely moral standards and white interests were omitted (for reasons which had to 
do with a particular theoretical interest in the 1992 study). The findings above may also 
show that ethnicity may be very important in its own right. or may become a surrogate for 
racial interests if the articulation of racial interests is blocked. as is the case in the political 
climate which emerged in the nineties. There is also more than a suggestion in the 
comparison that an essential part of the self-image of being an Afrikaner is having a 
particular morality and value system, and when this is not available as a response 
alternative, the ethnic association is more directly expressed. 
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The comparison, however, is less than adequate because of the different items included in 
the 1992 study, but with this in mind another item was included which allowed a closer 
comparison with the 1977 study. Results are presented in Table 21. 
The indications from this table are clear. First, there is an almost uncanny consistency in 
the replies endorsing white security and justice for all. Second. however. the importance of 
economic issues appeared to increase between 1977 and 1992. Thirdly. however, while 
there was a marginal increase in the importance attached to etlmo-cultural issues, they still 
lag far behind racial interests even at the late stage of 1992 when the maintenance of racial 
privilege was doomed to extinction at the policy level. No meaningful shift towards an 
emphasis on ethnicity had occurred and race still appeared to be the dominant 
consideration. One should add, however, that the emphasis on conservative morality 
appeared to be declining. 
Table 21 
TWO MOST IMPORTANT REASONS FOR RESPONDENTS TO SUPPORT 
ANY POLITICAL PARTY: WHITE AFRIKANERS: 1992, 
WITH COMPARISONS TO 1977 
1992 1977 
First reason Second reason First reason 
Future security of whites 26,5% 5.6% 272% 
F airnessi'._i ustice all races 14,8% 8,5% 15,1% 
Maintaining moral standards 6,7% 8.1% 13,6% 
Maintaining white power 5,4% 9.1% 10,5% 
Economic welfare 7,3% 18,4% 2,5% 
Protection of language/culture 3,3% 10.0% 1,1% 
[ Protecting minority occupations 1.9% 6.1% Not asked 
193 
In a further attempt to assess the relative importance of race and ethnicity among the other 
interests of an embattled minority, respondents in the 1992 investigation were asked 
whether they were becoming "more or less worried" about a range · of issues and 
developments. This form of questioning allowed a wide range of comparisons between the 
relative importance of issues to be made. In Table 22. results are presented according to 
home language: 
Table 22 
PROPORTJONS OF AFRJKAANS AND ENGLISH RESPONDENTS 
EXPRESSING INCREASING OR DECREASJNG CONCERN ABOUT 
A NUMBER OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS: 1992 
! 




less more more 
i i 












Crime and personal safety I 82,2% 5.5% 
I 83.1% I 4,8% 




Cultural rights of minorities 67,1% 9,5% 54J% 
I 
16,9% 











Race relations I 56,0% 17.4% 43.8% 
I 33,4% 




! Service/amenity standards 71,5% 6,5% ; ' 7l.0% 3,4% 
Here again, the relative importance of ethnic concerns, although high_ among Afrikaners, 






job opportunities, personal safety and financial security. There is no dominance of ethnic 
concernintheseresul~. 
The theme of ethnicity in the context of the emerging new dispensation was explored 
further in the 1992 survey in a very structured way with a number of statem~nts. The 
statements and the responses to them are presented according to home language in Table 
23: 
Table 23 
ATTITUDES IN REGARD TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND ETHNIC 
ISSUES IN POLITICS: PROPORTIONS AGREEING TO VARIOUS 
STATEMENTS BY HOME LANGUAGE AMONG WHITES: 1992 
(Selected items, not presented in the order given below) 
Percentage agreement 
Afrikaans English 
Afrikaans self-determination is natural and should be 79.0% 62,1% 
respected 
Afrikaans self-determination is old-fashioned and 21.2% 57,9% 
backward 
Self-determination only way to maintain culture and 50.7% 37,3% 
traditions 
If white economic security is guaranteed then no 57.2% 77,6% 
need for self-determination 
One cannot expect cultural groups to be governed by 59.6% 28,6% 
other people 
If economy is healthy and standards are civilised, no 47.9% 77,6% 
need for self-determination · 
A core area (an "Israel") should be set aside for 43.5% 30,4% 
white Afrikaner self-determination 
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The results above are helpful in attempting to untangle the dilemma of Afrikaner ethnicity 
and its expression. An "ethnic" or cultural group-based ideology is by no means a 
consistent or dominant feature of the political thinking of Afrikaners, as the results above 
show. There is an indication that nearly six out of ten would "trade" ethnic autonomy for 
economic prosperity, and almost the same goes for the maintenance of civilised standards 
and a sound economy. Some one-fifth of Afrikaners see self-determination as an old 
fashioned and redundant ideology. A measure of the extent of commitment to ethnic 
autonomy is the proportion wishing an area set aside as a kind of" Israel" for Afrikaners in 
South Africa, and it would amount to roughly four out of ten Afrikaners. Broadly it would 1 
I 
seem as if about four out of ten Afrikaners have consistent and serious ethnic-cultural/ 
commitments. 
On the other hand, however, there is no doubt that a far greater concern with ethnic issues 
exists among Afrikaners than among their English-speaking compatriots. The English are 
clearly ambiguous about Afrikaner cultural aspirations, since some roughly sixty per cent 
think that it should be respected but almost the same number think it to be old-fashioned 
and backward. In general, however, the English have far less of a feeling for aspirations to 
autonomy, probably because the status of English as a world language and the international 
dominance of Anglo-Saxon values provides a sense of security under almost any 
circumstance. 
Perhaps the fifth item in the table is a measure of the difference between Afrikaners and 
English: some six out of ten Afrikaners feel that a "group" should be governed by its own 
people whereas only some 30 per cent of English can sympathise with this ambition. 
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A more recent data set analysed for this analysis is based on an opinion survey undertaken 
in May 1995, when many of the implications of the new dispensation were becoming 
clearer for South African voters. 11 
Respondents were presented with a range of statements of policy or ideological position 
and asked to indicate whether they agreed with the statement or not. The statements 
included, allow one to assess the relative concern with ethnic issues relative to issues of 
other types. The results. according to home language. are presented in Table 24. 
The pattern of results in the table above suggest that Afrikaners are far less confident of 
coping in the new South Africa than their English-speaking counterparts. Some six out of 
ten believe that they will not be able to compete on a fair basis compared with less than five 
out of ten among the English-speakers. Some eight out of ten perceive life as having 
deteriorated compared with just over five out of ten among the English. Only one out of ten 
perceive the new government as having done its best for them compared with three times 
that proportion among the English and only three out of ten Afrikaners. ha! f the proportion 
among the English, believe that there will be opportunities for maintaining their culture. 
11 The fieldwork was undertaken by MarkData, then the survey research unit of the Human Sciences 
Research Council. The sample is of a random stratified design. comprising 2229 persons of all races. 
countrywide. rural and urban. Of these 445 were whites and 302 were white Afrikaners. Personal interviews 
were conducted. This author was responsible for the design of the sample and framed the questions analysed 
for the present analysis. 
Table 24 
LEVEL OF AGREEMENT WITH STATEMENTS COVERING ETHNICITY 
AS COMPARED WITH OTHER ISSUES, ACCORDING TO 
HOME LANGUAGE: N 445, MAY 1995 
Percentage agreement 
Afrikaans English 
Religion is more important than politics 95.2% 75,4% 
I My main concern is my income - other things matter 56.6% 47,5% 
less 
Since coming to power, the new government has 11.8% 28,1% 
done the best it can for people like me 
Life in South Africa is becoming worse for people 82.9% 52,9% 
like myself 
Crime and disorder have become the most serious 96.8% 97,1% 
issues in SA 
SA is a country for black Africans, others will have 23.9% 
to take second place 
I 
36,6% 
The main task of government is to see that people 76.2% 77,3% 
work hard/obey law 
• 
People like myself will not be able to compete on a 63,0% 46,6% 
fair basis in future 
I 
I A II peo p I e shou Id be part of a new nation and forget 35.2% 84,0% 
their differences : 
• In government, language groups should enjoy equal 80,1% 
I 
66,2% 
I power as groups 
Self-determination for language groups is the only 80.0% 51,l % 
way to protect language and culture 
There are ample opportunities for all language 31.4% 56,9% 




Clearly there seems to be a basis for a defensive ethnic reaction or at least a sense of shared 
threat as Afrikaners. Indeed, the reactions are very different among the Afrikaners than they 
are among the English. Only roughly one third of the Afrikaners are convinced by the 
prospects of building a new nation, whereas over eighty per cent of the English feel that 
this is desirable. Some eight out of ten Afrikaners endorse the idea of some form of "group" 
participation in government, and surprisingly, almost as many English support this notion. 
Similarly, eight out of ten of the Afrikaners seem to endorse the idea of self-determination 
for language groups. This item is particularly interesting since it was asked in exactly the 
same form in the l 992 survey, when only 51 per cent of Afrikaners agreed that "Se(f 
determination is the only way to maintain culture and traditions". A jump from 50 per cent 
to 80 per cent in three years is quite dramatic. 
These responses could be a temporary phenomenon. reflecting the initial difficulties of 
adjustment to a new political situation, but on the other hand many of the effects of 
redistribution policies have yet to occur. At the very least the results in the last table show 
that the politically "latent" ethnic motivation may be coming to the fore. 
6.4 INTERIM CONCLUSIONS ON THE SCOPE AND PATTERN OF MODERN 
AFRIKANER ETHNICITY 
A wide range of findings, based on a diversity of opinion questions. spanmng almost 
twenty years has been reviewed. The results have been surprisingly consistent over most of 
the period, and the consistency has withstood different methods of questioning. Hence, 
within the obvious limitations of opinion-survey data one can be fairly confident in drawing 
brief interim conclusions at this stage about Afrikaans ethnicity at the popular level. The 
conclusions are interim because more focused data have yet to be reviewed. 
The empirical evidence suggests that, in general. culturally-based Afrikaner political 
commitment and ethnic consciousness, specifically defined. has not been nearly as 
prominent in the construction of political and social meaning for the modern Afrikaner as 
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race identification, moral commitments and class or economic interests. Certainly, a 
consciousness of Afrikaans identity is pervasive, but it does not achieve the weight or the 
prominence of other concerns in comparative questioning. 
The racial identifications, and the concern with traditional or conservative (Calvinist?) 
morality could be argued to be essential components of a more complex (or multiplex) 
"ethnicity", which could perhaps be described as a conservative Christian white-western 
identity, thus challenging many of the assumptions of Afrikaner ethnicity on which the 
study has been based. Does one conclude, then, that Afrikaners are no more or no less than 
a category of white South Africans who are more traditional in their morality than others, 
who have more closely identified with their racial status than others and who have about 
the same concern as other middle class South Africans with their economic advantages? 
Does one use this as a point of departure in beginning to look for reasons as to why these 
distinctions should hold -- reasons such as mobilisation, closer competition with blacks for 
economic occupations and other resources, historical myths perpetuated by leaders to serve 
power interests, etc. etc? 
One must take such possible factors seriously as a contribution to any explanation of group 
sentiment, but it would avoid one additional finding whi.ch has been as consistent as the 
others. This is that while popu_lar ethnic concern was for most of the period obviously not 
"activated~ to compete with racial status or moral commitments in the modem political 
economy of South Africa, the findings have shown that it is consistentlv present as a set of 
personal or social commitments, perhaps outside of the political sphere. 
Furthermore, the most recent evidence reviewed suggests an intensification of these ethnic 
sentiments to the point at which they might well become politically more salient as time 
goes by. This has seemed to be particularly the case with an inclination to support self-
determination for Afrikaners. 
One cannot avoid the conclusion, however, that for most of the period reviewed, one was 
observing a group consciousness at two levels. Race consciousness, material concerns and 
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{ an aggressive conservative morality were dominant at the level of political articulation, 
\ while ethnic group consciousness was a binding factor at a social and interpersonal level. 
\ 
One of the sets of findings suggested that Afrikaners were also more inclined than English-
speakers to conceptualise group interests as more impo1iant than individual interests, thus 
providing an underlying inclination supportive of ethnic mobilisation if it were to become 
more overt. 
\' ,. To explain this farther one may recall that in the theoretical rev1e1,,v, the propos1t1on was 
made that ethnicity can be activated or become more overt. to constitute a form of social 
"closure" or group boundary to protect or promote material or power interests. To become 
functional in this way, however. the ethnicity has to pre-exist in the consciousness of the 
group concerned. Activists and politicians are unlikely to be able to manufacture it de novo, 
and if ethnicity was a purely manufactured phenomenon it would not be as ubiquitous as it 
appears to be. Among Afrikaners it quite clearly exists and is pervasive and valued, but in 
the modern period -- certainly since the early sixties and until very recently, it has not 
\ become mobilised in the interplay of political interests because it has been unnecessary. 
""~ .. .,,. 
Popular ethnic mobilisation of Afrikaners has been unnecessary for several reasons. As 
some of the findings have suggested, the encapsulation of Afrikaners in an institutional 
network of church and party, both having been possessed of a status and power position 
secured by racial status, allowed the question of identity to be taken for granted. Afrikaners 
generally did not have to compete on an ethnic "ticket" because their power interests were 
strengthened by associating more broadly with non-Afrikaans whites. Even the supposedly 
ethnic right-wing political parties have never let any opportunity slip by to enhance their 
support with English, Italian, German and Portuguese w-bites. In a sense, therefore, Jan 
Smuts, Louis Botha and the later Hertzog triumphed: they initially were able to locate 
Afrikaners within a broader and more powerful social alliance with British imperialism and 
English settlers which was essentially racial, and this broader framework has persisted 
remarkably in the popular consciousness. Whatever it intended to achieve in earlier 
decades, the National Party's role in opposing the inclusive tradition of Smuts and Botha 
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was essentially concerned with the power-balance and class trade-offs within the broader 
alliance, and at the stage of English language dominance the more intrinsic cultural and 
ethnic interests were very real, but no amount of ethnic rhetoric could convince the 
ordinary Afrikaner that broader white South Africanism was not the stratet1:ic ideal. 
Within the social alliance, ethnic ideals could be kept alive. valued and expressed, but at a 
secondary level as far as manoeuvring for power and material advantages in the wider 
system was concerned. Socially, as the results show, Afrikaner ethnicity was always alive 
and well, supported by and including a more traditional moral outlook. Politically, 
however, it would seem that most Afrikaners had a shrewd sense that to abandon wider 
white South African solidarity would have been throwing away a precious asset, and a 
linkage with a wider western world of influence. While the National Party was sufficiently 
dominant to incorporate most English-speakers in a secondary status, Afrikaners in the 
National Party had no need to activate their language identity. The fact that some of the 
. empirical material reviewed showed that Afrikaners outside the powerfully cushioning 
National Party and Dutch Reformed Church contexts were more self-conscious about their 
ethnic identity would tend to lend support to this possibility. 
Afrikaans ethnicity, therefore, appears to have been socially salient but politically and 1 
economically "latent", while racial mobilisation was the strategic spearhead. Racial_,,) 
solidarity, however, by now has run its course, and while the effects were not yet evident at 
the time of the survey in 1992, the brief review of 1995 data suggests that some 
fundamental changes in the level at which ethnicity is articulated had taken place. One may 
speculate briefly at this point that if the party system in the new South Africa is unable to 
protect minority interests. then ethnicity as the basis for political mobilisation of Afrikaners 
could be called into play once again -- Afrikaner ethnicity may be poised for a political 
revival. 
At the same time, however. one should recall that there remains a substantial minority of 
Afrikaners who are prepared to identify with the nation building initiatives of the ANC-led 
government. Among these Afrikaners one finds many of the business elites and academic 
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and intellectual leaders who, in tenns of the survey evidence, have been marginal to the 
core of ethnic consciousness among the rank-and-file Afrikaners. Afrikaner leadership, 
thus, is deeply divided and the influence to keep the ethnic consciousness of Afrikaners a 
matter of private conviction will also have its effects. What the outcome will be is 
impossible to say, but this factor must be borne in mind as a reminder that there will never 
be complete consensus in the articulation of social and political commitments. Perhaps like 
the Jews, Afrikaners will always be characterised by both universal and particularistic, or 
communal, responses to political opportunities and constraints. 
Another perspective which emerges from the findings concerns the conservative moral and 
religious outlook. It will be recalled that in one of the surveys reviewed. this dimension of 
commitment was not included in the fixed answer alternatives presented. and perhaps in its 
stead a cultural consciousness was approved very prominently. There is a possibility that 
the underlying and unarticulated consciousness which many or most Afrikaners have of 
themselves is in fact a blend of language and religious identity. and that this accounts for 
the ambiguity of identifications when only language as a label is referred to. 
Finally, one has to note that while cultural, racial and economic concerns are all wrapped-
up in a package of consciousness, there were indications in the data that a category of 
responses exists which reflects an evaluation of culture without a commensurate evaluation 
of racial and economic advantage. In this category of responses may be an indication of the 
seeds of a potential for ethnic leadership which would not be "compromised" as it were, by 




A NON-AFRIKANER INTERLUDE: A BRIEF COMPARATIVE CASE 
STUDY OF FLUIDITY OF ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG 
AFRICAN MINEWORKERS IN A CONFLICT SITUATION 
The review of empirical evidence on Afrikaner ethnicity in the last chapter leaves the 
impression of ethnicity as a "fluid" phenomenon: one which is overt and active under some 
conditions but can be latent if social relations and conditions do not "engage" it. This 
author's understanding of this feature of ethnicity has been considerably deepened by a 
specific case study of ethnic conflict among African workers in the South African mining 
industry. This experience is offered in the chapter. which follows more or less as an 
illustrative "interlude", which will be drawn upon in the final chapter in order to assist in 
the interpretation of Afrikaner ethnicity in relation to wider ethnic dynamics. 
ETHNIC CONFLICT AMONG BLACK WORKERS IN THE MINING INDUSTRY: 
A CASE STUDY OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN CONSCIOUSNESS AND 
ACTION 
From July 1986 to October 1987, senous conflict associated with ethnic competition 
erupted among the black employees in the gold mines in the Evander area to the East of 
Johannesburg. This conflict had a fairly long history, starting in July 1976 when a Pondo 
(Xhosa-speaking ethnic group from the Northern Transkei) group attacked Sotho-speaking 
colleagues at the Kinross mine, during which event six men were killed. In Sept 1981, nine 
men were seriously injured in a fight between ethnic dance teams at the same mine. The 
Sotho-speakers comprised a single language group recruited from both the Free State 
province and neighbouring Lesotho. They were all South Sothos; a distinctive language 
group. 
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In July 1986, the National Union of Mine Workers (NUM) was involved in a boycott of the 
bar (saloon/pub) in one of the mines in the area and the office of the union was closed by 
management, heightening tension among workers. One of the union leaders was dismissed 
and the union mobilised among workers for support in demanding the dismissal of the mine 
Labour Superintendent, who was accused of favouritism. 
In September 1986, there was a major fire disaster at the Kinross mine which led to a 
worker stay-away and a day of mourning, accompanied by worker marches. In March 1987, 
the Sotho-speakers accused Pondo Indunas (a team leader or foreman: the term Induna 
being a Zulu/Xhosa word for headman) of being aggressive in a routine search of men at a 
gate. In May 1987, Pondo miners clashed with members of a Sotho-speaking gang (the 
Russians -- mainly unemployed former miners) at a "shebeen" (an informal tavern) on a 
neighbouring farm, during which six men were killed. During the rest of May there were 
further attacks by Sotho-speaking miners on Pondo Indunas and miners. during which a 
further nine men were killed and many more seriously injured. As a result of the tensions 
over l 00 men took voluntary discharge. The NUM demanded that the system of "tribal" 
Indunas be done away with and that the tribal groups be integrated fully in the hostel 
accommodation. Until then the men of different language groups had been accommodated 
in separate sections of the hostels. The Indunas agreed that there would be integration but 
that tribal segregation between individual rooms be retained. In these arguments and 
discussions there were accusations, once again, thatthe labour Superintendent was biased 
in favour of the Sotho group. 
Then a rumour spread that Sotho workers were going to prevent the Pondos from entering 
the bar. The Pondos then mobilised to storm the bar and the ensuing fighting spread widely 
throughout the mine and nearby farms. A total of eleven men were killed, 12 injured and 52 
were discharged. After these events the mine management strengthened security 
arrangements and the conflict subsided but understandable tensions persisted. Due to the 
tensions it was impossible to integrate the hostels as the NUM had recommended. 
I 
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In late 1987, Dr. Kent McNamara and this author were commissioned by the 
understandably concerned mine management to investigate the incidents and the wider 
"tribal" conflict and prepare a report for the corporate management. As part of the 
investigation a representative sample of 800 miners, stratified according to five language 
groups in four mines in the area, was drawn and personal interviews conducted by trained 
interviewers. The fieldwork was undertaken by lMSA (Pty) Ltd. A report was prepared in 
April 1988, on the basis of which the observations which follow are made (McNamara and 
Schlemmer, 1988). 
On the basis of the attitude survey and other aspects of the investigation. including 
individual interviews with role players, a complex picture of interaction between 
"structural", situational and ethnic causes of the conflict emerged. The following points 
were relevant: 
• In spontaneous replies to probes on the causes of the conflict. only between 11 and 29 
per cent of the miners themselves, depending on the particular mine. saw the conflict as 
being due to ethnic or "tribal" hostility. Further than this there was no consensus among 
the miners on the causes of the conflict. Some blamed the "Russian" gang or prostitutes 
for stirring up trouble, some blamed the favouritism of management. some blamed the 
union and some blamed the Indunas. It was almost as if some force overwhelmed the 
mineworkers which nobody fully understood. 
• Even when pre-prepared alternative options on the cause of the conflict were presented 
to respondents, no useful consensus emerged. The dominant explanation chosen was 
that the attacks were simply acts of "revenge" and retaliation for actual or perceived 
injuries or insults (64 per cent mention). Other major reasons chosen were: 
reactions of solidarity against management favouritism ( 5 7%) 
revenge for acts against prostitutes ( 46%) 
the protection of the jobs of the own ethnic group (38%) 
to prove man..liood (37%) 
to attempt to acquire the jobs of workers in other ethnic categories (35%) 
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to relieve the boredom of hostel life (20%) 
• While general work satisfaction was fairly high, perceptions of the fairness of 
disciplinary procedures and of management treatment of groups revealed problems: 
over one third of workers regarded personnel practices as unfair. 
• Some 40 per cent of the miners perceived the future employment opportunities for their 
"group" as at risk. Some 48 per cent of the Sotho workers at the most troubled mine 
saw future employment prospects of the Sotho as poor. 
• There was very little conscious commitment to ethnic interests as such. Some 56 per 
cent of all the miners saw the relations and sympathy between the groups of different 
regional and language origin as "good". Only 25 per cent described inter-ethnic 
relations as generally poor. 
• Ethnic in-group ties were generally conceived of as "home" ties and these ties were seen 
in a fairly utilitarian light: as sources of assistance, useful in sending messages home 
etc. The "home areas" from which miners had come were widely dispersed areas even 
within language categories, and hence for them to be linked together within language 
regions required a rudimentary concept of ethnicity. 
• Home ties were not consciously seen as more important than other relationships in the 
workplace -- only 32 per cent placed home ties above work friendships in importance. 
• But, the less conscious elements were powerful. For example some 66 per cent of 
miners said that they felt "safer" when there were many people from their home areas 
on the mine. 
• Ethnic tension had not become an embedded as a polarising feature, despite the 
tragedies and the tensions, and 64 per cent of the miners felt that relations between the 
ethnic groups would improve in the future. Some 87 per cent of the miners felt that the 
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workers associated with the union "trusted" each other despite their different ethnic 
origins. Even more surprising, some 72 per cent of the men felt that the integration of 
rooms would reduce tensions and 39 per cent felt that it was the be~t way of avoiding 
conflict in the future. Only some 20 per cent felt that they would feel safer with and 
prefer roommates of the same origin as themselves. 
• While home ties were obviously highly valued, only some 30 per cent of the miners 
who valued home ties conceptualised the significance of these ties as ·ethnic, cultural or 
linguistic in nature or significance. 
• The rates of recruitment and re-employment of the two groups involved in the conflict 
had been declining slowly but steadily over the preceding years. and the rates of 
recruitment of Zulus, a minority on the mine, had been increasing. in part due to less 
labour militancy among the Zulus. Only some 23 per cent of the men who felt that their 
jobs were at risk saw the risk as being associated with their origins or ethnic status, 
however. 
• In the most troubled mine, some 45 per cent of the Sothos mistrusted mine management 
and felt insecure as a consequence. At least a third of all miners and some 50 per cent of 
Pondos at the most troubled mine were to some degree or another consciously-
committed to the safeguarding of the employment opportunities of the ethnic in-group, 
which achieved a greater salience as a consequence of the mistrust of mine 
management. 
In the special interviews conducted among Indunas and umon leaders almost everyone 
seemed committed to a reconciliation between the different groups and to the integration of 
the labour force. The unionists tended to blame management for the tensions but could not 
explain how management would gain anything by creating conflict that would lead to 
serious production and income losses, quite aside from the costs of the damage to the mine 
property. The Indunas liked the idea of integrated residences but were cautious and one 
gained the impression that they feared that some event might spark inter-tribal warfare 
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within confined quarters. At the public level, at any rate, no one; neither unionists, workers, 
Indunas or managers, seemed to take an ethnocentric stance. The workers in general wanted 
to be "comrades" and identified strongly with the union. But in their recreation they 
coalesced into language-based ethnicity. 
The conclusions to be drawn from this case study have suggested themselves already. Here 
one had a black workforce which under the influence of a progressive union, and in contra-
distinction to a dominantly white management. was overtly committed to inter-ethnic 
harmony between black workers, and which even after the episode of bloodthirsty clashes 
between Sothos and Pondos, maintained an optimistic and progressive view of inter-group 
relations. This overt commitment to unity was not purely superficial: it extended to positive 
recommendations from the workers themselves that bostel accommodation should be more 
ethnically integrated. While "home" ties were valued. for obvious reasons, they were 
conceptualised by workers within a situational and practical framework rather than as 
components of an ethnic ide:1tity. 
But underneath the more public commitments, private anxieties were heightening tensions 
among and between the "comrades" at work. These anxieties were fed primarily by a 
downward trend in re-employment for the two major protagonists. the Sothos and the 
Pondos. Perceptions of management bias reinforced the anxieties. 
The Zulus, who appear to have been the main beneficiaries of the trend in employment, 
never became the object of any hostility. The tensions and anxieties were just that, 
emotional arousal without any particular focus or formulated outlet. In this situation of 
heightened arousal, against a background of sheer survival anxieties relating to 
employment, to some extent anything could have happened. The tension could have found 
outlet in heightened mutual solidarity, or heightened labour militancy (which it did to a 
relatively limited extent), or in acts of aggression against I ndunas as a status category, or 
perhaps even in the appearance of pathologies like alcoholism or depression. 
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For most of the men involved in the later conflict, however, no ambiguity or variability of 
identity in the conflict was evident at all. When some or another incident, like competition 
for the attentions of prostitutes or the other, relatively trivial incidents mentioned, provided 
a catalyst, language-group formation and mobilisation was immediate, and the resulting 
action displayed no sense of cross-language group sympathy at all. The violence occurred 
between tightly organised and utterly solitary language groups: by simple virtue of the fact 
that the men were in different language categories ( despite speaking a form of simple Zulu 
(Fanakolo) as a common medium of communication on the mine) and that by virtue of 
home ties, they had a form of regional identity. The violence emerged as intensely ethnic 
action. 
As the conflict developed it became mindlessly bloodthirsty. Men trying to escape from the 
faction fighting were dragged off security fences and slaughtered with bush-knives, mining 
equipment was broken up to provide deadly lumps and shafts of steel with which heads 
were crushed. Deadly fear swept the mines and scores of men whose existence depended on 
their work, dismissed themselves voluntarily and fled the area. 
Perhaps the greatest tragedy was that at the end of the episode of bloodletting, the men 
themselves could not explain what it was all about. This kind of event used to take place all 
over the South African mining industry, and every two to three years some major episode 
of inter-ethnic killing occurred somewhere in the industry. The precipitating events make a 
mockery of any logic of causality. 
In our report to management we identified the immediate cause of the conflict, as opposed 
to the precipitating events, as the heightened anxiety caused by preferential management 
recruiting practices, and furthermore recommended that the lnduna system be modified to 
avoid ethnic team formation and that the hostels be integrated in ways suggested in 
discussions among the men themselves. But the pattern of findings suggested that for as 
long as the migrant labour system lasted, there would be a danger that tensions and 
anxieties related to job-security or conditions would "activate" a latent sense of group 
identity, sufficiently powerful for it to form a focus of mobilisation under stress. Among 
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other foci of solidarity and mobilisation, and despite the public disavowal of ethnic 
loyalties or the surprising lack of a highly self-conscious ethnic concern, this factor of 
identity seemed to have the most potential for bonding and social boundary-formation. 
Indeed it appeared to be explosive in its consequences. It is suggested, therefore, that this 
brief case study has something to offer by way of insights into the apparently :fluid and 
ambiguous nature of Afrikaner ethnic consciousness. 
CHAPTERS 
ETHNICITY WITHIN THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
A MULTI-VARIATE ANALYSIS 
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In the previous two chapters the responses of Afrikaans South Africans and African South 
Africans to the issue of ethnicity, or their actions in an ethnic context, have been explored 
directly on the basis of survey items. The analysis has been partial, however, because the 
review of basic theory in earlier chapters has suggested that ethnic responses or phenomena 
almost always occur in interaction with other goals, motivations or sentiments in any given 
situation. Hence the previous two chapters have in a sense begged the question of the way 
in which ethnic consciousness relates to the other variables with which ethnicity is 
intertwined. 
The review of the relevant theory in fact imposes an obligation to consider the inter-
relationships between ethnicity and other salient socio-political variables because the most 
fundamental issue of theoretical dispute is whether or not, or to what extent, ethnicity has 
an independent significance as a dimension of social structure and social action. 
The immediate question, then, is whether the levels and intensities of ethnic motivation 
which the previous two chapters have displayed, on their own and r~lative to other issues of 
policy or commitment, are autonomous components in a mix of interaction or whether they 
are simply attitudinal "surrogates" for other concerns which may be less readily articulated 
or expressed in action. This question is very easily posed but very diHicult to answer on the 
basis of persuasive evidence. When a South African says that he or she is concerned about 
his culture and values, how does one begin to try to find out whether culture is the real 
concern or whether, consciously or unconsciously, it is not perhaps a way of saying that he 
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or she is really concerned about standard of living and level of income relative to that of 
others with which it is compared? 
One way is to probe more deeply, and to undertake a virtual social "p,sycho-analysis" of the 
subject, using perhaps techniques of association to try and establish what the concern with 
culture means once the possible layer of rationalisation has been penetrated. No doubt this 
would be generally accepted as the approach with greatest 'face validity", as it were. The 
disadvantage of this approach is that, without huge and very skilled personnel resources, a 
very limited number of people can be interviewed in such depth, and one will immediately 
be confronted with the issue of how representative they are. This issue of representivity is 
very significant when dealing with a sentiment which is not necessarily consistently present 
across all categories of people and which has very varied nuances in its expression. 
Another approach, which would be of unchallenged validity. would be to examme 
significant events, and in studying the circumstances which triggered the events, and the 
factors impinging on them, to discern the relative significance of ethnicity in relation to 
other salient factors in the action. This has been attempted in the brief report on ethnic 
conflict on the mines, reported in chapter 7, but the study, because it was an applied 
investigation, did not lend itself to a full examination of the issue at hand. 
In this chapter, a third approach will be adopted, that of multi-variate analysis, and in 
particular Factor Analvsis. The issues taken into account will be broadened beyond 
ethnicity, with a view to inspecting the inter-relationships between ethnic attitudes and 
attitudes to other issues in the socio-political field, on the assumption that the patterns will 
provide insights into the relative "autonomv" of the different issues. 
This type of analysis requires large-scale aggregate data for the results to have statistical 
stability, and the further requirement of representivity means that national attitude survey Ill 
data must be used where possible. Hence, the focus will turn to multi-variate analyses of 
nation-wide opinion polls on issues relevant to the theory. 
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Before talking about factor analysis, however, a limitation on this methodology in this 
study ha~ to be presented. Nation-wide opinion polls, as everyone knows, are hugely 
expensive, and usually beyond the means of a single scholar. Hence the survey evidence 
reviewed ahead is not drawn from surveys dedicated to the purpose of this particular study. 
As before, this author has had to extract as much significance for this topic as possible from 
data-sets of multi-purpose surveys conducted by himself in the context of other 
investigations, some of them on different topics entirely. In order to compensate as much as 
possible for this limitation, a number of different surveys are examined. so that lacunae are 
reduced by complementarity. Even so, however, not all the gaps have been covered, and 
this will be taken into account in the interpretation. 
8.1 FACTOR ANALYSIS AS A METHOD OF DETECTING UNDERLYING 
PATTERNS IN DATA 
Factor analysis is a multi-variate statistical technique in terms of which the inter-
correlations between a large number of items of measurement or observation are explained 
by a smaller number of "factors". These factors are the result of associations between the 
items and as such they represent, or can represent, the underlvin!! structure of the pattern of 
difference in the detailed items. The ''factors" are not clusters as such; they are a more 
subtle crystallisation of patterning in data. 
An example would be a factor analysis conducted on, say I 00 cardboard boxes. If all the 
measurements made on I 00 boxes (height, length, areas of surfaces, width, volume, 
circumferences, diagonals, etc, etc,) were to be inter-correlated within the combined data-
set, and subjected to a factor analysis, three basic "factors" should emerge to explain the 
variance, namely height, width. and length. These three factors could predict all the 
variations in the sample of boxes and allow one to better understand the structure of the 
shape of boxes. If the boxes, however, were not measured completely accurately, but rather 
described from recall, and if the boxes were to be home-made. and had odd shapes with 
curved or skew lines, then the three factors of length, height and depth would not explain 
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all the variance, but a proportion of it. The rest of the variance would be due to irregularity, 
. and might produce a series of weak factors without much geometric significance. 
The latter analogy of oddly-shaped home-made boxes. described rather than measured, is 
an approximation of what happens in factor analysis when applied to opinion poll data. It 
can explain the underlying structure, but a great deal of unavoidable imprecision as well as 
individually-based peculiarities and contradictions in the responses mean that the major 
factors seldom explain all the underlying patterning in the replies to the survey questions, 
and that some of the results are "dirty" in the sense of reflecting nothing more than 
1mprec1s1on. 
An excellent introduction to the technique is that of R.J. Rummel. Rummel records that: 
"Confronted with entangled behaviour, unknown interdependencies. masses of 
qualitative and quantitative variables, and bad data. many social scientists are 
turning toward factor analysis to uncover major .l'ocial and international patterns. 
Factor analysis ... can disentangle complex inter-relationships into their major and 
distinct regularities." (Rummel, 1967:444) 
"It makes explicit and more precise the building of .fc1ct-linkages going on 
continuously in the human mind." (p445) 
Rummel points to many utilities of factor analysis but the following are most significant for 
current purposes: 
"Parsimony or data-reduction ... reducing a mass of information to an economical 
description" (p448 ), 
"Structure. Factor analysis may be employed to discover the basic structure of a 
domain ... 11 ( 449), 
"Hypothesis testing ... (regarding) dimensions ol attitude. personality, group and 
social behaviour, voting and conflict. Since the meaning usually associated with 
"dimension" is that of a cluster or group o_/highly inter-correlated characteristics, 
or behaviour, factor analysis may be used to test for their empirical existence." 
(p450), and 
"Theory . ... the analytic framework o./social theories or models can be built from 
the geometric or algebraic structure offactor analysis." (p45 l ). 
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The factor analyses used in the following analyses are based on matrixes of correlations 
between the attitudinal variables in nation-wide opinion and attitude polls, in which all 
items are included in both the row and the column dimensions. and each item is inter-
correlated with every other item, and both positive and negative correlations are obtained. 
The coefficients of correlation express the extent of the relationship between the row and 
column variables, and are expressed as geometric associations (angles) in the calculation. 
From these associations, a pattern will emerge which reflects the mutual convergences of 
variables in relation to one another as well as the positive or negative strength of the 
associations. These convergences or "clusterings" are the factors. The aim is to determine 
the minimum number of factors which will explain sufficient variance to be useful within 
the framework of the analysis. 
It is important to note that a convergence denoting a factor is not a group of people. Rather, 
it is a "tendency" in their replies, and the same "group'' may produce different tendencies. A 
factor is an abstract relationship between responses. and therefore one will often tend to 
find a single category of people associated with more than one factor. 
A factor analysis initially produces what are called "principal fix tors", but the resulting 
pattern of associations, expressed as angles of variables in relation to one another, is 
usually "rotated' in order to find simpler and more distinct patterns in the data. The un-
rotated results will, in the first factor reveal the "largest pattern" of association in the data 
(sometimes called the general factor), the next factor the next largest pattern which is 
relatively independent of the first factor, and so on. In producing this outcome, the 
calculation will show the proportion of the variance in an item which is associated with the 
pattern ("commonality"). The commonality results eventually produce the proportion of the 
overall variability in the data which is explained by the factor. and in social scientific data 
there is usually a substantial proportion of unexplained variance beyond that explained by 
the meaningful factors, as already indicated due to the individual peculiarities or 
measurement error in the data. 
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Since the underlying calculations are in the form of geometric associations within vectors 
of a multidimensional space, and each item has an association with each factor (the critical 
issue being the closeness of the association), the first pattern obtained can be refined by 
what has already been referred to as "rotation". The computer will search through the 
associations in order to find the arrangement or pattern of inter-relationships which 
maximises the geometrical distinction between patterns of association (factors) and in this 
way the most distinctive crystallisation of underlying associations is obtained. The analysis 
which follows, therefore, will be based on the rotated factors. using the Varimax method in 
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 6.1. Chapter 2 .. 1994). After rotation, 
scores for each factor, based on regression equations. can be calculated to show the 
relationship between factors and background variables like age. gender, etc. 
There is a great deal more technical detail which could be discussed but that given above 
will suffice for present purposes, because the intention behind the analvsis at hand does not 
require a very detailed technical interpretation of the results. Furthermore. there are certain 
weaknesses in the technique as applied to the kind of data available which makes a very 
detailed analysis inappropriate and possibly misleading. The correlations used are based on 
the Product Moment technique, which strictly speaking requires what is called ratio or 
interval data; data in which the effective distances between different values assigned to the 
variables are quantitative. This is not the case with most attitudinal items based on the usual 
"strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree" response alternatives. These responses 
are "ordinal" and not interval data. The responses approximate broadly to equal intervals. 
Therefore the base data is not very precise. Furthermore, each attitude statement in a survey 
of the type used is subject to misunderstanding by respondents. or by very specific 
understandings imposed by an individual's particular experience. Hence the items 
themselves tap the dimension being studied only roughly, and the resulting pattern depends 
on the aggregate trend which penetrates through the individual variability and peculiarities. 
Furthermore, respondents in attitude surveys can answer in different contexts without these 
contexts necessarily becoming evident. It was found in one of the sets of results which will 
be discussed that some of the white conservative respondents in 1992 were still making the 
assumption that majority rule would never come in South Africa while others in the same 
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party camp were expecting the worst, from their point of view. Obviously, their reposes 
were contradictory as a consequence of this. 
Therefore, what has been extracted from the factor analyses is not a very precise definition 
or delineation of the underlying patterns but simply an indication of the broad attitudinal 
geometry. The interest is definitely not in describing factors which emerge in quantitative 
terms, because the precision of the underlying data does not warrant it. Rather, the interest 
is iir what kinds of content different underlying patterns have and whether or not ethnicity 
appears to varv to some extent independently of other variables. In other words the 
intention has simply been to explore whether or not certain factors are relatively 
autonomous within the pattern of variance. This is a modest requirement of factor analysis, 
and the data, in their aggregate form, are adequate for this purpose. Perhaps the approach to 
be adopted is best described as exploratorv rather than definitive. 
In the presentation of the results which follow, attitude items are shortened and paraphrased 
in the text for purely practical reasons, but sufficient content of the full item is given to 
allow the reader to anticipate the fuller wording of the items. Although technical 
appendices for the factor analyses reported on cannot be provided for. reasons of 
practicality. 
The factors will be presented initially not as overall factor descriptions but as lists of items 
with loadings oh the factor above + or - 0,20. The loading indicates the strength of the 
contribution of the item to the factor structure. In this way readers will be able to judge the 
composition of the factors for themselves, rather than depending on this author's labelling 
of the pattern. 
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8.2 ETHNICITY WITHIN THE MIX OF SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN 
SOUTH AFRICA: DOES IT HA VE RELATIVELY AUTONOMOUS 
STATUS AS A FACTOR IN CONSCIOUSNESS, MOTIVATIONS AND 
COMMITMENTS? 
In the discussion of results which follows, some of the exercises will be described in less 
detail than others in order to avoid a lengthy and tedious text. The more recent survey 
material will be given greater attention. All the survey data reported on are based on 
personal interviews within nation-wide samples, covering all sectors of the population, 
including rural and squatter communities. 12 
People of mixed blood and Asians have been omitted from some of this analysis for two 
reasons: first, their sample sizes are unavoidably smaller and produce less stable results, 
and second, the intention is to examine the anatomy of ethnic motivations and this objective 
does not require that all available data be analyzed. There is no intrinsic interest in 
describing race groups as such, since the study is about the search for general principles. 
The concentration on the results of Africans and whites has the additional advantage that 
these two groups are most polarised in terms of socio-economic levels and in terms of the 
theoretical discussion, this contrast is essential for the interaction between ethnicity and 
class relations to be examined. Furthermore, up to 1994, whites were the only fully 
enfranchised group and as such were a political "majority". Since 1994. Africans have 
become the numerically dominant voting category and the majority party. the ANC, draws 
the lion's share of its support from the African majority. They are now the political 
majority. Since the parties dominantly oriented to whites and Africans have been 
responsible for a great deal of the ethnic and anti-ethnic socialisation in South Africa, these 
reasons for the inclusion of the two groups are very relevant, and a "test" based on Africans 
12 The sample designs are all multi-stage. probability samples drawn within strata defining size of 
communitv. rural-urban status and dwelling unit type, with the strata distinguishing between suburban houses, 
apartments, collective dwellings and single worker hostels, government "township" housing schemes, 
commercial farms and traditional subsistence rural areas. The sample sizes will be given for each survey 
reported on, and for whites and Africans, the two groups for which separate analyses wil I be presented. 
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and whites is conceptually sufficient for the purpose at hand. Other groups have been 
included in later results, however. 
One last qualification: the items covenng ethnic or cultural concerns are not 
comprehensive. The competing purposes in the multi-purpose surveys discussed meant that 
in all cases only a small handful of "ethnic" items could be included. The intention was 
merely to include "indices" of ethnic concern, to interact with indices of other interests, and 
not to explore the internal dimensions of ethnicity, which is an objective reserved for 
other chapters. 
8.2.l FIRST FACTOR ANALYSIS: FEBRUARY 1992 
In February 1992, a series of political attitude items was induded in a nation-wide 
survey of South Africans, with a sub-sample of I I 00 Africans and 500 whites. 
Thirty-seven items were presented to respondents covering a range of constitutional 
issues, the protection of minority rights, opinions about transition to majority rule 
and expectations of what developments would be in the social, economic, cultural 
and inter-group relations fields. 
In this .and certain of the factor analyses which follow, only the factors will be 
presented which include ethnicity or related items with meaningful loadings on the 
factor. Some factors had less relevance to our interest since they had no "ethnicity" 
items with meaningful loadings on the factor. 
From the thirty-seven items eight factors were extracted. with a. relatively low 
contribution to overall variance of l O per cent for Africans and 14 per cent for 
whites. The low contribution to variance was due to the large variety of items; for 
example the inclusion of items relating to expectations of the future, which in the 
end appeared not to interact very meaningfully with the attitude items. The 
following factors were of interest. Items which are relevant to the issue of ethnicity 
are emphasised: 
Table 25 
FACTOR ANALYSIS ONE: 
DESCRIPTION OF FACTOR COMPOSITION IN AN ATTITUDINAL 
SURVEY AMONG AFRICANS AND WHITES: FEBRUARY, 1992 
(Note: Items paraphrased and recast so that loadings can aJI read 
in one direction) 
AFRICANS: FACTOR 2: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIANCE: 1,9% OUT OF 10% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- DEVOLUTION TO LOWER TIERS: LOADING 0,52 
- FREEDOM TO CRITICISE: 0,49 
- PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP RIGHTS: 0,42 
- COALITION GOVERNMENT: OAO 
- DEVOLUTION TO IMMEDIATE COMMUNITY: 0,40 
- NATIONAL CULTURAL UNIFORMITY: 0,40 
- SENATE VETO IN PARLIAMENT: 0,39 
- NATIONALISATION OF BUSINESS: 0,32 
- MAJORITY PARTY SOVEREIGNTY: 0,29 
- PRESIDENTIAL POWERS ABOVE PARLIAMENT: 0,28 
- STRONG TRADE UNION INFLUENCE ON 
GOVERNMENT: 0,27 
- (language group representation in parliament : 0, l 5) 
AFRICANS: FACTOR 4: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIANCE: L6% OUT OF 10% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- TRADITIONAL LEADERS REPRESENTED IN 
- PARLIAMENT: 0,61 
- HOMELANDS PRESERVED WITHIN PROVINCES: 0;54 
- LANGUAGE GROUP REPRESENTATION: 0,50 
- STRONG TRADE UNION INFLUENCE: 0,32 
- GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BUSINESS GROWTH: 0,29 
- LAWS TO CURB POLITICAL PROTEST: 0,28 
- NATIONALISATION OF BUSINESS: 0,26 
- ANTI-:TAX REDUCTION: 0,25 
- MAJORITY PARTY SOVEREIGNTY: 0,25 
- AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: 0,25 
- COALITION GOVERNMENT: 0,20 
AFRICANS: FACTOR 6: 




- STRONG TRADE UNION INFLUENCE: 0,32 
OPPOSITION TO PRESIDENTIAL POWERS OVER 
PARLIAMENT: 0,28 
CIVIL SERVICE WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVE: 0,26 
OPPOSITION TO REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXES: 0,26 
ANTI MAJORITY PARTY SOVEREIGNTY: 0,20 
OPPOSITION TO NATIONAL CULTURAL UNIFORMITY: 0,20 
FEEL SAFE IN SOCIETY: 0,20 
WHITES: FACTOR 2: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARJANCE: 2.8% OUT OF l 4% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- HOMELANDS PART OF PROVINCES: 0.54 
- TRADITIONAL LEADERS IN PARLIAMENT: 0,46 
- RACE RELATIONS WILL IMPROVE: 0,41 
- CHECKS ON MAJORJTY PARTY POWERS: 0,41 
- LANGUAGE GROUP REPRESENTATION: 0,39 
- COALITION GOVERNMENT: 0,38 
- FREEDOM TO PROTEST: . 0,34 
- POLITICAL VIOLENCE WILL DECLINE: 0,30 
- BLOCKING SENA TE: 0.23 
- FEEL UNSAFE IN SOCIETY: 0,23 
WHITES: FACTOR 6: 
CONTRIBUTION TO V ARJANCE: 1.1 % OUT OF 14% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- DEVOLUTION OF POWER TO LOCAL COMMUNITY: 0,54 
- DEVOLUTION TO LOWER TIERS: 0,46 
- PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP RIGHTS: 0,37 
- NATIONAL CULTURAL UNIFORMITY: 0,28 
(note, item misunderstood: many people with a high association 
with this factor believed apartheid would continue and that 
national meant the "white nation") 
- FEEL SAFE IN SOCIETY: 0,22 
- CHECKS ON MAJORJTY PARTY POWERS: 0,21 
- TRADITIONAL LEADERS IN PARLIAMENT: 0,21 
- LANGUAGE GROUP REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT: OJ7 
WHITES: FACTOR 7: 
CONTRJBUTION TO V ARJANCE: 1.0% OUT OF 14% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- STRONG TRADE UNION INFLUENCE: 058 
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- ANTI-REDISTRIBUTION TAX: 
- PRESERVATION OF HOMELANDS WITHIN 
PROVINCES: 
- LANGUAGE GROUP REPRESENTATION: 





The second factor analysis, also based on a nation-wide sample as described earlier, 
was conducted on 700 whites and 750 Africans. Altogether. 62 items were fielded 
for whites and 24 for Africans. The overall contributions to variance were 57 per 
cent in 8 factors among Africans and 46 per cent among 11 factors among whites. 
Table 26 
FACTOR ANALYSIS TWO: 
DESCRIPTION OF FACTOR COMPOSITION: JUNE 1992 
AFRICANS: FACTOR 8: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIANCE: 5% OUT OF 57% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- LAWS TO PROTECT LANGUAGE AND CULTURE: 0,80 
- WEALTHY PEOPLE LIMITED TO ONE HOUSE: 0,35 
- CURBS ON TRADE UNION INFLUENCE: 0,27 
- EASIER SCHOOL EXAMS TO BENEFIT BLACKS: 0,25 
- GOVERNMENT TO CONTROL BUSINESSES: 0,22 
- ACTIVIST ORGANISATIONS (Civic Associations) 
NOT TO HA VE POWER IN CITY GOVERNMENT: 0,22 
- REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION: 0,20 
- TRADITIONAL CHIEFS IN GOVERNMENT: 0,15 
REGRESSION FACTOR SCORES indicate that this factor is associated with: 
Dutch Reformed and Evangelical sect membership. 
Low school education 
Minority African languages, not Zulu or Xhosa 
Lower and higher levels of income rather than average levels 
AFRICANS: FACTOR 4: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIANCE: 5% OUT OF 57% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- TRADITIONAL CHIEFS IN GOVERl\lMENT: 0,76 
- EASIER SCHOOL EXAMS TO BENEFIT BLACKS: 0,50 
- (activist) CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS TO HAVE POWER 
IN CITY GOVERNMENT: 0,49 
- LOCAL COMMUNITIES TO MAKE OWN LAWS: 0,39 
- MANY BLACKS APPOINTED AS JUDGES: 0,29 
- LAWS TO PROTECT LANGUAGE AND CULTURE: 0,20 
- CURBS ON HIGHER WAGES FOR BLACKS: 0, 19 
REGRESSION FACTOR SCORES indicate that this factor is associated with: 
- The Gereformeerde, Presbyterian and Congregational churches 
- Post matriculation or degree qualifications 
- Northern Sotho and Venda language groups 
- Rural and former homeland residence 
- Higher levels of income 
WHITES: FACTOR 4: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIANCE: 3.9% OUT OF 46% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
THE ACCEPTANCE OF GROUP AND CULTURAL 
DJFFERENCES JN NAT!ON-BUJLDJNG: 
OTHER CONCERNS MORE IMPORTANT THAN 
INCOME: 




RELIGION IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN POLITICS: 0,42 
NON-AFRICANS SHOULD NOT TAKE SECOND BEST: 0,41 
ALL POLITICIANS MAKE FALSE PROMISES: 0,36 
LAWS TO PROTECT LANGUAGE AND CULTURE: 0,26 
DOING WRONG IS BAD EVEN IF NOT FOUND OUT: 0,26 
AGAINST FREE IMMIGRATION OF SKILLED PEOPLE: 0,24 
WHITES SHOULD NOT HA VE PRIVILEGES AS IN PAST: 0,23 
OPPOSITION TO CULTURAL ASSIMILATJONIUNJTY: 0,23 
AGAINST INTEGRATION OF MUl\JICIPAL AREAS: 0,21 
REGRESSION FACTOR SCORES indicate that this factor is associated with: 
- Dutch Reformed Church membership. hence also with Afrikaners 
- High church attendance 
- Moderate to high education levels 
- Rural areas and to a lesser extent small towns 
- Townhouses and semi-detached/farmhouses 
- Under 34 year old people 
- Lower income categories ( due to youth) 
WHITES: FACTOR 5: 




- OPPOSITION TO CULTURAL ASSIMILATION/UNITY: 0,52 
- OPPOSE SECURITY FORCES CONTROLLED BY 
LARGEST PARTY: 0,52 
- OPPOSE LAWS TO PREVENT PROTEST: 0,48 
- OPPOSE NATIONALISATION OF MAJOR COMPANIES: 0,48 
- LAWS TO PROTECT LANGUAGE AND CULTURE: 0,39 
- REJECTION OF EASIER EXAMS TO HELP BLACKS: 0,35 
- REJECTION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR BLACKS: 0,32 
- NOT MUCH TO LEARN FROM AFRICANS: 0,22 
- LIFE IN SA GETTING WORSE: 0,22 
- CHANGE IS OCCURRING TOO QUICKLY: 0,20 
REGRESSION FACTOR SCORES indicate that this factor is associated with: 
- Catholic, Jewish and Atheist populations 
- University degrees 
- Rooms, townhouses and garden cottages 
- 35 to 49 year old people 
- Middle income levels 
8.2.3 THIRD FACTOR ANALYSIS: JANUARY 1995 
This research was directed at establishing attitudes in respect of priorities for 
government policy and for the stances of political parties. A series of objectives 
were given to be rated on a scale of importance. 
In this factor analysis all factors will be described because of its regency and in 
order to present a profile of the overall patterning of attitudes. This analysis was 
carried out on a nation-wide sample of 1457 Africans and 407 whites. In the 
analysis among Africans 5 factors were extracted contributing 46 per cent to the 
overall variance. Among whites, 6 factors were extracted contributing to the overall 
variance by 55 per cent. 
Table 27 
FACTOR ANALYSIS THREE: 
DESCRIPTION OF FACTOR COMPOSITION: JANUARY 1995 
AFRICANS: FACTOR l: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIANCE: 18% OUT OF 46% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- DISCIPLINE AND STANDARDS IN SCHOOLS: 0,71 
- REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH FROM RICH TO POOR: 0,69 
- FAIR TREATMENT FOR ALL SOUTH AFRICANS: 0,60 
- CONCERN WITH INTERESTS OF DISADVANTAGED: 0,53 
- RESPECT FOR AUTHORITY: 0,32 
- SOCIAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR: 0.32 
- PEACE AND RECONCILIATION BETWEEN GROUPS: 0,28 
AFRICANS: FACTOR 2: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIAN CE: 8% OUT OF 46% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- PRIDE IN OWN GROUP: 0,75 
- PROTECTION/PROMOTION OF CULTURAL RIGHTS: 0,51 
- RESPECT FOR AUTHORITY: 0,51 
- RELIGIOUS AND MORAL VALUES: 0,46 
- SOCIAL SERVICES FOR POOR: 0,38 
- REDUCTION OF TAXES: 0,34 
AFRICANS: FACTOR 3: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIANCE: 7% OUT OF 46% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- SOCIO-ECONOMIC EQUALITY: 0,59 
- RECONCILIATION AND PEACE: 0,54 
- BETTER SALARIES, WAGES AND WORKING 
CONDITIONS: 0,54 
- REDUCTION OF TAXES: 0,52 
- RELIGIOUS AND MORAL VALUES: 0,41 
- FAIR TREATMENT FOR ALL GROUPS: 0,26 
AFRICANS: FACTOR 4: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIANCE: 7% OUT OF 46% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: 0,63 
- LAW AND ORDER: 0,57 
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- SALARIES, WAGES NOT IMPORTANT: 0,37 
- OWN CULTURAL RIGHTS: 0,36 
- SOCIO-ECONOMIC EQUALITY: 0,36 
- RELIGIOUS AND MORAL VALUES: 0,28 
- SOCIAL SERVICES FOR POOR: 0,27 
- FAIR TREATMENT FOR ALL SOUTH AFRICANS: 0,20 
AFRICANS: FACTOR 5: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIANCE: 6% OUT OF 46% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- LOW COST HOUSING PROVISION: 0,70 
- JOB CREATION: 0,57 
- LAW AND ORDER: 0,40 
- SOCIAL SERVICES FOR POOR: 0,35 
- TAX REDUCTION: 0,22 
- RELIGIOUS AND MORAL VALUES NOT IMPORTANT: 0,22 
WHITES: FACTOR I: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIANCE: 14% OUT OF 55% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- OWN CULTURAL RIGHTS: 0,74 
PRIDE IN OWN GROUP: 0,68 
RELIGIOUS AND MORAL V ALLIES: 0,67 
RESPECT FOR AUTHORITY: 0,36 
SOCIAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR: 0,32 
BETTER SALARIES, WAGES AND WORKING 
CONDITIONS: 0,20 
FAIR/EQUAL TREATMENT FOR ALL NOT IMPORTANT: 0,25 
WHITES: FACTOR 2: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIANCE: 12% OUT OF 55% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- JOB CREATION: 0,74 
LOW COST HOUSING: 0,65 
RECONCILIATION AND PEACE: 0,48 
ADDRESSING SOCIO-ECONOMIC INEQUALITY: 0,37 
LAW AND ORDER: 0,33 
INTERESTS OF THE DISADVANTAGED: 0,32 
SOCIAL SERVICES FOR POOR: 0,27 
LESSER IMPORTANCE OF DISCIPLINE AND 
STANDARDS IN SCHOOLS: 0,28 
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WHITES: FACTOR 3: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIANCE: 9% OUT OF 55% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- INTERESTS OF DISADVANTAGED: 0,68 
- REDISTRIBUTION OF WEAL TH: 0,67 
- BETTER SALARIES, WAGES AND CONDITIONS: 0,57 
- SOCIAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR: 0,34 
- LAW ORDER AND CRIME LESS IMPORTANT: 0,25 
- SOCIO-ECONOMIC EQUALITY: 0,26 
- LOW COST HOUSING: 0,22 
WHITES: FACTOR 4: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIANCE: 7% OUT OF 55% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- DISCIPLINE AND STANDARDS IN SCHOOLS: 0,75 
- RESPECT FOR AUTHORITY: 0,54 
- PEACE AND RECONCILIATION: 0,55 
- FAIR/ EQUAL TREATMENT FOR ALL: 0,41 
- INTERESTS OF DISADVANTAGED: 0,27 
- BETTER SALARIES AND WAGES NOT IMPORTANT: 0,19 
- PRIDE IN OWN GROUP: 0,18 
WHITE: FACTOR 5: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIANCE: 6% OUT OF 55% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- SOCIO-ECONOMIC EQUALITY: 0,49 
- FAIR TREATMENT FOR ALL: 0,49 
- REDISTRIBUTION OF WEAL TH: 0,26 
- BETTER SALARIES, WAGES NOT IMPORT ANT: 0,37 
- REDUCTION OF TAXES NOT IMPORTANT: 0,73 
WHITES: FACTOR 6: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIAN CE: 6% OUT OF 55% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: 0,79 
- LAW AND ORDER: 0,54 
- RECONCILIATION AND PEACE: 0,23 
- FAIR/EQUAL TREATMENT FOR ALL NOT IMPORTANT: 0,25 
- TAX REDUCTIONS NOT IMPORTANT: 0,23 
- PRIDEINOWNGROUPNOTIMPORTANT: 0,17 
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AN ADDITIONAL ETHl\TICITY FACTOR WHICH EMERGED AMONG ALL 
GROUPS IS PRESENTED BELOW: 
ALL RACES: N 2259. 
ETHNICITY FACTOR: FACTOR l 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIANCE: 15% OUT OF OVERALL 
CONTRIBUTION OF 5 FACTORS OF 48% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- PRIDE IN OWN GROUP: 0,74 
- PROTECTION OF CULTURAL RIGHTS: 0,69 
- RELIGIOUS AND MORAL VALUES: 0,64 
- RESPECT FOR AUTHORITY: 0,52 
- SOCIO-ECONOMIC EQUALITY: 0,20 
- LAW AND ORDER: 0,20 
SOCIAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR: 0.21 
REGRESSION FACTOR SCORES: an examination of these scores 
shows that this ethnicity factor is associated with: 
Whites dominantly, followed by blacks. and with coloureds 
and Asians weakly or negatively associated with it 
The Conservative Party, the Freedom Front, the African 
Christian Democratic Party, non-aligned Africans and 
the National Party in that order 
The Free State and the Eastern Cape 
55 years and older 
Degrees and diplomas 
Afrikaans, Southern Sotho, Eastern Cape Xhosa 
Housewives and pensioners 
Afrikaans DRC churches and conservative Evangelical sects 
Towns rather than cities 
8.2.4 FOURTH FACTOR ANALYSIS: MAY/JUNE 1995 
The analysis is based on a nation -wide survey among a sample of 2228 cases in 
mid 1995. The study was aimed at covering attitudes on a comprehensive range of 
policy issues, including cultural rights and group-based issues. The factor 
analysis has been conducted on the entire sample only. Its utility is that it can 
provide a complete and very recent overview of the role of ethnic motivations in the 
interplay of political attitudes in the South African population as a whole. There are 
rather more adequate ethnicity variables included than in the other analyses. 
I 
Table 28 
FACTOR ANALYSIS FOUR: 
DESCRIPTION OF FACTOR COMPOSITION IN AN ATTITUDE 
SURVEY: JUNE, 1995 
ALL RACES: FACTOR 1: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIANCE: 17% OUT OF AN OVERALL 
CONTRIBUTION OF 5 FACTORS OF 48% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- LIFE SEEN TO BE IMPROVING: 0,71 
- GOVERNMENT HAS DONE ITS BEST FOR ME: 0, 72 
- SA OFFERS A BETTER FUTURE FOR ALL: 0,55 
- POLITICAL LEADERS DO NOT MAKE FALSE PROMISES: 0,52 
- AMPLE OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL LANGUAGE GROUPS 
TO EXPAND THEIR INTERESTS IN A NEW COMMON SA: 0,48 
- LAW AND ORDER, CRIME NOT THE MOST SERIOUS 
ISSUES: OAO 
- MY POLITICAL PARTY MAKES ME FEEL IMPORTANT 
AND RESPECTED: 0,33 
- RELIGION NOT MORE IMPORTANT THAN POLITICS: 0,23 
- PEOPLE LIKE MYSELF ABLE TO COMPETE WITH 
OTHERS: 0,27 
ALL RACES: FACTOR 2: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIANCE: 13% OUT OF 48% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- SELF-DETERMINATION FOR LANGUAGE GROUPS: 0,60 
LANGUAGE GROUPS SHOULD HAVE EQUAL POWER 
(CON SOCIA TION): 0,60 
RELIGION MORE IMPORTANT THAN POLITICS: 0.42 
CRIME AND DISORDER MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS: 0,54 
GOVT. TO ENCOURAGE PEOPLE TO WORK/ SOCIAL 
DISCIPLINE: 0,34 
AMPLE OPPORTUNITY FOR LANGUAGE GROUPS IN 
NEW SA: 0,40 
POLITICAL LEADERS MAKE FALSE PROMISES: 0,25 
PEOPLE LIKE MYSELF WILL NOT BE ABLE TO COMPETE: 0,24 
LOOK FORWARD TO A BETTER. MORE PROSPEROUS 
FUTURE: 0,23 
ALL PEOPLE SHOULD TRY TO FORGET THEIR 
DIFFERENT TRADITIONS AND LANGUAGE GROUPS 
AND BE PART OF A GREAT NEW NATION 023 
REGRESSION FACTOR SCORES: this factor is associated with the following: 
- All urban areas 
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- Whites, Asians and coloureds in that order 
- 35 years and older 
- High school education and above 
- Afrikaans, bilinguals, minority African languages 
- POLITICAL PARTIES: PAC, NP, FF. CP. IFP 
- Middle to higher incomes 
- Self employment 
- Jewish, Muslim, Dutch Reformed Churches. Evangelical sects, 
Shembe sect. 
- Main concerns: crime, violence, illegal immigration, the economy. 
ALL RACES: FACTOR 3: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIANCE: 7% OUT OF 48% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- MY POLITICAL PARTY MUST GIVE ME WHAT 
WANT, OTHERS MUST SACRIFICE: 0,76 
- MY POLITICAL PARTY MAKES ME FEEL 
IMPORTANT AND RESPECTED: 0,56 
- MAIN CONCERN IS INCOME, OTHER THINGS 
MATTER LESS: 0,57 
- PEOPLE SHOULD WORK HARD AND OBEY LAW: 0,47 
- SOUTH AFRICA A COUNTRY FOR BLACK AFRICANS: 0,34 
- DISAPPOINTED IN GOVERNMENT: 0,20 
ALL RACES: FACTOR 4: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIANCE: 7% OUT OF 48% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
- GOVERNMENT CHANGING THINGS TOO SLOWLY: 0,68 
- ALL PEOPLE SHOULD TRY TO FORGET TRADITIONS 
AND LANGUAGE GROUPS AND BE PART OF A ,iVEW SA: 0,45 
- SA OFFERS ALL A BETTER AND MORE PROSPEROUS 
FUTURE: 0,44 
- THERE IS AMPLE OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL 
LANGUAGE GROUPS TO EXPAND THEIR INTERESTS 
IN A COMMON SA: 0,35 
- SELF-DETERMINATION FOR LANGUAGE GROUPS 
REJECTED: 0,21 
FACTOR REGRESSION SCORES: this factor is associated with: 
- Former homelands, coloured townships, black townships 
- Africans and Coloureds 
- Younger rather than older adults 
- Primary school education 
- Minority African languages, 
- POLITICAL PARTIES: AZAPO, IFP. ANC 
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- Lower income 
Unemployed people, informal sector 
African Separatist Sects, Anglicans. Methodists and some 
Evangelical sects 
- Major concerns, jobs and housing 
ALL RACES: FACTOR 5: 
CONTRIBUTION TO VARIANCE: 5% OUT OF 48% 
SUPPORT FOR: 
WEAL THIER SHOULD GET POORER FOR SAKE 
OF EQUALITY: 0, 73 
- I WILL NOT BE ABLE TO COMPETE WITH OTHERS: 0,49 
SA A COUNTRY FOR BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS: 0,47 
MAIN CONCERN IS INCOME. OTHER THINGS 
MATTER LESS: 0,30 
LIFE BECOMING WORSE: 0,29 
DISAPPOINTED IN GOVERNMENT: 0,27 
CRIME AND DISORDER NOT SERIOUS: 0,22 
POLITICAL LEADERS MAKE FALSE PROMISES: 0,20 
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This ends the range of factor analyses to be discussed. They appear to provide 
sufficient material for the patterns underlying the varied responses in the attitude 
surveys to be assessed in the light of the objectives of this investigation. 
8.3 INTERPRETING THE PATTERNS 
8.3.1 THE VARIANCE EXPLAINED 
The variance explained by the factors extracted for the different analyses has varied 
from a low of 10 per cent (for reasons already given) to close to sixty per cent. 
What about the unexplained variance? Some additional variance could have been 
covered had more factors been extracted, but this would have meant working with 
less and less meaningful tendencies. An optimal result was aimed at. 13 
13 "Eigenvalues" of one and above were taken as the cutting points for the extraction of factors (see SPSS, 
6.l, 1994) 
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What, however, does the unexplained variance add up to? 
In any society a great deal of the responses of people are contradictory and at times 
confused -- perhaps best described as a "porridge'' of sentiment. Obviously South 
Africa has this in full measure and this is the major reason why the contribution of 
factors to the variance was not higher. The factors which were extracted identified 
what are in fact the indicators of a latent structure in the political culture which 
"protrude" from the porridge of relatively less focused and coherent sentiment. 
They are what could be termed "nodes" or lumps of ideological coherence which, 
because of this very coherence, make a great deal more impact on the society than 
the ebb and flow of less-coherent sentiment. 
8.3.2 THE MEANING OF THE FACTORS 
Thus far the factors which have been extracted have not vet been labelled in terms 
of their overall composition. The composition is compris~d of both the items whicJ 
achieve meaningful loadings and the strength of the loadings. ln many cases itemJ 
have been included with relatively low loadings (0.15 to 0.30), but this is deliberate! 
Because the exercise, as already stated, is exploratory. and the field is one of 
nuances, even quite low loadings can indicate a tendency which might assist in th 
1 
interpretation of a factor. 
Aside from this, the exercise of giving an overaH conceptual description to a facto: 
is a delicate one. One must be constantly mindful of the fact that the factors ar~ 
circumscribed by the choice of items, and that the "real" factor of \~,'hich thb 
statistics are merely an indicator, is undoubtedly much richer and more complex i~ 
content. Any names given to factors, therefore, are merely working labels to ass+ 





In interpreting the meaning of the factors, one must bear in mind that the same item 
can shift its meaning from one factor to another. The term 'fair treatment", for 
example, can be a reform-directed concept in one factor and a defensive, 
conservative concept in the context of another factor. These shifts in meanings have 
to be interpreted in the context of the factor as a whole. 
8.3,3 THE ANATOMY OF SOCIO-POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AS 
"INDICATED" BY THE FACTORS 
In proceeding to attempt to give the factors labels, an attempt will also be made to 
draw the factors together into a map, or the anatomy. of socio-political 
consciousness. Recall that the different factor analyses. since they were based on 
different items, will be used to complement each other in describing the parameters 
of popular consciousness. It cannot be claimed that the conclusions drawn from the 
factor analyses are definitive, because very often the number of items able to be 
fielded was rather limited. The conclusions drawn have to be cautious, but the 
findings are at least suggestive. 
SOUTH AFRICA AT LARGE: 
BASED ON FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN 
FACTOR ANALYSIS 4, WITH REFERENCE TO ANALYSIS 3 AS WELL 
I. RAINBOW NATION: optimism, trust in the political system, secular, and 
unitary 
2. RELIGIOUS-ETHNIC TRADTIONALISM SOCIAL DISCIPLINE AND 
ECONOMIC CONSERVATISM: (virtually identical to multi-racial factor 3 in 
factor analysis 3) 
315. AFRICAN POWER AND ENTITLEMENT (with lesser or greater cultural-
traditionalism, more or less democratic) 
4. ANTI-PLURALIST "JACOBIN/SM" 
These factors for South Africa at large tend to obscure tbe finer nuances in both 
minority and majority consciousness. Therefore the same exercise will have to be 
repeated for whites and Africans. The four multi-racial factors above, however, are 
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a fairly faithful reflection of the major thrusts in the socio-political consciousness of 
South Africa at large. The "Rainbow nation" complex has in fact been a powerful 
metaphor in the programme of the initial Government of National Unity and in the 
broad interaction between the ANC and its constituencies. It is a compelling 
mindset while it lasts. Of all the factors it is possibly the least resilient, and some of 
the detailed item loadings reflect disappointment with government creeping in. It is 
the kind of optimistic consciousness which could perhaps endure if the economy is 
very successful, as it was in high-growth Malaysian and Indonesian plural societies, 
as opposed to, for example, lower-gro\vth Sri-Lanka and India that have clearly not 
sustained an early post-liberation social harmony. 
The ethnicity factor, number 2, is solid and is confirmed in all the factor analyses. 
What is · also confirmed is that it is not a pure etlmo-cultural factor but is 
consistently associated with religious and socio-economic conservatism. The 
ethnicity. therefore, is part of a complex of value conservation. lt is, however, not 
reactionary, because more often than not in the item loadings there is clearly an . 
association with socio-economic reform and improved social services. It may be 
defensive, but it is not associated with strong class demands. It is or appears to be a 
fairly gentle factor. It is, however, firm in terms of commitments to culture, religion 
and morality. 
Factors 3 and 5 vary only slightly and they are· clearly recognisable as parts of the 
same complex of "A.fricanist" or "black" solidarity and claims. There is complexity 
within the broader factor, as we will see among Africans. but it appears to cohere at 
a broader level as the equivalent of the "anti-colonial" claims so familiar in the 
Third World in this century. Within it there is lesser or greater emphasis on 
traditionalism, and lesser or greater concern with power_ but the Africanist claims 
and expectations are consistently present. 
Factor 4, the "Jacobinism" complex, is somewhat of a surprise since one might havt; 
expected it to have been subsumed under the "Rainbow nation" factor. Possibly thJ 
I 
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Rainbow nation tendency is too generous, and the legacy of apartheid has required a 
more positive anti-pluralist thrust to emerge. 
All these general factors cut across race to some extent: some coloured and Asian 
and a small number of white people, for example. would be associated with the 
Rainbow nation tendency, although factor 3/5 would be dominantly African. The 
ethno-religious factor, however, is more non-racial in its composition, reflecting a 
strong sentiment that one can recognise in both majority and minority 
consciousness. The etlmo-religious factor may also be the most universal of the 
factors, and least time and place bound. because many of the ethnic cultures in the 
world at large may have a similar broad composition. 
AFRICAN SOUTH AFRICANS 
When looking in more detail at the African population categories, some of the 
broader factors above dis-aggregate into more specific tendencies. Although the 
following map is based largely on the January 1995 analysis, factors emerging from 
the whole analysis which confirm these trends are built in. as presented below: 
ANATOMY OF AFRICAN CONSCIOUSNESS BASED LARGELY ON 
FACTOR ANALYSIS THREE, WITH INFLUENCES FROM OTHERS 
l. SOCIAL-MORAL CONSER VA TISJvf AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC REFORM 
214. ETHNIC-TRADITIONALIST-RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND REFORJvf (with 
confirmation from 1992: 1 and 2) 
3. RELIGIOSITY AND RECONCILIATION 
5. POWER. POPULIST DEAfANDS AND ENTITLEMENT: this factor is in fact a 
dimension moving from lesser or greater radicalism. lesser or greater 
emphasis on traditionalism, and lesser or greater acceptance of power 
centralism (see 1992 analyses). On could make a case. therefore. for the factor 
to be dis-aggregated into power nuances. as follows: 
- AFRICANIST, ETHNO-TRADITIONAL POWER CLAIMS 
POPULIST-PROLETARIAN POWER CLAl1l1S 




Being a largely middle class sub-society, with a great deal of internal 
differentiation, the factors which emerge are more differentiated than those among 
Africans. Based on the January 1995 analysis. but drawing nuances from the others, 
and from regress10n factor scores, the line-up of tendencies appears to be as 
follows: 
ANATOMY OF WHITE CONSCIOUSNESS BASED ON FACTOR 
ANALYSIS THREE, AS INFLUENCED BY OTHERS 
la. DEFENSIVE ETHNO-TRADITIONALIST-RELIGIOUS SOCIAL CONSER-
VATISM WITH ECONOMIC CONSERVATISM (largely Afrikaans. non city) 
(see both of the l 992 factor analyses for confirmation of this factor) 
I .b. SECULAR ETHNO-CONSERVATIVE IDENTITY W'JTH SOCIO-
ECONOMIC CONSERVATISM (Jewish. Catholic. secular identities but not 
necessarily excluding Afrikaans non-traditional identity). 
2. SOCIAL-DE1'.10CRATIC REFORM AND DELIVERY 
3/5. LEFT-LEANING REFORM AND REDISTRIBUTION 
4. CONSERVATIVE SOCIAL DISCIPLINE AND REFORM 
6. CAPITALIST INVESTMENT ORIENTATION. more or less conservative in 
orientation (also in factor 7. Feb 1992) 
FEB.92: 6 ANTI-CENTRALIST DEMOCRATS, including more or less mild 
ethnic consciousness ( see factor 6. Feb 1992) 
In reviewing these tendencies, it is interesting to what extent the diverse forms o I 
retreat from supp01i for Apartheid among whites has differentiated political 
consciousness, so that the nuances of ideology appear more clearly in the white than/ 
in the African factors. The ethnicity dimensions are very similar to those amonJ 
Africans, and it is in these tendencies, which cut across racial divisions, that the 
more "rooted" nature of ethnicity emerges. 
I. Among the whites, however, it is almost as if a factor is missing. A critic of thi$ 
1, '-' I 
analysis may well ask why there is no factor based on WHITE RACIAti 
INTERESTS? One reply to this is that it exists in the non-explained variance, m!k 
was not sutliciently structured or coherent to erneree as a factor, partly becaust 
most whites no longer have the confidence to articulate it directly. In this regard on 
· 8.4 
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must bear in mind that whites in South Africa have become sufficiently apologetic 
about the history of apartheid to have experienced a fragmentation of any formerly 
focused and overt racial identification· and interest-orientation. As will be pointed 
I 
out in the next chapter, the political party wb:icl: enjoys the major share of white 
support, the National Party, is about as formless and un-focused as the unexplained 
variance in the factor analyses. If one looks at the white factor analysis results, one 
can find the Democratic Party (in factor 2 and 6 in the white analysis), the 
Conservative Party and the Freedom Front (and perhaps a subdued section of the 
National Party) in factor la. One recognises white ANC-SACP supporters in factor 
3/5. One only sees a dimension of the National Party in factor 4. but for the rest the 
tendencies which gave the party its dominant position in white politics at the time 
tend to be smothered in uncertainty and ·contradictions. within the unexplained 
vanance. 
___ _..1 
This, then, is how the anatomy of political consciousness emerges from the factor 
analyses. It appears to accord with and be confirmed by the general appearance of 
political debate in the society. What then, do these patterns tell us about the topic of 
this study -- ethnic identity? 
UNPACKING ETHNICITY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The simultaneous emergence of a virtually identical ethno-religious identity with a 
traditional flavour among both whites, mainly Afrikaans, and Africans, and the parallel 
phenomenon of a more secular ethnic consciousness which involves other minorities as 
weH, is noteworthy. It tends to counter any notion that ethnicity (as opposed to a broad and 
formless racial consciousness) existed solely as a rationalisation for white domination. This 
point is strengthened by the fact that the ethnicity factors are less associated with economic 
conservatism than thev are with a mild social responsibi!itv and reform consciousness. 
Unless it is remarkably well disguised, there is hardly any semblance of the notion of 
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"white greed" in the ethnicity factors -- it no doubt exists but was smothered m the 
. unexplained variance. 
' 
This interim conclusion would not entirely satisfy the radical-instrumentalist school of 
analysis in South Africa, because it could be argued that these ethnic sentiments, no matter 
how much they cut across race in their dimensions, could nevertheless have been exploited 
as a prop for white domination. This may be so, but the urge for white domination did not 
create them. There certainly appears to be "intrinsic" content and autonomy in the ethnic 
factors. 
· An interesting feature of the way in which ethnic group consciousness has emerged in the 
factors is that it is not always' at odds with "nalion-huilding". in an overarching national 
context For example. factor 2 in the multi-racial factor analysis of May l 995, gives a 
positive loading not only on particularist items but also on items which have to do with 
ethnic "space" in an overarching patriotism and with the ideals of national unity. In other/ 
words, the simultaneous appearance of both general and particular symbolism in the sam~ 
l .. factor hints at the possibility of symbolic trade-off'>. · 
Another implication of the patterns relating to ethnicity is that they may have strong 
I 
religious-moral value content, but they are clearly more strongly associated with smaller or 
threatened language interests than with the interests of the super-dominant languages likJ 
English, Xhosa and Zulu. The latter two languages may be under threat from English as 1 
bureaucratic, political and economic language, but their currencies as lingua franca at stree~ 
level among the black majority are very strong. This is not the case with Afrikaans, thb 
Sotho languages, but particularly the very small language groupings 'iike Ndebele, Vendl 
and Changana-Tsonga. I 
The suggestion in Chapter 2, that ethnicity may be weakened as people move up the scall 
of economic and educational status, is not confirmed by this analysis. The factors relatin~ 
to communal identity tend to be more middle class than otherwise. This is particularly to + 
seen among Africans, among whom ethno-religious identity concerns are, if anything, mme 
I 
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likely to be found among the less than very poor and among the better-educated people than 
among the rank-and-file proletariat. As far as the South African case goes, then, ethnicity is 
not obliterated by modernisation or by socio-economic mobility. This would not deny the 
fact that there is a great differentiation of socio-political consciousness among the middle 
and emerging middle classes. 
The last general issue which emerges from the factor analysis is that ethnic consciousness, 
as opposed to a broader racial and radical racial-Africanist consciousness. almost always 
appears with a religious consciousness and with conservative social (as opposed to 
economic) morality. As already said, identity consciousness in South Africa is perhaps 
more accurately described as communal consciousness because of its more inclusive basis 
in what has already been termed "value conservation". This raises the interesting question 
of whether ethnicity on modern society tends to be left or right-leaning in its wider political 
commitments. 
This chapter on the multi-variate analysis has the utility of having provided a rather clearer 
picture of how communal interests contrast with and combine with other interests. It has the 
added benefit of complexity. As political sociologists should know in advance. the world of 
everyday social interaction is the graveyard of over-conceptualised theory. Ethnicity and 
related issues of communal identity are confused and intertwined in society, but at the same 
time very resilient. It is clear that these sentiments in South Africa have survived 
Apartheid, and that conclusion alone would attest to the persistence of the phenomenon. 
CHAPTER9 
MORE RECENT VIEWS OF WHITE AFRIKANERS AND 
OTHER SOUTH AFRICANS ON TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICAN 
LANGUAGE POLITICS 
In the preceding chapters one has seen some tentative indications of a hardening of ethnicl 
attitudes among Afrikaners; indeed some of the data have suggested that emotions whic~ 
would predispose to ethnic dissent may be crystallising or recrystallising in th9 
consciousness _of white Afrikaners. More recent empirical inputs may help to show what i~ 
happening and whether the tentative indications in the earlier chapters are part of ai 
sustained process. The following sections are devoted to these more recent studies. Asi 
before, it is useful to compare the responses of White Afrikaners to those of other language 
groups in South Africa. 
In February 1997, this author undertook a further nation-wide survey of the reactions of' 
language groups in South Africa to the major trends in language and cultural policy and in 
particular to the "nation-building" agenda of the government and how it relates to cultural 
minority rights in the new democracy. This study. was undertaken on commission by 
MarkData (Pty) Ltd., following a decision taken by an important gathering of concerned 
brown and white Afrikaans-speaking community-leaders and intellectuals at Oude Libertas 
in Stellenbosch on November 30, 1996, to discuss the situation of Afrikaans language 
rights. At the meeting a vigorous debate occurred between different viewpoints on the issue 
of whether or not the situation of Afrikaans was seriously threatened. At the meeting it was 
agreed that the debate should continue. 
Professor Hermann Giliomee and others who were prominent in the initiative considered 
that a survey among all South Africans might contribute insights to the debate. The 
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necessary support from business sponsors was motivated, and this writer was requested to 
formulate a draft interview schedule for discussion with key persons involved in the 
initiative and the sponsors, after which MarkData (Pty) Ltd. was contracted to carry out the 
fieldwork under the supervision of the author. The writer undertook the analysis of the 
findings for reporting back to the sponsors, and the data have been further analysed for this 
chapter. The author would like to acknowledge the contributions of Prof. Giliomee and the 
others involved in this investigation. 
The sample of slightly over 2200 was a multi-stage stratified probability design. The 
stratification factors were nine major residential categories and covered all South Africans, 
rural and urban. Personal interviews by trained fieldworkers were conducted in the home 
languages of all respondents during January and February of 1997. The questions posed are 
paraphrased. The interviewing approach to the study did not suggest that Afrikaners were 
the major focus of interest, and hence a possible Afrikaans ethnic bias was avoided as much 
as possible. 
The survey was of an "omnibus" type in which, for reasons of cost-saving, items for other 
clients were also included in the investigation. Some of the items which will be analysed 
below were not part of the "Oude Libertas" investigation, but permission has been obtained 
to use them here. The results will be very broadly reviewed before concentrating on an 
analysis which is focused on the theme of this study. 
The results show very extensive apparent disquiet over language rights among white 
Afrikaans-speakers. Some 83 per cent of Afrikaners declare themselves to be "unhappy" or 
"very unhappy" about the official treatment of both their cultural values and language, 
compared with 19 per cent among white English-speakers, 32 per cent among coloured 
Afrikaners and 23 per cent among Africans. 
The results of a further question on the same topic are worth presenting in detail on a 
comparative basis: 
Table 29 
To what extent do you feel that the present government respects the interests 






White Africans Zulus 
Afrikaans Afrikaans English 
Satisfactory 5% 33% 67% 41% 27% 
I As reasonably expected 11% 18% 19% 26% 30% 
Pretends to 20% 23% 4% 24% 32% 
Neglects 31% 13% 7% 5% 6% 
Promotes another language 33% 
I 
12% 3% 3% 5% 
NOTE: balance to l 00 per cent is non-response or other answers. 
Among all ethnic minorities, white Afrikaners feel the most threatened. No less than 84 per 
cent feel that the present government either does not "respect" the rights of their mother 
tongue as much as they could reasonably expect or else neglects and even positively 
undermines it by promoting another language, English. This 84 per cent compares with 25 
per cent among Afrikaans-speaking coloureds, 10 per cent among white English-speakers 
and 8 per cent among speakers of African minority languages. 
Compared with the only 16 per cent among white Afrikaners. roughly 50 per cent of 
coloured Afrikaans-speakers feel that their language is treated "adequately" or "at least as 
well as one could reasonably expect". The coloured Afrikaans-speakers, however, are not 
exposed to the full effects of new language policies and practices because the 
overwhelming majority live in the Western Cape, which is under opposition control, has a 
majority of Afrikaans-speakers and has a dominantly Afrikaans-speaking provincial 
government and civil service. 
j 
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Black respondents, who compnse several language minorities are very much more 
optimistic or less-concerned about their language interests, as one might expect so soon 
after a "liberation" from a situation of racial domination in which language-based ethnic 
differentiation was far less salient than the major distinction between whites and people of 
colour. Nevertheless, as many as one-third feel that the present government is either 
insincere or hostile in respec.:t of their minority language rights. and this proportion rises to 
over 40 per cent among Zulus. 
As a consequence of their relatively heightened sense of ethnic marginalisation, some six 
out of ten Afrikaners (59 per cent) expect that their language will be weakened over time or 
become extinct, whereas only 18 per cent of coloured Afrikaans-speakers feel this way. In 
terms of the extreme fear of the language becoming extinct, coloureds are a little closer to 
white Afrikaners because l O per cent fear that Afrikaans will disappear compared with 19 
per cent in the white Afrikaans group. 
Already, some 21 per cent of the white Afrikaans respondents and 37 per cent of the 
Afrikaans-speaking coloureds have decided that it would be best to have their children 
educated in an international language, namely English. The proportion among Africans is 
also high at some 36 per cent. 
1)ms there seems to be fairly widespread concern about language, but with white 
Afrikaners clearly most worried. This contrast obviously relates to the fact that Afrikaans, 
unlike the other languages, has suffered recent status loss (as opposed to the past and 
continuing neglect of the other minority languages). Up to 1994. Afrikaans was the 
predominant language of government and it had emerged as a language of academia, 
science, technology and the arts. Today it is surviving in private use, the print media and 
literature, but in most other respects it has been downgraded closer to the formal status of 
any one of the other nine minority languages, none of which has had the opportunity of 
being developed to encompass technological, professional and academic use. 
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While the other minority language users may complain justifiably of lack of progress in the 
development of their languages, for Afrikaners the problem is experienced as the actual 
destruction of advances already made. In politics, as in other spheres. one might have to 
consider that there is a difference in the effects on people of what they perceive as "sins of 
commission" compared with "sins of omission". 
Surprisingly, however, Afrikaners can console themselves with the fact that many other 
South Africans sympathise with them in their predicament. When asked whether Afrikaans 
today enjoys " ... more or less than its rightful recognition''. no fewer than 48 per cent of 
white English-speakers and 37 per cent of blacks express the view that it is suffering 
discrimination. The accusation which is occasionally made that Afrikaans still enjoys more 
than its fair share of privileges is not as widely endorsed. Only 18 per cent of English-
speakers and 31 per cent of blacks felt this way. 
On this issue of discrimination against Afrikaans, white and brown Afrikaners are more 
united than they are on the issues already discussed. Some 88 per cent of white Afrikaners 
and, despite the linguistic privilege of being in the Western Cape. as many as 55 per cent of 
coloured Afrikaans-speakers feel that Afrikaans enjoys less than its rightfhl status in public 
life. 
These perceptions may not be the stuff of which nation-building, reconciliation and the 
repair of the divisions created by Apartheid are made. One sees this in the fact that only 31 
per cent of white Afrikaners feel that the various ethnic groups in South Africa have 
"moved closer together" over the past two years. This compares with 42 per cent among 
Afrikaans-speaking coloureds, the same proportions among Zulus, 49 per cent among 
English-speaking whites, 55 per cent among English-speaking coloureds and 53 per cent 
among blacks in general. 
These results seem to illustrate the fact that, to the extent that the present government, 
semi-state agencies and other institutions have tried to foster national unity through playing 
down language and cultural differences or relegating them to the "cultural sphere" of 
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public life, which may be seen as a type of secondary status among the issues confronting 
the country, they could be risking reactions which are counter-productive for national unity, 
certainly as far as white Afrikaners, and to a lesser extent Afrikaans-speaking coloureds are 
concerned. 
In general, not only white Afrikaners but all South Africans appear to favour a ''pluralist" 
basis for national unity. When asked what broad approach to "nation-building" they 
favoured, as one would expect only 5 per cent of Afrikaners. but no more than 34 per cent 
of the entire sample of South Africans, endorsed the view that "national unity should have 
priority over specific language interests". Most South Africans seem to feel that unity and 
the maintenance of particular language and cultural interests are equally important, or that 
unity should actually be based on the protection of and co-operation between distinctive 
and acknowledged cultural 'ind language interests: 53 per cent among all South Africans, 
95 per cent among white Afrikaners, 66 per cent among coloured Afrikaans-speakers. 
Nevertheless, as has happened so often in newly democratic multi-ethnic states, the fear is 
often expressed in government circles that ethnic claims represent a challenge to national 
unity (see the final chapter). However, despite their clearly evident ethnic commitments and 
their sense of cultural threat, only 23 per cent of white Afrikaners feel that their language 
and cultural interests should actually take precedence over national unity. They are joined 
in this conviction by a mere l 0 per cent of all South Africans. 
Hence, the majority sentiment among most South Africans is clearly that national 
reconciliation can be achieved while simultaneously protecting and promoting the rights 
and interests of cultural minorities. White Afrikaners are not dominantly at odds with this 
idea. It is against this background of perceptions that the decisions by government 
departments, some local authorities and some private corporations to move to the exclusive 
use of English may be problematic for national unity, and clearly not only with respect to 
Afrikaners. In the survey some 80 per cent of Afrikaners, 70 per cent of blacks and 72 per 
cent of South Africans in all categories said that being served or attended to in their own 
languages made a big or a considerable "difference". 
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As all these findings would lead one to expect, majorities of all South Africans feel that 
"independent voluntary organisations to promote and protect their language and cultural 
interests" are important -- overall 74 per cent of all South Africans. Surprisingly, the more 
intense expressions of this need are not limited to Afrikaners. While 43 per cent of white 
Afrikaners felt that this role of voluntary organisations is verv important, the proportion is 
41 per cent among black South Africans ( 49 per cent among Zulu-speakers) and 38 per cent 
among Afrikaans-speaking coloureds. 
Such organisations, however, are not seen to be greatly effective despite their importance. 
When asked whether private voluntary organisations in the field of cultural and language 
interests "act effectively or not", some 45 per cent of white Afrikaners, 37 per cent of 
coloured Afrikaans-speakers, 30 per cent of Zulus and 23 per cent of all blacks said that 
they felt such organisations were wholly or partly ineffective. 
Among white Afrikaners, the same hesitations emerged in respect of a new statutory body 
established by government in terms of the new Constitution. a Council for the Promotion 
and Protection of the Rights of Cultural. Religious and Linguistic Communities. The 
establishment of this body flowed from a last minute inclusion in the new constitution 
strongly urged by Afrikaans-oriented political parties. While 80 per cent of all South 
Africans see the Council as capable of providing either effective or adequate protection of 
their language and cultural interests, the proportion ·drops to 56 per cent among white 
Afrikaners. The remainder of the Afrikaans respondents were cynical or critical -- some 17 
per cent feel that it will actually weaken their interests, probably realising that the Council 
will to a large degree be self-neutralising because of the variety of cultural interests it will 
have to represent, and yet at the same time will allow government to claim that it is making 
important statutory provision for the protection of minority cultural and language interests. 
Some 81 per cent of Afrikaans-speaking coloureds appear to have faith in the Council, 
however. 
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On the face of it, these results suggest a potential for Afrikaans dissent if the politics of 
culture and language turn sour in South Africa. There is clearly a high level, possibly a 
groundswell of apparent concern among Afrikaners and very considerable sympathy for 
them among other groups, not to mention a measure of concern about their own languages 
among black minorities. 
When asked how far voluntary cultural organisations should take their mandates to protect 
cultural interests, the white and coloured Afrikaans-speakers are very cautious, however: 
Table 30 
How far should such (independent voluntary organisations) go 
in the protection of language and cultural interests? 1997 
White Coloured White Africans Zulus 
Afrikaans Afrikaans English 
Organisations not important 15% 32% 35% 28% 34% 
Stimulate interest 33% 40% 40% 32% ·23% 
Make representations 29% 15% 19% 32% 33% 
Organise strong protest 22% 14% 5% 8% 9% 
Despite the strong apparent sense of ethnic threat the proportions of white Afrikaners 
endorsing a recourse to strong public protest (22 per cent) is not large, although it is 
significantly larger than it is among all other groups. It indicates sufficient numbers to 
provide public support for activist movements, but it does not suggest a cohesive 
orientation among white Afrikaners as a group. 
In the survey respondents were told about a proposal for the establishment of a new 
organisation for Afrikaans-speakers, which would operate across race groups and 
independently of political parties, in order to mobilise and act on behalf of Afrikaans and 
I 
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its rights as a language. The respondents were asked whether they would become involved 
in such an organisation. The results were as follows: 
Table 31 
AFRIKAANS-SPEAKING SOUTH AFRICANS: DEGREE OF INTEREST 
IN BECOMING INVOLVED IN A NEW ORGANISATION 
TO MOBILISE AFRIKAANS-SPEAKERS AND ACT ON BEHALF 
OF AFRIKAANS LANGUAGE INTERESTS, 1997 





Would support, become involved in local activity 12% 19% 
Would support, become involved in national activity 11% 13% 
Would support privately, no personal involvement 43% I 49% 







See no need for organisation I 11% 3% 
Undesirable and possibly detrimental 1% 1% 
No information 1% 2% 
At the meeting of concerned Afrikaans-speakers in Stellenbosch referred to earlier, some 
delegates expressed fears that the launching of a new Afrikaans initiative to promote and 
protect Afrikaans, albeit on a non-racial basis, would run the risk of an.tagonising the 
majority of South J-\fricans. The results of the survey in general would not suggest this --
indeed as we have seen, it appears that there would be considerable sympathy among other 
groups for Afrikaans language action. In their responses to the question tabulated above 
only 10 per cent of all respondents and a mere 1.3 per cent among blacks felt that an 
Afrikaans initiative would be "unwanted" or "detrimental". 
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The two tables of results presented above suggest that short of a third of white Afrikaners 
would be prepared to become actively and openly involved in a new initiative to protect 
Afrikaans and short of a quarter would endorse going to the lengths of strong public protest 
in the pursuit of such protection. Therefore, as already suggested. the balance of opinions 
suggests that there would be enough support to make a movement impressive in absolute 
numbers but not enough to protect the hypothetical movement from criticism, and even 
opposition from within the ranks of white Afrikaners. 
Support for these initiatives among coloured Afrikaans-speakers is at about two-thirds of 
the relative level among white Afrikaners. The same comments about a lack of consensus 
around an activist ethnic role as given for white Afrikaners apply in even greater measure 
to coloured Afrikaans-speakers. 
Trends in the results not tabulated above suggest that upper-middle class and white collar 
white Afrikaners are somewhat less committed to organised action than blue-collar 
Afrikaners, although strong support is evident among semi-professionals, mainly teachers. 
The Afrikaans professional, business and executive class is fairly divided, in the sense that 
these categories contribute most of the rejection of the need for such and organisation but 
also contain substantial proportions that support it. Support is to some extent dependent on 
membership of one of the three traditional Afrikaans Calvinist churches -- Afrikaners who 
have no religious affiliation are less enthusiastic about the idea of the organisation 
proposed. It is interesting, however, that members of the rather fundamentalist or "pietistic" 
Afrikaans Protestant Church, the breakaway movement in protest against the liberalisation 
of the Dutch Reformed Churches (see earlier chapter), are less interested in active 
involvement in such an organisations than Afrikaners in the mainline Afrikaans churches. 
This may be a case of fairly fundamentalist religious convictions supplanting ethnic 
mobilisation? 
The trends in the results not tabulated above show that coloureds, who are bilingual or who 
speak English at home, contain higher proportions who are opposed to the idea of such an 
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organisation than their Afrikaans counterparts, but nevertheless yield majorities who 
support organised action on behalf of Afrikaans, and these majorities are actually more 
intense in their support tban coloured Afrikaans speakers. There is clearly a category of 
coloured people who have become anglicised but who have retained fairly intense feelings 
with regard to Afrikaans. Among coloured people the greatest support lies in the middle 
socio-economic categories with both very poor people and graduates least inclined to 
support the prospect of an organisation such as the one described. 
Trends according to political party supported are predictable: the National Party supporting 
white Afrikaners are more likely to support the idea of the organisation than white 
Afrikaans Democratic Party supporters, but the strongest support comes from the ranks of 
the right-wing parties and Afrikaners in the dominantly traditional Zulu lnkatha Freedom 
Party. The few white Afrikaners who support the ANC are deeply divided, with a few 
endorsing the organisation very strongly but most rejecting it: the trends are based on a 
very small sample size, however, and are not reliable. 
Among coloureds support for the organisation is as strong. if not stronger among ANC 
supporters, as among National Party followers, and there are sufficient numbers of coloured 
ANC supporters to make the trends meaningful. 
The brief review of the survey results above suggests that ethnic consciousness 1s 
widespread among both white and brown Afrikaans-speakers. but that a more activist 
consciousness or a spirit of protest is a distinctly minority phenomenon. Ethnic dissent 
however, is probably always a minority phenomenon until the prospects of success draw 
increasing numbers of supporters into the orbit of ethnic movement. This means, however, 
that ethnic movements in the early stages of mobilisation. or in the case of Afrikaners, re-
mobilisation, have to survive lack of popularity and even opposition from within ethnic 
ranks for a protracted period. This situation places a premium on leadership. Because such 
movements are vulnerable to being discredited and discouraged because of the numerical 
marginality, it also means that the surrounding opportunities and constraints are cmcial, as 
the theoretical discussion in chapter 2 has suggested. 
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This period of early incubation would also place a priority on the ideological coherence and 
sense of conviction among the rank-and-file supporters of such movements. The results as 
discussed cannot really indicate to what extent a coherent syndrome of disaffection is 
emerging. In order to investigate the patterns in the data more thoroughly, factor analyses 
were conducted on the results. 
The rationale for employing factor analyses has been discussed in previous chapters and 
need not be repeated here. As with the factor analyses reported on in earlier chapters, the 
intention was not to test hypotheses, and hence the need was not for a very precise 
approach. The purpose was exploratory, with the main interest focused on the way in which 
sentiments combine to reflect the underlying coherences. 
Two factor analyses were conducted. First, only the items included on language and culture 
were included. The items are not really suited to a factor analysis because they are not all 
strictly uni-dimensional and nor are they necessarily focused on Afrikaans but more on the 
issue of minority languages and cultures. Nevertheless, the items contain a sufficient range 
of content to allow ethnic "ideology" to be reflected if it exists. without placing great 
demands on the precision or "purity" of the data. The items are shortened and paraphrased 
for presentation in the text and factor analysis. 
The factor analy'ses were run independently for all major race groups and for both white 
and coloured Afrikaans-speakers, but the results are discussed in detail only for Afrikaans 
Whites. and selected comparisons are made in respect of other groups. 
The factor analysis, after vanmax rotation, to mcrease the differentiation between 
underlying trends (see earlier discussion on factor analysis) yielded six factors among white 
Afrikaners, as follows (note: in the presentation which follows the variables are phrased in 
the "direction" shown by the sign of the loading of the items, and loadings of 0,25 and 
above on each factor are included). Readers should note that all the factors described below 
are relatively small minority-based clusters of sentiment; one is interested in the patterns 
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rather than in any quantification of the scope of the factors. The approach is interpretive 
rather than quantitative: 
Table 32 
FACTOR ANALYSIS ON LANGUAGE AND CUL TllRAL ITEMS: 
WHlTE AFRIKANERS: 1997 
FACTOR 1: 








National unity a priority as opposed to the survival and protection of 
language: 0,68 
Home language treated satisfactorily as opposed to the promotion of 
another language: 0,42 
Afrikaans enjoys more than its rightful share in official use, as 
opposed to being harmed by official policy: 0.53 
Languages can disappear but communities survive -- no need for 
concern: 0,3 7 
The future of own language so uncertain in the professional world 
that children should be educated in international language as opposed 
to mother tongue: 0,73 
Equal opportunities for all takes precedence over mother tongue and 
quality of education: 0,65 






Voluntary cultural organisations·not effective: 0.50 
English should take precedence in public broadcasting as opposed to 
equality for minority languages: 0.83 
English should take precedence in official communication over 
minority languages: 0,86 
Government trying to promote another language at the expense of 
home language: 0,30 
Voluntary organisations to promote cultural interests not important 
or necessary: 0,25 
FACTOR 3: SENSE OF THREAT TO LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 
ITEM 2 Own language seriously threatened with extinction: 0, 76 
ITEM 4 Voluntary cultural organisations not effective: OAS 
ITEM 7 Government trying to promote another language at the expense of 
home language: 0,53 
ITEM IO An official Council for the protection of language and culture will 
weaken language and cultural interests: 0.68 
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ITEM 11 Afrikaans being seriously harmed by recent government policy: 0,42 
FACTOR 4: REJECTION OF NEED FOR CULTURAL MOBILISATION 
ITEM 12 · Organisation to mobilise on behalf of Afrikaans unnecessary or 
detrimental: 0,91 
ITEM 14 Languages can disappear but communities will survive -- no need for 
concern: 0,34 
ITEM 5 Voluntary organisations to promote cultural interests not necessary 
or important: 0,25 · 
FACTOR 5: PRIVATE ETHNIC-CULTURAL SURVIVAL 
ITEM 3 An Afrikaans organisation should stimulate interests in language and 
cultur~ as opposed to protest: 0.84 
ITEM 4 Languages may disappear but communities will survive -- no need 
for concern: 0,4 7 
ITEM 5 Voluntary organisations to promote cultural interests not important 
or necessary: 0,38 
ITEM 1 The protection of language and culture a priority over national unity: 
0,30 





In interests of good relations and national unity no insistence on the 
public use of home language: 0,81 
Voluntary organisations to protect cultural interests not important or 
necessary: 0,44 
An official Council for the protection of language and cultural 
interests will weaken them: 0.29 
The active protection of a language should never be neglected: 0,29 
These results are quite surprising. Of the six factors which the results yielded, five indicate 
tendencies toward the rejection of or withdrawal from ethnic commitment and the 
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promotion or protection of ethnic interests in the public domain. Factor 3 is an exception 
and reflects a strong sense of threat to language and culture, but it is not associated with 
those items which offered respondents and opportunity to support protest or mobilisation 
on behalf of ethnic culture. It is a fairly helpless sense of threat. 
One may ask why this pattern of factors emerged when the results of individual items 
discussed above showed a MAJORITY perception of ethnic status loss among Afrikaners. 
Most of the focus and convergent responses in the factor analysis were towards the 
rejection of the ethnic cause. despite clearly evident disaffection among Afrikaners on most 
of the attitude items. The reason is that the more pervasive sentiments contained much 
inconsistent and divergent thinking -- something like a "porridge" of sentiment. and hence 
did not crystallise into clear convergences. 
There is. therefore. little evidence of a consistent dimension of sentiment based on ethnic 
commitments with a corresponding inclination to activism and protest. Yet we know from 
the results of the items individually that some one-third of white Afrikaners would actively 
support an organisation to protect and promote Afrikaans and that some one-fifth would 
endorse strong action to the point of public protest. The fact that these dimensions did not 
crystallise in the factor analysis suggests that the activist sentiments are not part of a 
consistently ethnic "paradigm". 
In other words, while an broad ethnic awareness and sense of cultural status loss exist 
among white Afrikaners, the inclinations to protest and mobilise among rank and file 
Afrikaners do not seem to flow from a consistency of responses or perhaps a strong sense 
of ethnic "mission''. There seems, therefore, to be a weakness in the extent of convergent 
thinking or ideology at the ethnic level -- or a lack of focus in the ethnic "script". 
One must be cautious here and ask whether the fact that the items were not really suited to 
the analysis might not have obscured the dimension in question. But the factor analysis 
produced a very coherent "ethnic protest" factor among coloured Afrikaans-speakers. The 
,', 
full results of the factor analysis for this group are not presented but one factor among 
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coloured people needs to be discussed in particular, if only to show up the lack of it among 
white Afrikaners on exactly the same basis of analysis. 
COLOURED AFRIKAANS SPEAKERS: 
FACTOR 4: ETHNIC ACTIVISM AND PROTEST 







Own language seriously threatened with extinction: 0,44 
Organising strong public protests if cultural demands are not met: 
0,70 
Government trying to promote another language at the expense of 
home language: 0,48 
Will actively support a (non-racial) organisation mobilising on 
behalf of Afrikaans: 0,58 
The future of own language in the professional world so uncertain 
that children should be educated in an international language: 0,29 
It should be noted that the "activist" items also crystallised in the factor analysis conducted 
for all Afrikaans-speakers, because the coloured respondents tipped the correlations in the 
directions indicated in the factor above. It is interesting that in the coloured group the 
response of educating children in English appears almost in the protest mode -- perhaps a 
matter of people feeling forced into this option because of the situation of Afrikaans. 
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Among black South Africans the activist ethnic factor also crystallised. as follows: 
BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS: 
FACTOR 3: ETHNIC ACTIVISM AND PROTEST 







Own language becoming seriously threatened with extinction: 0.25 
Strong public protest if language and cultural demands are not met: 
0,56 
Government neglects own language or promotes another language at 
its expense: 0,62 
Will actively support a (non-racial. non-political) organisation 
mobilising on behalf of Afrikaans: 0.60 
Active protection of a language must never be neglected: 0,26 
Among the blacks another factor, factor 5 has a moderate loading on ethnic protest. but in 
the context of the other factors it appears to be linked to different sentiments (perhaps black 
nationalism, although there were no items to bring this out strongly) and to opposition to an 
Afrikaans organisation. 
While one accepts that factor 3 among blacks is a small node of sentiment among the other 
orientations, it is interesting that it coincides so closely to the coloured ethnic response. It 
makes on realise that there is a small minority of blacks who speak fluent Afrikaans as a 
first or second language and that some kinds of associations between their own cultural 
interests and those of Afrikaners have taken root. One must also accept that the more 
progressive black radical or nationalist groupings would see this type of thinking as an 
advanced form of "alienation" or ''false consciousness". But the presence of this factor 
among blacks makes the lack of it among white Afrikaners even more remarkable. 
Among the white Afrikaners, then, the activist responses are present but are not consistent, 
coherent or related to an ethnic dynamic. F'actor scores were calculated in order to relate the 
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factors to background variables. Among Afrikaners, factor 3 -- the ethnic threat factor, is 
associated with poorly-educated Afrikaners and mildly with tertiary education and with 
Afrikaners with high-school qualifications negatively loaded. This is an almost classic case 
of groupings in the intelligentsia finding common cause and possibly providing leadership 
to their ethnic co-members in less advantageous situations. 
The factor tends to be associated with middle rather than lower income levels, so it is not 
associated with socio-economic deprivation, but rather with the self-reliant lower middle 
class or working class. It is negatively associated with the 18 to 24 year old youth, as well 
as with older people, and therefore, although not strongly age-related. it is associated with 
the middle ranges of age. 
ln terms of political sympathies, the factor is negatively associated with National Party 
support and positively associated with the Freedom Front. the party which espouses an 
Afrikaner homeland. It is also associated with people who refuse to divulge political 
support, and therefore is probably also associated \vith the more extreme right wing 
minority factions which arc so controversial that people would rather not display their 
sympathies. 
ln terms of religion, the factor of ethnic threat is most strongly associated with tiny 
marginal groups like Catholics, Presbyterians, a minority among membership of the 
Afrikaans Protestant Church and people in small Evangelical congregations, rather than 
with the core Calvinist denominations. This ties in with previous findings which show that 
the large Dutch Reformed Church may tend to cushion ethnicity to the extent that it 
becomes latent. 
Among coloured Afrikaans-speakers the ethnic activism factor has the strongest 
associations with lower and higher education, and negatively associated with the middle 
ranges of education -- a similar pattern as appears among white Afrikaners on the ethnic 
threat factor. Among coloured people it is has female associations and associations with 25 
to 34 year old people, not with the very young adults as among white Afrikaners. Among 
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coloureds it has Northern and Eastern Cape and Free State associations more than with the 
Western Cape, where the stronger influence of the ANC among coloureds might tend to 
weaken it. It seems to be associated with unemployed coloured people. students and mildly 
with housewives as the gender trend would lead one to expect. 
In terms of political affiliation it is very mildly associated with the very tiny Freedom Front 
supporting group and strongly with refusal to divulge political sympathies; here again 
suggesting that the sympathies are politically controversial. ln terms of religion the factor 
of ethnic protest among coloureds is associated with Dutch Reformed Church membership, 
unlike among Afrikaners. 
The factor scores among blacks suggest that the ethnic protest factor is mildly associated 
with higher education, with KwaZulu-Natal and the North West province, with self-
employment and the informal sector, with the ANC. with the ACDP and the minuscule 
numbers of blacks who favour the right wing Freedom Front. The associations with religion 
are very mild except that some association exists with Dutch Reformed Church 
membership and more strongly with Anglican. Muslim. small Zionist groupings and 
Orthodox church membership; the latter being minuscule. 
After this analysis, the issue of the protest consciousness of White Afrikaners and other 
groups was explored with a wider range of items in the same study. going beyond ethnic 
issues and into socio-economic and political themes. First the responses to the items 
included on a comparative basis are presented. In this presentation the tabulated results of 
questions already discussed under the preceding discussion of language and cultural issues 
will not be repeated. 
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Table 33 
COMPARITIVE RESPONSES TO A RANGE OF SOCIO-POLITICAL, 
ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ITEMS: MARKDATA SURVEY: 
JANUARY/FEBRUARY, 1997, N 2200 




j Taking all things together in your life how would you say things are these days? 
Very happy 5% 8% 5% 5% 10% 
Fairly happy 52% 55% 45% 48% 44% 
Neither 12% 14% 21% 14% 13% 
Fairly unhappy 20% 18% 22%1 24% 23% 
Very unhappy 9% 5% 
I 
6% 8% 9% 
Over the past two years cultural and racial groups have: 
Moved closer 31% 49% 43% 44% 53% 
Relations same 31% 30% 32% 24% 27% 
Drawn apart 38% 21% 22% 31% 19% 
How would you describe the life you are living now -- is your life: 
Getting better 16% 
I 
27% 33% 26% 44% 
Stayed same 40% 48% 35% 51% 29% 
Getting worse 40% 24% 22% 21% 22% 
DK 4% 1% 8% - 3% 
As a South African with a particular language and cultural background, how do you 
feel about the way your cultural values and language are treated these days? 
Very happy 2% 4% 3% 3% 11% 
Fairly happy 7% 57% 39% 47% 53% 
Neither 8% 19% 28% 22% 13% 
Fairly unhappy 53% 16% 25% 20% 17% 
Very unhappy 30% 3% 2% 9% 6% 
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(Note: In the following series only the fairly and very unhappy responses are presented) 
How do you feel about the following aspects of life at the moment? 
I Public affairs and administration 
Fairly unhappy 49% 42% 30% 33% 27% 
Very unhappy 18% 8% 1% 11% 6% 
Personal safety and security 
Fairly unhappy 45% 38% 
I 
37% 39% 26% 
Very unhappy 23% 32% 8% 23% 7% 
• Your income and standard of living 
Fairly unhappy 27% 25% 39% 35% 33% 
Very unhappy 15% 8% 13% 27% 18% 
Future opportunities and prospects 
Fairly unhappy 41% 25% 27% 24% 29% 
Very unhappy 13% 16% 8% 20% 11 % 
The way people like you arc generally treated 
Fairly unhappy 28% ! 14% 34% 26% 23% 
I 
Very unhappy 7% 9% 7% 13% 10% 
The overall performance of the party you have supported 
Fairly unhappy 45% 27% 28% 
I 
38% 21% 
Very unhappy 15% 11% 6% 9% 12% 
Taking all things together (again), how satisfied are you with your life 
as a whole these days 
Dissatisfied 19% 19% 32% 25% 30% 
Very dissatisfied 4% 6% 3% 10% 7% 
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These patterns reflect the complex interplay of class. power, security and culture in South 
Africa's group-based politics at the present time. In their surface responses to these items, 
the white Afrikaners present an "ethnic" profile to some extent. 
They are most likely to feel the sense of cultural threatand are most likely to feel that the 
groups in South Africa are drawing apart. The Afrikaners also lead the way in the 
perception of general deterioration of conditions and life chances -- things "getting worse", 
and in the perception that future opportunities and prospects are limited. These perceptions 
could also be in response to a sense of cultural siege. 
But other variables show that the white Afrikaners face a situation of what one may call 
one of "wide-5pectrum" threat. From this perspective one can describe the situation of the 
white Afrikaners and the other groups in a different way. [f one for argument's sake takes a 
discontent level of below 40 per cent as some kind of cut-of[ then one can describe the 
white Afrikaner as being in a sense of perceived threat or pressure as regards: 
culture and language, security, standard of governance. political alienation, future 
prospects and at a lower level, income threat and a sense of general deterioration. 
The heavy endorsement of the language threat may simply be because it is the most 
obvious change in the status of Afrikaners, but the perceived pressure on the group is multi-
facetted. 
The group (or set of groups) which is closest to the Afrikaners in the spectrum of perceived 
threats is that of Indians. The perceived threats are most marked in respect of security and 
material conditions, but standards of governance. political alienation and a sense of 
narrowing prospects make up the profile of pressure. The ethnic threat is not marked among 
Indians although more marked than average. 
Coloureds, most of them Afrikaans-speaking or bilingual. have a narrower spectrum of 
threats. The leading perceptions are a sense of material deprivation. threats to safety and 
security, and a sense of invidious treatment. Among blacks the perception of deprivation is 
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even narrower, mainly material and a sense of narrowing prospects. The white Anglo-
Saxons, the most affluent group, are generally least threatened except by the issue of safety 
and security, standards of governance and marginally a sense of narrowing future prospects. 
The white Afrikaners, then, are in a perceptual sense. besieged from many sides. It is 
interesting, however, that the sense of threat does not invade the private sphere unduly, and 
they have the lowest sense of general life dissatisfaction. This factor of general 
dissatisfaction is highest among the poorer groups. Given this multi-facetted situation in the 
perceptual world of Afrikaners. the lack of crystallisation of the ethnic factor in the 
previous factor analysis makes sense. 
A further exploration of the composition of white Afrikaner consciousness was explored in 
the second factor analysis. this time with the non-ethnic factors above combined with issues 
of language and culture. 
Among white Afrikaners, the following FOUR factors emerged. Here again the items are 
expressed in the direction of the mathematical sign of the loadings: 
Table 34 
RESULTS OF SECOND SOCIO-POLITICAL AND CULTURAL FACTOR 
ANALYSIS AMONG WHITE AFRIKANERS: JAN/FEB 1997 SURVEY 
FACTOR 1: MATERIAL THREAT, INVIDIOUS OPPORTUNITY AND TREATlvfENT, 
AND GENERAL DISSATISFACTION 
dissatisfaction with living standards: 0,76 
dissatisfaction with future opportunity: 0. 75 
dissatisfaction with treatment: 0, 73 
overall dissatisfaction with life: 0,67 
dissatisfaction with life at the moment: 0.55 
unhappiness with life: 0,41 
groups moving further apart: 0,39 
I 
FACTOR 2: ETHNIC THREAT 
own language neglected by government, another promoted: 0,82 
Afrikaans seriously harmed by broadcasting policy: 0,78· 
unhappy at treatment of language and cultural values: 0,63 
groups moving further apart: 0,4 7 
FACTOR 3: LACK OF FAITH IN GOVERNMENT 
cultural council will weaken language and culture: 0.78 
dissatisfaction with public affairs and administration: 0.71 
dissatisfaction with treatment of language and culture: 0.40 
dissatisfaction with personal safety and security: 0,3 8 
FACTOR 4: POLITICAL ALIENATION 
will not vote in future elections: 0,85 
dissatisfaction with political party supported: 0.57 
general unhappiness in life: 0,4 7 
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From this factor analysis it is clear that the addition of socio-economic and political items is 
necessary to create the greater variability necessary to place the ethnic factor among 
Afrikaners in context. The reader will recall that this factor in the previous factor analysis 
appeared to contrast with a number of anti-ethnic dimensions. but those factors assumed 
prominence in the absence of the political and material (class) items. 
The most powerful factor is the first factor; that of generalised threat and invidious 
treatment with a strong material dimension. But the ethnic dimension emerges in the 
second factor, and it is relativelv autonomous of material protest. Hence, as previous 
chapters have shown, an ethnic factor remains consistently present in the white Afrikaner 
consciousness, and it is not an accompaniment of material or power threats. 
In this factor analysis we see evidence once again that the ethnic factor is present in the 
other groups in the society as well. Among Afrikaans-speaking coloureds and black South 
Africans the following "ethnic" factors are present: 
Table 35 
ETHNIC FACTORS EMERGING AMONG COLOURED AND 
BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS ON SECOND FACTOR ANALYSIS: 
MARKUA TA SURVEY: JAN/FEB 1997 
AFRIKAANS-SPEAKING COLOUREDS: 
FACTOR 2: ETHNIC DISSATISFACTION: 
own language neglected by government. another promoted: 0,80 
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on language seriously harmed by government and broadcasting policy: 0,73 
unhappy with the treatment of language and culture: 0.59 
cultural council will weaken language interests: 0.40 
BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS: 
FACTOR 3: ETHNICALLY-BASED CONCERN WITH GOVERl\!MENT POLICIES: 
cultural council will weaken language interests: 0.65 
own language neglected by government. another promoted: 0,63 
priority for English in official use and minority language equality: 0,59 (this 
was a complex item and is not suited to the factor analysis - it scores 
towards language equality if people accept that English is a lingua franca) 
groups moving further apart: 0,54 
Afrikaans being seriously harmed by government policy: 0,41 
Given that these results have demonstrated once again that ethnic dimensions are present 
among all South Africa's minorities (there is an ethnic factor which can be demonstrated for 
white, Indian and coloured minorities taken together which has not been presented for 
reasons of brevity), how do these factors relate to the "activist" items which were included 
in the previous factor analysis? Factor scores were calculated for a range of variables. One 
of the variables was on how far voluntary cultural organisations should go in acting on 
behalf of language and cultural interests, up to the suggestion of strong public protest. 
The protest position has the following scores on the factors extracted: 
AFRJKAANS WHITES 
FACTOR 1: MATERIAL THREAT AND GENERAL DISSATISFACTION: 
PROTEST SCORE: 0,28 
FACTOR 2: ETHNIC THREAT: PROTEST SCORE: 0.26 
FACTOR 3: LACK OF FAITH IN GOVERNMENT: PROTEST SCORE: 0,28 
FACTOR 4: POLITICAL ALIENATION: PROTEST SCORE: MINUS 0,32 
AFRJKAANS-SPEAKING COLOUREDS 
FACTOR 2: ETHNIC DISSATISFACTION: PROTEST SCORE: 0.91 
BLACKS 
FACTOR 3: ETHNIC CONCERN WITH POLICY: PROTEST SCORE: 0,18 
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These results in respect of whites and coloureds confirm exactly what was suggested by the 
previous analysis in this chapter, this being that the ethnic factor is not more "activist" in its 
implications than other factors of discontent among white Afrikaners. but it certainly is so 
among the small proportions of Afrikaans coloured "ethnics". The ethnicity factor is very 
weakly associated with an activist orientation among blacks. 
The "ethnic" factor among coloured people needs some elaboration. It is qualitatitively 
different to the ethnicity among white Afrikaners. Unlike the case among white Afrikaners 
it is not something associated with a type of "high-culture" consciousness, and it is most 
probably not experienced by coloured people as a "cultural identity". It is probably not an 
identity which has become "mythologised" or institutionalised, as in the case of white 
Afrikaners. It is a sense of group identity which has emerged from being sandwiched 
between whites and blacks, and from being socially distanced from both throughout 
history. It certainly does not mean that there is any common cause with white Afrikaners. It 
is a group-consciousness which one may perhaps describe as an informal or nascent 
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ethnicity, but it does have more militant or activist connotations than the more formal group 
identity among white Afrikaners. 
The conclusion one reaches has to be cautiously stated. The survey results showed that 
more white Afrikaners than Afrikaans-speaking coloureds supported the notion of.a strong 
public protest role for voluntary organisations: 22 per cent compared with 14 per cent. 
Hence the protest consciousness is more pervasive among white Afrikaners than among 
coloureds, but it is based on a mix of concerns about material interests. discontent over 
standards of governance, a sense of general dissatisfaction as well as ethnic commitments. 
lt is also probably less militant among white Afrikaners than it is among the coloured 
people. Among the coloureds, the protest consciousness is also widely based on multi-
facetted issues, but despite its lesser scope in the group. there seems to be a more coherent 
emotional or ideological "node" in which coloured ethnic identity is specifically associated 
with an activist consciousness. 
If a coherence of ideas is more likely to produce active protest than a melange of 
discontents, which is plausible but arguable, then one could say that one is more likely to 
see protest of a latently ethnic type emerging among a small grouping of coloureds than 
among a relatively larger grouping of ethnically discontented white Afrikaners. 
Finally, one must once again place the ethnic commitments of Afrikaners in a wider context 
to assess the weight which they carry. In the survey reported on. after the first question on 
general happiness with life or otherwise, an open-ended question was asked: "What 
changes of any kind would make you feel happier with the way things are in your life --
what would be the most important change ... ? It must be remembered that this question 
was asked in the context of a number of questions about politics, social and economic 
circumstances and cultural· issues, hence it was not likely to have been interpreted in a 
personal or intimate context. The spontaneous answers classified in categories for the 




RESPONSES TO QUESTION ON CHANGES IN CONDITIONS WHICH 
WOULD INCREASE HAPPINESS: MARKDATA SURVEY: JAN/FEB 1997 




Money and material issues 13% 14% 10% 14% 9% 
Employment 4% 7% 24% 31% 30% 
Housing 1% 2% 13% 5% 10% 
• Services 1% 1% 4%i 2% 17% 
Education 1% 2% 1 (% - 7% 
Welfare 1% 4% 1% 4% 2% 
The economy 11% 12% 5% 4% 3% 
Crime 20% 29% 10% I 23% 2% 
1 
Political peace 13% 8% 8% 
• 
5% 1% 
Religious 2% - 2% - 1% 
• Recreational 1% 2% ]11/i) - 1% 
Language and cultural issues 5% 1% 2% - -
• Rights and justice 15% 5% [ 1% 5% 7% 
Other 2% 
i 
6% 4% 1% 2% 
These results suggest that the issue of "rights andjustice" in the table above is only partly a 
matter of ethnicity. An inspection of the detailed replies classified in this way suggest that 
among the coloureds, Indians and blacks it is a matter of concern over race discrimination, 
but among white Afrikaners about one-third of the replies under rights and justice seem to 
refer to ethnic in-group interests. If one combines this one third of the "rights" answers with 
the language and cultural concerns, then out of 100 per cent, a small minority of about l 0 
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per cent of white Afrikaners express ethnic or group concerns in stating their expectations 
or desired changes. 
This relatively low level of concern and commitment amidst all the other factors in a 
complex society is one of the realities of consciousness among Afrikaners. This issue will 
be revisited in the next chapter. 
CHAPTERl0 
THE MOST RECENT PROFILE 
OF AFRIKANER CONSCIOUSNESS 
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On the assumption that ethnic activism may take time to emerge in situations of ethnic 
threat, it is useful before proceeding to draw conclusions to assess even more recent 
patterns of ethnic consciousness. A further nation-wide survey by MarkData (Pty) Ltd, 
among a sample of 2330 South Africans in June 1998 afforded this opportunity. Here again 
because items were included for purposes other than this analysis. strict comparisons with 
earlier items are possible in only a few cases, but as has been explained at the beginning of 
this text, the intention cannot be to achieve great precision. The broad dimensions of the 
phenomenon are of interest. 
Among the sample was a sub-sample of 259 white Afrikaners and 170 coloured Afrikaans-
speakers. The items used are only slightly summarised and paraphrased for discussion in 
the text. As with the previous chapter, broad comparisons are presented between the 
responses of major groups in South Africa. The characteristics of the sample are as 
presented before for the MarkData Omnibus surveys. 
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Table 37 
PROFILE OF RESPONSES TO A RANGE OF SOCIO-POLITICAL AND 
CULTURAL ISSUES: MARKDATA SURVEY, JUNE 1998: N 2330 
White White Coloured Coloured Indian Black 
Afrikaans English Afrikaans English 
1. There is ample opportunity for all language groups to protect their interests 
in the New South Africa: 
Strongly agree 5% 5% 12% - 5% 20% 
Agree 13% 24% 46% 54% 34% 45% 
Neutral 7% 13% 8% 26% 10% 10% 
Disagree 38% 39% 22% 11% 36% 13% 
Strongly disagree 34% 16% 5% 4% 13% 7% 
DK (don't know) 3% 4% 7% 4% 2% 4% 
2. People should try to be part of the New South Africa and forget their differences: 
Strongly agree 19% 30% 42% 20% 33% 42% 
Agree 38% 51% 49% 45% 58% 41% 
Neutral 18% 9% 5% 24% 5% 5% 
Disagree 17% 4% 1% 6% 2% 8% 
Strongly disagree 6% 4% 2% 4% ]% 2% 
DK (don't know) 2% 2% 1% - 1% 2% 
3. Some Afrikaners express dissatisfaction about the treatment of their language 
and culture: How do you see the demands which are made? 
Entitled to demand 87% 57% 74% 65% 25% 15% 
Cannot expect special 
treatment 12% 40% 14% 11% 35% 54% 
Past privilege means 
that others deserve 1% 3% 12% 23% 39% 30% 
more 
4. People like me will not be able to compete on a fair basis in future: 
Strongly agree 34% 23% 12% 14% 18% 12% 
Agree 35% 42% 31% 22% 47% 27% 
Uncertain 2% 8% 13% 38% 6% 15% 
Disagree 18% 21% 34% 26% 19% 32% 
Strongly disagree 6% 5% 6% - 9% 12% 
DK (don't know) 5% 3% 4% - 2% 3% 
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White White Coloured Coloured Indian Black 
Afrikaans English Afrikaans English 
5. Life is getting worse for people like me: 
Strongly agree 49% 29% 19% 23% 
I 
47% 19% 
Agree 37% 44% 38% 37% 26% 26% 
Uncertain 4% 11% 7% 15% 7% 7% 
Disagree 5% 12% 23% 19% 10% 30% 
Strongly disagree 4% 3% 7% 6% 9% 16% 
DK ( don't know) 1% 1% 5% - 1% 2% 
6. My main concern is my income and standard of living -- other things matter less: 
Strongly agree 25% 18% 40% 20% 35% 31% 
Agree 39% 35% 42% 48% 33% 37% 
Uncertain 17% 8% 4% 26% 14% 6% 
Disagree 14% 28% 10% 10% 11 % 17% 
Strongly disagree 5% 7% 4% - 4% 7% 
DK ( don't know) - 4% - - 3% 3% 
7. I have greatest confidence that as an individual I will be able to protect and 
advance my interests: 
Strongly agree 8% 7% 24% 18% 26% 26% 
Agree 24% 25% 36% 36% 34% 41% 
Uncertain 9% 9% 13% 17% 13% 10% 
Disagree 29% 41% 12% 23% 19% 15% 
Strongly disagree 21% 15% 7% 6% 3% 5% 
DK (don't know) 10% 3% 7% - 5% 4% 
8. If you think about South Africans like you, which of the following describes 
their how they feel in general? 
Mostly happy and 
satisfied 3% 9% 7% 6% 5% 20% 
One tries to adapt 28% 26% 32% 26% 23% 29% 
Hope for 
improvement 31% 25% 46% 44% 22% 37% 
Conditions cannot 
continue - urgent 
action necessary 36% 37% 11% 25% 47% 12% 
DK (don't know) 1% 4% 4% - 4% 2% 
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White White Coloured I Coloured Indian Black 
Afrikaans English Afrikaans I English 
: 
9. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of government 
at present? 
Very satisfied 1% 4% I 2% ': 13% - -
Satisfied 16% 17% 34% 16% 
I 
15% 42% 
Dissatisfied 40% 39% 50% 46% 40% 30% 
Very dissatisfied 42% 41% 13% 33% 40% 14% 
DK (don't know) 1% 2% -
I 
4% 3% 1% 
: 
10. To what extent wm you accept the outcome of the forthcoming (1999) elections? 
Fully 38% 42% 69% 37% 36% 73% 
• Partly 40% 39% 25% 52% 45% 23% 
Not at all 
I 
20% 18% 3% 11% 15% 3% 
Uncertain 2% 1% 2% - 4% 1% 
I 
11. My vote wUI make no difference to my personal situation: 
I 
: 
Definitely agree 40% 38% 17% 28% 44% 25% 
Agree partly 33% 37% 28% 43% 29% 25% 
Disagree 18% 15% 28% 26% 11% 26% 
Definitely disagree 9% 9% 24% 3% 12% 22% 
I 
12. My vote will make no difference to the situation in the country: 
Definitely agree 34% 31% 15% 26% 29% 22% 
Agree partly 31% 35% 19% 48% 31% 21% 
Disagree 21% 18% 45% 14% 18% 26% 
Definitely disagree 13% 16% 17% 11% 17% 29% 
DK 1% -
I 
3% 2% 6% 3% 
13. How likely are you to vote'! 
Definitely 65% 51% 49% 8% 35% 64% 
Probably 16% 20% 29% 58% 30% 18% 
Uncertain 10% 11% 14% 17% 24% 6% 
Probably not ·3% 5% - - 1% 3% 
Definitely not 6% 12% 1% 7% 4% 3% 
DK 2% 2% 8% 11% 6% 6% 
I I 
White White Coloured 




14. Which of the following would you expect within South Africa 




























































16. Think about the most serious problems you have mentioned. How do people like 
you feel about possible solutions? (For these serious problems see next table) 
Resignation: solutions 
not possible 4% 7% 5% - - 4% 
Draw to attention of 
government 15% 21% 22% 15% 15% 29% 
Place strong pressure 
on government 50% 48% 45% 59% 65% 34% 
People have to be 
patient ]% 2% 6% 1% 5% 20% 
Co-operate to find 
own solutions 28% 17% 23 26% 13% 13% 
Other 2% 5% - - 2% 1% 
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White White • Coloured Coloured Indian Black 
Afrikaans English I Afrikaans English 
17. Which of the following is the most serious or urgent problem of 
people in your position'? 
Financial/economic 17% 14% 31% 15% 15% 25% 
Poor services 2% 3% 81¼) - 3% 10% 
Crime/unsafe 42% 56% 16% 53% 46% 18% 
Treatment language 
and culture 3% - - - - 1% 
Unemployment 17% 5% 35% 21°/ti 9% 37% 
Conditions/standards 
in schools 5% 6% 1% 7% !6% 5% 
Affirmative action 9% 7% 5% 4% 6% 1% 
Non-payment of rates 
and services 3% 4% 3% - 1% 1% 
On the face of it, the results to the last item suggest that ethnic concerns which item l 
showed to be pervasive among white Afrikaners. are not in the first line of priority. The 3 
per cent spontaneous mention hardly rates as a groundswell. It may have risen if the option 
of second and third priorities had been given, but the intention was precisely to establish 
the very intensely felt priorities. The other comparisons in the table show that the concerns 
of white Afrikaners and of Afrikaans-speaking coloured people and all other categories 
tend to be shaped by their socio-economic circumstances or vulnerabilities as racial groups 
or minorities rather than by cultural identity. 
It could be argued, however, that these non-ethnic priorities could be seen through a lens of 
ethnic consciousness, as it were, and hence acquire an intensity among people who have a 
sense of group identity, which may not be evenly spread through the society. The evidence 
for this is mixed. 
White Afrikaners. are no more dissatisfied by the performance of government than white 
English-speakers, Indians and only somewhat more than English-speaking coloured people. 
One may be dealing with an urban racial minority-based dissatisfaction more than anything 
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else. They are no more likely to say that they will not accept the forthcoming election 
results at all than white English-speakers, who have very few ethnic concerns to intensify 
their alienation. White Afrikaners are slightly more likely than English-speakers to feel that 
they cannot protect their interests as individuals, but the difference is hardly meaningful. 
On the question of the importance of incomes and standards of living. white Afrikaners are 
less likely to than English-speakers to reject the idea that materialistic concerns are 
paramount. 
On the other hand, however. white Afrikaners clearly seem more likely to disagree strongly 
that "There is ample opportunity.for all language groups to protect their interests". They 
seem more likely than all other groups to disagree with the notion that one should be 
" ... part of the new South Africa and forget ... differences". With Indians. also a culturally 
distinctive minority, they are most likely to feel that their lives are getting worse. They also 
seem more likely than others to feel strongly that they will not be able to compete on a fair 
basis in the future, although the white English come fairly close to them in this fear, which 
means that it is probably based on a mix of culture. race and class considerations. 
White Afrikaners, however, are no more likely to be developing an activist consciousness 
than other minorities. In item 8. above they are only somewhat more likely than English-
speaking coloured people, no more likely than white English-speakers and less-likely than 
Indians to endorse "urgent action" in order to address grievances. ln item 16, they are less 
likely than Indians and English-speaking coloureds, and about as likely as white English-
speakers to endorse "strong pressure" on government. 
Hence, in the evidence as a whole above, the white Afrikaans group, while showing an 
augmented sense of socio-economic and political threat in some respects, is not particularly 
distinctive in others. The impression of minority arousal is not stronger than among other 
minority groups like Indians and English-speaking coloured people. Among the latter two 
groups, the more angry or intense responses probably owe more to their politicisation by 
apartheid than to any ethnic consciousness. 
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But one has to bear in mind a feature that has been noted before in assessing empirical 
evidence, namely that the white Afrikaner ethnic consciousness may be a subset of the 
broader sentiment; it may be a vanguard or rearguard consciousness among a section of the 
white Afrikaans group. One has to explore the relationships between variables in the data to 
take the analysis further. 
It will be recalled that relatively few white Afrikaners. namely 24 per cent, disagreed or 
strongly disagreed with the nation-building ideal: "People should /Jy to he part of'the new 
South Afhca and.forget their differences.'' There is. however. fairly large variation in the 
results in terms of region. In the survey findings the propo11ion is some 39 per cent in the 
Western Cape and the Free State, 43 per cent in the North West and 63 per cent in the 
Northern Province. The proportions in the rural farming areas is 48 per cent. To some 
extent, then, a· defence of ethnic identity is a regional phenomenon: it is characterised by 
those areas which had a strong and homogeneous Afrikaner political character before the 
end of white political domination. 
But it also to an equal extent a class phenomenon. Among semi-skilled blue-collar workers 
it is high at 49 per cent, but it is very low among skilled blue-collar workers, who are 
presumably less threatened and insecure. 
But neither the regional variations nor the class correlations are consistent across items. 
Overall some 34 per cent of white Afrikaners strongly disagreed with the statement that 
"There is ample opportunity for all language groups to protect their interests in the new 
South Africa", but it was higher among both artisans (60 per cent), executives (55 per cent) 
and clerks (45 per cent), and the regional variations do not relate to meaningful trends. 
In response to the statement that "Life is getting worse.fhrpeople like myself", (49 per cent 
strongly agree), the proportion in farming areas was lower ( 42 per cent) and in metropolitan 
areas higher (55 per cent). Both the low-income earners (R2500-R4 l 60 per month) and the 
higher income groups (R8330-R 16600 per month) yielded higher proportions feeling this 
way than the average among white Afrikaners. 
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Similarly, the fear that "People like me will not be able to compete on a fair basis in the 
future", with which some 34 per cent of white Afrikaners strongly agreed, showed 
indifferent regional variation and higher than average strong agreement among both semi-
skilled and unskilled people (52 per cent) and professional and semi-professional groups 
(47 per cent). 
In regard to the other items as well, there is little consistency in the patterns of responses by 
background or regional variables. This also applies to tlJe evidence of a more activist 
consciousness, which is indicated by the "urgent action" response to item 8. above and the 
"pressure on government" response to item 16. Some 36 per cent of white Afrikaner overall 
endorsed urgent action, but this was slightly higher among both low income earners (45 per 
cent among R1250-R2500) and among high earners (43 per cent among Rl6600 plus), very 
low in the Free State ( 18 per cent), but very high among white Afrikaners in the Eastern 
Cape (56 per cent), which yielded bland responses on other items. The Eastern Cape white 
Afrikaners were also far more likely than average to endorse pressure on government (76 
per cent as compared with 50 per cent on average). 
Clearly, then, there is no coherent pattern across the country and across socio-economic 
groups among white Afrikaners. Hence if ethnic activism is developing, it seems not to be 
related to socially or geographically visible categories at this stage. 
The sentiments may be part of cross-cutting attitudes, however. It is of interest, therefore, 
to look at the relationship between the "urgent action" response and other attitude 
responses. While some 36 per cent percent among all white Afrikaner endorsed "urgent 
action" in response to their problems, the proportion is meaningfully higher among certain 
attitudinal categories, as follows: 
• "URGENT ACTION": OVERALL: 36% 
• AMONG THOSE WHO DEFINITELY OR PROBABLY WILL NOT VOTE: 
60% 
• AMONG THOSE WHO FEEL THAT RESISTANCE AND UNREST IS 
UNA VOIDABLE: 56% 
• AMONG THOSE VERY DISSATISFIED WITH GOVERNMENT: 55% 
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• AMONG THOSE WHO STRONGLY DISAGREE THAT THERE IS AMPLE 
OPPORTUNITY FOR LANGUAGE GROUPS TO PROTECT INTERESTS: 
53% 
• AMONG THOSE WHO STRONGLY DISAGREE THAT INDIVIDUALS 
CAN PROTECT AND ADVANCE THEIR INTERESTS: 51% 
• AMONG THOSE WHO STRONGLY AGREE THAT LIFE IS GETTING 
WORSE: 49% 
• AMONG THOSE WHO DISAGREE THAT SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD 
BE PART OF THE NEW SA AND FORGET THEIR DIFFERENCES: 47% 
• AMONG THOSE WHO ADVOCATE PRESSURE ON GOVERNMENT IN 
RESPONSE TO THEIR PROBLEMS: 46% 
• AMONG THOSE WHO FEEL THAT VOTES ARE MEANINGLESS 
BECAUSE THE ANC WILL WIN ANYWAY: 47% 
• AMONG THOSE WHO STRONGLY AGREE THAT INCOME IS THEIR 
MAIN CONCERN: 44% (THOSE WHO MERELY AGREE: 25%) 
• AMONG THOSE WHO DISAGREE THAT THEIR MAIN CONCERN IS 
THEIR INCOME: 46% 
This pattern suggests that the more activist response emerges from a mix of orientations, 
including sentiments associated with group identity but also with feelings of political 
powerlessness and general discontent with circumstances. The last examples above really 
illustrate the pattern -- both the materialists and the non-materialists embrace substantial 
proportions who feel that urgent action is necessary. 
This is perhaps what one would expect, and once again there is no clear evidence that the 
ethnic response is associated with any greater activism than other forms of discontent. The 
reactions to the situation as depicted in the items reviewed suggest that. as with other South 
African minorities, Afrikaner are responding as a group motivated by material interests, 
feelings of political powerlessness and a range of other conditions as \Vell as ethnic 
concerns. The ethnic concerns are not more intense or inclined to an activist response than 
the other concerns. 
These results, as presented, show no meaningful shift towards a heightened ethnic protest 
orientation in the time which has elapsed. They are in the main compatible with, and indeed 
confirm the results in earlier chapters. But the pattern is undoubtedly complex and requires 
that a more sophisticated analysis be made than the comparisons above have allowed. 
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Therefore, once again a factor analysis was unde11aken on these data. as undertaken in 
previous chapters, to explore the more detailed implications of the interaction between 
attitudes and sentiments. 
Separate factor analyses were conducted for white Afrikaners. coloureds. Asians and white 
English. In the case of coloureds it was decided not to separate the group along language 
lines because of constraints on sample size. 
As in the previous chapter, the items are restated to read in the value-direction of the 
mathematical sign of the statistical loading, and hence all the loadings could be stated as 
positive values. This avoids the difficulty of interpreting negative loadings. Among all the 
groups, five factors were sufficient to exploit the relevant content of the interactions in the 
data. Loadings of around and above 0,30 are taken to define the factors. 
Among white Afrikaners, the following five factors were extracted after "Varimax" rotation 
to enhance the distinctiveness of the factors, as undertaken in previous chapters: 
Table 38 
WHITE AFRIKANERS: SOCIO-ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND ETHNIC 
FACTORS: FACTOR ANALYSIS ON SURVEY DATA OF .JUNE, 1998 
FACTOR 1: (contribution to variance: 16%) 
POLITICAL DJ.'SAFFECTJON, ETHNIC PROTEST AND ACTIVISM 









(see comment on item below) 
CIRCUMSTANCES AND TREATMENT REQUIRE URGENT ACTION: ,68 
DISSATISFIED WITH PERFORMANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT: ,60 
WILL NOT ACCEPT ELECTION OUTCOME: ,55 
LIFE NOT IMPROVING: ,52 
LANGUAGE GROUPS LACK OPPORTUNITY TO PROTECT Il\TTERESTS: 
,47 
THE AFRIKAANS LANGUAGE DEMANDS RESPECT: .43 
UNABLE TO PROTECT INTERESTS AS AN INDIVIDUAL: ,29 
WILL NOT VOTE: ,29 
I 
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FACTOR 2: ( contribution to variance: 14%) 
DETERIORATING CIRCUMSTANCES, THREAT BUT AMBIVALENT ETHNICITY 
B2b PEOPLE LIKE ME UNABLE TO COMPETE: . 70 




UNABLE TO PROTECT INTERESTS AS AN INDIVIDUAL: .56 
DISSATISFIED WITH PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENT: .48 




CANNOT FORGET DIFFERENCES AS PART OF NEW SA: 
(AFRIKAANS LANGUAGE DEMANDS RESPECT: -. I 0) 
FACTOR 3: (contribution to variance 10%) 
POLITICAL INTEGRATION WITH MINORITY CONSCIOUS'NESS 
Bl 1 VOTE MAKES A DIFFERENCE TO SITUATION l>J COUNTRY: .83 
A6 VOTE MAKES DIFFERENCE TO PERSONAL SITUATION: .82 
B 13 WILL VOTE: ,38 
B2f CA1\I1\JOT FORGET DIFFERENCES AS PART OF NEW SA: .33 
FACTOR 4. (contribution to variance 9%) · 
POLITICAL AND ETHNIC RETREAT 
B8 INDIVIDUALS SHOULD SEEK OWN SOLUTIONS. NOT IN GROUPS: ,76 
B7 PEOPLE HA VE TO RESIGN THEMSEL YES TO PROBLEMS: ,64 
B9 BECAUSE OF PAST, AFRIKAANS DESERVES LESS ATTENTION THAN 
OTHER LANGUAGES: ,48 
B13 WILL NOT VOTE: ,41 
FACTOR 5. (contribution to variance 8%) 
APOLITICAL MINORITY IDENTITY 
B2e MAIN CONCERN NOT INCOME AND STANDARD OF LIVING: ,81 
B2f CANNOT FORGET DIFFERENCES AS PART OF NEW SA: ,59 
B2g CANNOT PROTECT INTERESTS AS INDIVIDUAL: .40 
Four of the white Afrikaans factors have ethnic or minority dimensions. The first factor 
points to an aggressive consciousness, with ethnic content as well as more generalised 
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dissatisfaction and activism. Curiously this dimension ~s not in opposition to the nation-
building theme of playing down differences for the sake of new South African unity, but 
there is a fairly strong demand for Afrikaans to be treated with respect. It is possibly a 
factor in which strong protest and activism is aligned with a demand for the recognition and 
inclusion of the minorities into the collective whole. Factor one thus involves the blending 
of ethnic concerns and other dimensions of interest with sharp discontent and a sense of 
urgency. It has a strong dimension of political alienation and it is also associated with the 
concept that upheaval in South Africa is inevitable. 
Factors two, three and five are somewhat uncertain as regards ethnicity because they do not 
incorporate the demand that the Afrikaans language deserves respect but they are 
associated with distance from the new South African unity ide.:il. They may be a white 
minority consciousness rather than an Afrikaans ethnic identity. Factor four, on the other 
hand. involves a withdrawal from any ethnic or minority commitments. 
On the face of it factor one, with the exception of the fact that it is not opposed to the idea 
of nation-building within a more equitable system, points to a minority-based but 
substantial spread of consciousness aligned with the potential for coherent Afrikaans ethnic 
mobilisation. One must, however, look at selected factors among other groups to assess the 
relative gravity of the Afrikaans factors ( only factors relevant to the theme are displayed). 
Among blacks there is a strong dissatisfaction and protest factor, as well as a fairly 
apolitical ethnic factor: 
282 
Table 39 
BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS: SOCIO-ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND ETHNIC 
FACTORS: FACTOR ANAL YIS BASED ON SURVEY OF JUNE 1998 
FACTOR l: (contribution to variance, IS%) 
ACTIVE DISCONTENT 
B2a/d LIFE NOT GETTING BETTER/GETTING WORSE: ,79/.67 
B 1 DISSATISFIED WITH PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENT: . 78 
B5 CIRCUMSTANCES AND TREATMENT REQUIRE URGENT ACTION: ,70 
B2c LANGUAGE GROUPS LACK OPPORTUNITY TO PROTECT INTERESTS: 
,36 
A2 WILL NOT ACCEPT ELECTION OUTCOME: .33 
FACTOR 3: (contribution to variance 10%) 
ETHNIC ,MINORITY SOLIDARITY 
B2g CANNOT PROTECT INTERESTS AS AN INDIVIDUAL: .71 
B2f CANNOT FORGET DIFFERENCES AS PART OF NEW SA: ,66 
B2e MAIN CONCERN NOT INCOME AND STANDARD OF LIVING: ,63 
B2c LANGUAGE GROUPS LACK OPPORTUNITY TO PROTECT 
INTERESTS: ,50 
The results above are suggestive of an ethnic factor in factor 3 but factor 1 is probably 
based on a mix of socio-economic and identity protest. 
Among coloured South Africans the following factors relevant to this analysis emerged: 
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Table 40 
COLOURED SOUTH AFRICANS: SOCIO-ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND 
ETHNIC FACTORS: FACTOR ANALYSIS ON SURVEY DATA OF ,JUNE 1998 
FACTOR l: ( contribution to variance 18%) 
ACTIVE DISCONTENT 
B5 CIRCUMSTANCES AND TREATMENT REQUIRE URGENT ACTION:. 79 
Bl DISSATISFIED WITH PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENT. 76 
B2dla LIFE NOT GETTING BETTER/GETTING VVORSE:. 761. 75 
B2b PEOPLE LIKE ME CANNOT COMPETE: .53 
A2 WILL NOT ACCEPT ELECTION: .51 
BJ RESISTANCE. UNREST UNAVOIDABLE: .34 
BJ3 WILL NOT VOTE: ,33 
FACTOR 2: (contribution to variance 12%) 
ETHNIC PROTEST 
B2g CAl\JNOT PROTECT INTERESTS AS AN INDIVIDUAL: .81 
B2c LANGUAGE GROUPS LACK OPPORTUNITY TO PROTECT INTERESTS: 
,70 
B2f CANNOT FORGET DIFFERENCES AS PART OF NEW SA: ,44 
B2a LIFE NOT GETTING BETTER: ,34 
B9. AFRIKAANS LANGUAGE DESERVES RESPECT . . 33 
FACTOR 4: (contribution to variance 10%) 
COLOURED INDIVIDUALISM, ANTI-WHITE 
B2f MAIN CONCERN NOT INCOME AND STANDARD OF LIVING: ,75 
B2f CANNOT FORGET DIFFERENCES AS PART OF NEW SA: ,63 
B9 BECAUSE OF PAST OTHER LANGUAGES THAN AFRIKAANS 
DESERVE MORE ATTENTION: ,57 
A2 WILL NOT ACCEPT ELECTION: ,39 
B8 INDIVIDUALS MUST SEEK OWN SOLUTIONS: .38 
B3 RESISTANCE AND UNREST UNLIKELY: .32 
Among coloureds there is also a political alienation factor. number 3. and a factor, number 
5. which emphasises pressure on government, the need for individuals to seek own 
solutions and the prediction of unrest and resistance. 
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Among Indians a fairly similar pattern emerges with an active protest factor and what could 
be a minority solidarity factor: 
Table 41 
INDIAN SOUTH AFRICANS: SOCIO-ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND ETHNIC 
FACTORS: FACTOR ANALYSIS BASED ON SURVEY DAT A OF JUNE 1998 
FACTOR 1: (contribution to variance 22%) 








LIFE GETTING WORSE/NOT GETTING BETTER:. 84/.75 
DISSATISFIED WITH GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE: .70 
CIRCUMSTANCES AND TREATMENT REQUIRE URGENT ACTION: ,68 
PEOPLE LIKE ME UNABLE TO COMPETE: .68 
LANGUAGE GROUPS LACK OPPORTUNITY TO COMPETE: .52 
WILL NOT ACCEPT ELECTION OUTCOME: . 44 
MAIN CONCERN INCOME AND STANDARD OF LIVING: ,31 
FACTOR 3: (contribution to variance 9%) 
MINORITY SOLIDARITY 
B2g CANNOT PROTECT INTERESTS AS INDIVIDUAL: .68 
B2e MAIN CONCERN NOT INCOME AND STANDARD OF LIVING: ,67 
B2f CAl\JNOT FORGET DIFFERENCES AS PART OF NEW SA: .67 
In addition to these factors the Indians reflect a political alienation factor, a milder protest 
factor and a possible "tramformation" or liberation factor reflected in the view that other 
languages deserve more respect than Afrikaans. 
Among the white Anglo-Saxons a pattern similar to the Afrikaans factors emerges, with a 
very strong active protest factor, a political alienation factor and an ethnic factor with a 
strong element of solidarity with Afrikaans, which, of course, may be a racial factor. The 
relevant factors are: 
Table 42 
ENGLISH-SPEAKING WHITES: SOCIO-ECONOMIC, POLITICAL 
AND ETHNIC FACTORS: FACTOR ANALYSIS BASED ON SURVEY DATA 
OF JUNE, 1998 
FACTOR I: (contribution to variance 20%) 
ACTIVE PROTEST 
B2d/a LIFE GETTING WORSE/1\JOT GETTING BETTER: .80/.79 
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B2c LANGUAGE GROUPS LACK OPPORTUI\rITY TO PROTECT INTERESTS: 
,68 
BS CIRCUMSTANCES AND TREATMENT REQUIRE URGENT ACTION: ,61 
B2b PEOPLE LIKE ME IB\JABLE TO COMPETE: ,63 
Bl DISSATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE: ,60 
B2g CANNOT PROTECT INTERESTS AS AN INDIVIDUAL: .58 
FACTOR 2: (contribution to variance I I%) 
POLITICAL ALIENATION WITH MILD PROTEST 
A6 VOTE MAKES NO DIFFERENCE TO PERSONAL SITUATION: ,80 
Bl I VOTE MAKES NO DIFFERENCE TO SITUATION IN COUNTRY: ,79 
B13 WILL VOTE: .41 
B5 CIRCUMSTANCES AND TREATMENT REQUIRE URGENT ACTION: ,32 
B2e MAIN CONCERN NOT INCOME AND STANDARD OF LIVING: ,30 
FACTOR 3: (contribution to variance 10%) 
POLITICAL ALIENATION AND AFRIKAANS ETHNIC ASSOCIATION 
A2. WILL NOT ACCEPT ELECTION OUTCOME: ,75 
B9. AFRIKAANS LANGUAGE DESERVES RESPECT: .66 
B3. RESISTANCE AND lTI\JREST UNAVOIDABLE: .57 
B13. WILL NOT VOTE: ,41 
B 1. DISSATISFIED BY PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENT: .29 
FACTOR 4: (contribution to variance 10%) 
INDIVIDUAL ALIENATION WITH SOME ETHNIC OR RACIAL CONTENT 
B2f CANNOT FORGET DIFFERENCES AS PART OF NEW SA: .64 
B2e MAIN CONCERN NOT INCOME AND STANDARD OF LIVING: ,61 
B8 INDIVIDUALS MUST SEEK OWN SOLUTION NOT IN GROUPS: ,56 
B13 WILL NOT VOTE: AO 
B9 OTHER LANGUAGES DESERVE MORE ATTENTION THAN 
AFRIKAANS: .37 
A2 WILL NOT ACCEPT OUTCOME OF ELECTION: .32 
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One of the noteworthy aspects of the factor analyses is that most of the factors are either 
neutral or structured around dissatisfaction with the current situation. One knows that this 
does not reflect the overall pattern of attitudes in the country. because there is after all a 
very large majority which supports the present government and its programmes. The factor 
analysis among blacks has produced a positive dimension but it has rather weak loadings 
and is weaker in its contribution to variance explained than the factors which have been set 
out in the text. 
What it does mean, however. is that the positive attitudes have less focus than the negative 
views. There is less crystallisation of tendencies or "ideologies". as it were among the 
positive sentiments; they are much more like a kind of "porridge" of optimism. 
Furthermore, it has to be borne in mind that the items used in the factor analysis did not 
serve to stimulate the feel-good factor in politics. One must be cautious therefore, not to use 
the factor analyses as a picture of the entire spectrum of political attitudes but only for the 
purpose for which it has been emploved here; this being to attempt to understand the 
interaction between ethnic sentiment, minority sentiment and responses based on other 
interests. 
In this context one may begin to draw the tentative conclusion that a strong active protest 
consciousness is part of the attitudinal dynamic across all minority groups, and that it has 
"ethnic" content or tinges among all these groups. Here we see an illustration once again 
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that white Afrikaners, the primary focus of this study. are not markedly more inclined to 
have developed a coherent ethnic mind-set relevant to their political situation than other 
minorities in the population. To put it differently. while Afrikaners doubtlessly have a more 
coherent sense of identity at the sociallevel than other minority groups. this identity is not 
necessarily more "engaged" in a political sense than the less formalised identities of the 
other minorities. 
It is interesting, for example, that the strongest loading on the protection of Afrikaans 
language interests is found in a factor in the white English category. and that this item has a 
loading on one of the factors among coloureds which is not markedly weaker than that 
among white Afrikaners. 
The strongest factor among Afrikaners, the mix of political protest and ethnic commitment 
(Factor 1 described as "political disaffection, ethnic protest and activism"), suggests that 
the evidence in the previous chapter has either been modified by more recent trends or that 
the items used in the factor analyses in the previous chapter did not bring it out. They 
should have. however, since they were no less constrained than those used this chapter. 
Perhaps the convergence of political, socio-economic and ethnic sentiment which was 
hinted at as a possibility in the earlier chapters is beginning to occur. One may just be 
beginning to see a crystallisation of ethnic reaction which in the earlier studies was 
submerged in confusion associated with rapid change. 
One has to inspect this factor more closely, therefore. to see what it is associated with. As 
before factor scores were calculated for all the biographical variables. on political party 
choice and on an item on the most urgent problems identified by respondents. 
Table 43 
WHITE AFRIKANERS: ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN THE FACTOR OF 
POLITICAL AND ETHNIC PROTEST AND ACTIVISM AND OTHER 
VARIABLES, BASED ON FACTOR SCORES 
A. Subgroups with higher than average factor scores on factor: 
ALL AFRIKANERS: ,04 
RURAL DWELLERS: ,31 
WESTERN CAPE: ,26 
NORTHERN CAPE: ,3 l 
NORTHERN PROVINCE: ,46 
FARMERS: ,30 
MANAGERIAL: ,26 
SKILLED MANUAL: ,34 
SEMI-SKILLED: ,53 (very small sample) 
SELF-EMPLOYED: ,15 
R8000-Rl 6000PM: .44 
<R l 250PM: ,51 
NON-TELEVISION VIEWERS: ,29 
SA DRAMA ON TV: ,35 
MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM: 
- financial: ,23 
- language/culture: ,41 
- affirmative action: ,27 
POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORTED: 
- Freedom Front: ,21 
- Conservative Party: ,24 
- A WB: ,84 (small sample) 
- will not vote: , 75 






B. Subgroups with lower than average factor scores on factor: 
ALL AFRIKANERS: ,04 
EASTERN CAPE: -,26 
FREE STATE: -,34 
KWAZULU-NATAL: -.20 
GAUTENG: -,16 





















The picture that emerges is that the factor is strongly regional in the sense that it is most 
powerful in those provinces in which a strong conservative or established Afrikaans culture 
exists. It withers in the melting-pot provinces or in those areas in which conservative black 
leadership is prominent, like KwaZulu-Natal. It does not only pervade the poorer groups 
but is strong in the self-made categories of managers. self-employed businessmen and 
higher blue-collar workers. ft is negated by the values and environment of tertiary 
education. As a tendency in the Afrikaans community it is therefore weak on intellectual 
leadership. 
The factor which is strongest among the university-trained Afrikaners is Factor 3, which 
was described as composed of political system acceptance, a lack of protest consciousness 
and a rather mild rejection of the notion of submerging cultural differences for nation-
building. The tendency among the Afrikaans intelligentsia therefore would be a type of 
mildly equivocating commitment to both political correctness and ethnic preservation. As 
will be pointed out in the final chapter, this accords well with observable reality. 
While the results reviewed have been limited by constraints on the scope of the research, in 
particular in terms of the range of items available for analysis from survey results, the trend 
is nonetheless clear, and tends on the whole to confirm the pattern observed in earlier 
chapters. There is very little evidence of anything resembling a "pure" ethnic dissent among 
Afrikaners, and their protest consciousness, which appears to be growing. is based on a 
mixture of ethnic- concerns and concerns which may be described as the concerns of a 
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political minority in a system in which a demographic majority-based party appears to the 
minority to be well-nigh hegemonic. This reaction among Afrikaners goes a long way to 
explaining why in the 1999 elections, ethnic Afrikaners were so easily able to shift their 
allegiances to an English-language aggressive liberal protest party -- the Democratic Party. 
The more strictly-based dimensions of Afrikaner ethnicity are weaker and are less "activist" 
in their flavour, but there is strong evidence of an ethnic consciousness within generalised 
protest and activism, to the extent that it exists among Afrikaners. 
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CHAPTER 11 
FINAL EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTION: 
THE ANATOMY OF SUPPORT FOR A VOLKSTAAT 
The most focused, and certainly the most far-reaching aspiration among ethnically 
mobilised Afrikaners is for the recovery of the distinct and unambiguous self-determination 
that a separate and autonomous territorial dispensation for Afrikaners could establish. As 
indicated in chapter five (5.4), a Volkstaat Council was established as a statutory body as 
part of the "pacification" of right-wing Afrikaners during the negotiations over the 
transition to majority rule. 
One of the major mandates of the Council was to establish the !eve! of support among 
Afrikaners for a form of territorial self-determination in a Volkstaat. This level of support 
was to be incorporated as evidence in the final submission to the government on the 
Council's arguments in respect of the Volkstaat. Very few observers of the South African 
political situation have ever believed that the ANC-led government would voluntarily agree 
to the creation of a Volkstaat, not only because of an ideological opposition to the idea, but 
because it would establish a precedent which other regional minorities, like traditional 
Zulus in the former colonial Zululand, for example, might wish to exploit. 
Nevertheless, having agreed to the Volkstaat Council as a strategy to defuse tensions, the 
government has been obligated to allow the Council to go through the motions of its 
mandate and to receive a report on the investigation. The objective of establishing the 
strength of support for a Volkstaat has in the process, however, provided some interesting 
data on the aspiration to self-determination among Afrikaners, which forms the basis for 
this final empirical chapter. 
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Considerable uncertainty has existed as regards the likely extent of support for a Volkstaat 
among white ethnic Afrikaners. Members of the Afrikaans intelligentsia are themselves 
divided in their assessment of the strength of support. It is not uncommon for prominent 
Afrikaans professionals, academics and businessmen to dismiss the Volkstaat support as 
insignificant and marginal in the political debate. Other experienced observers, however, 
argue that a considerable extent of covert support for the concept of a Volkstaat exists; 
support which is not necessarily openly displayed because it is felt to be politically 
incorrect or inappropriate in the current social and political climate. 
The decision by the Volkstaat Council to commission research into the extent of support is, 
presumably, a major contribution the base of empirical and verifiable knowledge on an 
important aspect of the debate about the future of Afrikaans nationalism in the new 
dispensation. 
Two surveys were in fact undertaken by the Council; one in late 1995, and the second in 
late 1998. While this review of the research will concentrate on the 1998 study, a brief 
comparison between the two surveys is possible to establish whether or not any trend in 
support is evident. 
In both of the studies this author was engaged as a co-researcher/consultant on the projects. 
The main researcher was Dr. Steyn Steenekamp, the Managing Director of the firm 
Opdatum Opnames (" Up To Date Surveys"), a firm which specialises in consumer research 
among Afrikaans communities. This author, aside from participating in the 
conceptualisation of the studies, was called upon by the Council to review and evaluate the 
research. 
11.1 THE METHODOLOGY 
The survey of attitudes and perceptions of a "Volhtaat" conducted in late 1998 followed 
the same broad methodology and procedures as those of the 1995 study. Direct 
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comparisons between the results of the two surveys are possible only to a limited extent, 
however, because of changes to the interview schedule used in the latest survey. 
In the previous survey in l 995, a number of quite crucial questions relating to support for a 
Volkstaat under certain conditions were follow-up questions to a general item which 
established the extent of-support for the broad principle or "concept" of a Volkstaat. The 
generality of the introductory question was such as to possibly inflate the extent of support 
which the results reflected. In the most recent survey a more "conservative" approach was 
adopted in which the respondents were asked about their reservations about a Volkstaat, 
and the follow-up questions were directed at assessing levels of support it the reservations 
were to be addressed. While the 1995 results were meaningful if interpreted correctly, the 
latest results provide a more cautious and firmer basis for assessing the extent of support 
for the political possibility of an ethnic territory or state. 
The methodology in general was appropriate and suited to the topic. The study was limited 
to Afrikaans-speakers in three regions: the Pretoria Metropolitan region. the "Bushveld" 
regions encompassing towns and farms in a wide band between Warmbaths and 
Potgietersrus in the Northern Province, and the "Drakensberg" region of Mpumalanga, 
encompassing towns and farms between Bronkhorstspruit and Balfour all the way East to 
the Swaziland and Mozambican borders. The areas were defined on the basis of the fact 
that they covered or were adjacent to areas that were being considered as possible districts 
in which Afrikaner self-determination could be established. The regions, therefore, are 
those which are probably most likely to contain persons sympathetic to the Volkstaat idea. 
The study did not attempt to generalise for white Afrikaners throughout South Africa. 
Being concentrated in three large regions in which conservative Afrikaans-speakers are a 
substantial majority among whites, it does, however, generalise for a reasonably large 
proportion of white Afrikaners in the country, certainly in the Northern areas. 
The sample sizes were Pretoria: 402, Mpumalanga (Drakensberg North): 200, Bushveld: 
I 03. Total: 705. 
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The vast majority of the respondents were white and Afrikaans-speaking, but the sample 
was not drawn on a racial basis. The fact that the interviews were conducted telephonically 
would have meant that a coloured person in the regions surveyed who was Afrikaans-
speaking, would have been included in the normal course of the fieldwork. The sample can 
be regarded as a non-racial sample of Afrikaans-speakers in the regions selected, the vast 
majority of them white. 
The use of telephone interviews has become increasingly common in opinion survey work 
throughout the world -- in the USA and Europe these days virtually all polls are telephone 
polls. Because of security systems at farms and private middle class homes. researchers are 
finding increasingly that telephone polling gives better sampling returns than personal 
visits. Telephone polling tends to under-estimate very poor people who are not telephone 
subscribers, but since the study was directed at a category of people who are almost 
exclusively the established working class or the middle class. this was not a problem for the 
study. Telephone polling also underestimates very recently mobile people who do not have 
phones. but this would have had a very minor effect in the sample. 
In telephone polling, there may be a tendency for respondents to be more cautious and non-
committal. The results of this study suggest that this was not a serious impediment. If 
anything, however, the use of the telephone technique will tend to slightly underestimate 
support for any ideas deemed to be controversial, and for this reason the levels of support 
for a Volkstaat as reflected in the study mav be close to the minimum levels in the 
communities surveved. 
The sampling technique was that of systematic (interval) sampling from private entries in 
the relevant telephone directories. This is an acceptable alternative to random sampling and 
because telephone numbers are randomly assigned, the method avoids any noteworthy bias. 
Non-Afrikaans speakers appearing in the systematic selection were excluded at the point of 
interview, in order to generalise for an ethnic category, as the research brief directed. It 
should be noted, however, that in the earlier survey English-speaking whites were included, 
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but separately categorised, which provided an interesting insight which will be detailed in 
due course. 
One last point on the methodology; because the fieldwork was conducted by an Afrikaans 
firm, and because the study was introduced as being a project of the Volkstaat Council, 
right-wing Afrikaners would have felt rather more at ease and hence would have been more 
frank and open in the interviews than they might have been in a standard investigation by a 
typical opinion polling organisation. 
11.2 THE RESULTS OF THE 1998 STUDY BRIEFLY DESCRIBED 
The results in this brief review will be summarised for Pretoria and for the total sample of 
three areas. Pretoria on its own is of interest because, being the capital city the residents are 
well exposed to viewpoints alternative to those of Afrikaans nationalism. 
11.2.1 SUPPORT FOR THE CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLE OF CULTURAL SELF-
DETERMINATION 
The principle of self-determination appears to be widely accepted. In response to 
the question of whether or not Afrikaners had the "right to make claims to self-
determination" ("aanspraak maak"), some 76 per cent of Pretoria and 78 per cent of 
the total sample answered in the affirmative. Only 13 per cent and 11 per cent 
respectively were opposed to the right to make such claims, with the balance 
uncertain. 
A more specific early question posed was whether there should be "a part or parts 
of South Africa with significant autonomy in which Afi·ikaners could enjoy a great 
deal of self-determination". Some 42 per cent of Pretoria and 47 per cent of all 
respondents endorsed the proposal fully, and 26 per cent and 25 per cent 
respectively endorsed it to some extent. Hence a broadly supportive response to the 
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concept of territorial self-determination was obtained from 68 per cent and 72 per 
cent of the Pretoria and total samples respectively. One can assume that between 
two.:.thirds and three quarters of Afrikaners in the regions surveyed have sentiments 
in favour of ethnic self-determination. 
The question immediately above was posed in exactly the same way in the 1995 
survey, and a strict comparison for Pretoria is possible. Full and unqualified support 
for some form of geographic self-determination increased from 33 per cent in late 
1995 to 42 per cent in 1998. Obviously one must be cautious about generalising 
from this but the comparison suggests an increase in support for the notion of self-
determination.15 
It will be noted from the results already presented that the results for Pretoria are 
slightly less positive than those in the non-metropolitan regions surveyed. This is 
not a rural-urban difference, but is due to the fact that the upper middle class areas 
in Southern Pretoria, in which the proportions of graduates is significantly higher 
than in the Northern areas, are relatively less inclined to endorse ethnic self-
determination, thereby lowering the overall support in Pretoria. 
Full support for the principle of an area in which Afrikaners could exercise rights to 
self-determination varied as follows between categories of respondents: 
15 It is conventional to use tests ofstatistical significance in comparisons such as these but the design of the 
samples, being stratified. multi-stage samples with a single respondent selected per household in the final 
stage. do not match the assumptions of most conventional tests. It is wiser simply to be cautious, accepting 
the result as suggestive of an increase in support for the notion of self-determination. One may assume that 
broad in-principle support for ethnic autonomy is tending to strengthen rather than weaken. 
Table 44 
VARJATIONS IN SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF A VOLKSTAAT: 
VOLKSTAAT SURVEY, 1998 
Full support: entire sample (n 705): 
Full support in sub-categories: 
Household income <R 48 000 pa: 
>R 96 000 pa: 




















The drop-off in support for the principle is noteworthy among the more highly educated. 
the upper middle class and among students. The influence of religious denomination is also 
quite marked, with the members of the largest and least fundamental Afrikaans Church (in 
a theological and in a political sense), the NG Church. clearly less committed to the notion 
of self-determination. 
These findings support many other findings, some referred to in earlier sections, which 
show that the Afrikaans "intelligentsia" (loosely described) is fairly deeply polarised 
around the issue of Afrikaans ethnic and cultural claims. 
11.2.2 REALISTIC DOUBTS AND RESERVATIONS 
When asked whether they had any reservations or doubts about the concept of a 
Volkstaat, most respondents agreed that the idea has its problems. Only some 31 per 
cent of Pretoria and 29 per cent of all respondents had no doubts or reservations. 
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The doubts and reservation were the same as those expressed m the 1995 
investigation, namely concerns among respondents that: 
• they would have to relocate to enjoy the benefits of autonomy; 
• that a Volkstaat would be economically non-viable: 
• that it was politically unrealistic, since the government was unlikely to allow the 
initiative to develop; 
• that an area or areas for a Volkstaat would be isolated and lack infrastructure 
and services, and; 
• (among a very small minority) that a Volkstaat would imply relinquishing 
claims by Afrikaners to self-determination in the whole of South Africa. 
In the interviews. however, each of the doubts was taken and the question posed as 
to whether or not the respondents would support a Volkstaat if the major problems 
they discerned could be solved or minimised. After such hvpothetical qualifications 
and assurances, the (hypothetical) expression of approval of the aim of a Volkstaat 
rose to some 65 per cent, or 70 per cent if one includes people who supported the 
idea but believed that the practical problems were totally insurmountable. In the 
Pretoria sample, the support rose to 61 per cent and up to 6 7 per cent if the 
sympathizers with serious doubts about its practicality are included. 
l 1.2.3 THE EXTENT OF FIRM RESISTANCE TO THE IDEA 
It has been noted that some categories of respondents could not endorse either the 
principle or the practicalities of a Volkstaat, even when problems and concerns had 
been hypothetically addressed. Some of this lack of support was due to uncertainty, 
however. Some 15 per cent of the entire sample were opposed to the idea of 
Afrikaner self-determination in principle. Within this proportion, however, only 8 
per cent in Pretoria and 6 per cent in the entire sample said that they would actively 
oppose moves to establish a Volkstaat should these eventuate. 
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11.2.4 THE BASIS OF THE ASPIRATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION 
The roughly two thirds of respondents who endorsed rights to self-determination 
and the aims of a Volkstaat, fully or partially. were asked about the issues in respect 
of which self-determination was necessary or desirable. The probes were both open-
ended and based on the presentation of fixed-answer alternatives. 
The dominant considerations expressed or selected were not necessarily ethnic or 
"cuitural". The major motivations appear to relate to the current state of the 
economy, to levels of crime, to standards in public health care. to educational 
standards and to the official "equity" or affirmative action policy which was being 
introduced at the time of the survey. 
This is not to say that cultural motivations were unimportant. Some 36 per cent of 
the Pretoria sample and 30 per cent of all respondents were motivated by cultural 
and ethnic-religious concerns, and 37 per cent and 48 per cent respectively by a 
concern about the future of Afrikaans education -- obviously these concerns could 
overlap with each other, and with security and economic concern since respondents 
gave more than one response to the question on their motivations. Since the ethnic 
motivations were always mentioned in association with other considerations, it is 
impossible to discern any differences in attitudes to self-determination between 
those motivated by cultural concerns and those motivated by other concerns. 
It is important to note, however, that only some IO per cent of respondents gave 
culture or language as their first reason for aspiring to or endorsing the idea of self-
determination. The mention of culture or language tended to be more prominent in 
Pretoria and among the better-educated supporters of the Volkstaat idea. 
An interesting pattern emerged in the results of the 1995 Volkstaat study, in that at 
least 40 per cent of English-speaking whites interviewed in Pretoria endorsed and 
expressed their support for the idea of a Volkstaat. Some of them, perhaps a third or 
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more, had feelings of identification with Afrikaners or with Afrikaans culture, but 
most of these English-speakers aspired to a Volkstaat for reasons associated with a 
desire to restore white racial control, not because they were nakedly racist, but 
because they had no faith in the future under majority rule. 
In a sense these English-speakers give the game away. The issue of a Volkstaat, 
among both Afrikaans and English-speaking whites. is more likely to be supported 
in reaction to majority rule and its perceived consequences than it is likely to be 
supported for reasons of ethnic and cultural self-determination. 
11.2.5 PERVASIVE PESSIMISM ABOUT THE FUTURE 
It follows from the last comment that the most powerful factor driving the search for 
an alternative dispensation is a pervasive sense of uncertainty about the future. In 
1995, only 24 per cent of the Pretoria respondents felt positive about the future. At 
the time there was the possibility that the pessimism was due to the rapid political 
transformation and shift of power that had taken place the year before, with an 
accompanying sense of status-loss for Afrikaners. The sentiments, therefore, might 
have been expected to moderate over time. 
This has not been the case, and in 1998 only 22 per cent of the Pretoria respondents 
feel positive -- indicating no real change. Thirty percent are uncertain and no fewer 
than 48 per cent feel negative about the future. The results for the non-metropolitan 
areas are even less positive. 
11.2.6 PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGY 
Around 30 per cent of all respondents who did not oppose a Volkstaat were 
completely uncertain about the strategy to achieve it. There may be a hidden agenda 
disguised by this response but most of the uncertainty was genuine. About 30 per 
cent to 33 per cent support the use of established political channels and negotiation. 
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Slightly more, or around 35 per cent of all Volkstaat sympathizers. were prepared to 
go further and suggest more active strategies like the establishment of co-operative 
ventures in core areas of the proposed territories and even forms of passive 
resistance. Only a very tiny minority. three percent; envisaged forceful 
confrontation. however. These were sentiments expressed in interviews which had 
aroused the imaginations of respondents, however. and it is doubtful whether the 
same levels of voluntary activity would be achieved in any real programme. 
11.3 BROAD CONCLUSIONS 
Since 1995, the extent of support for the principle and practical possibility of a Volkstaat 
area or areas for Afrikaners has probably strengthened slightly. Among largely white 
Afrikaners in among the largest concentrations of white Afrikaans settlements in the 
country, nearly one third have no doubts or reservations in respect of their support for self-
determination, and another third or slightly more support the principle and would support it 
in practice if their practical reservations and perceptions of its lack of economic or political 
viability could be addressed. 
While there is considerable uncertainty about the kind of action to follow in pursuit of self-
determination, there is quite substantial sentiment in favour of active voluntary 
mobilisation of a peaceful kind in pursuit of the idea. This level of commitment is unlikely 
to be realised in any concrete initiative, but it certainly reflects quite considerable intensity 
of support. 
While the sentiments supporting the idea of self-determination for Afrikaners are largely a 
nostalgia for the status and conditions which whites enjoyed under political Apartheid, at 
least ten percent and perhaps up to around one third of Afrikaners in areas of Afrikaans 
concentration are motivated by a commitment to a sphere of autonomy for Afrikaans 
culture. This level of commitment would be somewhat lower among white Afrikaners on a 
nation-wide basis, but since all ethnic movements begin in a core of commitment and 
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activism, it does signal some prospect for the development of more general aspirations to 
cultural self-determination as time goes by. 
Quite aside from the survey results reviewed above. however. the issue of territorial self-
determination has become a battleground of factions within the Yolkstaat movement itself. 
One faction is committed to an area in the Northern Cape as the core of a Volkstaat. This 
initiative is built around a small settlement on what is in fact a communal farm called 
Orania. Other factions, within the Volkstaat Council itsel[ propose areas to the East and 
North of Pretoria and parts of Pretoria itself. The Freedom Front. meanwhile, in an 
endeavour to make the concept more practical. has committed itself to other mechanisms 
for self-determination within the constitution, including sub-regions of provinces able to 
enjoy limited autonomy. and the idea of Cultural Councils with statutory powers. The 
initiative, therefore, is in quite considerable ferment at the moment and if anything, it is 
losing momentum: Given the levels and quality of commitment that the Volkstaat survey 
has revealed. however, it is unlikely to go away. 
In other words, this survey seems to have demonstrated that the Volkstaat "project", in the 
broadest sense, is sufficiently endorsed to warrant serious consideration among circles of 
relevant policy-makers. While the most powerful underlying motivations for the aspiration 
to ethnic self-determination may not be intrinsically "cultural". it is impossible in any 
ethnic movement to disentangle material and cultural interests in the course of mobilisation. 
These strands of motivation are likely to converge and blend as time goes by. 
Perhaps the only conditions under which the sentiments studied would wane. would be a 
period of spectacular economic progress and a rapid resolution of problems in security and 
the administration of a complex society. Such a rapid change in the political economy 
would be surprising, however, and it would be sensible to assume that the factors that have 
produced the results reviewed are likely to endure. 
CHAPTER 12 
DISCUSSION OF THE EVIDENCE 
THE RISE, DECLINE AND CURRENT CONDITION 
OF AFRIKANER ETHNICITY AND ITS RELEVANCE 
TO ETHNICITY THEORY 
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In this chapter the evidence from the South African case study will be drawn together to 
highlight factors associated with the patterns over time up to the present. Most importantly, 
some key implications of the case study for theories of ethnicity will be explored. The 
report will end with a very brief consideration of the future of the Afrikaans ethnic 
movement. 
12.1 KEYNOTE FEATURES OF AFRIKANER ETHNIC MOBILISATION AS IT 
EMERGED IN HISTORY 
A SIMULTANEOUS ACCRETION OF IDENTITY AND STRUCTURE OVER TIME 
The review in chapter 5 of the emergence of the Afrikaners shows that they are, relatively 
speaking, a young ethnic group, with the roots of the identity derived from diverse origins 
and phases of their history. The broad coherence of the group in its major components was 
only achieved within the last century. The evolution of identity has been extraordinarily 
complex, with elements which have imparted great strength and tenacity but at the same 
time brittleness and vulnerability as a consciousness and as a movement. 
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The original seed of identity was the association with the Dutch East India Trading 
Company, which attempted to impart a Dutch national character to the settlement and 
which provided the language root of what was later to become Afrikaans. The settlers, 
however, were in every sense a ''.fragment" of Europe. in the pattern described by Louis 
Hartz ( 1964 ). Their responses to conditions were largely defined by the dominant 
intellectual currents of I i 11 and 18th Century Europe. Not only by Europe, however, but by 
a self-consciously Protestant tradition at a time of great confessional tension. 
The European conception of culture and civilisation was that of the fori11al "high cultures", 
incorporating codified legal systems, literature, art, formal institutions and formal statuses 
and ranks. This conception, as much as somatic differences. created a perception of a vast 
gulf of civilisation between the settlers and the indigenous people they encountered. A 
reasonably high level of endogamy was both the result and a further cause of the 
persistence of this racial differentiation which would probably have occurred even without 
the institution of slavery, which introduced a further differentiation of racial status. 
Hence the group-consciousness which formed among the early Free Burghers had elements 
of firm definition and elements of great ambiguity. The firm definition of group boundaries 
was the racial European-indigenous division. The ambiguity may have derived from the 
fact that although the national status of the settlement was Dutch and the Company 
emphasised the Dutch identity, the settlers themselves were of mixed European origins, 
allowing conceptions of a Germanic and wider European consciousness. 
Since the consciousness of identity was firmest around the division of race (as it was for 
most northern Europeans colonists in the l ?111 and 1SC11 Centuries). race was fated to become 
the dominant marker of the group's social boundary. 
These original cores of identity and the quality of consciousness associated with the 
identity were overlaid many times over by additional elements as sections of the settler 
group encountered new influences and challenges. Taken from the beginning of the 
settlement, these elements included the bureaucratic status differentiations imposed by the 
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Company between officials, employees, free settlers, slaves and indigenous people, the 
hardships and material privation of the migrant farmers, the perceived lack of sympathy of 
the later British colonial authorities, the tensions, communication difficulties and resource 
competition between the settlers and indigenous tribes on the open and umegulated frontier, 
and later warfare and tensions in the interior as the settlers trekked north. Thus the earliest 
manifestation of ethnicity was not exclusively or specifically Dutch or "Aji-ikaans.,, but was 
a probably a more generalised consciousness of local group position and status relative to 
hostile competing groups. 
IDENTIFICATIONS ACROSS THE ETHNIC BOUNDARY 
At different times, and well into the 20111 Century, the relations with the British had a 
significant influence. While the British in all periods tried to Anglicise. assimilate or defeat 
the emergent Afrikaans movement, the resulting hostility was not consistent and at 
significant periods the settlers and later the Afrikaners in the Republics and in the Union 
were divided on the issue of the English -- it is interesting to note that the exiled Dutch 
Prince of Orange supported the British occupation of the Cape. for example. 
Some of the most notable Afrikaner leaders and elites sided with the British. At rank-and-
file level many Afrikaners were for long periods undecided in the their loyalties. Giliomee 
( draft manuscript in progress, 1999) records that the future National Party Prime Minister, 
in speaking to the Bondsraad (Council) of the Broederbond in 1942, lamented that the 
powerlessness of the Afrikaners was caused by internal divisions in all sectors of Afrikaner 
society; divisions which he attributed to the close interaction with the economic and 
cultural world of the English-speakers, leading to a duality in the consciousness of 
Afrikaners. 
The interface with the Anglo-Saxon world, as indicated in the review of the Afrikaner's 
history, had to be dealt with in the political struggle against Smuts, Hofmeyr and the South 
African Party. When that struggle was won, the English ceased to be a problem in the sense 
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that they were a numerical minority, they tended to live in different towns and suburbs and, 
in any event, a large proportion of them were as race-conscious as the Afrikaners. 
Studies by Lever (1978:113) and later by the Human Sciences Research Council (1985:80-
83) showed that after the sixties, the "social distance" between English and Afrikaans-
speaking white South Africans, as measured in the well known Social Distance Scale, had 
narrowed to rather insignificant levels. Lever's study in 1968 showed that the Afrikaner-to-
Afrikaner social distance index was l ,2 and the Afrikaner-to-English-speaking white index 
was 1,3; in terms of social interaction they were virtually members of the same group. The 
Dutch, for the Afrikaners, had by then become ethnic semi-strangers, as understandably had 
the British, with indexes of 2,2 and 2,0 respectively. Needless to say the social distance 
indexes for Africans, coloureds and Indians were all well over 5. 
The 1984 study of the HSRC suggested a very slight widening of the Afrikaans-English 
social distance gap from the Afrikaners' side in the late maturity of Apartheid, but if 
anything a greater closeness of English-speakers to Afrikaners -- racial solidarity at work. 
IDEOLOGICAL COORDINATION OF THE CORE ETHNIC DEFINITIONS 
Linked with the previous point, the review shows that since the early settlement onwards 
there were disparate orientations among prominent Afrikaner opinion formers on the nature 
and flexibility of the ethnic boundary processes. The degree of exclusiveness and the 
openness to alternative value systems in the same polity were the critical issues. In the 
period after Verwoerd, when his successor, BJ. Vorster realised that more pragmatic 
policies had to be pursued in the interests of strategic positioning of the government and in 
order to augment its support base, the debate intensified and a division emerged in elite-
thinking called the "verkrampte-verligte" (narrow versus enlightened) divide (see Giliomee, 
1992, and Van Niekerk, 1985). This debate, which was fairly remote from the burgeoning 
Afrikaner business establishment, was muscular and it had as its audience not only the 
cultural leaders and ideologues within the ethnic networks but a much wider phalanx of 
South African and international observers. It had as participants both Afrikaners who were 
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loyal to the ethnic mission and rebels who attacked from a position of political opposition 
and hostility. 
Although the Broederbond moved to the forefront of the debate among the "loyal" 
Afrikaners and attempted to integrate the new ideas into establishment thinking, the wider 
ramifications of the debate could not be "co-ordinated". and a circle of disaffection formed, 
strengthened by the attention it received from outside Afrikaner ethnic ranks. This was to 
prove destabilising for the ethnic movement, creating unce11ainty and confusion. 
THE INCORPORATION OF CLASS ELEMENTS INTO ETHNICITY 
The factor which intensified group consciousness more than any earlier element was the 
Anglo-Boer war and the dislocation and impoverishment of large numbers of Afrikaners 
after the Anglo-Boer war. In fact it was a phase of proletarianisation of the poorer former 
farmers. It was at this point that Afrikaners experienced the fear of sinking into the depths 
of poverty and simplicity of existence that typified the African proletariat. Had more 
Afrikaans workers perpetuated their association with the unions and absorbed labour 
ideologies, the subsequent history of the Afrikaans nationalist movement may well have 
been different. 
As Johnston (1993) has argued, a major difference between the Northern Irish Protestant 
movement and that of Afrikaners was that the former was firmly structured around trade 
union solidarities and organisation and hence developed a sense of strategic autonomy. 
South Africa's divided labour market made a cross-racial and cross-cultural unification of 
the working class problematic. Significant sections of the Afrikaner workers corps were 
therefore only too glad to be "rescued from communism", as it was called, by alternative 
labour organisations which had the support of the Broederbond. 
Hence the protest consciousness of the Afrikaner workers became incorporated into the 
burgeoning anti-British movement for self-determination. This. as Johnston points out, was 
to have significant implications for South Africa much later on, because the moral and 
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strategic ethnic leadership lost the element of uncompromising combativeness of typical 
labour organisation. 
CRITICAL BOUNDARY ISSUES DEFINE THE CONSCIOUSNESS -- RACE USURPS 
THE CORE CONTENT 
The ethnic enterprise was intellectually driven by various strands of ideology in addition to 
the settler-based and anti-imperialist nationalism. These included varieties of Calvinist 
fundamentalism, German Romanticism and German race ideology. although the imported 
race ideologies were not in themselves very influential. 
Nevertheless, the noted novelist and academic historian. J.M. Coetzee (1991) has described 
some of the leading ethnic brokers as "obsessed" by notions of race purity; an obsession 
which, through what Coetzee describes as social "contagion". produced a movement which 
was fixated ("crazed" in Coetzee's term) on the threat posed by the black majority for the 
Afrikaners' future. 
The source of this fixation with race, which was ultimately to compromise and cripple the 
Afrikaans ethnic movement, has been described in many ways. Marxist authors have not 
devoted too much attention to it other than seeing it as a subsidiary or facilitating sentiment 
which could serve to promote the mobilising interests of the Afrikaans petit bourgeoisie in 
its campaign of capital accumulation. The race fixation was probably supported by the 
emergent capitalists -- Weber's principle of an "affinity" of interests referred to earlier 
would typify the process, but the nationalist movement was simply too large to have been 
conceptualised and directed, even inadvertently, by the commercial leadership. It was a 
movement driven by an idea and a system of moral precepts that required the intellectual 
muscle of theologians, academics, intellectuals and activists to drive it. It included petit-
bourgeois class interests but could not conceivably have been moulded by such interests. 
But why the almost pathological obsession with race? Welsh ( 1978) provides an insightful 
analysis arguing that race discrimination is frequently not a consequence of racism or race 
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prejudice, but typically arises in situations in which ethnocentrism, inter-group competition 
and differential power are involved. Broadly this was the case in the South African 
situation, but the intensity of the racial cleavage is such that a more textured explanation is 
called for. 
Having had some personal insights into the thinking of some of the prominent "high 
priests" of race theory at the time, including the infamous Geoff Cro1~je and some of his 
associates -- the topic of Coetzee's analysis -- my view is that it arose dominantly from a 
very particular and self-conscious concern with the ethnic boundary among the highly 
religiously and socially conformist intelligentsia in the Northern provinces in the late 
thirties, forties and fifties. I would put together an explanation in the following way. 
Those many Afrikaners who had emerged from the status of migrant farmers and 
impoverished semi-nomadic survivalists during the trek. and finally ended up as dislocated 
work-seekers, refugees from failed agriculture, were in fact an "underclass". They were 
constantly "at risk" of adopting the lifestyles of and becoming absorbed into, the larger 
underclass society of coloured people and blacks. The middle class intelligentsia, as already 
indicated, were the heirs to a moral and social tradition informed by European "high 
culture". The elite Afrikaners in the North had furthermore developed an extreme status-
consciousness because of the humiliation caused by the imperialist British treatment of 
Afrikaners. 
The sprit of Afrikaner solidarity was already present and widespread. These ethnic 
entrepreneurs both identified with and needed the Afrikaner underclass for their cause, 
which was basically a status-competition with English-speaking elites and with those 
Afrikaners who identified with them. There was also an ideological conflict, informed from 
within the Afrikaans Calvinist traditions, between the economic individualism and liberal-
conservatism of the British and English-speaking South African middle class. and the more 
socially-oriented communalism of the Afrikaner elites. 
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In addition, the Afrikaner ethnic entrepreneurs in the North were also, as a consequence of 
the geographic isolation of the Afrikaans Calvinist churches. rather austere and puritanical. 
In fact, theirs was a culture of psycho-sexual repression (which Coetzee also refers to 
within a Freudian framework). An ongoing issue of discussion between this author's mother 
and a good cross-section of the Afrikaner elite wives (whose children she taught music), for 
example, concerned things like whether or not a respectable housewife could afford to be 
seen in casual clothing watering a garden. With this mind-set. the task at hand was to uplift 
the ''.fallen" Afrikaner underclass; an ethnic and a religious obligation. 
The "saviours" could take no risks, and the best way of doing it. was to focus specifically 
on the strengthening the "lower boundary" of the underclass. which was the racial interface. 
In Pretoria, parts of Johannesburg and the Witwatersrand. church-linked and municipal 
social workers were allocated to priority areas where there was a danger of race-admixture. 
As a junior student social worker as late as the early fifties. this author was allocated to a 
black-Indian-Afrikaner contact area in the north of Pretoria. 
This Transvaal obsession later became encoded in Christian-national Education, and was 
carried back into the relatively more "socially mature" Cape. which had an older middle-
class which had not become as isolated as the Transvaal ethnic elite. The lower boundary of 
the Afrikaner underclass, which was simultaneously the race boundary. occupied far more 
of the attention and energy of the emerging Afrikaner elite than notions of capitalist 
empowerment of the Afrikaner petit-bourgeoisie. It was in fact more the drive for full 
ethnic inclusion and less,of a racial stereotypy which structured the racial obsession. This 
interpretation is a nuance, however, and in a broader sense it was in effect institutionalised 
racism. 
As a consequence of these and other dynamics a formalised racial caste-system was 
powerfully entrenched, and was to outlive its relevance for Afrikaner boundaries but also 
come to be seen as a cost for the private sector and a de-legitimating factor for the entire 
ethnic project, spawning divisions and heightened opposition. 
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· THE RELEVANCE OF THE CULTURAL DIVISION OF THE LABOUR MARKET 
The literature in the chapters on theory relating to the influence of divided labour markets 
in segregating ethnic interests is compelling. Because of the fact that African workers 
undercut the Afrikaners in employment it is certainly another issue where the principle of 
an "affinity" of interests· in establishing powerful structures was relevant. The ethnic 
ideologues in the thirties and forties were more than aware of the fact that some form of 
"job reservation" for whites would ultimately be necessary. One must accept that the 
competitive interests of white semi-skilled labour strengthened the race factor in the 
consciousness of rank-and-file Afrikaners. 
It is difficult without gomg into very detailed evidence. to decide on the relative 
significance of labour market competition in the make-up of race consciousness in the 
movement. Any number of quotations or examples of events in the labour market for or 
against the proposition will not decide the issue. Perhaps one telling point. however, is that 
I could find no evidence that from the thirties and forties onwards. the race consciousness 
in the industrial towns and cities was any more severe than in non-industrial areas like 
Pretoria, Pietersburg, Bloemfontein and the like. 
The divided labour market was a factor, but not an overwhelming factor in the mix of 
factors contributing to the institutionalised racism of the Afrikaner nationalist movement. It 
played an important part in the general determination to protect the lower boundary of the 
ethnic group -- it was therefore also incorporated into the wider etlmic dynamic. 
THE SURVIVAL OF RACE AS THE DOMINANT MARKER 
In terms of ethnic "markers", then, the issue of the cultural tension between Anglo-Saxon 
and Afrikaans cultural worlds declined in salience after the Afrikaner nationalists achieved 
power. The religious marker, that of Afrikaner Calvinism. was unproblematic -- the Dutch 
Reformed Churches and Calvinist congregations as such had never been under serious 
pressure from the British. The political boundary was strengthened and extended with 
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confidence. These developments exposed race among the markers as the issue of greatest 
salience. As the tide of the other defining features ethnicity receded in salience, the issue of 
race was left high and almost dry, as it were. 
The racially-defined ethnic boundary construction and defence fed back into the 
consciousness, and into the Afrikaner nationalist enterprise. and would have done so even 
without the relatively limited influence of the imported German race theories. This was 
fated to establish institutionalised racism and apartheid as the template of its ethnicity. It 
was, as suggested, a case of obsessional ethnic boundary maintenance usurpirnz the content 
of the consciousness. 
THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF ETHNICITY 
Political power after 1948 made the issue of the promotion of the Afrikaans language and 
culture less and less problematic; it became an issue of complacency. because the state 
administration took over the functions of ethnic cultural maintenance. The state, which 
grew more powerful in the post-war period of rapid economic growth. dealt with more and 
more issues on behalf of the Afrikaners. The relative, but narrowing, disadvantage of the 
Afrikaners in business was also an advantage in other respects because the most competent 
people became schoolteachers and public servants, and the Afrikaners received good 
service from the new dispensation. This was the institutionalisation and bureaucratization 
of ethnicity, and with it the growth of dependence· on the National Party and its state 
machinery. 
Race, however, maintained its salience because the emergmg black liberation struggle 
prevented the resolution of that one aspect of the boundary system. Increasingly over time, 
it once again became an issue of survival, because the ethnicity had become incorporated 
into the state nationalism of the Republic, and the Republic was seen to be under racial and 
ideological attack. 
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The role of the state was to make the defence of boundaries too easy for the voluntary 
ethnic personnel in welfare and cultural organisations. Whereas in other ethnic groups, even 
in South Africa, boundary maintenance for whatever reason has to be maintained through 
the unofficial yet powerful sanctions and signals generated in the internal group dynamics, 
by the eighties Afrikaner professionals had the luxury of being able to distance themselves 
from the bureaucratic rules, which were very often crude and offensive. 
In a very real sense the state had dislodged the ethnic formation. With apologies, another 
small example from personal experience is useful. This author. as a Probation Officer in 
1960 in Pretoria, refused to implement official instructions in terms of the Child Welfare 
Act to remove an illegitimate baby of a Protestant unmarried mother from non-Protestant 
foster-care, and as a long drawn-out consequence was charged with contempt of the 
Children's Court. The entire Afrikaans professional establishment was sympathetic, but to 
no avail, and even the Magistrate fudged the issue and I left the Pretoria public service. In 
this and in many other ways. an ossifying state machinery was beginning to alienate its own 
professional and intellectual constituency. This was undermining the flexibility that any 
organisational system requires. Would the Afrikaner cultural leaders in the Cape have 
wanted to see the destruction of District Six, thereby alienating an Afrikaans-speaking 
coloured community substantially on the side of Afrikaners on the race issue? 
STATE LEADERS AND THE LOST SCRIPT: THE COSTS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
DEPENDENCY IN THE TRANSITION 
The most severe costs for the group were imposed by the bureaucratised state oligarchy on 
the leadership capacity of the ethnic group. After decades in power the government quite 
aside from its ethnic representation, suffered all the defects of an unthreatened and 
dominant power position. 
From the mid-eighties onward, it was placed under the severe, and thoroughly-deserved 
stress of having to deal with international pressure and sanctions, the externally and 
internally-organised campaigns of the liberation struggle and attempt to formulate policy 
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responses to complex problems arising out of the failure of Apartheid. On the policy level 
its responses were clumsy, and it failed to take timely initiatives to retain the high ground. 
The reputation of the party in academic and intellectual circles suffered disastrously. The 
security strategies in particular alienated many people who might otherwise have remained 
committed to the ethnic cause. This also meant that the government machine lost talent and 
capacity and became even more alienating -- a vicious cycle of bureaucratic decay. 
The government was in effect experiencing, under extreme stress. all the dilemmas of state 
control and legitimacy in mobilised and politicised plural societies. The inevitable result 
was more and more Afrikaner intellectuals seeking other networks of identification. 
When the costs of maintaining apartheid became too great and the government leaders 
began to implement a very necessary but poorly digested agenda of political change, the 
accelerating effect of precedents pulled them well beyond their capacity to manage the 
process. When the actual transition to democracy beirnn. the role of the bureaucratic party 
~ ' 
was even more cataclysmic for the core interests of Afrikaner ethnic goals (as opposed to 
the goals of the Apartheid state establishment). In the end the government entered the 
negotiations without a clear concept of a resolution and without anticipating the disruptive 
effects on its agenda which negotiation crises, invented and otherwise, would have on its 
negotiating positions. 
The shadO\vy "deal" between the political establishment and the liberation movements 
which was anticipated by most realistic observers, was understood as one of a broad type 
encountered in negotiated transit~ons to inclusive democracy described inter alia by 
O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead ( 1986). The concept was that of a founding "pact". 
Such pacts were generally understood by the authors referred to as being based on, and 
guaranteeing, the vital interests of the major parties to the agreement. Although the South 
African transition had the appearance of such a pact it offered very much less in terms of 
guarantees of the vital cultural interests of Afrikaners than Professor Schmitter himself 
anticipated (personal communication on a visit to South Africa). 
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The negotiations themselves were.• the basis of the long-overdue political miracle of 
peaceful transition from authoritarian rule. A political miracle achieved, and mercifully so, 
however, on the basis of an uneasy blend of the good intentions of the government 
leadership, unremitting local and international pressure and woeful negotiating 
incompetence by the establishment politicians and bureaucrats. In this respect the 
conclusions of Alexander Johnston (1994) that the absence of a tough. protectionist trade-
union tradition in the Afrikaner nationalist establishment are particularly apposite. 
• The settlement was a Godsend in its destruction of Apartheid but a disaster for the 
conceptually and culturally distinct interests of Afrikaner ethnicity as a collective cause, 
revealing the full effect of A frikanerdom's latter-day reliance on the state, the dominant 
party and its advisors. 
On the side of the liberation struggle, the negotiators were drawn from the ranks of highly 
competitive and skilled current and former trade unionists and activists, with an abundance 
of progressive intellectuals and lawyers available to give support. On the side of 
government and the National Party, the participants were state ministers and politicians 
who had become accustomed to the delegation of tasks and the support of bureaucratic 
functionaries. The legal advisors on the side of government, because of the intensity of 
international pressure against apartheid and on South African academia, were apologetic 
and often anxious to be accepted as professionals by their opponents on the side of the 
liberation movements. 
The National Party government went into the negotiations confident that it would emerge 
with a form of power-sharing in which they, the National Party and the ANC, as well as 
certain smaller parties, would be part of some form of semi-permanent ruling coalition. The 
confidence with which they held this concept obscured the detail which they required to be 
concerned about in the negotiations. To cut a long story short. the National Party and 
government negotiators were clumsy and naive in the negotiations compared with their 
antagonists. Some ministers actually commenced the begi1ming of their political defection 
in the process. 
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The negotiations produced an agreement for a five-year coalition "Government a/National 
Unity", but one suqject to numerically-based executive decision-making. which proved to 
be so tension-ridden and indeed humiliating for the National Party that it withdrew into 
opposition after two years. No single sphere of local autonomy or categorical entrenchment 
of cultural rights for Afrikaners was retained; not even at local government level. The party 
that went into the negotiations with a massive power advantage. fortuitously for the 
establishment of an open democracy based on constitutionally guaranteed individual rights, 
managed to snatch almost total defeat from the jaws of an equitable chance of an interesting 
multi-cultural constitution. In one restricted historical phase it accomplished more to 
undermine the Afrikaans language than the entire British colonial enterpris_e had been able 
to accomplish in successive periods over centuries. 
This, as said, was the ultimate price paid by the Afrikaans ethnic enterprise for the reliance 
on politicians and bureaucrats who had grown fat and complacent with total power over 
decades. As the review in chapter 5 has suggested. the Afrikaners at large would never have 
even remotely accepted the outcome or even the transitional negotiations had they known 
what they were likely to produce. They might have accepted what Dan Horowitz ( 1982) has 
described as "dual authority politics", but they were handed the power base of a permanent 
minority instead. 
12.2 THE CURRENT QUALITY OF AFRIKANER ETHNICITY 
Empirical studies have shown that Afrikaner ethnicity at present has a pervasive quality of 
ambiguity. While all ethnicities undoubtedly have a blurred quality, history has bequeathed 
a particular complexity to Afrikaners. 
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THE WIDER RACIAL OR EURO-CENTRIC IDENTITY . 
The factor-analyses and the other survey-based evidence have shown a dominant 
preoccupation with deteriorating group status that is simultaneously a racial status. This is 
closely linked with material protest and a perception of governance in the country which 
deviates widely from the (very much idealised) memory of efficiency and orderliness under 
the former white government. The material protest is not based on fiction: the very large 
1999 annual "AMPS" survey (All Media Products survey carried out for the advertising 
industry) shows that white unemployment has doubled since l 995. This consciousness is ---based on relativities more than on absolute deprivation because Afrikaners are still a 
privileged minority. The material protest is shared with English-speaking whites. Hence the 
threats perceived in the new situation are not specifically ethnic. Threats to Afrikaans )( K 
language and culture rank very low in the priority-order of status threats. 
In terms of group identification, the primary political identification of most Afrikaners is 
with other whites. This is based on an openly euro-centric conception. or misconception, 
that II Western" standards and orderliness are at odds with a more compliant, relaxed and 
less principled "African" system of governance, although many conservative whites and 
Afrikaners perceive some affinity with the type of African conservative traditionalism 
portrayed by the traditional Zulu leadership, for example. One . appreciates that many 
readers will not expect too fine a point being put on this white orientation and would see it 
simply as persisting Afrikaner racism, which it is in effect. At the same time, however, 
because it is imbued with conceptions of European culture and styles of governance, it 
signals a wider zone of ethnic identification among Afrikaners -- 11 dual consciousness". 
The empirical results, taken together, show that Afrikaners have a somewhat greater 
commitment to this conception of Western or Euro-centric identity than English-speakers. 
This is no doubt partly due to a greater sense of threat to their occupational interests in the 
new situation, but I would submit that it is also due to the fact that an aspect of Calvinist 
doctrine emphasises a worldly expression of faith in orderly and accountable public life. 
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We may recall that the results of Hanf et al ( 1981 :91) showed Afrikaners to be about three 
to four times more religiously and ethnically conscious than English-speakers. 
Gibson and Gouws (1998) have established empirically that the whites, mainly Afrikaners, 
with a stronger level of group identification, racial or ethnic, and those with more intense 
psychic needs for identification, are most likely to express antipathy to racial and ethnic 
outgroups -- a familiar finding in social science. This type of finding may be tautologous, 
however, saying in effect that ethnics have stronger ethnic boundaries than non-ethnics. It 
also glosses over the perceptual dynamics involved. 
THE AFRIKANER CULTURAL AND ETHNIC "INNER-CONSCIOUSNESS" 
While less thari one in ten Afrikaners give priority to threats to language and cultural 
interests over material concerns and concerns with governance. the proportion which 
identifies primarily with the Afrikaans ethnic group is higher. The empirical evidence 
shows it at around 20 to 30 per cent. In other words, a core of the more particular ethnicity 
is consistently present in the consciousness of Afrikaners. 
Furthermore, the level of priority given to threats to language and culture tend to be 
increasing over time, up to the most recent investigations. More recent, as yet 
uncomputerised data seem to show a further intensification of language and cultural 
gnevances. 
While not at the level of first priority, a sense of language and cultural discrimination is a 
matter of near-consensus among Afrikaners. In this sense, among rank-and-file Afrikaners 
as opposed to intellectuals, there is very little conscious defection from an association with 
the ethnic group. The defection which has taken place is from organised ethnic politics. 
Politics is dominated by wider status, identity and material concerns. whereas cultural 
identity is preserving itself in the private or social spheres. There is a "retreat" but it is a 
retreat from politically mobilised ethnicity as opposed to identity. 
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An extensive series of factor analyses on attitudinal data showed that within the wider 
crystallisation of a racial and Euro-centric group consciousness. which tends to coincide 
with a cultural consciousness among Afrikaners. there is a separately identifiable 
commitment to specifically Afrikaner ethnicity, and similar but less manifestly experienced 
tendencies among other minorities in South Africa. 
This "inner identity" could conceivably be merely a superimposition on the wider racial and 
Euro-centric consciousness, but the factor analyses showed very consistently that it is a 
separate perceptual dynamic. It obviously has large areas of commonality with the wider 
identification but it crystallises separately and therefore has a de!Zree of autonomous 
attitudinal status. 
This ethnic, as opposed to racial, identity is not unique to Afrikaners. and all groups within 
the South African racial minorities reveal, equally consistently. a more particularistic as 
opposed to racial identification. It is in all groups a minority phenomenon but the minority 
strength of the tendency is not insignificant. 
This "ethnic" identity among Afrikaners is not consistently associated with any greater 
militancy than the wider identity, and indeed there is no greater militancy among 
Afrikaners in general than there appears to be among other racial and language-based 
minorities. Associations with militancy are stronger among the coloured language minority, 
where the identity is overlaid, with a strong consciousness of material deprivation. 
Nonetheless, there is a core, albeit small, of ethnic militancy among Afrikaners. 
The empirical research also confirmed much earlier findings by Schlemmer (and Turner) 
(1973) that the ethnic-orientation among Afrikaners includes a sub-group which we termed 
"separatist verligtes" ( enlightened separatists) -- a fairly distinct tendency in which 
ethnicity is not associated with racial outgroup-hostility. lf anything this orientation has 
strengthened. The evidence is strong, therefore, that Afrikaner ethnicity and racial-Euro-
centric in-group identification are conceptually and · ideologically separate phenomena. 
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They overlapped and consistently reinforced each other in the period of Afrikaner ethnic 
mobilisation, but they are distinguishable phenomena in their composition. 
In this regard one should note as well, that research by Lever ( 1978: 126) suggested little 
association between Afrikaans ethnocentrism and the authoritarian personality syndrome 
which has been associated with racism in a number of studies outside South Africa. 
The '' inner identities" among the coloured and English-speaking white racial minorities are 
not as self-consciously held as is the case among the Afrikaners. The identities have not 
become encoded or mythologised; they are what one may describe as nascent etlmicities in 
the form of group-consciousness. The finding that some form of ethnic group identification 
is present among English-speakers has been established before. not only by this author but 
also by Sennet and Vorster (1996). Among the English-speaking white "semi-ethnics", as it 
were, there is an a sense of affinity with Afrikaans ethnicity but among coloured "semi-
ethnics" the relationship to white Afrikaners tends to be hostile. as one would expect in the 
light of Apartheid. 
The empirical evidence also reflected a marked educational differentiation between the 
tendencies identified for Afrikaners. The majority of Afrikaners with university education 
tend to have weaker group identification at all levels of identity outlined above, but there is 
a core among the Afrikaans intelligentsia that remains ethnic in its commitments. The 
heated and hostile debate which rages currently between "cosmopolitan"· and ethnic 
Afrikaners is well-reflected in the empirical data. 
POLITICAL OR TERRITORIAL SELF-DETERMJNA TION: A LIMP CONSENSUS 
Afrikaners reveal a high ievel of support in principle for self-determination and/or a 
Volkstaat, but an active commitment to the ideal is a minority phenomenon. The urge to 
self-determination is not only related to ethnic commitment but also to the racial-Euro-
centric identification. This is also reflected in the significant support for an Afrikaner 
Volkstaat among English-speakers. 
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The level of active commitment to the ideal of a Y olkstaat is mainly depressed by 
perceptions of its economic and political non-viability. As such it is limp and passive, but if 
a perception of its practical possibility took hold, the ideal is likely to burgeon. 
ONION VERSUS ARTICHOKE: LAYERS OF AFRIKANER JDENTJTY 
What the data tends to show is well expressed by Stanley Hoffmann (1968:200-201). 
Ethnic idei1tity is not like an onion with which, if one peels away layers of outer identity, 
the vegetable vanishes; it is rather like an artichoke. where peeling away layers of petals 
eventually reveals the core or heart of the flower. 
The specifically Afrikaans high-priority ethnic commitment 1s a minority phenomenon, 
albeit significant. The descriptive cultural self-definition of themselves by Afrikaners, is a 
majority phenomenon, but does not have direct salience as regards political commitments. 
Religious self-identification and commitment is also a majority phenomenon, no longer 
with direct salience for politics. 
The identification with a wider racial-Euro-centric value system. however, is a majority 
phenomenon with direct salience for conservative political commitments. The political 
salience, however, appears to be intensified where cultural and religious self-definitions are 
present. The effect of the apparently non-politically focused cultural self-identification, 
therefore, is subliminal, but powerful. 
The high-priority ethnic commitment, therefore, appears to be at the core of what may be 
termed an ethnically-linked but not necessarily self-conscious political culture. This 
political formation is dominantly conservative, but it embraces an idealistic and reform-
oriented minority. The political salience of both the core-ethnicity and the wider ethnically-
linked elements of political culture are tending to intensify, but gradually. 
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The broad categorisation given above tends to be supported by empirical survey research 
by Bornman (1994a) and by Kotze (1997), although they did not attempt the identification 
of layers of identity as offered above. Another study by Bornman ( 1994b) has shown that 
ethnic identification among Afrikaners is associated with positive self-image and 
confidence. Although this to some extent lowers the dependence on ethnic identi.fication, 
one of the problems of the Afrikaners over the decades was how to deal with extremely 
self-assured Anglo-Saxon competitors. The Afrikaans author Nepgen (1938) remarked on 
this problem long ago and argued that the ethnic identification and the sense of having a 
collective mission increased the sense of personal worth of Afrikaners. Here we see an 
illustration of one of the primary factors in ethnic identification at work. 
12.3 SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR ETHNICITY THEORY 
One way of relating Afrikaner ethnicity to a wider theoretical field is to ask how the major 
features of Afrikaner ethnicity outlined above would translate into general propositions. 
Some of these propositions can be fairly firm, while other issues have to be stated as 
possibilities, because the Afrikaner case study does not always produce a clear conclusion. 
' 
The following propositions and possibilities are suggested by the conclusions for 
Afrikaners reached in the previous section; also by the wider evidence and the historical 
review of the emergence of Afrikaner ethnicity. The propositions are not assumed to be 
new or original, but they may have some confirmatory value. They broadly coincide with 
and tend to confirm the relevant propositions included in chapter 4. 
THE ETHNIC CORE SUI GENERJS 
Despite several overlays of group-linked interests, interactions with other groups at the 
boundaries and adaptations in value systems, what bas been termed an ethno-cultural inner-
consciousness within the particular ethnic group, can or will persist. This core-
consciousness is relatively independent of extraneous instrumental motives, and denotes an 
intrinsic identification. 
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The core ethnic commitment is not necessarily a majority phenomenon. But even where it 
exists in a minority within the group, it is a "core" in the sense that the common self-
identification of most members in terms of culture and ethnic label links them to the core 
' 
commitment in a pattern of common sentiment. 
THE ETHNIC CORE AND MYTHS OF ORIGIN 
The ethnic core-commitments, where they are self-conscious. are likely to be linked to the 
myths of group origin, since these myths are the symbolic metaphors which impart the 
sense of belonging which is a defining feature of ethnic phenomena. The myths of origin 
need not be highly specific. By this is meant that they need not relate to a single ancestor or 
kin formation. The perception of the emergence of a group over a period of distant history, 
with diverse symbolic events, may be sufficient. 
THE SPECIFIC IDENTITY REFERENCE IN THE ~MYTH OF ORIGIN A1AY OR MAY NOT 
HAVE A BEARING ON THE RELATIVE EXCLUSIVITY OF THE GROUP AT A LATER 
STAGE. 
The history of the Afrikaners raises the question of whether or not a broad European-· 
Protestant self-definition at an early stage, or the ambivalence with regard to the English, 
may have influenced the rules of ethnic inclusion or exclusion at a later stage. The question 
of whether a very specific myth (eg. Moses/the Tribe of Israel) versus a more diffuse 
reference (Germanic-French Protestant settlers associated with a Dutch Company) makes a 
difference to the degree of ethnic exclusivity at a later stage. requires comparative 
investigation. (In the case of Afrikaners there is even today a semblance of Germanic or 
Huguenot pride. but its subtle effects have not been investigated.) 
IT APPEARS TO BE POSSIBLE FOR ETHNIC RESPONSES. EVEN MILITANT 
RESPONSES TO EMERGE EVEN WHERE THE ETHNIC IDENTITY JS LATENT 
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If elements of "contrastiveness" are present and a competitive situation with sufficient 
stress to generate needs for psychic support exists, an ethnic response quite as powerful as 
is would occur in a self-conscious ethnic group is possible. This illustrates the "need 
disposition" aspect of ethnicity which underlies its "availability" as a factor in group or 
political mobilisation and conflict. 
This proposition is drawn from the evidence of inter-group conflict among black workers 
on the mines which occurred with a strong ethnic coloration despite the fact that the 
participants were idealistically opposed to the notion of ethnic solidarity and group 
formation. It is also drawn from the evidence of a "group consciousness" with elements of 
activism among coloured people in the factor analyses. although the actors themselves 
would probably not experience anything like an ethmc consciousness and indeed would 
feel uneasy if they did. 
ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS JS NOT UNIFORM ACROSS A GROUP (as implied by the 
distinction above between a core consciousness and marginal consciousness) BUT THE 
EXTENT TO WHICH THE CORE AND THE MARGINS lvlOBILJSE AGAINST EACH 
OTHER JS RELEVANT TO THE VIABILITY AND SURVIVAL OF AN ETHNIC GROUP. 
The question here is whether the outer rings in the "artichoke" of ethnic identity allow the 
"heart" to speak on their behalf is obviously critical to the coherence or vulnerability of a 
cultural group. 
THE POSSIBILITY OF TENSION BETWEEN CORE VERSUS MARGIN, OR BETWEEN 
"EXCLUSIVES" VERSUS "INCLUSIVES" RAISES THE QUESTION OF THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF LEADERSHIP, ORGANl,SATIONAL CO-ORDINATION AND 
RECONCILIATION WITHIN THE GROUP, WHICH H4S A BEARING ON THE 
VULNERABILITY OF THE GROUP. 
The Afrikaners, for example, at different periods have spent perhaps a century or more 
fighting each other about the relationships with the English-speakers and more latterly with 
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coloured Afrikaans-speakers. This proposition has been made very effectively by Milton 
Esman (1990:55) 
"Equally important (to an ethnic group) are the uhilities. commitment, and 
coherence of the political entrepreneurs who organise and guide ... (and) provide 
ongoing links with the mass of their ethnic community." 
ETHNIC BOUNDARIES (as Frederik Barth postulated) RELATE AfORE TO THE 
INTERESTS AND INSTRUMENTAL INTERACTIONS OF AN ETHNIC GROUP THAN TO 
ITS CORE CONTENT AND COMMITMENTS. AND AS SUCH. SINCE THE 
BOUNDARIES AFFECT THE CORE CONTENT OVER TIME. THE BOUNDARY CAN 
USURP THE ORIGINAL COMMITMENTS. 
This seems to follow convincingly from the Afrikaners instrumental concerns with race and 
the race boundary. 
AN ORGANISED ETHNIC GROUP WILL INCORPORATE C'LASS INTERESTS AND 
OTHER COMPETITIVE INTERESTS RELATIVE TO OTHER GROUPS. IT IS POSSIBLE 
FOR AN ETHNIC GROUP TO INCORPORATE OPPOSING CLASS INTERESTS 
SIMULTANEOUSLY. AND TO RECONCILE THEM WITHIN THE GROUP. OR TO GIVE 
ONE SET OF INTERESTS PRECEDENCE OVER ANOTHER. CLASS INTEREST CAN 
BECOME THE DOMINANT INTEREST BASE OF A GROUP OR IT A1AY BE LESS 
SALIENT RELATIVE TO OTHER GROUP INTERESTS 
This proposition is in contrast to the proposition in Marxist literature, which would have it 
that the class dynamic will usurp, incorporate or even manufacture or facilitate ethnic 
interests to support the structural imperative of the mode of production. The fact that the 
Afrikaner ethnic group could simultaneously incorporate and integrate proletarian, petit 
bourgeois and (semi-socialist) bureaucratic interests at the time of its greatest cohesion 
indicates, however, that the ethnic formation can be the prior or co-ordinating factor. 
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WHERE CLASS INTERESTS ARE INCORPORATED. UNLESS AN ENTIRE CLASS JS 
INVOLVED, THE PHENOMENON OF "SPLIT LABOUR MARKETS" WILL EMERGE 
AND THE CLASS SEGMENT WITHIN THE ETHNIC GROUP WILL COMPETE WITH 
CLASS-EQUIVALENTS OUTSIDE THE GROUP. THE S'AME PRINCIPLE WOULD 
APPLY IN RESPECT OF CAPITAL MARKETS AND BUREAU( 'RATJC OPPORTUNITY 
Here again the ethnic dynamic appears to have precedence over the class dynamic. In the 
case of Afrikaners the impoverished proletariat did not co-opt the ethnic group but returned 
to the ethnic group of the identification they had before their proletarianisation. The split 
labour market literature seems to place undue emphasis on the worker competition; the 
competition between ethnic adversaries will occur at all levels of opportunity. and as such 
reflect the instrumentality of ethnicity as such and not the incorporation of ethnicity for 
extraneous instrumental purposes. 
IT FOLLOWS THAT THE ETHNIC FRAMEWORK CAN LEND THRUST AND 
COHERENCE TO CLASS INTERESTS WITHIN ITS FORJ\!JATION AT THE SAME TIME 
INCORPORATION OF CLASS-BASED ORGANISATION AS A COMPONENT OF 
ETHNIC lvJOBILISATJON CAN LEND STRENGTH AND TENACITY TO AN ETHNIC 
GROUP. 
The references in the preceding text to the comparative work on South Africa and Northern 
Ireland by Alexander Johnston are apposite in this regard. but the development of Afrikaner 
capitalist organisations were particularly important to the competitive viability of Afrikaner 
ethnicity, AND VICE-VERSA. 
It may be assumed to follow that both class and ethnic dynamics are capable of 
incorporating each other under the required conditions. but it is suggested that this 
equivalence is rare. The ethnic formation normally requires so wide a diversity of functions 
and roles that the occupational structure implied would cut across a typical class structure. 
It is suggested, therefore, that: 
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WHILE AN ETHNIC FORMATION CAN INCORPORATE CLASS DYNAMICS AND 
INTERESTS WITHIN IT, CLASS-BASED FORMATIONS. BECAUSE THEY IMPLY 
CONFLICT BETWEEN WORKER AND BOURGEOIS PERSONNEL. CANNOT 
NORMALLY INCORPORATE THE ETHNIC DYNAMIC 
THE GENERAL COMPETITIVE MOTIVATION WITHIN ETHNIC GROUPS JS THAT OF 
GROUP STATUS OR POSITION VIS A VIS OTHER GROUPS -- THE GENERAL 
REWARDS BEING SELF-ESTEEM THAT ALL MEMBERS CAN SHARE. THIS GROUP 
STATUS TRANSLATES INTO PSYCHIC REWARDS AND SELF-CONFIDENCE. 
This factor has among Afrikaners contributed to the competitive success of individual 
members after periods of dislocation and defeat. 
IT JS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER. FOR STRONGLY-DEVELOPED INTERESTS IN A 
COMPETITIVE SITUATION TO SO COLOUR AND STRUCTURE THE DEFINITIONS 
OF GROUP STATUS THAT SUCH INTERESTS BEGIN TO USURP THE 
ORGANISATION AND GOAL SETTING WITHIN THE GROUP. THIS DANGER JS 
GREATEST WHEN THE INTERESTS INVOLVED ARE THE POWER-INTERESTS OF 
INFLUENTIAL ELITES. BECAUSE THE STRATEGIC MISTAKES THEY MAKE IN 
PURSUIT OF THEIR POWER INTERESTS MAY DAMAGE THE COHERENCE AND 
VITALITY OF THE GROUP. THIS DANGER JS LESSENED IF THE ELITES IN THE 
GROUP ARE DRAWN FROM A DIVERSE INTEREST-BASE IN THE ETHNIC GROUP 
ITSELF. 
In the case of Afrikaners the political elites became too powerful and the entire project was 
placed at risk by its dependence on a political party. which linked the integration of group 
status to particularly power-oriented policies which were doomed to fail. 
A RELAXED BOUNDARY BETWEEN TWO GROUPS CAN GIVE RISE TO A DUAL 
IDENTITY, OR AN OVERARCHING IDENTITY. WHICH CAN BECOME THE MORE 
SALIENT IDENTITY IN THE POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC FIELDS THE GROUP WILL 
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CONTINUE TO EXIST WITH AN ETHNIC "CORE" BUT THE MARGINAL 
MEMBERSHIP MAY LOSE THE FEATURES OF MOBILISED ETHNICITY AND 
BECOME A GROUP WHICH JS MERELY LJNGUJSTJCALLY OR CULTURALLY 
DISTINCTIVE. 
This is the proposition arising out of the relationship between Afrikaans and English-
speaking South Africans after socio-economic progress among Afrikaners and the 
attainment of political dominance reduced the competition between the two groups. It is 
necessary to note, however. that: 
EVEN WHERE A BOUNDARY HAS LOST ITS INSTRUMENTALITY OR SALIENCE FOR 
THE PROMOTION OF GROUP STATUS. AND DUAL IDENTITY AND POLITICAL OR 
ECONOMIC COALITIONS E1\1ERGE, A CORE WITHIN THE GROUP JS LIKELY TO 
RETAIN AN ETHNO-CULTURAL CONSCIOUSNESS. AT TIMES UNCONNECTED WITH 
INTER-GROUP COMPETITIVENESS (see above proposition on the inner consciousness). 
UNDER THESE CONDITIONS AN ETHNIC GROUP MAY LOSE CONSIDERABLE 
COHERENCE AND THE SCOPE OF ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION WILL SHRINK BACK 
TO THE CORE. 
THE RELATIVE SIZE OF THE CORE COMMITMENT. OR ALTERNATIVELY STATED, 
THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT BECOMES ERODED WILL DEPEND ON MODES OF 
EXPRESSION OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE GROUP CULTURE AND THE ALTERNATIVE 
IDENTITY SUPPORT AVAILABLE WITHIN THE CULTURE. LIKE RELIGIOSITY OR 
INDIVIDUALISM 
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN GROUPS THAT HAVE NO SALIENT COMPETITIVE 
RELATIONSHIPS JS AN INSTANCE OF "UNRANKED" ETHNICITY AND THE 
SHRINKING OF THE CORE OF ETHNIC COMMITMENT (as opposed to nominal 
recognition of cultural or language differences) CAN GIVE RISE TO WIDER PROCESSES 
OF GROUP DECOMPOSITION. 
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The process would accord with an observation made by Donald Horowitz ( 1985:29 passim: 
see theoretical section) that the ethnic "cement" is weaker in unranked groups than it is in 
ranked groups. Horowitz also makes the point that there is uncertainty in unranked groups 
(see ahead). His point is taken, however, that because the odds are so stark in situations of 
ranked ethnicity, and the possible conflicts so severe. that unranked groups may be more 
stable over time, albeit at a lower level of intensity. The non-mobilised and unranked 
"ethnicity" of cultural differences and residues can be very stable and persistent over time. 
There are other dangers, however. 
IN "UNRANKED" GROUPS OR IN SITUATIONS IN WHICH POLITICAL 
COMPETITION BETWEEN TWO GROUPS JS OF LOW SALIENCE. THE ORGANISING 
AND CO-ORDINATING ELEMENTS WILL WEAKEN OR BE TAKEN OVER BY 
INTELLECTUALS OR ETHNIC EXTREMISTS. AND IN BOTH CASES THE ETHNIC 
GROUP WILL LOSE COHERENCE OUTSIDE THE ETHNIC CORE. 
In the case of intellectuals in modern industrial society. their "ethnic" values will be 
vulnerable to the pervasive universally-oriented humanist or cosmopolitan spirit in upper-
middle class Western culture. In the case of ethnic extremists their lack of sympathy with 
the more pragmatic rank-and-file members will reduce their capacity to co-ordinate and 
reconcile conflicting tendencies within the group. The cement in the core will have to be 
exceptionally strong for the group to maintain a significant coherence. as with, say, the 
Jewish group in South Africa where the collective memories not only of the holocaust but 
also of descent from ghetto communities in Eastern Europe are still fairly strong. 
WHERE THE ETHNIC BOUNDARY DEMARCATES "RANKED" GROUPS, IT WILL 
OBVIOUSLY BE MORE FIRMLY DEFINED AND DEFENDED THAN IN CASES WHERE 
GROUPS ARE UNRANKED. 
This observation is simple common-sense; these boundaries are more often than not 
accompanied by conflicts of interests, political competition or invidious status distinctions 
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and it follows that "social closure" of various kinds will result. This does not mean to say 
that boundaries between unranked groups become irrelevant but as with non-exclusive 
Afrikaners and English-speaking whites in South Africa. there are hardly any sanctions 
relating to intermarriage, for example. 
WHERE INTERACTION BETWEEN RANKED GROUPS THREATENS CORE FEATURES 
IN THE SELF-DEFINITION OF THE ADVANTAGED GROUP. AND THE INTEGRITY 
OF THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THEM JS THREATENED BY SOCIAL CONDITIONS 
OR OTHER FACTORS INCONSISTENT WITH THE RANKING. THEN VERY INTENSIVE 
BOUNDARY MAINTENANCE BEHAVIOUR AND SUPPORTING RATIONALISATIONS 
WILL EMERGE. 
In the previous section this process was put forward as an explanation of the genesis of the 
racism of Afrikaner nationalists. They were fighting for their conception of Afrikaners as 
heirs to the "civilisation" perceived to be associated with the European high cultures, which 
was under threat because of the socio-economic crisis of the Afrikaner poor. This is a case 
where the processes of boundary maintenance have effects which among many, if not most 
Afrikaners usurped the original basis of their ethnic consciousness and superimposed a 
systematic racism in its stead. Although one does not want to put niceties on racism, an 
understanding of a process such as the one outlined may help to identify means to combat 
the virulence of racism in some. if not all situations. 
FINALLY, WHERE POLITICAL OR OTHER VICTORIES AWARD AN ETHNIC GROUP 
CONTROL OF A TERRITORY AND ITS STATE MACHINERY. THE ETHNICITY. IN 
BECOMING A NATIONALISM, JS INTRODUCED TO A NEW RANGE OF THREATS 
AND COMPLEXITIES. 
Even ethnically-based governments in plural societies cannot ignore the competitive 
pressures emanating from competing civic groups and ethnic goals have to give way to 
strategic power goals and coalitions of interest. Such coalitions may reduce the salience of 
ethnic boundaries for the political elites. Furthermore, the strategic and practical 
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requirements of government, even in ethnically dominated states. may alienate the ethnic 
rulers from at least some of the ethnic followers. If the government's attempt to pursue 
ethnic goals at the cost of risking conflict or deeper conflict. moral contradictions will arise 
which will weaken collective ethnic resolve. 
These and a host of other factors in governance typically appear to cause schisms and splits 
between tendencies within ethnic ruling groups. and in addition to the examples of political 
schism and splits among Afrikaners, one may think of hosts of other examples. from Israel, 
the Basque federal province, Northern Ireland and many others to Belgium. When ethnic 
groups divide between political parties, the nature of inter-party competition makes the 
more responsive methods of reconciling tendencies within an ethnic group more difficult to 
achieve. 
Aside from which the bureaucratic imposition of institutionalised protection for ethnic 
interests by a government undermines the voluntarism and key elements of commitment 
which are central to the nature of ethnicity. The greatest risks to ethnic group coherence 
will arise when a group claims formal political power over others. 
12.4 TOW ARDS A FRAMEWORK 
Each one of the propositions in 12.3 coincides broadlv with propositions reviewed in the 
literature. It would be tedious to return to chapters 2 and 3 to pick up the references, but a 
few stand out. Mention has already been made of the fact that the conclusions of Donald 
Horowitz ( 1985) on the differences between ranked and unranked systems long preceded 
this text, as would his conclusions on dual and over-arching identities. and the moral 
contradictions which weaken ethnicities in situations of ethnic domination (Horowitz, 
chapter 1 ). Horowitz elsewhere (1975: 134) observes in the context of Nigeria that 
"With a multiplication of contexts, there was typically a multiplication of'levels and 
some qf the lower levels of identity often remained quite poiverfiil ": 
in confirmation of the propositions made above about levels of identity and the persistence 
of the inner identity of Afrikaners at a core. 
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Similarly the propositions about the ethnic boundaries as mechanisms of competition are 
broadly in line with much of the analysis of Frederik Barth ( 1969). although this analysis 
gives more prominence to the fact that boundaries cannot be drawn around something that 
has no prior reality of ethnic consciousness. His propositions. however. accommodate the 
fact that the racial boundary obsession of Afrikaners usurped much of the original "content" 
of the ethnic commitment. 
The persistence of core ethnic commitments on the basis of intrinsic attachments to a real 
or mythical origin has similarly been emphasised by authors too numerous to mention. The 
exposition of the utility of ethnic attachments to the individual psyche by Horowitz 
(1985:143-147, 182-184) and their capacity to stimulate reactions out of proportion to the 
threat involved· (Horowitz, page 130-131) is consonant with the potential for violent 
responses to outgroups. even where ethnic identity has not crystallised as a self-conscious 
phenomenon. A pre-ethnic "need" for group identification under certain conditions is 
accommodated in the propositions above. 
The propositions above take issue with some Marxists for assummg that class 
contradictions and interests operate with some "hidden hand" of structural influence, 
beyond human agency, to create supportive cultural and other "superstructural" 
manifestations, including ethnicity. But this analysis makes provision for class, through 
affinities of interest, strengthening ethnic structure. -Indeed material interests and class 
contradictions are almost always present in inter-ethnic competition. The notion that ethnic 
formations can incorporate class as elements in their structure of interests is also a familiar 
theme in the literature reviewed in chapter 2. 
The fact that there is not any new or totally contrary proposition in the range above does 
not unduly concern this author because social science progresses in an endless process of 
confirmation and refutation. But the propositions were presented in a continuous listing for 
a particular reason: this being to demonstrate that, in order for them to encompass the 
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empirical features of the particular case study, they could usefully be integrated m an 
explanatory framework. 
The proposal of an integrated explanatory framework is not new either. but if one can be 
identified which covers the varied patterns of cause and effect in the South African case 
study it might just be useful in other contexts. What are the requirements of such a 
framework? 
Eric Leifer, after making the point that: 
"The distinctions hetween class and ethnic interests has allowed a sharper division 
between proponents ol the two models than was theoretical(y or empirically 
justifiable 11, 
argues for the need to embed the rational pursuit of advantage ,v·ithin a sociological model; 
a model which can be provided by identifying the elements of ethnic mobilisation. He 
emphasises the need for a focus on mobilisation of identity rather than identity as a 
condition which is complete in itself: 
"Throw away the distinction between class and ethnic interests und the data begin 
:,,peaking only one language. This is not the language ol economic motives or (~l 
passionate ethnic appeals but the language ofpolitical mohilisation. The aim c~l a 
model ofpolitical mobilisation is to predict the degree ofmobili:::.ation which will 
occur in concrete settings." (Leifer, 1981 :46) 
In order to be embedded in what Leifer refers to as a "sociological" approach, a model has 
to incorporate and transcend the major competing explanations of ethnic action. It has to 
transcend both the essentialism of reliance on anything approaching primordial sentiments 
as a sufficient condition for mobilisation, and those instrumentalist or radical constructivist 
arguments to the effect that interests and rational calculations unleash hidden processes 
within social structure which relegate human sentiments and needs to a secondary or 
accompanying role. 
Something along the lines of an integrated framework is offered by Juteau (1996), a model 
which she terms "ethnic communalization". She departs from the assumption that ethnic 
boundaries are not created "ex nihilo; they are created ji-om 'real' social locations and 
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involve 'real' histories 11 (p6 l ). Her model, with some colouring in of aspects which appear 
to be implicit in her arguments, would involve an integration of two boundary processes. 
The one is the "external boundary" which involves the chanuinu definitions of insiders and 
outsiders under the impact of the transactions and competitions of interest with other 
groups and forces at the boundary of the ethnic group. The "internal houndary''_ on the 
other hand, involves the socialisation and mobilisation processes which are necessary to 
engender or reinforce a subjective belief in a community of origin and to establish the 
markers and criteria which the actors must use in social and political interaction. 
Yelvington (1991:165) also supports the postulate of a dual boundary process in ethnicity, 
as have Horowitz and others. 
The "internal houndaty" processes of Juteau can be seen in t\VO ,vays. They can be seen as 
the consolidation and reinforcement of identities and historical memories which already 
exist as cultural features. They are sometimes depicted. often by authors wishing to 
establish the primacy of class and power interests. as the manipulations or creations of 
identity and meaning by powerful establishments. A South African example would be that 
of Hofmeyr (1987) who gives an account of "being made into an Afi·ikaner" by an 
"unstable and contradictmy process" of the manufacture of an Afrikaans identity and 
literary culture in the early twentieth century. If such authors make the slightest 
acknowledgement that the manufacturing of identity is unlikely to succeed or be so 
common unless there is a prior "seed" of a sense of origin and the psychic rewards 
associated with a sense of difference, then the "internal boundary" process of Juteau can 
accommodate both the "idealists" and the Marxists. As Crawford Young explains: 
"Primordialism usefully completes instrumentalism hy explaining the.force (I would 
add 'availability') of the "qffective tie" through which interest is instrumentally 
pursued."(Young, 1993:23) 
The notion of the processes internal to the group being a form of boundary is useful 
because unless those processes are effective the internal identity formation will not support 
from below the external boundary which gives the ethnicity its cohesion in the pursuit of 
group status and rewards. 
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But the notion of the mobilisation or organisation of the internal processes and criteria is 
too mechanical on its own, and would in practice be too forced to be effective. There must 
be another or additional link between the factors associated with the external boundary and 
the internal responses for the model to be what Leifer above calls "sociological". 
Carter Bentley has put forward propositions which would bridge the external and the 
internal dimensions of ethnicity. He calls it ''habitus" (Bentley. 1987: Bentley, 1991). 
Bentley commences with the observation that ethnic boundaries and definitions do not 
necessarily co-vary in any regular fashion. He has to explain why ethnic identification can 
arise, or not arise. independently of the actual origin or cultural features of a group. He uses 
the concept of "habitus", following Pierre Bourdieu. to explain the process he postulates. 
Habitus is described as the experience by a group of circumstances and conditions, 
including economic and social factors as well as language_ differences. etc.-- the group's 
"habitual practice". 
This habitus or habitual practice produces: "consciousness of affinities of interest and 
experience that embodies subliminal awareness of objective commonalities in practice" 
(Bentley, 1987:27). In a later reply to a critique. Bentley makes the description simpler 
when he says that shared economic, social and cultural conditions "engender feelings of 
identification among people similarly endowed" (1991: 173). Furthermore, Bentley argues 
that habitual practice engenders "common memories which hecome unconscious" (p 173) 
and that it represents "deep structure ... drawing together an infinite variety of' surface 
expressions as being of a single type" (p 170-171 ). Bentley rejects the assertion in a critique 
by Yelvington (1991) that he makes light of the sentiments and feelings of identity, but he 
tries to relate them more to the shared conditions of the group than to the myths and 
circumstances of origin. 
The inputs of the authors referred to just above provide useful guidelines to a framework. 
The task now is to draw them together, and to relate them to both the conclusions emerging 
out of chapters 2 and 3 and to the propositions arising out of the South African case made 
under 12.3 above. 
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. An integrated model along the following lines is suggested. The ordering of points is 
simply for convenience and does not necessarily imply priorities or sequences in the 
process: 
• ETHNICITY IS MOBILISATION 
First, the emphasis has to be on ethnic mobilisation, because inert ethnicity would be 
merely an interesting form of cultural differentiation or celebration of self by a lifestyle 
category. 
• IDENTITY IS NOT ARBITRARY OR ENTIRELY MANUFACTURED 
Second, the entire construction could be arbitrary. which it clearly is not. if the focus of 
identity was simply fortuitous or convenient for those who might gain advantage from 
it. One could have ethnic groups of Toyota or Volkswagen owners or joggers and tennis 
players. What makes ethnic mobilisation possible (but not inevitable) is the presence of 
the variable but fairly common tendency to derive psychic satisfaction from a sense of 
group-belonging and ego-amplification, coupled with the fact that: 
• THE AFFECTIVE AFFINITY OF ETHNICITY WITH KINSHIP GIVES IT ITS 
PREVALENCE AND MOBILISING POWER 
The sense of identification with groups of actual or putative ongm has a greater 
capacity to provide the psychic rewards for various reasons. Bentley makes a 
convincing case for the fact that because ethnic identification has an emotive affinity to 
the perceptions which bind actual families or clans together. descent symbolism enjoys 
prevalence over alternative symbols of identity (Bentley. I 987. following Epstein, 
1978). However, one has to allow for the fact that religious identification can and often 
does offer ·equally powerful rewards (see chapter 2) and has the capacity to dislodge 
descent symbolism (see also persuasive arguments by Theodor Hanf ( 1994)). Where 
descent symbolism and a specific denominational identity are intertwined, as in the case 
of Afrikaners until recently, the power of the identification may be compounded. 
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• ETHNIC IDENTITY V ARiES WITH HISTORICAL PAIN AND PAST 
MO BILI SA TION 
The prior propensities to identify with descent groups are not. to borrow phrases from 
chapter 2, definitive, inevitable, ineluctable or ineffable. but they are commonly 
available and their effects can be activated by mobilisation. Their availability and the 
ease with which they will be activated will depend on the past experience of shared 
social stress, pain, humiliation, privation, relative deprivation. status threat or threats to 
self-image in the experience of the group. Trevor-Roper's depiction. referred to earlier, 
of nationalism as wounded identity is apposite. The range of ''omplifiers" given above is 
deliberately broad. It may be made more difficult for ethnic mobilisation to occur or to 
persist in a group which was for the most part satisfied. wealthy. confident and whose 
political position was such as to make it immune to cha I lenges within the immediate 
social environment. The recent examples in South Africa and in the USA of a shared 
consc10usness among blacks of racial victimisation. which structures their 
contemporary attitudes within a framework of "victimolot,..,ry". to coin a clumsy phrase, is 
a convenient example. 
• ORIGINAL ETHNIC IDENTITY IS ELABORATED AND SHAPED BY THE 
COMMONALITIES OF ONGOING EXPERIENCE 
Moving the identity beyond a relatively inert potential, the structuring factor of 
commonalities of cun-ent experience is the crystallisation -- the "deep structure" 
(Bentley) of the "habitus". The "habitus" includes the effects of interaction with others 
by the members of the group iri question. This "habitus" can maintain internal 
coherence or it can become diffuse or fragmented by a differentiation of interpretations. 
This crystallisation is not yet the group "ideolqry.," but it is the basis on which an 
ideology offered to the group by the intelligentsia becomes meaningful. The "habitus" 
as it emerges in the shared understanding, must obviously be linked plausibly but not 
perfectly to the historical identity and the sense of shared past group experience. 
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• THE ETHNIC EXPERIENCE HAS TO BE INTERPRETED WITHIN THE ETHNIC 
GROUP 
As suggested immediately above, this habitus must be internally reinforced and 
consolidated through socialisation and the formulation for the group of a popular 
ideology in the form of a mirror of its condition. This corresponds to Juteau's internal 
boundary formation. If the co-ordination and interpretation functions of the ethnic 
leaders and intelligentsia is weak and contradictory. and the socialisation functions are 
equally dissipated, then the condition of internal mobilisation of the group will be 
vulnerable to alternative forms of engagement with the wider society. In particular, for 
example, more universal appeals and the logic of individualistic engagement of the 
economy in the liberal mode will offer persuasive alternative orientations. Horowitz 
(1985:24) refers to the fact of relative group worth in unranked ethnic systems always 
being subject to great uncertainty, and makes reference later to the alternative moralities 
which impact upon the ethnic value system. The internal ethnic group "boundary" is 
indeed vulnerable to the forces which have been described in sociological shorthand as 
the forces of" modernisation". 
Hence. for any instance of ethnic mobilisation. the servicing role of ethnic leadership 
and ethnic institutions of socialisation are paramount. One should note that where the 
themes in the internal boundary in contemporary society include a racist consciousness 
or any other consciousness which offends shared international norms, the ethnic 
mobilisation will be under particularly sharp attack. It is in such situations that the 
ethnic leaders and the ethnic intelligentsia must reconcile their ethnic goals with 
powerful external norms. 
It was precisely this failure that gave Afrikaner ethnicity its greatest single source of 
vulnerability, and rightfully so because the ethnic leaders either defected, or failed to 
confront the racist Apartheid administration and bureaucracy in time. Having rigidly 
institutionalised the racist system in "separate development" the state administration, 
through typical fear of precedent, was itself unable to ad,iust the system it had set in motion. 
• THE ST A TE IS POWERFUL IN CREATING OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CONSTRAINTS FOR THE ACTIVATION OF ETHl'JICITY 
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The observation above raises the need for an additional point. this being that the state, 
whether colonial or otherwise, can impose conditions which shape the "habitus" quite 
formidably and can even create the opportunity for new definitions of descent (see 
Laitin, 1982 on the -influence of colonial and post-colonial government on Yoruba 
ethnicity). By their very definition state laws and regulations as they intersect with 
ethnic aspirations will have a definitive effect. The main point about the influence of 
governments on the internal boundary creation is that they are less flexible than 
informal ethnic processes and the ethnic definitions can be artificially strengthened in 
the short term but become ossified in the process. 
• ETHNIC BOUl\JDARIES ARE SHAPED IN INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNAL 
COMMONALITIES OF EXPERIENCE, INSTRUMENTALITIES. AND 
RESPONSES TO THE GROUP BY OUTSIDERS 
The concepts of habitus or internal boundary formation would be meaningless if the 
entire group lives on an island. The potential would be there but ethnic mobilisation 
only becomes conceptually possible in interaction with other groups or nations. The 
external boundary formation, in Juteau's terms, in alignment with Barth ( 1969), is the 
vehicle or the mechanism by which competitive goals are achieved and in terms of 
which transactions with other groups and with the outside political and social 
environment occur. But most importantly, it is, to paraphrase Barth's famous expression 
(l 969: 14-15), the shape and texture and structure of the ethnic "vessel" which according 
to Barth, gives the ethnic group its content and character. 
But in line with Juteau and the proposition above. the boundary is not merely some 
alienated construction which imposes downwards. lf external forces are powerful in 
limiting and confining an ethnic minority in social and economic space this downward 
imposition would be relatively definitive, but not completely so. Similarly, if class 
forces or power interests exercise influences to structure a boundary. close it off or open 
it up for instrumental reasons, the forces would impose themselves downwards, but not 
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with absolute effect. In contrast to the popular conceptions of the boundary hypotheses, 
this author's argument and probably that of Juteau is that the vessel and the contents--
the external and internal boundary norms and criteria -- interact to produce the 
outcome. Two minorities in comparable situations of powerless and social exclusion 
will not necessary respond in the same way or develop the same types of boundaries. 
The external boundaries of the group, then, are those forces of inclusion or exclusion 
which create opportunities or limitations for the ethnic group. as they are responded to 
by the ethnic membership itself: and the responses will not be uniform. But the 
responses can be creative to the extent that the social institutions. leaders. mobilisers 
and role models in the ethnic 2:roup understand the process and. once again. with 
respect to the reasons whv an ethnic consciousness exists in the first place. attempt to 
reconcile the forces. constraints and opportunities. 
This final suggestion 1s simultaneously a suggestion that "sociolo,""'Y" is not only the 
interplay of abstractions in the form of values and structure: it is also process and agency. 
Horowitz (1975: 135) refers to the "alacrity with which groups are uhle to adjust their 
identity downwards as well as upwards ... ". Sandra Wallmann ( 1986:245) from within the 
"boundary" tradition, observes after an empirical study of ethnic situations in London, that 
the resilience of ethnic organisation varies with the flexibility of its boundaries, the 
openness and heterogeneity of its leadership structure which allows for generative 
organisational forms, and with the levels of its economic and identity resources. Esman 
( 1990), referred to earlier, also emphasises the importance of the co-ordinating and 
interpretive functions of ethnic elites. 
\ These propositions, ranging from the original core of potential for ethnic mobilisation to its 
instrumental functions of positioning a group relative to others or dealing with the way in 
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' which the alternative groups impose boundaries on the group. would seem to be reasonably 
capable of answering all the questions thrown at ethnicity. As postulated in chapter 1, no 
basis was discovered in this analysis for declaring that essential. instrumental and 




They are incompatible only if either the essentiality of identity or the structures of 
instrumentality are claimed to be autonomous, or to have greater autonomy than the 
alternative dynamic. These claims, endlessly pursued in the literature. have done much to 
retard the development of insights potentially usefol not only in the development of 
disciplines but in the search for the reconciliation of ethnic conflict. 
12.5 FINAL COMMENTS ON THE CURRENT COLLAPSE OF AFRIKANER 
ETHNIC MOBILISATION 
Finally, then, how and why has the formerly formidable Afrikaner ethnic mobilisation 
decomposed? There may be wider lessons in the answers to these questions. 
Most of the attempts at answering these questions have been stated or implied in the earlier 
discussions. Concluding observations may be useful. however. 
THE DILEMMAS OF UNRANKED ETHNIC MOBILISATION 
A large part of the limpness of Afrikaner ethnicity in mobilised form derives from its 
unranked status. For a negatively-ranked ethnic formation -- an exploited or marginalised 
minority -- the mode of solidarity in opposition, protest or dissent may be dangerous, but it 
does provide the glue to which Horowitz referred. It also focuses the minds of the co-
ordinating elites. There is also a great deal to be gained if opposition succeeds. 
Furthermore, the legitimacy of the surrounding political and social system can be 
discredited, which means that the elites and intellectuals are protected from distracting 
values and ideologies, or else they can commandeer such values to back their own claims. 
Afrikaners today are not oppressed or exploited. They have serious problems which will be 
noted later, but they are still widespread in officialdom. the Afrikaans elite residential areas 
are among the richest in the country, and although unemployment is increasing, it is below 
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the average levels of unemployment in the European Union. Their often legitimate 
grievances over high levels of crime and corruption and standards of administration are 
fully shared with English-speakers, coloured people. Indians and increasingly with middle 
class blacks. In point of fact the levels of crime are highest in English-speaking white 
residential areas. A report in the Saturday Star (13/1111999). based on police statistics on 
local areas in Gauteng for 1998, shows that after central business and inner city districts, 
the predominantly English-speaking residential suburbs of Sandton. Randburg, and 
Brooklyn have higher rates of serious crime than mainly black areas like Soweto or the 
Afrikaans-speaking areas of northern Pretoria. 
Hence there is little cause for ethnic solidarity in their socio-economic "hahitus" conditions; 
rather a middle class, minority-based protest solidarity which is precisely the political 
framework which the English-language Democratic Party offers. In a speech to the 
Freedom Front in July 1997. the experienced observer of Afrikaner affairs. [sak de Villiers, 
the then editor of the largest Afrikaans newspaper Rapport, explained the relative lack of 
success of that ethnic party very simply: 
"Too little has changed for Afrikaners. The constellotion of trends looks bad, the 
major structures are shifiing, things will change. hut at present life has a reassuring 
normality." 
I will come to de Villiers' prediction presently. 
THE CHANGED RATIONALE FOR MOBILISATION 
As discussed in chapter 5, the major impact of the change in the political dispensation for 
Afrikaners has been the rapid relative downgrading of the status of the Afrikaans language. 
~••----L--:...---• -~---~--------•~ .-L."'"- ~ •---=• -=•-=·• , •• _ -•L•------
F rom personal experience, a mere five years after transition. Afrikaner officials in Pretoria 
are losing their technical and professional vocabularies in Afrikaans. Poor coloured people 
can speak Afrikaans in public offices but white _mi_ddle-class Afrikaners are simply 
assumed to feel obligated to speak the language of the new elite, English: As the empirical 
studies have shown, Afrikaners are anything but happy about this. Why!hen are they not 
····----. .,.,... ... --
mobilising? 
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There are initiatives such as the Afrikaans "Oorlegplarform" (Consultative Forum) which is 
just beginning the new intellectual debate, and various cultural bodies constantly make 
polite noises of concern. Popular grass-roots involvement is restricted to tight and localised 
networks, like the listeners of the "rebel" Radio Pretoria (which actually has very little 
political content). 
One of the reasons for this limpness has been implied in much of the preceding discussion. 
Although the Afrikaans language is objectively a core concern of the ethnic group. it ceased 
------------ -- . . ----;;:------;---;-:-;c:---:-;-----~-------------
to be an issue of mooffisafion 5efore most of today's Afrikaners were born. The language -- ------- -- - -- ·-
was bureaucratised into neutrality as a mobilising concern. The key sensitivities of ethnic 
response became centred around race, political power and economic opportunity and or 
privilege. The issue of Afrikaans is not aligned with these mobilising sensitivities, and 
more importantly, it requires an alternative framework of articulation and rationalisation. 
The Afrikaans language is a non-racial marker. It is shared between a white middle class 
and the poorer sections of the coloured community and very small black communities. It 1s 
not the racial cleavage whi.:h is paramount, however. It is that the key priorities of the 
wider ethnic circle are not where Afrikaans is at. Afrikaans is what one may term a socio-
cultural attribute which is "nice to have"; it is not a "need to have". As a "nice to have" it is 
passionately enjoyed and respected, but its public decline is not "life threatening" within 
Carter Bentley's conception of the ethnic "habitus" ( see earlier). 
For the Afrikaners of the "inner" or core consciousness. Afrikaans is a "need to have", but 
they are divided along other lines. Half or more of the core-consciousness Afrikaners are 
deeply conservative and have an attenuated intellectual leadership. Some are deeply 
conformist in religious orientation and tend to eschew activism of all kinds. Others are 
progressive humanists and "greenish" cultural conservationists for whom Afrikaans is a 
non-racial issue remote from any concern with its bureaucratic downgrading. There is no 
single Bentley-type "habitus" for these disparate social categories -- they live in different 
South Africas. 
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THE MYTH OF ORIGIN AND KINSHIP HAS BEEN COMPROMISED 
In ethnicity myths matter. and to the extent that the Afrikaner myth of kinship was a euro-
centric conception of origin in a continent of high cultures of great antiquity, that myth is 
no longer of any utility as an identity-anchor in strategic public debate. It is deeply 
politically incorrect, and as such embarrasses any Afrikaner who follows the Afrikaans 
press, let alone public television. Today, most of the people who visit the Voortrekker 
Monument are foreign tourists or curious blacks. 
If Afrikaners were poor and exploited these fashionable considerations would not matter. 
Traditional Zulus honour the warrior-king and sub-continental tyrant. Shaka, with great 
enthusiasm, but Afrikaner historical rituals have been sanitised. At a 1998 Day of the 
Covenant ceremony, not long ago the premier ritual occasion for the nationalist faithful, the 
speaker, Professor Fika van Rensburg concluded: "The lime ... ofclosing oflto protect and 
lo nurture, of exclusive prescriptions and of negative. rejecting and self-congratulatory 
Afrikanerdom has passed" (Rapport, 27112/98). Afrikaners changed the name of 
Verwoerdburg to the name of a cricket-ground, and some are busy mobilising support for a 
name change for Pretoria, the capital of Paul Kruger's Republic. to Mandela City. Most 
Afrikaners and English-speaking whites, as post-industrial middle-classes, more than any 
of their compatriots. are captives of global New-Class ideology. 
INSTRUMENT AL LIABILITIES 
Afrikaners have over one-third of the total spendii1g power m South Africa, and with 
coloured Afrikaans-speakers, the language-based spending power could be close to 40 per 
cent. But advertising, jn_ .. f\frik.a,.a,gs is declining ___ ~Q_ayp_l_y_ (k'"larkData database). Most ---------- ~ . . 
Afrikaans companies are recasting their corporate images so as to neutralise impressions of 
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the ethnic connection. Employment Equity legislation; while defensible in the larger 
context, means that an Afrikaans or any white male identity is no advantage and is often a 
liability on the job-market. 
There is still an active nation-wide Afrikaans Chamber of Commerce movement and 
Afrikaans businesses enjoy some of the advantages of networks in business linkages and 
market penetration, but these am typically localised in scope. There are consistent pressures 
on the Afi-ikaanse Handelsinstituut (The Afrikaans Commercial lnstitute) to merge into a 
wider non-racial body. There are very few instrumental reinforcements of the ethnic 
boundary, and more instrumental penalties associated with it. 
THE WEAKNESS OF THE MANAGING AND CONCILIATING FUNCTION 
Esman (1990:55) describes this function: 
"Much olthe energy of ethnic group leaders must ofien he commilled to managing 
and conciliating these internal tensions and conflicts in order to maintain control ... 
and to battling opponents within the ethnic community." 
This was described earlier. following Juteau, as part of the inte1:nal boundary process. In the 
Afrikaans ethnic formation at present this function is not even weak -- as a centrally located 
process it is non-existent. 
The Afrikaner Broederbond, which was the co-ordinating core (see earlier assessments) 
maintained secrecy long after it was necessary, and hence lost accountability within the 
ethnic constituency. It relinquished its early independence of political parties and coalesced 
with the National Party, which meant that when the National Party split or lost votes, the 
Broederbond lost more and more of its overview capacity. 1t played. with other groupings, 
a fairly valuable undercover role in facilitating the readiness to negotiate before the 
transition to open government, but when the negotiations actually occurred it relinquished 
its responsibilities to the National Party cabinet. 
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The Broederbond still exists, now as the Afrikanerbond, and is no longer clandestine, but 
from its attenuated position it has been unable regain any central co-ordinating role in 
respect of the major ethnic issue -- the status of the Afrikaans language. Its current human 
resource capacity is questionable. 
DECOMPOSITION ALMOST COMPLETE 
The collapse of the Afrikaner ethnic enterprise. therefore. bas occurred neatly in terms of ~----all the ethnic rules reviewed in previous sections; from the founding myths and anchors of 
identity through to co-ordinating capacities and both internal and external boundary 
regulations. The case study offers rather complete negative confirmation of the way 
ethnicity works. 
All that is left are the nominal cultural markers. a sense of status loss which is salient at a 
secondary level of priorities and an apparently intensifying but relatively restricted core of 
identity -- the inner layer of consciousness uncovered by the empirical findings. 
12.6 THE FUTURE: REMISSION OR REBIRTH? 
Prediction is hazardous and particularly so in respect of a fluid phenomenon like ethnicity. 
All one can do is to employ techniques of informed speculation in an attempt to 
comprehend the likely variability of the phenomenon in the future. The discussion below 
will claim no more than to explore, tentatively at best the contrasting but realistic 
possibilities which the future might hold in the form of a scenario analysis. The analysis 
will draw liberally but broadly on the propositions on ethnic mobilisation and conflict in 
chapter 3, and in the other theoretical chapters. 
David Lai tin remarks that '1Observers of nalionalism are indeed both mved by its power 
and dumfounded by its ·weakness" (1997: 280). Yet within nationalism the seed of identity 
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has impressed observers with its persistence and tenacity, language-based identity often at 
the forefront. In a review of modem Europe, Lai tin notes that 
"People want to keep their mother tongues alive even if those languages are left 
behind in the worlds of technology and interdependence" ( p280). 
The empirical review m this dissertation has demonstrated that while the political / 
mobilisation of Afrikaners has collapsed, and their boundaries with other minority groups 
are porous, a core of commitment within the group. with language as its critical marker, 
and a sense of threat and loss of status appears to be established and. if anything. gradually 
intensifying. Will this trend continue and build up to a situation in which new ethnic claims 
challenge the state? 
Research in some very broadly similar situations does not provide categorical guidance. 
Fenwick, after studying the historical emergence of French Quebecois regional 
communalism in Canada. contrary to expectations concluded that 
"modernisation. industrialisation and increasing economic integration promote the 
likelihood that nationalist movements will develop among minority communal 
groups" (1981 :215). 
He also demonstrated that despite the structural integration of the over-arching economy, 
the social segmentation between French and English-speakers had not diminished, due in · 
some measure to the cultural division of labour. On the other hand. a similar study of 
Flemish identity in Belgium suggests far more ambiguous processes (Kerremans, 1996). 
Kerremans adduces evidence to suggest that the Flemish rank-and-file are far from being 
overwhelmingly in favour of greater formal and constitutional Flemish autonomy or 
separation in Belgium, although most of the elites and political leaders certainly are. 
Neither the situation of the French in Canada or of the Flemish in Belgium is strictly 
comparable to that of Afrikaners in South Africa today. The major difference is that neither 
French language in Quebec or Flemish in Belgium are any longer µnder any significant 
threat as official regional languages and as languages of fonnal cultural communication. 
One might expect that the Afrikaners, by comparison will become more activated over 
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language rights than the cases above as time goes by, particularly if a popular cultural 
leadership emerges to drive the action. 
On the balance of probabilities, it would seem as if the core language-based ethnic 
commitment among Afrikaners is likely to at least maintain itself at the levels described in 
earlier sections or slowly intensify, all else being equal. A further assumption that one can 
make, all else being equal, is that the broader ethnic amplifier of non-ethnic grievances 
which was identified earlier will continue to create greater alienation among Afrikaners 
than among other minorities 
But all else is seldom equal and we know from the foregoing analysis that the influence of 
state policy and institutions, of wider conditions in the society and of the interaction with 
other groups will have decisive effects on the pursuit of ethnic goals. On the basis of the 
review of literature in chapter 3 and the conclusions in chapter 4, one might sum up the 
hypothetical propensity for remobilisation and activism among Afrikaners as follows: 
Factors predisposing to ethnic action include: 
I. the fact that they have a history of mobilisation: 
2. the severe losses of status and loss of autonomy which have occurred in the 
recent past; 
3. the clear evidence from the empirical studies that they consider the present 
dispensation to be unfair and less than thev consider themselves to be 
entitled to (relative deprivation); 
4. the blocks to legal redress due to the fact that that the constitution and 
legislation rules out any challenge to affirmative action or claims to· a 
restoration of language rights; 
5. the fact that they are "squeezed" in the sense that there is no escape from 
their perceived predicament. They cannot escape their racial identity, which 
means that they would not benefit by submerging their Afrikaner ethnic 
identity. The perception is that the only way of evading their situation is to 
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fall in line with government expectations and align themselves with the 
majority in a position of second-class status. It is perceived by many to be a 
situation in which they are being forced to sacrifice commitment to their 
own ethnic group; 
6. the indication from the literature that ethnic dissent is greatest in situations 
of intermediate "repression" (neither stark authoritarian repression nor the 
scope of action possible in a liberal democracy) is perhaps another factor 
which will predispose to some form of action. 
Factors which hypothetically militate aaainst the prospects for ethnic action include 
the following: 
l. the fact that although gnevances are high. the action-orientation is lower 
than it is among some other groups. hence the intensity of grievances may 
not outweigh perceived penalties and constraints: 
2. the fact that perceived discrimination is not seen to be directed against 
Afrikaners specifically but against whites or minorities in general; 
3. the fact that the wider group, as opposed to the core group, tends to have a 
dual identity which would indicate that a specifically ethnic cause would be 
limited in scope; 
4. the fact that Afrikaner elites are divided and that the coherence of 
organisation has become weakened; 
5. as a relatively prosperous group there is the large disincentive of a lot to 
lose; 
6. the Afrikaners would have few allies if they were to confront the state. 
Furthermore, state appears to be very determined to pursue a nation-building 
approach and most of the media, including the Afrikaans press tends to 
support this approach, as do the many Afrikaners who still work for the state. 
The moral imperatives of the central state may therefore be a very large 
constraint; 
7. there is also the possibility that more time might have to elapse: the literature 
reviewed suggested that overt etlmicity can become latent or submerge for a 
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period while a group and its leaders remobilise and develop a strategic view. 
(See the discussion of the work of Gurr, de Nevers. Williams and others in 
chapter 3.) 
It does seem then that the prospects for some form of remobilisation among Afrikaners are 
very much in balance, and that remobilisation, under present circumstances will not be 
rapid. To assess these prospects in greater detail would require extremely detailed 
investigation of policy and likely future developments in the wider society., well beyond 
the scope of this study. All that can be attempted is to capture m~~jor possibilities in the 
form of broad alternative trends in Afrikaner ethnic mobilisation within the scenario 
analysis below. 
One base of mi.alysis m the scenanos is the internal propensity to remobilise among 
Afrikaners, discussed above. Another base of analysis is the current approach by 
government to minority interests and ethnic claims. Given the ANC government's formal 
and repeated commitments to non•racism, albeit qualified by relatively restrained 
affirmative action, transformation and redistribution policies, one can rule out any naked 
repressive action against Afrikaner cultural interests, or more punitive policies than the 
current stance (see Adam, 1995). Following Giliomee ( 1998) and themes debated in 
Giliomee and Simkins (1999), with own observations added. 1 would describe one of the 
orientations of the current ANC government as one of "responsive hegemony" or perhaps 
even "gentle Jacobinism". 
The term hegemony, in the tradition of Gramsci, is frequently used by the ANC in its own 
communications. as the following recent example illustrates: 
"Our first responsibility in developing an approach to deployment in the present phase 
is to establish what the principal tasks of the revolution are ... Winning hegemony ... 
Our programme of prioritising key centres of power for deployment should there.fore 
continue ... (and) should go hand in hand with the movement having a programme of 
engaging with the institutions we seek to transform - hence the importance . . . of the 
continual mass-presence of the ANC . .. (in) legislatures at all levels. the economy, 
education science and technology, .sports, recreation and culture. mass popular 
organisations and mass communication. 11 (ANC, Cadre Policy and Deployment 
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Strategy, 20, July, 1999) 
This illustration should make it clear that as one of the bases of its policy approach, the 
current government is clearly "centralist" in its philosophy and as such not exactly wedded 
to the principles of "pluralist" or liberal democracy. The composition of the ANC is 
multiplex, and another relevant view in the ANC is what one might describe as "civic 
nationalism". Greenfield ( 1992) uses this term in distinction to that of ethnic nationalism; it 
implies an_ individually-based conception of a national community based on citizenship. 
But the concept of civic nationalism in the case of the ANC is. not surprisingly, coloured 
' 
by the notion that the character of the nation will reflect the fact that it has an African 
majority and an African location. 
In terms of both the centralist-hegemonic and the civic-majoritarian conceptions of the 
national community. the notion of even a degree of autonomy for independent and 
particularistic interests is problematic for the party. It is to its credit. therefore, that in 
practice it has taken the trouble to meet with and listen to the problems of ethnic minorities, 
including meetings with the Afrikaner right-wing Freedom Front. This has been described 
earlier as a "pacification" strategy, and while it may not have been intended as such. that 
has been·its effect. The Leader of the Freedom Front. General Viljoen. has in fact aroused 
the ire of viewpoints within his own circle because of his meetings with the ANC. A 
common view among many Afrikaners is that it is a "heuningkwas" technique (a paintbrush 
dipped in honey) and that it is co-optive and disempowering (Rapport, 15/2/1998). 
The view of government leadership on the place and role of ethnic minorities like 
Afrikaners was lucidly, if diplomatically expressed by President Mbeki in an address to a 
recent gathering of the Afrikanerbond: 
"We should say that a real Afrikaner is a good Afi-ikaner if he is concerned about 
the interests of all the people in the country ... The challenge facing South Africans 
is to ensure that their dffferent cultures, languages and religions cease to make 
them islands unto themselves". 
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This is inviting rhetoric, but, not surprisingly, the Chairman of the Afrikanerbond replied 
that 
"the ahility o/Afi'ikaners to contribute to development would he influenced by the 
degree to which they could continue lo be themselves ... we cannot contribute if we 
are marginalised, i/we are excluded.from puhlic life." (Citizen, 28/7/1999) 
Hence the government and the ANC are firm on the principle of the unity and integration 
of all minorities by way of nation-building, and accept and even respect cultural variety but 
only as a quality of the integration. While firm in its principle that minorities have a 
primary obligation to commit themselves to the nation. the alacrity with which the 
government has at least listened to Afrikaners suggests a degree of flexibility and 
willingness to entertain conciliation within the model. Mbeki announced recently that he 
would establish a division in his office for the protection of minority rights. 
As bases for the further analysis, both the consc10usnesses among Afrikaners and the 
approach of the government to minority issues will vary with the scenarios which will be 
developed below. ln developing the scenarios l have drawn heavily on my own regular 
monitor of the political environment of the economy for the South African Council of 
Business (SACOB/Schlemmer, 1996-1999) and a very comprehensive recent policy 
analysis by the Centre for Development and Enterprise (Bernstein et al. 1999). It should be 
noted that while the real world is always more than a little untidy. the approach of scenario 
construction requires that outcomes be distinctive or even polarised in order to best 
illustrate the underlying dynamics (see Peter Schwartz. 1991 ). Among many possible 
outcomes, the more probable scenarios which crystallise are the following: 
l. CONSOLIDATION: present policies with regard to cultural and racial minorities 
continue, average levels of economic growth improve on their present mediocre 
levels and hence ensure reasonable per-capita income grow1h. and on the strength of 
increased fiscal resources, the coherence and effectiveness of state administration and 
security control also improves gradually. The demand for skills allows racial equity 
policies and affirmative action for blacks to be pursued without undue constraints on 
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opportunities for minorities. The grievances of minorities tend to subside gradually, 
and core Afrikaans concerns are supported less and less by wider minority grievances 
and disaffection. The government is under decreasing pressure to address minority 
issues and Afrikaans ethnic and language interests. while not discredited, are 
sidelined. 
2. CONCESSIONS AND CONCILA TION: econo1111c recovery 1s not sustained and 
socio-economic grievances among minorities persists. The state experiences ongoing 
capacity problems and both the efficiency of state administration and the 
effectiveness of the security system is compromised. Because these capacity 
problems deepen grievances and lower investor confidence. the economy deteriorates 
further and all the problems are drawn into a self-remforcing downward spiral. 
Recognising that there is a risk of serious disaffection among minorities, the 
government, within its current policy framework in respect of language. cultural and 
group rights, initially makes cosmetic and ameliorative gestures to minorities and to 
Afrikaners, but has to give greater attention to the mounting problems besetting the 
black majority. While it resists populist pressures. it has to increase its clientelism 
and patronage to the emerging black middle class to prevent divisions in the ANC 
support base. 
3. DEFENSIVE REACTION: the econom1c, governance and security scenarios are 
negative as in 2 above, and as above the deterioration tends to be self-reinforcing. 
Instead of attempting any conciliation of minority grievances. the government, fearful 
of the precedents which might be created and under pressure from radical viewpoints 
within its alliance with the South African Communist Party and the labour 
movement reacts defensively and attempts to discredit or intimidate minority 
protests. At the same time it has to deal with dissent of a non-ethnic kind on a wider 
basis as well. The overall coherence of the ANC begins to deteriorate and tendencies 
towards authoritarianism emerge. 
If scenario 1 (CONSOLIDATION) or something like it materialises. given leadership 
divisions and the disparate strategic consciousness among Afrikaners, the sheer variety of 
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reactions to the political and economic environment will ensure broad continuity with the 
present. The credibility of the stance supporting a civic nationalism and an individual 
rights-based political culture will solidify. The scope of intense core commitment among 
Afrikaners will remain small and may even shrink. although the intensity of the 
commitment at the core might deepen very gradually over time. Afrikaners at large are 
likely to begin to resemble a minority linguistic category rather than an organised ethnic 
group. The strength and spread of the language as a private medium will shrink for a 
protracted period awaiting a rebirth at some much later stage if and when the political 
culture in the country become more accommodating of diversity and pluralism. (In other 
words Afrikaans may follow the route of Friesian or Welsh identity for a long while.) 
No major dissent could be expected even from the core group of Afrikaners because the 
disincentive of improving state security capacity and the fact that so many of the members 
will have so much to lose will ensure compliance. 
If scenario 2 (CONCESSION AND CONCILATION) were to emerge. a process of re-
mobilisation of Afrikaners could commence, with far-reaching possibilities. Restricted 
economic opportunity and affirmative action for blacks will make more leadership talent 
available to the group. The protest consciousness within the core and the wider group will 
re-socialise people in the course of everyday interaction (see ""habitus·' in the previous 
sections) and the scope of core commitments will broaden. If and when a more overt ethnic 
protest consciousness emerges, it will be likely to enjoy moral support from the wider non-
core Afrikaner group, from English-speaking whites and from black and coloured minority 
language groups as well. 
The conciliation attempts of government will probably be to offer a more substantive 
"multiculturalism", perhaps resembling the Australian model or in the form of special 
cultural councils, a charter of language rights and guarantees of the language-integrity of 
Afrikaans schools and universities. Such gestures wiii perhaps pacify many Afrikaners but 
will also increase the confidence and sense of opportunity among the more ethnically-
committed core Afrikaners. as well as that among other minorities. For this reason and 
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because of mounting socio-economic grievances, the concessions will not satisfy the rising 
expectations and the sense of being relatively deprived . 
. The mam stimulus, however, will be the sense of emergrng possibilities for self-
determination, which will encourage more trenchant demands. Multi-cultural policy will 
tend to lurch from precedent to precedent, and it could very well become elaborated to . 
include elements of consociation in the form of devolution. like a small self-governing 
Volkstaat, or areas of limited local self-determination either on a geographic basis or more 
probably resembling the formal spheres of autonomy for minorities in the old Austro-
Hungarian Empire. -- the policies of the Austro-Marxists like Karl Renner (see Hanf, 1994; 
Ra anan et al J 991) While there will be a risk that the progression to more substantive 
forms of multiculturalism will lead to the break-up of the state. there would be an equal 
chance that the country could stabilise and rebuild as a territorial and non-territorial 
federation. 
One proviso would apply. however -- the devolution could not be on racial. lines, because 
that would alienate so many interests within the ANC that generalised instability or 
counter-mobilisation could well result. Hence any form of devolution would have to 
involve coalitions of minorities in local areas or in regions -- an interest in such coalitions 
has already begun to emerge in the Afrikaner right-wing movement. 
The third scenario (DEFENSIVE REACTION) is the least predictable and the most 
disturbing. If in a deteriorating socio-economic situation, the government toughens up and 
rejects protests, proposals and appeals, it could lead to deterioration in the quality of the 
democracy to the point that special security measures are introduced. This, however, will 
occur at a point when the security capacity is also compromised and demoralised. The stage 
could be set for a widening potential for general instability. 
The current mobilisation and consciousness among Afrikaners is not such that they are 
likely to take the initiative; it is far more likely to emerge in marginal areas of the country 
among black language and tribally-based ethnic categories like the former Transkei or 
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traditional parts of KwaZulu-Natal and the Northern Province. where militant mobilised 
factions already commit violence from time-to-time. Under the conditions described, events 
such as these, with a burgeoning of protest consciousness among right-wing core Afrikaans 
groupings, a mobilised form of Afrikaner dissent could follow. There are well-armed hard 
men who are very quiet at the moment but they could come to the fore very readily (the 
Mail and Guardian gives an interesting example: 25/9/1998). Current mobilisation against 
affirmative action by the right-wing Afrikaans-based Mineworkers Union is also 
suggestive, and it serves to underline the points made by Johnston ( 199 l) about the utility 
of trade-union organisation within ethnic movements. 
Such developments could all lead to a situation of national fragmentation which is currently 
typical in large parts of the rest of the Southern African sub-region. but it could lead to 
earlier negotiations and trade-offs, with an outcome like that suggested for scenario 2. If the 
government tries to enforce central control and persists in attempts to discredit minority-
based movements, the initial response among Afrikaners will be typical of that described 
by Gurr as "conspiracy'' ( 1970:341-343 passim). 
Gurr distinguishes between three forms of instability: generalised and formless "turmoil", 
internal war, and conspiracy. The latter occurs when dissidents are a narrowly-based 
formation, but with high levels of discontent among its elites and with effective resources 
and leadership, amidst a wider constituency which is non-mobilised and divided. 
The state has capacity and loyalty problems in 1111posmg coercive controls. As the 
conspirators achieve successes, elements in the wider constituency start to give strategic or 
moral support and an ethnic movement emerges or re-emerges. 
Hence the outcome could be that of devolution along the lines of scenario but the extent 
of eventual concessions by the state could be more far-reaching. in constitutional terms. 
Once again, however, the Afrikaner core movement \Vill need cross-racial "'bodyguards" to 
fend off black mass counter-reaction, and the devolution is likely to be to the benefit of 
multi-race coalitions or regional arrangements. 
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Isak de Villiers, the former editor of the Afrikaans newspaper Rapp rt who was quoted 
earlier on the reasons for the current decomposition of Afrikaner nationalism, also 
predicted very firmly that circumstances would arise that would eventually lead to a 
Volkstaat. Perhaps he had scenarios 2 or 3 in mind. Economic growth with its implication 
of increased state capacity and opportunities for the economic co-optation of minorities 
would be the most secure guarantee that scenario l wi 11 materialise. Even the best of 
macro-economic management cannot ensure a dynamic economy. however. because of 
chronically low savings rates in the South African economy and the ever-present danger of 
emerging market contagion in a globalised world. 
There might be a view that one outcome has been overlooked in the assessment of the 
future. This outcome would be a variant on the picture of consolidation and integration 
which was presented under scenario l. The view might be that an alternative to both the 
latency or remission of Afrikaner ethnicity under a powerfully integrating state project and 
the alternative of ethnic contestation, exists in the form of democratic multiculturalism, 
without any devolution of power. within a benign consensus which would both preserve the 
coherence of the civic nationalism and the viability of ethnic cultures and languages. 
The Economist (23/9/1995:21-25) is eloquent on this possibility: 
"The trick in a successful (multi-ethnic) society isfbr minority citizens to feel that 
they are more than one thing at once: to be able to feel American and black. 
Scottish and British. an Orthodox Christian and a Bosnian. a _Muslim and an 
Indian. This is hard and it is easier for anyone seeking a po;,11er-hase to make it 
harder still ... But people will resist such appeals ?f it seems worthwhile to them. 
There are ideas that people value as they value hlood and earth. ·· 
This poss.ibility is the heartfelt wish of many Afrikaner intellectuals who try to balance a 
pride in culture with an endorsement of the civic nationalism of the ANC. It is the public 
stance of most foreign diplomats in the country and it is the spirit that moves the cultural 
desk of the ANC provided that methods are in place to ensure that the whole project is 






recommendations for South Africa. The student of South Africa. Theo Hanf has suggested 
some form of "ideological .syncretism"-- voluntary affiliation to non-racial cultural 
groupings coexisting with a consensus on national unity and democratic majoritarianism 
(Hanf, 1989: 112). 
No doubt this kind ofresolution has been secured in many places for long periods of time -
the United Kingdom would be an example in respect of the Welsh and the Scots until fairly 
recently, and in many ways it is the basis for the accommodation of ethnicity in the USA. 
The tough question, however, is whether or not it can survive in a system of ranked 
ethnicity, and in systems in which demographic imbalances correlate with voting trends and 
executive power to exclude minorities from effective political participation on a long-term 
basis? Is it not a system which is only likely to work or survive in pluralist democracies 
where the ethnic members have little sense of relative deprivation as groups and a rough 
equilibrium of power ensures that nobody feels politically excluded? 
Multiculturalism in majority-controlled unitary states has a very poor track record in 
Africa, and Crawford Young argues that it has been the basis for the emergence of open or 
disguised second-class citizenship (Young, 1997:4-14) But this type of.accusation has been 
levelled even in developed societies. Human rights-based individualism and liberal 
democracy can be an arrangement which is most advantageous for privileged majority-
based elites, and one in which the lack of communal rights leaves ethnic minorities in a 
situation of legitimated powerlessness. Charles Taylor is well-known for his depiction of 
this kind of situation as a case of "democratic exclusion"(l 998: I 44-156). A universal-
human rights tradition promoted by the progressive upper-middle classes of an 
economically or politically-dominant majority can serve to obscure. and protect their own 
implicit ethnicity, quite as successfully as implicit ethnicity can be obscured in situations of 
authoritarian majority dominance. The British author Geoff Dench. partly on the basis of an 
examination of the situation of the Maltese and other minorities in the UK, has made a 
compelling analysis of the ironic contradictions and protective mechanisms within a , 
progressive nation dedicated to individual liberty and human rights (Dench, 1986). Even an 
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author who works in the Parliamentary office of the ANC, after a study of a Zulu ethnic 
festival, has concluded that: 
"As South Africa attempts to consolidate its Jemocrw,y . .. it will have to try to 
reinvent pluralism, eschewing the indifference to difference which is the norm of 
established liberal democracies." ( Mathieson and Attwell. 1998: 122) 
Yet, one dare not rush to discredit civic consciousness and the universal goals of liberal 
democracy. Ralf Dahrendorf. in outlining a general view on democracy. correctly observes 
that "The constitution of" liberty worh, then. to the extent to which a society is dominated 
hy public virtues." (Dahrendorf, 1967:30) He contrasts the public or civic consciousness of 
Britain with the deeply romantic and ultimately lethal ethnic consciousness of pre-war 
Germany. This truth, and the truths of community. identity and familiarity, are all 
enriching, and al I can be exploited. One can only hope that somewhere between South 
Africa's futures, a resolution may be found. 
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